The Sidqi regime in Egypt, 1930-1935 : New perspectives. by Abul-Fadl, Mona Mohamed Abdel-Monem
THE SIDQI REGIME IN EGYPT (1930 - 1935)
NEW PERSPECTIVES
by
MONA MOHAMED ABDEL-MONEM ABUL-FADL
Thesis submitted for 
Doctor of Philosophy 
of London, School of 
Studies.
the degree of 





INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest
ProQuest 10672851
Published by ProQuest LLC(2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
2ABSTRACT
This study focuses on statesmanship in Egypt in 
the early thirties. Following another of the periodic 
clashes between King Fuad and the Waf d , Sidqi was summoned 
to lead an emergency government. This time the constitu-" 
tional crisis was complicated by the effects of a World 
Depression and attended by Egypt's partial recovery of 
its fiscal autonomy. Effective government was urgently 
needed then. Sidqi's background qualified him for the 
task which he assumed with architectonic vision and 
determination.
Rising above his immediate difficulties;, Sidqi 
transformed the crisis into an opportunity to create 
institutions which would buttress Egypt's independence. 
Convinced that excesses threatened that independence, 
and that imbalance underlay the compound crisis , he re­
instated a dynamic equilibrium which accomodated growth to 
stability . His immediate priority was to adapt parlia­
mentary life to the Egyptian situation and develop the 
latter to make it more conducive to the former. Thus, 
he re-organised the Administration, amended the Constitu­
tion and instituted a government which combined effective­
ness with representativeness. At the same time he implemented 
a protectionist policy to stimulate and diversify the 
economy. Perceiving the inter-dependence between structural 
and institutional change, he launched an energetic campaign 
to cultivate compatible public attitudes and values.
Preaching by example, he inspired his followers and sub­
ordinates to follow suit.
3Throughout, he coped with the principal political 
forces on the scene. With force and guile he contained 
his opponents and handled the British High Commissioner 
and the King dextrously. This enabled him to retain 
power long enough to institute his basic reforms.
Although he succeeded in his immediate objectives, 
the same background which qualified him for success 
combined with objective factors to undermine its consoli­
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6NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
& SOURCES
For familiar proper. - names I have used the English spelling in 
common usage at the time. Hence, Ismail Sidqi* Mohamed Said, Saad 
Zaghlul, Mustafa Kamel etc. Elsewhere, in transliterating Arabic words,
I have generally conformed to the method adopted in the Encylopaedia of 
Islam, with slight variations.
The telegraphic and confidential correspondence exchanged between 
the High Commissioner and the Foreign Office is found in a limited series 
of indexed volumes on the Egyptian political situation and are easily 
accessible.(FO M-07) I have therefore confined my reference generally to 
the c! ocument itself. Where relevant minutes and enclosures are found 
in the confidential despatch, which are not included in the confidential 
print, I have indicated the document in its original volume in the General 
Correspondence.
Sidqi1s speeches and public addresses of a given date are generally 
found in the Ahram or the Sha*b of the following date. L1Egypte Indust- 
rielle has been my source for his more specialised addresses and his 
talks in the forties.
A select bibliography is included at the end of the study in which 
the cited primary sources are listed and, where necessary, briefly annot­
ated. Primary1 here refers to the source material as well as to the way 
I have used it, so that where I have consulted technically primary material 
without citing it, I have listed that in my secondary sources. The latter 
includes works referred to in the body of the thesis as well as a selection 
of others which though not used directly in a study drawing essentially 
on primary material, have nonetheless, been influential upon it or closely 
relevant to it. In listing them, I am acknowledging both this relevance 
and influence.
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INTRODUCTION
This study is an attempt to deal with part of a controversy which 
surrounds a statesman and a regime, both of which have long been lost between 
the frailties of bias and neglect. By exploring different aspects of each 
in a fresh perspective it hopes to shed a light on an episode and a figure 
that are central to an understanding of contemporary Egyptian history and 
politics. The relevance of this attempt is heightened at this moment by 
its coincidence with the centenary of Ismail Sidqi Pasha (June 1875-July 1950).
Sidqi assumed the premiership of Egypt at two critical junctures: 
the first during the inter-War period (June 1930 - September 1933) and, the 
second, almost Immediately after the War (February-December 1946). Each 
of his terms in office was beset with a host of problems and, in each, he 
assumed his challenge with a self-confidence that was only matched by an 
equal will and determination. In both instances, he established his claim to 
statesmanship and yet, in the annals of contemporary Egypt, his role has 
scarcely been acknowledged. Here, it is the first of his two terms in office 
which will be examined. For all his difficulties in 1946, he was, at least, 
working within an established framework of political order whose basic 
legitimacy was not contended by the main political parties on the scene.
In contrast, Sidqi came to power in 1930 at a moment when the political 
balance was completely undermined and he had not only to steer a government, 
but also to found and impose a regime, almost single-handed in the face 
of imminent Insurrection. This provides a ready field for exploring the 
creative and architectonic aspects of his statesmanship.
The historical setting of the enquiry adds to its topical relevance 
in some ways too. The turn of the thirties brought with it its own challenge 
with the onslaught of an economic depression of unprecedented severity 
on the one hand, and the rise of fascist regimes and -movements on the 
European continent on the other. Both developments threatened a long- 
established order of production and prosperity in the West and undermined 
the tenets of a liberal philosophy which had dominated the turn of the century. 
Events though localised in origin, reverberated beyond and the test of states­
manship came to lie in its ability to grapple with their consequences. Egypt
was one of the foresmost.geopolitical outposts to feel the effect of 
developments beyond its borders as It was bound through its cotton trade 
to international markets and through its aspiring secular elite to European 
culture, while its political connections with Britain and the Capitulatory 
powers sealed these links. In addition, Egypt possessed Its own stock of 
domestic problems which were complicated by the onsetting repercussions of 
outside events and the problems with which statesmanship had to contend were 
accordingly made more difficult. The challenge to statesmanship at this 
juncture here In Egypt, as elsewhere, was great.
At this point some similarities between the ’thirties and the 
'seventies could be drawn. Just as today inflation affects all countries 
without discrimination, few countries could escape the rigours of the 
Depression in 1930. Economic preoccupations dominated then as they do now 
and the ability to grapple with the problems of political economy provides 
the measure of statesmanship in both eras. It is perhaps, worth recalling 
that while Egypt bore its common share of international problems at the time 
under Ismail Sidqi it also presented its model of statesmanship. Sidqi 
proclaimed his dictum that " economic policy constitutes the heart of 
politics". By doing so, he introduced a radical and timely conception of 
power which brought with it a much needed element of realism into the 
Egyptian political setting.
The rise of a regime headed by a strong and determined figure 
however, sounded a regressive note that drew Egypt away from the orbit of 
the democracies and brought it nearer developments elsewhere, such as Spain, 
Italy and the Balkans. In the spectrum of national politics, the advent of 
Sidqi was reminiscent of two previous palace coups which had already, in the 
brief span of parliamentary life in the country- threatened a fragile 
experiment. Being the third in a series of such setbacks, the regime has 
hitherto received scarcely any attention on Its own and its uniqueness is 
lost beneath a welter of superficial historical parallelism. In the eyes 
of the nationalist historian, it was merely another setback to the 
national movement. With the political debacle compounded by the effect 
of the Depression, an era of vital developments in the history of an 
emergent sovereign country is further shrouded in a haze of blackness, 
Prejudice and neglect.
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Other sides of the picture may yet deserve exploring. For the 
political historian there was the timely convergence of a number of factors 
which lend the Regime a uniqueness and entitle it to examination in its 
own right. The presence in government at that moment of a man of strong, 
independent views, backed by a long and distinctive political and admin­
istrative experience, and who was moreover, a veteran of the nationalist 
movement, coincided with the presence at the Residency of a High Commissioner 
who championed an unprecedented course in Anglo-Egyptian policy. This 
coincidence gave a peculiar turn to the course of political events as, for 
the first time, Egypt was ruled by a man who, more than any of his predecessors, 
knew his own mind and was determined to have his way, while he was fortunate 
enough- to be supported by an equally intent and idealistic High Commissioner 
who was prepared to stand back and let an Egyptian statesman act. This 
convergence occurred at a historical juncture which reinforced its conseq­
uences* as the advent of a statesmanship fundamentally oriented towards 
economic questions coincided with a significant turn in economic developments 
in Egypt. Consequently, any unqualified identification of the regime that 
emerged in 19 30 with its formal precursors in 1925 and 1928 would seem facile. 
If, in addition, it could be suggested that the distinctiveness of the 
Regime owed at least as much to statesmanship as to the mere fortuitous 
combination of circumstances, then it would be reasonable to assume the 
enquiry from the standpoint of statesmanship.
Statesmanship, by definition, assumes knowledge, skill and expertise 
in conducting public affairs. It entails the pursuit of a resolute and 
purposeful activity which is exerted upon events, or upon other wills.
This engages it in a constant mental and physical endeavour to control, 
influence or mould the fortunes of the state and^ in the course of its 
exercise, a conflict of political wills, and a clash with events, becomes 
inevitable. The Regime which emerged in Egypt in 1930 was the outcome of 
this confrontation rather than a simple expression of the will and ideals 
of a statesman.
This Regime was formally consecrated in the 19 30 Constitution and 
it continued uninterrupted until the end of 1934, when it was legally 
abrogated. For practical purposes , the period of transition which 
.continued until the restoration of the 1923 Constitution in December 1935,
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constitutes an extension of the RegimeNor its aftermath. The period 
between 1930-1935 thus presents a neatly defined one stretching in a 
solid, homogeneous six-year span. Sidqi himself, however, having laid 
the foundations of the Regime and presided, in part, over the beginning 
of its dissolution, left the helm of affairs in September 1933. The 
remaining year of its life saw its steady perversion into the palace 
regime in which it ended. The present essay confines itself to the 
earlier phases of the Regime rather than the later ones and to Sidqi in 
office^rather than to Sidqi in Opposition.
This focal restriction partly conditions the approach as it 
postulates an architectonic statesmanship and enquires into the attempt 
to lay the foundations of institutions. Conversely, the scope of the 
enquiry is defined and comparatively restricted; it is neither the 
British High Commissioner, nor the Depression, nor the Regime itself 
which outlasted its author that, are its objects. To the extent, 
however, that the Regime was the product of statesmanship it constitutes 
a relevant area for enquiry. Similarly, to the extent that the Depression 
was a challenging factor and the British High Commissioner and British policy 
were unavoidable elements in a situation in which the statesman was 
striving to promote the ground for stability and prosperity, they equally 
constitute relevant areas for study.
The Regime emerges at the crossroads of a social and political 
evolution, presides over an era of crisis and transition and endures long 
enough to consolidate embryonic traits and impress its existence on the 
national psyche.
Apart from its uniqueness, the integrality of the Regime to 
the historical whole of the Egyptian setting constitutes one of its essen­
tial characteristics. Despite its ephemerality • ■' its timely emergence, 
progression and recession, it was no superfluous incident that possesses 
little meaning or relevance outside its own narrow confines. Nor was it 
an isolated ’accident’ in the political history of Egypt, whose submer­
gence by events merely served to underline its insignificance and incon­
sequence. It had, on the contrary, flowed just as naturally out of the 
mainstream of Egyptian political evolution as it later fused with the 
subsequent flow of that mainstream. In its emergence, it reflected the 
social and political forces out of which it grew; its submergence left
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its subtle legacies behind^which it bequeathed, not necessarily to its 
specific successors but to the generality of Egyptian political evolu­
tion. The Regime partly derived', its significance from its * historicity * 
Its emergence was related to a particular constellation of forces in 
convolution at that historical moment and it contributed , in turn, to 
their evolution.
Part of the quest here is for an intrinsic .element in a historical 
evolution which is conditioned by a complexity of elements. It is 
neither the passive reflections contained in the Regime which are sought, 
nor the Regime as a reflection of an era of transition - a refraction 
of a prism. The search is for a creative dimension which could be 
attributed to the political process,the essence of which lies in a 
conscious human activity. It matters little whether It is rational or 
otherwise, or whether it Is conditioned by forces outside its realm, or 
whether it ultimately reflects the tension between human wills and their 
limitations or their obstruction by objective forces which present the 
constant challenge to the political will. These are considerations that 
can hardly detract from the principle of political activity or -‘irob it of 
its creativity.
This aspect of the enquiry Into the historicity of the Regime, 
however relevant, is only incidental and marginal to the principal 
quest. The Regime itself, approached from the vantage point of an 
architectonic statesmanship , remains its central theme.
Leadership provides a convenient conceptual point of departure 
in approaching a political regime on more than one count. If politics 
could partly be conceived as a will to power, it is the will of indivi­
duals which ultimately provides the subject of the power struggle. Even 
where such a struggle is perceived as a conflict between opposing and 
rival forces, the drama is acted out by the representatives of these 
forces, whether they are isolated individuals or collective, organised 
groups of such individuals. Perhaps, however, the single major justi­
fication for the leadership focus of the enquiry here may lie In the 
individualist, personalised nature of Egyptian politics. In the absence 
of dominant institutions and in the quicksands of ideological uncertain­
ties and disorientation, the individual, for all his capriciousness and
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inconsistencies, becomes the only solid certainty capable of dominating, 
even momentarily,the stage of events.
Conversely, if politics may be conceived as a version of purpose­
ful and meaningful activity, leadership becomes an even more tangible 
focus for an enquiry into a political regime. For then politics is no 
longer solely a concentric and consecutive sequence °f power struggle 
entailing the conflict of rival wills among infinistmal dwarfs seeking to 
establish their hegemony and to -.satisfy an insatiable craving that 
ultimately becomes its own justification. In the leadership/statesman­
ship perspective, politics ceases to be the sterile Ttour de force’ , 
as the will to power is destined to serve ends - whether material goals 
in the form of personal or group interests or goals in the form of 
sectional or collective ideals.
One of the substantial features which contributes to the unique­
ness of the Sidqi Regime lies in the advent to power of a statesman who 
possessed both a mature conception of the ends of political power as 
well as the will to apply his conception. Moreover, this coincidence 
of the conception with the situation in Egypt in 1930 served to lend 
a sense of direction to politics in circumstances that inclined towards 
general disorientation and confusion.
Historically, the types of government in Egypt since the inception 
of parliamentary life in 192L1- could be identified in the following :
(a) those Wafdist dominated, (b) the Palace variety, (c) coalition 
governments and (d) "caretaker" governments. * The last were 
essentially administrative bridges to pave the way for one of the pre­
ceding variants,while the coalition governments on the other hand, 
involved the intervention of the British to bring them about. There 
thus remained the two ’standing’ variants of regime-types, the one - 
dominated by the palace and the other by the Wafd. Apparently, the 
criterion here is whether they were imposed from above by the monarch or .■ 
hailed from the people below. The fact that neither King nor people
* This classification is suggested in a Foreign Office memorandum 
drafted by the Head of the Egyptian Department, Mr. J.Murray on 5.7.1930. 
FO 371/14616.
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qualified in the prevailing Egyptian situation for absolute sovereignty 
should, however, be emphasised. While the monarch was tethered to the 
British will, which exercised its effective constraints, the people were 
in effect constrained in their freedom , not merely by the objective factors 
common to the average under-developed situation ( ignorance, poverty, etc.), 
but also by a hypnotism induced by their obsession with a charismatic figure 
and a popular idea. Consequently, while the constraints on the monarch 
may have mitigated the likelihood of arbitrary power, those binding the 
people were of a nature to foster arbitrariness.
Alternatively, some normative criterion may be sought to clas­
sify regimes to some advantage from a practical point of view. Here a 
distinction-; is suggested between regime^types dominated by an administra­
tive set of values and others dominated by a political set of values. 
Classifying the types of government which, emerged in Egypt since the 
inception of parliamentary life accordingly becomes more meaningful and 
relevant. On the one hand, an element of historical continuity is main­
tained and, on the other, the reality of change and divergence is taken into, 
account. Governments dominated by the administrative penchant may find an 
affinity with those which existed prior to the parliamentary era and could 
well compare more generally with the colonial model. In contrast, Wafdist 
governments under Zaghlul and Nahas accentuate the switch to political 
priorities and the advent of the first Wafdist Government in 1924 may be 
of some revolutionary significance proclaiming as it did the inauguration 
of a new era of politics. Conversely,while the non-Wafdist variety of 
governments maintain a common denominator in their greater inclination 
towards the administratively orientated type, they could still be distinq 
guished from one another by the varying combination of the two basic 
dimensions. The extreme administrative type may be found in the ’care­
taker’ variety, like Adlyis in 1926 and 1929, while the palace-Govern- 
ment under Ziwar, following the resignation of the Liberals in 1925, and 
under Yahia in 1933-34 may be seen to have shifted the administrative 
spectrum away to a variant of the political. The coalition governments 
which emerged under Adly and then Sarwat in 1926 and 1927 contrived a 
greater balance between the political and the administrative. However, 
as this contrived balance was not a spontaneous development in prevailing 
circumstances, it needed the manipulating influence of an external agent.
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In this analysis, the Sidqi Regime may be conceived as an attempt 
to marshall the elements of the Egyptian political setting towards an indig­
enous equation. It strove partly to impose and partly to evolve a measure 
of harmony between the two sets of priorities. While the last Wafdist 
Government could have conceivably evolved towards a measure of such an 
equilibrium, in its own terms and in a slow circuitou'S" manner, this could 
have been ill-afforded by the situation then. Sidqi consciously strove to 
bring about that balance, with a deliberate administrative bias, but equally 
with a calculated political intent. How he sought to achieve this end and 
create his own sources of political support in the process, constitutes an 
aspect of his statesmanship which is considered in the principal enquiry.'
Statesmanship was not, however, operating in a conceptual void 
any more than it was acting in a contextual vacuum. Sidqi believed that 
a solid social and economic middle ground provided the sole guarantee for 
a stable middle ground politics, which was in turn the pre-requisite for 
progress. He saw, moreover, the creative minority as the driving force 
behind such progress and the presence of adequate institutions enabled it 
to assume its role. The reality he perceived around him though was quite 
different.
In the Egyptian context, the extremes were epitomised in the Wafd 
versus the monarch spectrum. The first represented a decadent minority 
whose ability to beguile the crowd and appeal to its primitive instincts 
exhausted its genius, time and energy and exposed its mediocrity. Its 
sole .claim to rule rested on a numerical majority and the contention that 
superiority resided in quantity shocked the more delicate senses. The 
grave responsibilities of government called on a fund of morality and 
wisdom, practical knowledge and experienced faculties. The will to powe'r 
was no justification for its command. It was a travesty to assume that 
the most complex of all tasks, the gravest and most far-reaching in its 
consequences should be left to individual frailties and mass fantasies, 
at the command of passion and ignorance. Competence and reason alone
could adequately justify a will to power. The perverse oligarchy estab­
lished itself in power by exploiting the ignorance and the passion of the 
crowd and by intimidating and tyrannising the erudite and competent 
into silence and submission. The government was'geared to serving the
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personal interests of its glib partisans on the one hand and gate-ring to 
the whims of the masses on the other. Responsibility was denigrated and 
eroded; chaos was imminent in such conditions, as it could neither itself 
provide for progress, nor could it ensure the conditions for such progress.
The objection to the other extreme was equally a rejection in 
principle as one born out of historical experience. Autocracy may be 
benevolent or otherwise, but in either case its weakness lay in its 
arbitrariness and unpredictability, neither of which provided for a 
durable basis for that stability which was conducive to progress. In its 
widest implications, the monarchy as a hereditary institution and as a 
symbol of national power could be congenial to stability, but it was 
pernicious in modern civilisation if it meant that the complex affairs of . 
the State were to be left to the monarch’s personal power and to a handful 
of courtiers and palace officials, accountable to no one but' their Royal 
Master, whose final arbiter was more often his passion rather than his 
wisdom. Palace government ensured neither competence nor progress; the 
country was, in fact, managed as a private estate - the King’s - and the 
spoils were shared among those who could play on Royal caprice and seduce his 
wisdom where that was cultivated.
At both ends of the spectrum, the monarch and the crowd, govern­
ment was an arbitrary affair. In one case, the locus of power was 
definable, located in a supreme individual; in the other, it was vague, 
residing in an anonymous mass. In both cases, effective power was in the 
hands of a skilfull and unscrupulous minority, regardless of its respective . 
characteristics: as in the one they may be the wealthy, in the other the 
propertyless. In the one case, they would prey on the monarch to augment 
their wealth, the very preservation of which was dependent on the continu­
ation of his good-will; and in the other, they would use power to create 
their individual fortunes. Power was personalised, not only in its exercise, 
but also in its use. In both extremes, arbitrariness and personalism were 
factors of dissipation and instability. The history of nineteenth century 
Egypt under the Mohamed Ali dynasty bore testimony to the dangers under­
lying the potential achievements under that form of government, while the 
brief interludes under the Wafd more recently, pointed to the dangers inherent 
in the other. Both forms of government - for convenience, the "Monarchical” 
and the ’'Republican" - may, however, possess their virtues in principle.
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The defined locus in the one emphasised the principle of action and 
accomplishment. Theidiffusion in the other, symbolised accountability 
to the whole. The fact that an absolutist ethos predominated in both 
defeated their respective purposes. The remedy to excess lay in moderation.
The sound institutionalisation of power was a guarantee that 
moderation would prevail. It entrusted power to a creative minority which 
was, by definition, both competent and responsible. It equally retained 
the virtue of action without violating the mores of accountability. Above 
all, it depersonalised power and stabilised it. This depersonalisation of 
power rendered it more amenable to regulation and control and so-endowing 
it with the elements of stability and engendering that environment conducive 
to progress. The creation of adequate institutions ultimately ensured that 
the minority which ruled was eligible for its task and that it exercised 
power rationally. Sidqi*s search for an indigenous solution to the problems 
of sharing and exercising power was essentially conducted in this perspective.
The enquiry begins by casting the Regime in general perspectives, 
first -of its author, or architect, and next of its emergence and development 
in the context of the power struggle. With the British integral to the 
peculiar Egyptian power-setting at the time, a glimpse will be shed on 
the internal aspect of the Anglo-Egyptian Question. Perspectives aside, 
the transition from the whole to the part occurs during the enquiry into the 
consolidation of authority, where the examination of SidqiTs leadership 
in a national spectrum comprises elements of both a macro-level analysis 
and a micro-level one. At this point, the structural pivot of the general 
enquiry is meant to.coincide with its focal contention regarding the 
creative dimension of statesmanship. The sequence explores the substance 
of the architectonic endeavour, first by considering the political institu- u 
tiohs which emerged under the Regime to provide the framework for political 
activity and, next, by examining the goals and trends of such activity in 
the policies which were launched. Throughout, the focus is on principles 
and practice as in the former instance,the conception of a new executive 
is postulated and its development is pursued in the course of two conflict­
ing trends which governed its evolution. In the latter part of the essay, 
the goal of a more balanced and viable national economy is postulated; here
the protectionist pursuits and the trend towards rationalisation are 
the : two main themes.' _
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In the absence of an adequate political history of the period and 
of the institutions of the Sidqi Regime, it has been necessary to contour 
historical developments and spotlight aspects of these' institutions. Through­
out, however, it is not the political history of the period which is the 
primary object of the enquiry, but it is the role of statesmanship. Thus, 
it is the retention of power, its institutionalisation, its exercise and 
its goals that provide the heart of this political essay. Part of the test 
of statesmanship is sought in its political agility and in its effort to 
grapple with adversity to promote its ends. How far it was able to impose 
itself upon the setting in which it acted, and how far it was compelled to 
drift with the current and to what extent it became dominated by forces beyond 
its control, constitutes a central theme throughout the presentation.
Despite its dynamic component, the choice of statesmanship as a focal 
point for the enquiry disposes it towards a static plane. An attempt has^ 
therefore^been made to accomodate the temporal dimension as well. At certain 
points, this Is explicit, as in Chapter IV, where the object of the enquiry 
is treated on two distinct levels, first that of the architectonics of power, 
where fundamental principles are sought in the new institutions, and next, 
on the evolutionary plane where discernible trends are pursued. Elsewhere, 
however, the'distinction is left implicit, as in Chapter II, in examining 
the role of the British factor in the rise and consolidation of the Regime.
Statesmanship left its imprint on a regime and that regime left its 
imprint on the political evolution of an era. If, throughout the study, 
the theme has been that of statesmanship, and the quest for Its principles, 
techniques, objectives and accomplishments, or, alternatively, its weakness­
es and limitations, it is only In order that the enquiry should expand its 
horizon to consider the historical role of the regime, or point out some of 
its possible Implications. This speculative aspect constitutes a sequence 




I- Early Experiences a.nd Formative Influences.
" The Past is an Index to the Future M
(Sidqi. 6.12.1923)
A. The Early Yea.rs.
Sidqi was born in Alexandria on the 15th June, 1875, into a. well-known old 
Egyptian family which hailed from a villa.ge in the Delta province of Gharbia. (1)
The family had a tradition of public service. (2) His grandfather, Mohamad Sid 
Ahmad Pasha, was the Chief of Prince Said's Cabinet, while his father, Ahmad 
Shukri, wa.s Governor of Cairo, Under "Secretary of State for the Interior and, 
at one time, Director of the Sudan Administration in the Egyptian government.
While the image of his grandfather is that of the charitable and learned cha.ra.cter 
living in the affluent style of the epoch's ruling c lass, his fa.ther's is  tha.t of a. 
capable and energetic administrator, ambitious, unscrupulous and with aspirations 
to modernity. His mother, Fa.tma. Hanem Sid Ahmad, possessed  a strong person­
ality and a mind of her own, and the image she conveys is  tha.t of a. woman indulgent 
of her private life and devoted to her public vocation. She was a pioneer in feminist 
education and headmistress of a school, in which capacity she channelled her 
creative talents. Only upon the counsel of her ageing father did she consent to 
marry her younger cousin, just returned from an education mission in Europe. (3) 
The style of the marriage and the age difference provides an interesting feature 
in the home in which young Sidqi grew up.
(1) An official biographical note in Sidqi's files in the Council of M inisters' archives 
uses the epithet a well-known "
(2) For relevant a.ccount see Sidqi’s memoirs. Mu.dh.akkir a t 1(1950), pp.5-6.
(3) Views on his mother and on his ea.rly upbringing are inferred from personal 
interviews with his daughter, the la.te Amina Sidqi, conducted in summer 1972.
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Although not an only child, Sidqi was the youngest of four, and he was 
brought up in a manner that set him apart from his brothers. "His mother chose 
to keep him by her side" and instructed him in his leisure, so that while members 
of his age-group frolicked about, little Sidqi would be tucked away in a quiet, 
detached world of books and dreams of his own; dreams that were not merely the 
product of his readings, but also of the household stories he overheard. Bearing 
in mind the turbulent political clime at the end of Khedive Ism ail's reign, the 
general sense of insecurity must have been reflected in the high ranks of official­
dom. The echoes of indignation at foreign encroachments, at financial bankruptcy 
and a t a receding sovereignty, may well have perplexed the young but vigilant 
brarnsof an imaginative listener. (4) Then he may have been labouring away to 
understand the riddle of his country's occupation and the source of anxiety to 
those he loved. With maturity and learning, however, childish perplexities gave 
wa.y as facts and figures came to provide the key to understanding and resolving 
his country's problems. He discovered that he had a "natural inclination" for 
economics and finance, while history was a. subject he learned to devour. (5) 
Gradually , he came to nurture a. 'realistic vision' to which his entire career was 
anchored. The ambitions he held for Egypt did not impair his sense of political 
reality nor did the latter hinder his struggle for the realisation of his ambitions.
■{“ ■i’
Ahmad Shukri, Sidqi’s father, had returned from his educational mission  
abroad, imbued with an admiration for French culture and a resolve to provide 
his children with a modern education. As a result, Sidqi received his primary and 
secondary schooling at the College des Freres where he proved him self a capable, 
intelligent and conscientious pupil who duly impressed his school-m asters. In an 
auto “biographic entry, Hassan Bey Youness, a school-m ate of Sidqi and a. future 
umda(village headman) of Manfalut, records his recollections on the score.
(4) See Sania. Qorra/a, Nirnr as-Siyasa a.l-Misriya (Cairo, 1952), pp. 64-65
Mudhakkirati, p. 7; Sidqi was an amateur book-collector and his personal 
shelves abound with some rare editions like Gibbon’s Decline and Fall (»77 7-" ? / 
as well as numerous volumes of European history, French literature and 
biographies.
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". . .  He wa.s the youngest amongst us but he was the cleverest, 
the most ambitious and energetic, the model of virtue and good 
manners. I followed in his footsteps and took him for my 
example. As a result, I pa.rtook of a share of the esteem  which 
his conscientiousness and good conduct evoked among his teachers 
and we took turns a.t the prefectship of the c la .ss .. .  " (6)
The convergence of a number of factors singled him out for a situation that spelled 
both privilege and isolation. He earned his privileged position through ha.rd work 
and im pressive conduct, and became the object of envy for his less able mates as 
well as an example to be looked up to. The situation was confounded by his a.ge.
His peers could hardly accept a perversion of an ascriptive pattern of seniority
while the young prefect, finding him self in a position that was coveted by many but
>
only attained by the few, equally nurtured his vanity. He reacted to the general 
resentment his age engendered by cultiva.ting an introversion that his home initially 
encouraged. The result was that complex sense of benevolent superiority, dutiful 
obligation and righteous self “confidence that converged to foster the paternalistic 
figure of later years and the convinced elitist he remained throughout life.
The Khedivial School, on the other hand, provided Sidqi with his first practical 
opportunity to realize his patriotic aspirations and to bridge the cultural rift with 
his surroundings. At the hands of distinguished scholars of the day he improved his 
Arabic to his satisfaction and joined Mustafa Kamel, the nationalist student leader, 
who was then a senior colleague at the School, in editing a. bulletin, al “Madras sa . He 
also contributed to another patriotic literary enterprise with Lutfi a.l«Sa.yed and others 
in a.l-SharaT, where he edited topics on economics and law. His activism developed 
his political ideas and wataniya. (patriotism) became a practical concept. It meant 
first, to hold fa.st onto the rights of the motherland, and to resolutely strive to 
achieve them; second, it meant to devote oneself to the pursuit of learning (a.l-film) 
not simply to prove worthy of independence, but to use it a.s a weapon for real 
independence. (7)
;j: jJ: &
(6) See Farag So liman Fuad, al~Kinz a.l"Thamin li^Udhama* a.l"Misriyyin, Part I 
(Cairo, 1917), p. 207.
(7) Mrdhakkirati p_ 7 • cf _ another version : 'to know where the interests of the 
country lie and to pursue them relentlessly;'” communicated in the course of 
interviews with his son, Dr. Amin and other close associates.
/
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Sidqi started his career in 1894 at the modest salary of £5 a month. (8)
His early years were spent as an assistant at the Alexandria Parquet before he 
joined the Alexandria municipality in 1900. Possibly, his personal connections 
with Mohamed Said Bey, who was then chef du parquet, was behind the handsome 
promotion he received in his very first year as he rose from the sixth gra.de to 
the third gra.de. (9) But Said was equally aware of his protege's abilities. (10)
The correspondence of the period in his personal service records casts an 
illuminating side-light on the public spirit a.nd conscientiousness with which the 
younger Sidqi undertook his work. (11) On one occasion he felt he could take his 
leave a. couple of days earlier as his colleague, Abu Zeid, had returned from his 
and so, " the work will not be affected. " On another occa.sion he returned from his 
holiday abroad ten days before his leave was over, and he wrote in giving up the J 
remaining period in order to resume work. It was not surprising that he should 
impress his superiors favourably wherever he went. His transfer from the Ta.nta 
Parquet in the Autumn of 1898 and his resignation from the Cabinet seventeen years 
later, in 1915, were two events of different purport that left their common imprint 
in the manifest regrets of the head of the one and the President of the other.
(8) This section is based on material in Sidqi's personal files in the Citadel 
Archives in Cairo, nos. 5365/5616/1/167. The following table gives the sequence 
of his rise  in the service between 1894 and 1915 :




parquet * 10 (8)
Secretary General, then
Under-Sec, of State (Interior) 135
Minister of Agriculture
then of Wa.qfs 200












(9) Mohamed Said was Minister of Interior in 1908, Prime Minister in 1911 and 
again in 1919; in 1924 he joined the first Zaghlulist Cabinet. See personality list 
in FO 371/12388 (file 1353)
(10) See Kashkul, 12.12.1924
(11) From Citadel Archives cited above.
i
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Meanwhile, the Administrative Order of 13th December, 1908, designated 
Sidqi to a newly instituted post as Secretary of the Interior. In this capacity he 
was vested with wide powers in connection with the supervision and control of 
personnel,as well as with liaison functions among the D irectors of the different 
departments and the Minister. Sidqi used to advantage his recent experience a.t 
the Municipality to reinforce his competence in his new position. It was here that 
he derived his stock of first-hand knowledge on conditions in the administrative 
services in government. Sidqi was soon promoted to be Under-Secretary of State 
for the Interior from his short-lived incumbency as Secretary, which was  ^
incidentally^ abolished. With the further enhancement of his authority* he occupied 
his new post with a rare dignity and patriotism that in some ways presaged his 
conduct when he came to power in 1930. (12)
It was not long before Sidqi became a Minister in the government of the 
day. His first political appointment in 1914 was to the recently instituted Ministry 
of Agriculture where he further consolidated its foundations and provided it with 
a. cause to promote. The draft legislation on Cooperatives which he introduced 
then and the Consultative Council for Agriculture which he formed set the pace 
for the numerous institutional innovations he launched in later years. The out” 
break of the War in Summer 1914, and the proclamation of the British protectorate 
over Egypt brought about a government reshuffle and Sidqi emerged a.s Minister 
of Waqfs. His term here came to an abrupt end in the flush of a. private scandal. 
The Minister of Religious affairs, it was exposed, was the secret lover of the 
daughter of a. patrician, a notorious young lady who, in a cr is is  of despair, had 
committed suicide and left behind an incriminating list of her affairs. The 
application of the censorship law might have restrained the Press but not the 
rumours. Upon the formation of the Delegation to defend Egypt's claim for 
independence three yeans later (the Wafd), his compatriots feared that his 
offensive reputation might prejudice their popular mandate. It galled Sidqi to 
realise that his tarnished public image undermined his credibility as a nation­
alist. (13)
(12) For general account seeMudhakkirati pp. 10-11
At this time Sidqi drafted a note on behalf of the Egyptian government upholding 
Egyptian sovereignty, 
cf. below Ch. II. p - 63
(13) See Saad Zaghlul Memoirs (Mudhakkirat)(unpublished) Note-book no. 32, 
pp. 1846-47; 1851.
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By 1915, Sidqi had been awarded a number of grades and decorations. In 1909, 
he received the Mirmeran and, so, became a Pa.sha at the a.ge of 34, This was 
preceded by the grade of Sania (Bey) in 1905 and the Medgidia. in 1908, and wa s 
followed by the Osmania in 1911.(14) His awards ca.me from a.cross the 
Mediterranean too, as in 1911 the King of Italy vested him with the decoration of 
Commandore and, three years later, the President of the French Republic awarded 
him the grade of Off icier de 1a. Legion d'Honneur, (15)
$ 4 $ $ $
In retrospect, Sidqi left his imprint on the Egyptian setting not only as the 
strong man who daunted his opponents, but also, a.s the solitary figure who baffled 
observers and detractors alike. To round off this sketch of his early years it might 
be useful to pause briefly at this phenomenon of his political isolation and examine' 
its likely origins there. Sidqi seem s to have had a. communication problem on the 
personal, cultural and political levels which was not, perhaps, peculiar to him as 
an individual, but it acquired a particular relevance in frustrating his political 
ambitions. This problem could possibly be referred to as a non-communicability 
syndrome.
Introversion was a dimension of this syndrome that was fostered by his 
isolated upbringing. Apart from a lifelong friendship with a boy, older than himself, 
the period spent at school confirmed him in an initial disposition. (16) Later, his
(14) His next awards followed in : the Grand Cordon de 1’Ordre du Nil, 23/3/1918; 
Grade d'el-Imtiaz in 1921; Grand Cordon de l'Ordre dTsmail, 26/3/1925; Grade 
d'el-Riya.ssa, 21/6/1930; Grand Cordon de Mohamed Ali, 10/10/1930 -  In 1931, 
following his settlement with the ex-Khedive (see Ch. IV below) the King found no 
other honours to vest his Prime Minister with, so he presented the Badge of 
Perfection to his wife, Fatma Hanem, "asthe reward which I can offer him in your 
person", His Majesty sa.id. SeeHtidhaldcirati p ^5
(15) He received La Grande Croix de la Legion d'Honneur (Fr) on 11/1/1932; in 
1932 two further decorations came from Italy : Le Grand Cordon de l ’Ordre du 
Pape Pie IX and Le Diplome de " Le Grand Cordon de l'Ordre des Saints Maurice 
et Lazare" - His two other decorations that same year came from Hungary and 
Austria.
(16) Mohamed Abdel-Khaleq Sarwat (d. 1927); graduated from the School of La.w two 
years before Sidqi and launched his career as Minister in 1914; twice Prime 
Minister in the 'twenties and led an Egyptian negotiating delegation in 1927 -  Sidqi 
entertained for him respect and admiration bordering on affection. See his
Mudhakkiratl, p. 35 -  For personality see also, FO 371/12388 .
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social life was confined to restricted circL es. Frequently, he retired to his 
country residence where he divided his leisure between reading and managing his 
estate. (17) His loneliness on the political stage was almost a replica of his 
personal solitude as a. trait in childhood persisted into adult life.
There were other factors that obstructed his ability to communicate on a 
personal level. An outstanding intelligence, widely read and disciplined, and 
a methodical mind, had from early life, given him a mental advantage over his 
peers that wa.s appropriately reflected in the different stages of his education. (18)
In public life this early mental maturity encouraged modes of thought and rea.soning 
and developed traits, like foresight, which might have rendered him "ahead" of his 
tim es, but ultimately, left him isolated in his age.
-J
This was reinforced by another communication barrier. His early launching 
into a foreign culture deprived him of an initial grounding into the national one, 
while an innate intelligence and his social seclusion heightened his assim ilation of 
foreign values and symbols. The turn his career took confirmed this barrier, as 
his service at the Alexandria. Municipality opened up for him a social milieu a.nd 
new cultural and intellectual vistas that widened the gulf between him and his country- 
men.
The resulting cultural rift, eventually, separated him from the national 
leadership cadres and barred his accessibility to the wider public. He became the 
object of misunderstanding and distrust among his people and at the same time, he 
remained incapable of appreciating their more sensitive qualities and aspirations.
As he could not appeal to them in their language or on their term s, his leadership 
left the people unstirred and the ground for mutual identification between leader 
and followers was eroded.
Moreover, his career in the Administration combined with his family 
tradition of public service to render the rulers-ruled complex another dimension 
of the syndrome. His elitism  was partly a. defensive gesture to overcome the 
communication barriers by evading them. His attempt to break out of his isolation
(17) Contrary to convention, Sidqi did not assign a riazir (overseer) -  He equally 
cultivated his hobbies, like rose-gardening, and won contests.
(18) He was, incidentally, admitted to the Khedivia.1 school at the age of 15, below 
the age-lim it, on an exceptional basis; maintained his record of distinction and came 
out top of his c lass upon graduation.
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often ended in frustration. Significantly, the universal hostility with which his 
constitutional venture met in 1930 was compounded by the inhibitions that sur« 
rounded his person as much as by the formalistic turn of Egyptian politics. (See 
below).
Formative Experiences
While it is  usually difficult to single out a. particular episode or experience 
in the life of an individual and extropolate on its effects in shaping his attitudes 
and outlook, the attempt is sometimes worthwhile and instructive. Sidqi seem s to have 
had three key public experiences in his youth and riper years that contributed to 
his distinctive formation as a statesman and nationalist. The first of these was his  ^
experience on the Commission of the Alexandria. Municipality while the other two 
coincided with a turning point in the national fortunes. The Great Wa.r left its 
repercussions on the Egyptian economy and stimulated the movement for independence. 
An important economic commission was formed to examine the former aspect and 
a national delegation or (Wald) evolved to meet the la.tter aspirations. In both, Sidqi 
played a prominent role.
1, The Alexandria Municipality.
" The period I spent as Secretary on the Commission of the 
Municipality was of immeasurable va lu e .. .  it  decidedly helped 
me in making my wa.y through later on. In effect, the Municipality 
is  but a minuscule government that contains all the different 
a.dministra.tions that have their counterpart in the government. "(19)
At the turn of the century, there emerged on the frontiers of Egyptian political 
institutions, a unique cosmopolitan body entrusted with governing the city of 
Alexandria. (20) By virtue of a convention between the Capitulatory Powers signed 
on 5th January, 1890, the Commission of the Municipality was vested with wide
(19) Mudhakkiratit p. 9; See also his elections manifesto in Ahra.m, 7/12/1923 and 
interview in weekly, Kol-Shei (No. 112) 2/1/1928, where he alludes to the impact 
oil his municipal experience.
(20) About this body see , Municipal!te dfAlexa.ndrie, D ecrets et Arretes relatifs 
a 1a. Constitution et rorga.nisa.tion de 1a. Municipa.lite'(Alex. 1892).
27
statutory powers that conferred upon it fiscal privileges which the Egyptian 
government itself was deprived of. The Commission was overwhelmingly foreign 
in composition, owing to its restrictive qualifications, and it stood a.s a select 
and closed "club" with a, sophisticated system of representation. Sidqi saw him self 
on that body a.cquiring a unique apprenticeship in government.
Following a. successful competition entry in 1899, Sidqi was appointed 
Secretary of the Commission and Director of the Contentieux. (Legal Depa.rtment)(21) 
Six years later he was promoted to a new post a.s Secretary-General and his salary 
was raised from £E600 to £E800 per annum. (22) Throughout these years, he was 
involved in va.ried activities. Apart from the standing committes which he invariably 
attended, he frequently participated in special committees tha.t were formed to } 
deal with contingencies a.s they a,rose.(23) He was so dynamic and competent there 
that when he left to further his career prospects in the central government, his 
functions Imd to be divided among his successors. (24)
His term at the Municipality coincided with its reorganisation. (25) Its
(21) The subject of the contest wa.s a French essay on the ideal system of running 
public transport. Ha.ving explored the pros and cons of public and private enterprise, 
he opted for the latter. The recollection seem s interesting in view of a. divergence 
with the Palace over 30 years later over the Alexandria Ra.mleh Concession. See 
FQ 371/16116/16119 (file 239)
(22) See proceedings of the Municipal Commission (PVSCM) 26/12/1906 « Earlier 
he was twice promoted and received three pay rises; "une gratification mensuelle 
de ££10”, wa.s recorded in 1904 followed by his additional nomination a yea.r later 
to the post of Director of Administrative Services.
(23) See examples below « notes 27 & 31 « The most a.ctive of the standing committees 
was the Finance Committee whose sittings often extended la.te into the night; Public 
Works was equally busy, with road-works and adjudications prominent on its 1907 « 
1-908 agenda. Between August and November of that year Sidqi chaired meetings as 
acting Administrator. See Delegation proceedings for 1908 in PVSDM .
(24) See PVSCM, 13/1/1909. %
(25) A joint commission designated by the government and the municipality met on 
21st October, 1902, and continued to meet regularly for the next seven weeks. It 
reviewed the Organic law in the light of its application, investigated corruption in 
the Administration and presented its recommendations to the Ministry of Interior 
on 13th December, 1902. Organisational issues continued to be debated long after.
See for ex. Ibid., 18/5/1904
28
executive was strengthened, a new cadre of officials was introduced and a. 
judicious rationalisation a.ccompanied both. Pragmatism dictated the a.doption of 
the institutional models compatible with the Alexandrine situation. A reflection  
of the prevailing mood was echoed in a member’s warning, . .  sans cela. ( i .e.  
the appointment of a Director), 1'administration resterait sans tete et l ’institution
a /
meme sera.it en danger du fait de 1'anarchie et du d esord re.. .  (26) The episode
duly impressed Sidqi who was directly involved with the ongoing proceedings.(27)
He realised too, that the city itself was in a dynamic stage of development.
The expansion and transformation which Alexandria saw in the first decade 
of the century was directly reflected on the scope and nature of the a.ctivity of the 
Municipality. In due course, Sidqi became familiar with such things as the technical 
aspect of modernisation, the advantage of stimulating local production, the requisites 
for balancing the budget and centralising fisca l legislation, as well as with the more 
general proposition that adminis trative powers were a corollary of fisca l powers. (28)
Sidqi eagerly took up the challenge to prove him self as an Egyptian before his 
foreign associates and put his heart into what was to him more than a job. (29)
The excitement around him was contagious and he identified him self with the 
developments and the dynamic tempo that became his own. His attentiveness to the 
proceedings on the Commission and on the Delegation (the executive organ) heightened, 
while he diligently pursued his work on the committees to improve his knowledge of 
the issues debated. It wa.s in committee work too that he evolved those technical 
skills, like memoranda "drafting, in which he eventually excelled. (30)
(26) Ibid. The issu es of anarchy and disorder continued for long to preoccupy Sidqi
(27) Sidqi was delegated at the time to the .ad. hoc .Enquiry Commission & the 
Disciplinary Council set up. While two other ‘ officials were sim ilarly
delegated, it is  interesting that Sidqi received the highest emolument^possibly due 
to his greater responsibility.
(28) Examples of some relevant sessions m aybe seen in those on 14/5/1902; 
5/12/1906; 10/2/1906 -  Ibid.
(29) Sidqi dwells on this challenge in his electoral manifesto in 1923.
(30) An influential model on the individual level may be tra.ced to the Baron de 
Menace. See for ex. memo in Annex to Proceedings in PVSCM, 2 /5 /1906.
(
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Moreover, a.s Secretary, he could not participate in the debate, but he cultivated 
an additional dimension of detachment that enabled him to entertain that breadth 
and balance which often characterised his judgement. This combination of the 
subjective and objective aspects of his involvement in the work of the Municipality 
proved a ra.re and inspiring one.
The period was one of practical and intensive assim ilation and many of his 
ideas on Authority stem from it. The compound electoral system taught him to view 
society as a corporate entity with a. plurality of interests, all legitimately entitled 
to representation and to the attention of Authority. (31) The latter had a delicate task 
before it in the process of compromise and balance in an effort to advance the general 
interest, while decisions could hardly be taken without taking.the views of those , 
affected into consideration. (32) It was here tha.t the roots of government by consult­
ation were sown. Equally, a rationalist outlook was cultivated as the Commission 
provided a. practical model in techniques of administra.tion. Instead of the prevailing 
personal and arbitrary conception of Authority, it afforded him with an institutional 
and objective perspective. Ultimately, it was a balanced and coherent view on the 
means and ends of government .which cam e >To u n d erlie  the architectonic 
dim ension  o f h is lead ersh ip .
Sidqi learned to handle with ability both men and issu es . His contacts carried 
him among differentiated and distinct c irc les, while the absence of established 
traditions allocating spheres of competence rendered much of the communication 
between the Government and the Municipality, which passed through his medium as 
Secretary, of a creative and substantial nature. The skills and arts of organisation 
and negotiation were duly cultivated. If it was the autonomy of a local body that was 
then at stake, soon it would be the Sovereignty of a nation he would embark on 
negotiating.
His policy in later years bears testimony to the impact of his municipal
(31) The electoral college of exporters, for e x ., whose grievances were brought 
to the attention of "Sedky Bey’* had representatives of six distinct functional groups 
sitting in varying proportions. Ibid., 27/2/1908 - Sidqi was delegated to the electoral 
enquiry compiission.
(32) In a note on the question of navigation in the Ma.hmudiah Canal Sidqi recorded his 
observa.tion on a letter from the Interior noting that a certain proposal proved 
acceptable to the Municipality not only on grounds of viability, but also on those of 
its approval by affected interests, " les representants des commerces" -  See Annex 
to Proceedings of Delegation. PVSDM 6/1/1908
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experience. Some examples may be sought in the abolition of the octroi duty, the 
proposed institution of a patente tax, the reform of the officials cadre and the 
legislation on local government, all of which occurred under his Regime in 
1930.(33) Other issues too, like the reorganisation of the Municipality and the 
execution of the Corniche project, which were among the live issu es in the 
'thirties, bea.r some direct affinity to interests bred in this period. (34)
By confirming him in his rational instincts and in his elitism , his experience 
in the Municipality deepened the communicability rift. To the extent that it 
enhanced the prospects of the statesman, it diminished those of the popular leader.
2. The Commission for Trade and Industry. (1916-1917) >
Sidqi was appointed to preside over a Commission of distinguished figures 
in the economic field whose object was to examine the effect of the Wa.r upon the 
Egyptian economy and to put forward recommendations ’for future development. (35) 
Although its terms of reference and powers were extensive, the practical nature 
and scope of its task depended largely on its conduct.
The Commission first met on 13th March, 1916 and held 38 sessions in the next 
18 months. Its burean, composed of the President and Vice-President, undertook a 
series of tours to inspect various workshops and factories and engaged in contacts 
with major business elem ents. The results were laid before the entire Commission 
in a. sequence of meetings before it split into sub "committees. Meanwhile, specific 
aspects were delegated to particular members or outside experts. Technical 
education provided another area of intensive enquiry which was sim ilarly conducted 
in a practical perspective. The activity of the Commission infused a corresponding 
zea.l in the country a.nd, upon its initiative, the first exhibition of Egyptian
(33) See below Ch. V -  for some of these policies.
(34) The reorganisation of the Municipality involved an attempt to upset the status . 
quo to the benefit of the Egyptian element. See Sidqi's letter to Loraine on 25/2/1932; 
and relevant correspondence in FO 371/16124 (file 726) -  In exonerating him self of 
certain charges connected with the Gorniche Road scandal, Sidqi referred -  inter 
alia. -  to his experience at the Municipality. See A hr am, 25/5/1934.
(35) The vice-president of the Commission was the Director of the Department.of 
Technical Education, Sidney W ells. Other members included Y. Aslan Qattawi,jNCra.ig, 
Amin Yehia, M. T alia.t Harb, F . Murdoch, H. Naus and M. Bourgeois. « For 
composition and terms see J. O. March, 1916
31
manufactures was organised at Alexandria, during the summer. Its conduct 
provided an insight into the calibre of its leadership.
Sidqi gave the lead to a constructive venture in his "open" and "pliable" 
attitude. (36) Apart from adopting sound managerial principles, a. mood of 
practical common-sense pervaded as he availed him self fully of the powers 
conferred upon him to overcome formal obstacles and resorted to first-hand 
sources wherever he could. His chairmanship involved the simultaneous exercise  
of authority and submission to it. This stimulated the tempo of the enquiry and lent 
it a breadth of spirit compatible with its purpose. While there were equally competent 
members on the Commission, it took the presence of a dyna.mic, responsive, 
resolute and clear-minded head to transform the body into the hive of activity it > 
turned into and to stamp it with the unity of purpose it maintained throughout. The 
choice of Sidqi for its presidency was partic'ula.rly fortunate, for he combined the 
technical and business orientation with political vision. This showed up in the 
Report of the Commission which he drafted and which wa.s submitted in November, 
1917.(37)
The Report appeared in about 300 pages, the core of which lay in just over 
one third. (38) It comprised an eloquent, forceful, balanced and comprehensive 
statement of the case for development, expounded in a spirit of informed moderation 
and realism . (39) Its essence, however, wa.s political. Equilibrium was sought as
(36) See obituary notice by A.W. Stewart. Times, 14/7/1950 -  This was the 
Director of the School of Arts and Crafts and Inspector of Trade Schools at the 
time and was closely involved in the work of the Commission. He observes in 
retrospect that, ”. .  .though he (Sidqi) wa.s not a technically trained man, his quick 
mind grasped the essential fa.cts of an industry and the need for modernisation. "
(37) This report is distinct from two others on the impact of the Wa.r on trade and 
industry, submitted earlier in September and December, 1916.
(38) Sidqi personally drafted this report. The remainder comprised 30 subsidiary 
reports on individual industries or on particular aspects of industry which were all 
appended under four main headings : sm all industry, large industry, new industry 
and m iscellaneous.
(39) See excerpts in Report, Taqrlr Lajna.t a.l-Tijara. w’a.l Sina.ra (TLTS) (Cairo, 
1925) pp. 19-20; 62-75.
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a. meansto secure "the widest possible measure of economic independence without 
which political independence would be of negligible merit. " (40) The exposition 
itself was conducted in an evolutionary perspective that stressed  the ethos of 
progress. (41) The pra.ctical merits of the Report essentially lay in its extensive 
and meticulous policy recommendations. A tw elve-point programme for developing 
industry was presented;(42) a six -point educational programme was included;(43) 
particular attention to a. flexible tariff policy was given; (44) and the institution 
of a department for Trade and Industry was advocated. (45) It provided Egypt with 
a valid framework for its development long before the adequate executive organs 
were established.
In presenting the case for industrialisation, Sidqi combined the objective 
detachment of the rational with the ardent vehemence of the enthusiast. The 
vigorous physical participation in the work of the Commission and the mental 
consecration to the literary and intellectual background of the subject, fostered a 
conviction that became an integral part of the Nationalist.
The temporary respitefroiti administrative responsibilities, thus afforded 
Sidqi an opportunity to devote him self to the economic aspect of the Egyptian Question. 
He acquired a first-hand knowledge of the fundamental social and economic structure 
of Egyptian society, developed an insight into its weaknesses and potentialities and 
emerged with a lucid framework of practical idea.s which embodied the constitution 
for a viable economy.
(40) Ibid., pp. 95”98
(41) Industry was conceived as an index to progress as much as industrialisation 
itself wa.s seen as an ongoing process which corresponded to the degree of civilisation  
attained at a particular moment in a. given situation, (a 1-ha 1a. al-siiia*iya al-moriazira. 
l i"ma.bla.gh taqqadumihi fi ma.ra.qr al-kamal a l”*bmrani).
(42) Ibid., pp. 95-98
(43) Ibid., pp. 111-112; also, pp .72-73
(44) Ibid*, Ch. IX and annex 29.
(45) Ibid., p. 118 - See also Ch.V below*^>p, 2-0%-^.09
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3. The National Movement: (1917 - 1920)
Between. 1917 and 1920 Sidqi played an active political role in promoting his 
ideal of Egyptian Independence. In October 1917, Ahmad Fuad came to the vacant 
throne following the decease of his uncle, Sultan Hussein Kamel. Sidqi gladly 
took up the opportunity of cultivating his old friendship. He became his willing 
confidant much to the alarm of the British Advisers who attributed the growing 
tension with the new Sultan to SidqiTs "pernicious" national influence. (46) But Sidqirs 
own private life had an unfortunate intrusive quality about it, so that, once again, 
following another of his "scandals" about a year later, he was removed from Pala.ce 
circ les, much to the relief of Sir Reginald Wingate. (47)
As the Wa.r drew to its close, a state of euphoria and expectation prevailed ? 
over the impending Peace Conference. But Sidqi^wlio knew his own mind, combined 
his enthusiasm with a clear vision and practical sense, to pen a comprehensive 
note on the Egyptian Question in anticipation of the event. (48) Subsequently, it 
formed the draft of the memorandum that the Egyptian Delegation presented to the 
Conference. On the basis of this note he was admitted into the ranks of the 
nationalist movement, which was formally institutionalised in the Wafd. The latter 
was a na.tiona.l delegation originating in a popular mandate and Sidqi rs place in it 
was discomfittingly ambiguous from the beginning. His "unpopularity" precluded 
the inclusion of his name on the list circulated to secure this mandate and^only later., 
was he coopted into it on the exceptional authority vested in its leader, Saa.d 
Zaghlul.(49) For a moment, Sidqi stood as the indispen&ble embarrassment to 
the national movement for whom, paradoxically, he was embarrassingly indispensable.
Meanwhile, his activity confirmed him in his own self "image of a dedicated 
nationalist working for the good of Egypt. He assumed a consolidating influence 
upon the national movement as he bridged the gap between an unpopular, isolated 
Sultan and the Wa.fd. He acted in the conviction that " if the nation flocked to
(46) See Wingate to Balfour, 31/08/1918 (ConfiO in FQ371/3199
(47) See Wingate to Balfour, 18/10/1918 (V. Con£tl) Ibid.
(48) SeeMudhakkirati  p. 17
(49) See note No. 13 above.
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its Prince and its elite frequented his circle, a mutual understanding would evolve 
which could be everyone’s advantage." (50) At the opportune moment too he used 
his personal influence with members of the Government to effect a liaison between 
them and the Wafd, much to the concern of the British, who reacted to the united front 
by deporting its instigators to Malta.
During his internment there (March-April 1919) Sidqi recorded some of his 
im pressions. (51) These memoirs contain an eloquent and incisive indictment of 
British policy and underline the extent to which, in folly and vengeance, it contributed 
to heightening nationalist susceptibilities. They also contain a statement of principle 
absolving the Wafd from the stigma of revolution and emphasising its moderation. But 
the popular uprising was proudly acclaimed.
” The crystallisation of the determination for independence 
(a.l-ta.zima al-istiqlaliya) has occur red and .. .  with it a stride 
in the cause of Egypt has been paced."
His reflections truly convey the mood of the tim es. A m ystical sense of elation was 
experienced a.t the prospects of a cohesive body3 "where each of us has absorbed 
the spirit of the whole" -  solidly contending the righteous and noble cause. The 
mis-givings voiced about the Sultan’s position were drowned beneath an optimistic 
wave of faith and confidence, before which, "personalities dwindled", and towards 
which, "every emotion was channelled". Generally however, a profusion of idealism  
is  checked by realism , extremism is  tempered by moderation and reason complements 
emotion. This phase was vital for the psychic and ideal formation of the Nationalist 
and the impact of subsequent developments should be seen against it.
When the deportees were later allowed to join their colleagues in Paris,
Sidqi was, on all counts, the unacknowledged secretary of the Wafd there. He 
brought his French fluency, social agility in European circles and customary 
energy and ability to the service of the national cause, notwithstanding the British 
restrictions on the movements of the Egyptian Delegation . (52) But his
(50) Saad Zaghlul Memoirs, Note-Book, No. 28, pp. 1552 -  1553.
(51) The manuscript was made available to me by courtesy of the one-time political 
secretary for Sidqi, Mr. Mahmud Rashid. They fall in 17 pages of close, neat 
hand-writing and comprise personal reflections interspersed with an account of the 
internment.
(52) SeeMudhakkirati^ p .21
quick perception and realism  soon sensed the pra.ctica.l futility of these efforts 
and signalled an impending reversal of the Wafdist course.
In a situation where the reality of power dominated the benevolence of its 
ideals, Sidqi realised that it was not possible to resolve the Egyptian demands in 
the international context. Ultimately^it rested in British hands and their resolution 
on a bilateral basis was inevitable. He urged a readaptation of Wafdist tactics 
accordingly, and emerged at the nucleus of an informal opposition. This earned 
him the personal wrath of Zaghlul and a dishonourable eviction from the Delegation.
On the 23rd June, 1919, the Wafd met under Zaghlul and took its decision in Sidqi’s 
absence. (53) His private conduct in Paris, which was "offensive to his colleagues", 
once again prejudiced his case. (54) In effect, a difference of opinion was branded 
as heresy and a momentary retreat to avoid a conflagration was returned with an 
abrupt excommunication. (55)
Sidqi returned to Egypt disillusioned with the turn the movement was taking.
He revolted against its indulgence in self-delusion and what he saw as its "foolery" 
of the people back in Egypt. (56) This did not however stop him from resuming his 
activity among the nationalists in the country, so that soon, once again in the winter, 
the military authorities banished him from the Capital. (57) In popular eyes though, 
his fate a.s a nationalist wa.s sealed by the short-schrift he had been dealt.
The next phase in the national movement began with the coming of the Milner 
Mission in the winter of 1919-1920. This was the phase Sidqi ha.d anticipated and 
which the Wafd in Paris belatedly acknowledged. Following his release from detention, 
as part of a general amnesty, he joined hands with the faction of Moderates, (dee 
below) This wa.s consistent with the rationalising influence he had hitherto exercised
(53) See Mahmud Abu'l-Fa.th, Al-Mas'a.la. al-Misriya wa.T-Wafd ( ), pp. 122-124
(54) See relevant correspondence in FO 371/ 3*71 8
(55) See for example of difference in opinion,in letter from Sidqi in Vichi to Zaghlul 
in Paris, 30/6/1919 in Muhamed Anis, Tha.wra.t Thaftatha. waTshrln Yulyu, ( i9S5 )  
pp. 287-289.
(56) See letter from his colleague, Mahmud AbuT-Nasr, the second casualty on the 
Wafdist list of dissentors, in Yusuf Nahas, Dhikrayat  (1937 ^ pp. 34-36
(57) An article by Sidqi written 011 2/12/1919 commenting favourably upon Lord 
Curzon’s speech and withheld from publication for reasons connected with his banish­
ment, reveals him despite his moderation -  a convinced nationalist. On this count he 
was accused of "political prejudices" that distorted his common sense. See Lee Stack 
to Keown-Boyd, 3/12/1919 in FO 141/448. C£u
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within the Wafd and confirmed him in his original moderation.
SidqiTs experience in the Wafd left its scars on both the career and the 
psyche of the nationalist. But a sense of personal injustice did not detract him 
from his national pursuits and a. negative public image merely confirmed him in 
his disdain of the ignorant and passionate mob. He did, however, emerge from 
it with a profound distaste for authoritarianism, factionalism, and the cult of the 
individual, while the sense of political reality which was behind his dissension  
continued to temper his future conduct.
By 1920 there emerged an ambitious figure considerably involved with the 
course of the national movement and possessing a.n idea.l stake in national 
development. At  the age of 45, the traits of the politician and the statesman were 
maturing, but it took the practical experience of the next ten years, in an eventful 
political career, for them to crystallise into that form they eventually assumed 
when he founded a regime in 1930.
II - Political Involvement (1920*4930)
A* The Political Context
Egyptian politics in the ’twenties provide the natural setting for Sidqi’s 
political involvement as well as the background to the regim e that emerged in 1930. 
There were three principal constellations of power, or forces, that, in one form or 
another, dominated the arena. These were the British, the Monarch and nationalist 
movement, commonly identified with the Wafd. In fact, the national movement was 
more extensive. Among the anti-Wafd, there were two general groups, a nationalist 
one challenging the Wald's monopoly, a.nd another whose partisans were apprehensive 
of the outcome of the nationalist movement or hostile to it. From 1920 onwards,
Sidqi may be seen in the anti-Wafd, fundamentally rooted in the nationalist camp, and, 
through his business interests, associated with the non "nationalist section.
It was the convergence of interests and attitudes towards the two central issues  
of the period, the Trea.ty and the Constitution, that drew Sidqi to one constellation or 
power group and a.wa.y from the other. The group of moderates originally signified 
those who were prepared to negotiate a settlement with the British, and as the Wafd
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accepted the principle of negotiation too, the ostensible dichotomy between the 
two groups posed the first milestone in the politics of form alism . The Moderates 
equally identified with a liberal code of government, or claimed to adhere to it.
They reflected a current of opinion more than an organisation, and when they 
emerged with one, it was loose and infested with individualism. Apart from their 
Treaty objectives, their commitment was twofold ; to circum scribe Wafdist 
domination and to assert the constitutional ha.se of parliamentary government, 
with a manifest concern for domestic reform. It was natural that Sidqi should 
be dra.wn to this group, although his distaste for partisanship made him dodge any 
official piarty commitment. (58)
In the meantime, political formalism characterised the mainstream of 
Egyptian politics and steadily submerged it in a welter of inconsistencies. Political 
appearance conflicted with political reality and the embattled power groups were canght 
in paradoxical conduct. This formalism operated’on two distinct levels that were 
soon, by virtue of the 1922 Declaration, interlocked. The seeds were first sown in 
the dispute that arose over the leadership of the official negotiating delegation in 
1920 and left their sinister echoes in the popular chants : “Occupation under Zaghlul 
far better than independence under A dly ." This shifted the focus from the rallying 
war-cry of Independence to the divisive quest for the identity of the chief negotiators.
The next milestone in the politics of formalism appeared with the Unilateral 
Declaration of 1922 by which the British granted Egypt a qualified independence 
pending the resolution of Four Reserved Points in a negotiated settlement. The 
addenda, of the Declaration provided for the creation of a. parliament “with the right 
to control the policy and administration of a constitutionally responsible government", 
with whom the Treaty agreement would follow. (59) The Wafd rea.cted to the event 
by condemning the Declaration a.s an act of trea.son -  on the part of the moderates 
who had secured it -  and simultaneously, welcoming it a.s a. spring-board to power.
The promulgation of the Declaration was, moreover, accompanied by a political
(58) Apart from a. passing reference in his memoirs to his distate to partisanship 
(Mudhaldcirati  pp. 45 and 57), his manifesto upon his final resignation from the Sha*h 
Party in 1938 contains an articulate and concise statement of his views on the score. 
See Ahram, 34.8.1938.
(59) See draft letter from Lord Allenby to King Fuad of 25th February, 1922 and 
Cabinet Conclusions in FO 371/7732.
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cris is  that presaged the subsequent instability, Anglo "Egyptian relations became 
the exhaust*pipe that polluted the vulnerable parliamentary institutions that emerged. 
The institutionalisation of the connection between the two issu es brought with it 
another interesting development. In time, the Wafd became conciliatory towards 
the British and intransigeant towards their rivals. As attitudes became inter­
changeable, the mores of nationalism were internalised while those of constitution­
alism were externalised.
The ongoing institutionalisation and internalisation of ambiguous conflict 
patterns led to successive anomalies. A complex pattern of volatile alignments 
followed which involved each party in manifest contradictions. At one moment, 
the King aligned with the "extremists" against the "moderates"; at the next, the > 
"moderates" aligned with the King against the "extremists" and, eventually, the 
"extremists" aligned with the British against both. Professed principles were 
subverted by mundane interests, while the momenta.ry convergence of these interests 
combined with intensive rationalisations to lend a surrealistic quality to the confounded 
political setting.
At each juncture in the political web, Sidqi figured prominently. In the first 
effective Administra.tion since the 1919 troubles and on the first official Delegation 
in the 1921 negotiations, he was conspicuous. Adly, who led the Delegation then, 
referred to him as "our youngest in years, but our w isest in wits " and left him 
to draft the forcible note terminating the negotiations. (60) He was, wi th Sa.rwat, 
the joint architect of the controversial Declaration which he viewed with a mixture 
of pride and contentment^determined to preserve its gains and extend them. (61)
He, too, was drawn into the same anomalies as the Constitutional Liberals, now 
formed as a Party, who became pawns in the hands of the Monarch in fighting the 
Wafd. The Wafd in turn, posed a.s the defenders of constitutionalism in a way that 
rendered power their exclusive preserve. Doubly dismayed at the distortions that 
had overtaken the nationalist movement and parliamentary life, Sidqi was determined
(6p) Yusuf i^ab&s., Saflja min ta fik h  m is r- 'a t-  hadith , m ufawadj£cAd|y- 
Curzoii —
(61) SeeMudhaklclratitpp. 25-27 and facsim ile of Declaration in Sidqi* s handwriting 
facing p .48.
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to find a radical solution that would put an end to abuse. The quest drew him into 
further anomalies that merely confirmed the issue of political formalism.
2. Sidqi's Political Career.
If Sidqi's presence in office in 1921 coincided with the emphasis on the 
external aspect of the national question, the focus shifted in the following year to 
the internal aspect. Sidqi in office in 1922 was more than Minister of Finance, for 
he was the intimate counsellor of Sarwat, the Prime Minister, and his right-hand 
man. He became the moving spirit behind an Administration committed to implementing 
the Declaration of Independence which, together, they had procured, and his task 
involved him both in liquidating the legacy of a pseudo-colonial era in which Egypt , 
was the trustee of a team of British advisers, and in laying down what he saw as 
the "organisational foundations of independence." (62)
His practical experience here confirmed him in the insight into the substance 
of independence which he had acquired earlier, during his engagement oh the 
economic Commission. At the same time, the Sarwat government undertook its 
mission in particularly difficult circum stances, shorn of the support of the Monarch 
and actively denounced by the populace. Sidqi first savoured the double fledged 
task of confrontation and asserting Authority. His distaste for factionalism grew 
as he watched passions prevail over reason a.t another critical moment of the 
country's development. He wa.s disgusted to find his conscientious efforts at 
consolidating independence, and those of his colleague, meet with agitation, as 
anti-British manifestations turned against Egyptians. If the crowd might be excused 
its ignorance, he thought, there wa.s le ss  justification for its leaders. At the same 
time, his activity involved him in the ongoing drafting of a Constitution which 
consecrated the sovereignty of the nation and this brought him, with his friend 
Sarwat, into a.n internecine backdoor conflict with "surreptitious forces". (63)
(62) See 1923 electoral manifesto. S <i,lovV' f
(63) A spa.te of accusations of "secret" agreements between Sarwat/Sidqi and Lord 
Allenby transpired to the national press at the time and recurred in 1925. Upon the 
publication of Sidqi's memoirs first in 1948, a diatribe occurred between Sidqi and 
Hassan Nafihat, one time palace favourite, which d iscloses their Palace source. See 
al-M ussawar, May, 1948. The book version in which these memoirs were later 
collected merely refers to "reactionary influences" (pp. 29, 30.) For Royal pin­
pricks against Sidqi personally, see FO 141/448 (file 1648).
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In more than one sense, his maiden political involvement here, at the cross-roads 
of Egypt's independence, left a profound impact which subsequent events fortified.
The next milestone in his political career came with the holding of the first 
elections in the following year. Although the Wafd had vehemently denounced the 
Constitution that was proclaimed in the Spring, in April 1923, it rallied to elections 
bringing with it to a new field the mass organisation tha.t had grown out of the 
mobilisation for independence. The outcome of these elections was a foregone 
conclusion before the combination of efficient organisation and Za.ghiulist charisma. 
Sidqi stood for them as a.n Independent, but vigorously maintained his conviction 
in the value of a truly representative parliament, including all parties and shades 
of opinion. "If other countries have benefited from such representation, we are fo 
far greater need of such benefits. " He especially warned against the event of 
domination.
"Should a single party monopolise for itself the seats in 
Parliam ent.. .  we are bound to stumble into disa.ster. " (64)
The warning was prophetic. The election results confirmed its implications as the 
da.wn of an era. of mass politics converged with that of parliamentary politics to 
the detriment of constitutionalism.
Moreover, Sidqi found him self the object of an insidious campai^owhich, to 
his d istress, jockeyed him into the defensive.
" God alone knows how I had never once imagined that the
day would come when I should have to defend m yself against 
slander., when my record, crystal-clear, spealcs for itself 
needing neither explanation nor justification.. Indeed, it deeply 
pains me to feel necessity call me to my own defence. " (65)
(64) The quotations here are taken from the electoral sta.tement he made to the 
elector-delega.tes in his native constituency of Ghorayeb on 6.12.1923. This 
appeared in the Ahram on the next day.
(65). A graphic description typifying that revulsion followed : "Do not expect me 
to descend upon the villages with scores of supporters and boys on the riffs of 
cars, waving banners in the air and drums beaiing in reception .. ,  and the sirens 
of women-folk rending the s k ie s . . .  ( I declare) I will not take part in this or any 
part of it myself, nor will I resort to this deplorable innovation whereby they raid 
the homes in rowdy p rocession .. make oaths and force others to make such oaths 
with them,swearing upon all sorts of deities, not to forfeit that spot till all, in 
unison, are pledged to their demands. . . "
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His constituency wa.s singled out for a concerted dose of Wafdist electioneering 
during which he became acquainted with a novel phenomenon, batsh al^gha.wgha1 
(mob tyranny). "From that moment o n ," he confessed to a. circle of electors,
"I have sensed my own impotence at meeting this campaign in kind. " Neither 
by upbringing nor by disposition was he inclined to pamper the whims of the 
m asses, and his conception of the national interest did not admit of indulging in 
the unedifying exercise of exchanged pejoratives. The extent of his revulsion with 
the ways of his opponents was commensurate with his determination not to give way. 
But he saw the harbingers of the Constitution, him self included, ousted, and the 
country was deprived, in its hour of need, of experience and ability. His later 
reflections on moral compulsion were backed by a vivid and concrete experience 
which ha.d established him in his elitism . (66) >
Sidqi*s own version of electioneering was distinctive. He preceded his 
candidature with informal lobbying patterned on traditional village life, as he held 
parleys with the opinioned members of the community and evolved a consensus on 
the means to tackle outstanding problems of the day. This wa.s followed by a public 
statement -  one of the two which appeared in these elections -  in which he refuted 
the allegations of his opponents add proclaimed his basic political principles. He 
presented a lucid definition of his conception of the national problem in its general 
dimension, as well as its "no less  important" internal dimension, and outlined his 
political programme. This statement provided the practical credo to which Sidqi 
continued to adhere in future years. (67) It introduced a note of reason into a 
setting infested with passion and, in so doing, it gave a foretaste of a style he brought 
to power seven years la.ter.
The inception of parliamentary life hastened the evolution of the power 
constellation as it confirmed the transfer of the tensions besetting Treaty politics 
to the constitutional arena. SidqiTs original dissension from the Wafdist mainstream
(66) In the presence of a cha.risma.tic influence, Sidqi equates moral coercion with 
administrative coercion .Mudliakklrati  pp. 29*30. His appeal to the public under his 
regime in 1930 was to urge people to think for them selves. See Ch. Ill below.pp. p t / M
(67) He stated his guidelines on public affairs in regard to specific issues ; 
economic independence, budget policy, economic structure of society and fiscal 
capitulations, cf. recommendations of parliamentary finance committee in 1926.
(see below p.
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on an issue of opinion deepened with the onsetting difference of principle. Meanwhile, 
the trials of office exacerbated Wafdist tensions which inhered in its conflicting 
loyalties between a Party seeking power and a movement for independence. At the 
close of nine months, it left behind it Anglo-Egyptian relations on the brink of 
disruption, the Administration subverted with partisanship and the provinces plagued 
with factionalism. Constitutional liberties proved farcical and the practice of 
parliamentary government merely consolidated Zaghlulist hegemony. By November 
1924, the truce between the Wafd and the Monarch had ended, and with the murder of 
Sir Lee Stack, Sirdar of the Sudan, British tolerance crudely snapped. The first  
political cr is is  flared up,
Sidqi joined the government that was formed in December 1924 "to save wha*;, 
it could of the wreck. " He was appointed to the Ministry of Interior" as a reinforcing 
element", and a.ll matters of political and even administrative importance were 
referred to him for decision. (68) He reorganised the Administration, restored  
confidence among officialdom and prepared for elections. The briefest convocation 
of parliament followed, ending in the first textual infraction of the Constitution and, 
a committee was formed to review the electoral la.w. (69) Although it was modified 
in August 1925, the political turn of events prevented its application. (70) Sidqi was 
not prepared to let the victory of the Monarch become the ba.sis for royal autocracy. 
The Palace perceived in his obstructive and "discrediting" tactics a threat to its 
advances, particularly in the departments of the Interior, and by the Summer, his 
removal from office constituted the "superim posed issue". (71) The disaffection 
between the two figures was reflected in the "indecent alacrity" with which a tentative 
resignation was snatched up in the early Autumn. The episode underlined the ultimate 
instability of any coalition round ta.ctical interests and confirmed the distrust and 
ambiguity tha.t underlay their mutual relationship.
(68) See Annual Report for 1925 (paras. 233-238) in FO 371/10911
(69) The Committee was composed of M. H. Issa., Ali Malier, A .F . Yahia. and 
Mohamed Ali, who, w ith  the exception of the last, were a ll in the Cabinet in 1930.
(70) For events -  See G. Lloyd, Egypt since C r o m e r , Vol. 2 (1934) p.. 110-12 i. ' 
Kohn, Nationalism S Im perialism .. . (1932) p .90-1; Shafiq , Hawliyat. ( vo l .2 )pp.
pp. K>8i
(71) See N. Henderson to Austin Chamberlain on 11.9 .1925 and 12.9.1925 in 
FO 371/10888;for more general account see situation report of 6.12.1925 in
FO 371/10889.
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While his experience in 1925 established him more firmly in his negative 
public image, it provided him with the model for emulation and improvement in 
1930. If his ruthless performance had aroused consternation among the Wafd, its 
outcome equally taught him a lesson. During the mutual antagonistic confrontation, 
he came face to face with Zaghlulism as a.n indomitable myth which captured the 
public imagination and will and which, in its ubiquity and intensity,taxed the sturdiest 
fighter. (72) This rea.lisa.tion induced him to modify his approach later under his 
regime as he reinforced administrative firm ness with an energetic campaign aimed at 
changing people's beliefs and values. (73)
His experience in 1925 also brought to light another basic ambivalence which 
characterised his relationship with the British. Unlike 1930, the British here ha.d 
welcomed his advent as opportune and, in time, Sidqi's Itteha.dist (palace) colleagues 
were anxious to attenuate this enthusiasm by exposing his duplicity towards the 
British. (74) For Sidqi, on the other hand, if the British were welcome counterweights 
to the King on the constitutional front, they were ultimately the obstacle to a much 
coveted national sovereignty, a fact which he could not, as a sta.unch patriot, forget. (75) 
Indeed, the British ha.d little doubt that benea.th a complacent exterior, there lay a 
ha.rd core and they held him in distrustful vigilance. The acting High Commissioner 
a.t the time, Mr. Neville Henderson, expressed this attitude in a perceptive lucidity.
(72) He aptly refers to an aspect of the charismatic phenomenon thus : shakhsiya. 
ga.bba.ra ghamarat al"bila.d, i .e .  a stupendous (daunting, overpowering) personality 
overwhelmed the land. Mudlialdcirati p. 32
(73) See Ch. Ill below, p p  iVx fJT
(74) In connection with Egypt's application to the League of Nations, for e x ., Sidqi 
urged the government to ignore advice earlier tendered it by the Residency and to 
address Geneva, forthwith without consulting the High C om m issioner. At the same 
time he launched his own efforts in Paris. See FO Minute of 2 .9 .1925 in FO 371/10911.
(75) Sidqi voiced the first official demand for evacuation in Parliament in 1945, his 
daughter, Amina Sidqi pointed out to me in our interview. Shortly after, she continued, 
at a reception, the British Ambassador greeted Sidqi with M Comment §a. va notre 
ennemi" -  to which Sidqi retorted in equal humour "If the defence of my country's 
rights renders me an enemy, then I am your permanent enem y."
" He is at heart as nationalist as Saa.d and I am sure he has no
read love for us. I have the impression that once he has utterly 
crushed Saad he would like to put on his mantle as the saviour of 
the country from the British. He is  unscrupulous and dangerous.
But.. .  far and away the most intelligent man in the governm ent.. .  "(76)
In the next round between the King and the Wafd, in the Summer of 1928,
Sidqi was the abortive Palace candidate. (77) The Residency however, found in 
Mohamed Mahmud, the leader of the Liberals, a more appropriate alternative 
and Sidqi prudently overcame his personal disappointment. He threw in his lot 
wholeheartedly with the new Administration and took an active part in its political 
rallies and in Party counsels. (78) He was, nevertheless, critical of the temporary 
suspension of parliamentary life as a means of circumventing Wafdist domination.
He sponsored a trend within the Party that favoured the restoration of an amended, 
constitution to avoid the dubious prolongation of an interim period, which was by 
definition, unstable. With the return of the Wafd to power in January 1930, Liberal 
fortunes rapidly declined. Mahmud's petulant self-abandonment was the sequel of 
an ineffective policy tha.t provoked discontent in the Party at his sterile  leadership.
In the early months of the year, Sidqi took some initiatives to resuscitate the Party, 
but they were futile and merely left behind them the personal tensions which 
conditioned the reception he met when he arrived to lead the government in June.
Before then, however, there were other significant phases of his political 
and more general involvement in developments in the 'twenties. In 1926, he played 
an active role in bringing about the coalition government that put an end to palace 
rule. His role here was reminiscent of its counterpart in 1918 when he brought 
Wafd, Sultan and government together, and it was equally embryonic of a. pattern 
which re-em erged at sim ilar junctures in later years. (75) His aversion of 
factionalism asserted itself in the successful liaison role he assumed in Opposition 
and it confirmed him in his ideal of national unity.
(76) Henderson to Murray, 25.7 .1925.
(77) SeeMudhakkirati J p. 38
(78) Although Sidqi denies having ever joined the Party (Ibid. , p. 45) there is  some 
evidence to the contrary. See Ism ^ l Sidqi Pasha, Sahifa Baida (1932) p .26 ; this does 
not belie his fundamental stand on partisanship . See above note -  (58).
(79) See above p .3 h- ; Sidqi took the initiative in bringing about the united front that 
emerged in 1935, (see Ch. IVp. 187) and again he was central to the formation of the 
National Front in the 'forties. See Weekly Summaries, July 8th-14th, 1943 (Secret) 
in FO 371/35536.
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In the next phase of his political career (1926-1928), Sidqi joined 
Parliament, where he brought his customary vitality and a mature conception of a 
deputy’s role. He used the Chamber as a forum for advocating his ideas on social 
and economic reform to cultivate a trend of opinion behind them. He urged the 
benefits of promoting development works like the Gebel Aulia and the hydraulic 
power station at Aswan, campaigned for protecting local industry and deprecated 
the fisca l Capitulations. (80) He presided over the financial committee with 
exceptional ability. (81) The budget report for 1926-1927 outlined a seven-point 
programme for economic development, which the Speech from the Throne at the 
beginning of the next session publicly endorsed. (82) He demonstrated, thereby, 
how government could be influenced through concrete policy proposals and their 
diligent pursuit. He learned too, of other ways in which parliament could provide 
an effective source of support to a national government in strengthening its hand 
on a question of sovereignty. (83) His interventions in debate were notably compact, 
informed and perceptive^which removed them from the manifest parochialism and 
average performance of the day. But it was his zealous industry in committees, 
out of the limelight, that confirmed his practical faith in the value of committee 
work for any serious parliament. The futility and ostentatiousness of the plenary 
sessions were even less  gratifying when they combined the spectacle of numbers not 
only out-weighing opinion but also seeking to tyrannise it. (84) He grew convinced 
of the need to strike a more equitable balance within its organisation so  as to secu re  
efficiency against mediocrity and to safeguard the representative principle.
(80) Sir Bertram Hornsby attributed the agitation against the fisca l Capitulations in 
the late ’20's to him. See Residency despatch of 16.5.1929 in FO 371/1?>(B 1^ 3 ; and 
Residency Minutes of July 1932 in FO 141/769 (file 443) ; for Sidqi’s policy advocation 
see ex. in interpellation in Chamber in MMN, 9 .2 .1927.
(81) Zaghlul, who was President of the Chamber then, paid tribute to Sidqi’s role : 
see Ibid, 19.7.1926 and 15.7.1927 ; much to Sidqi’s gratification.Mudhakkirati, p. 33.
(82) See Chamber debates in MMN, 18.2.1926 ; cf. 13.7.1926.
(83) SeeMudliakkirati  pp. 36-37; see example in session of 2 5 .6.1927 where he tabled 
three questions. One of his general questions here presages the ambitious programme 
he launched in 1946 when he formed an independent Superior Council, directly attached 
to the Council of Ministers to lay a plan for combating, poverty, ignorance and disease : 
a blue print for social and economic reform.
(84) The Wafdists tried to alter the statutes of the Chamber to the disadvantage of the 
minority during the 1927-1928 session. See MMN, 9 .6 .1928
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When Moha.med Mahmud came to power in 1928 he vigorously took up the 
issue of Sidqi rs ca.ndida.ture for the auditor ship -general with the King and the 
matter constituted a bone of contention between them. Mahmud was anxious to 
placate a dangerous rival while the King was hostile to both the creation of such 
a post and, especially, to Sidqi*s candidature for it. After all, in 1926, Sidqi 
had been behind the parliamentary offensive on the dilatory Royal purse, and, 
whatever his qualifications, he could not be welcome. (85)
By 1930, there was little doubt about Sidqi's qualifications on fiscal as well 
as broader economic issu es. His record of active achievement and involvement in 
the economy reinforced this conviction. As Minister of Finance in two consecutive 
governments in 1921 and 1922, he had wrestled successfully with the central issue? 
of public finances and emerged with his first budgetary fea.ir. He balanced a critical 
budget, bequeathed his successors a Reserve Fund of £E 9,000,000 and laid down 
the foundations of a policy successive Administrations followed. (86) He explained 
to his compatriots how the budget was a measure of national credibility while a 
strong Reserve was a cornerstone for development, (87) At the same time he 
sought the opportunity to promote some of the ideas which he had formulated in 
the 1917 Report. In extending industrial credit to Bank Misr he departed from prevail­
ing orthodoxy and set up a bold precedent. Similarly, with the 1922 legislation  
encouraging local production, he instituted in a mild but unmistakable beginning 
the principle of protectionism, which he later reinforced when he came to power 
in 1930. (88) Early in 1922 he actively encouraged the formation of the Association 
of Industries that was launched then. (89) Industry called for organisation and 
partnership and the new Association with its preponderance of foreign elements -
(85) For ex. of such an offensive see Ibid, 11.8.1926
(86) See Confidential Report on Egypt for 1921 (Ch. I I ., government finances) enc. 
in Residency despatch, December 1922 in FO 407/195.
(87) See statement in 1923 electoral manifesto.
(88) See ex. in M inisterial Decrees of 22. 6.1922; cf. extension of preferential 
treatment to local products in decree of 31.7.1930. See below Ch.V. p. 398
(89) The Federation of Egyptian Industries originated in an Association of Industries 
in February, 1922. For constitution and objectives see Misr al-Sina*iya (which will 
be referred to below in its French version, I/Egypte Industrielle (L'EI) Vol. 1 . ,  1924.
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reflecting the objective situation in Egypt at the time -  came to consecrate these 
principles. (90)
Sidqi also left behind him as Minister, the Economic Council. This was 
another expert consultative body presided over by the Minister of Finance and 
comprising different elements of competence a.nd authority, inside and outside 
government, formed with the object of conducting systematic research into 
economic policies "along scientific lines". (91) Outside office, he retained his 
connection with wha.t proved to be a vital and effective organ. He headed sub" 
committees on it set up to study the legislation on the Credit Agricole and drafted 
the comprehensive memorandum on it in June 1930, just before he came to power. (92) 
He was sim ilarly involved with examining the proposed tariff modifications in the 
new Customs regime in 1929. (93)
Between 1925 and 1930 Sidqi assumed an equally active role in private 
business and came in close conta.ct with foreign, notably Continental,--interests.
He presided over the Egyptian Electric C o ., the Komombo Sugar C o., the Deutajhe- 
Orient and Egyptian Pharmaceuticals, while he held directorships in other Companies, 
notably, Tramways, the Filature Nationale, Cement Orient and Egyptian Cement and 
Tilbury Dredging and Contracts. (94) Faced with the prospects of Independence, 
foreigners sought Egyptian connections and, in Sidqi,. they found more than the 
figure «hea.d they needed to bolster their security. For Sidqi, it was a case where 
his personal interests converged with those of Egypt as he saw them. In 1929, he 
became the Vice "President of the Association of Industries.
(90) See Ch. V below, p. 7_*o3
(91) See Note on the formation of the Economic Council submitted by Sidqi to the 
Council of Ministers on 12.8.1922.
(92) See text in Sa.hifat al-Tijara. w ral"gina*a (STS), July, 1930.
(93) For Customs regim e, see Ch. II and V below, pp. 36 i p. ’11% ■
(94) Upon his advent to power in 1930, Sidqi resigned his directorship in eleven 
Companies. See list in Ismail Sidqi Pasha, SahTfa.. . , p. 18
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By 1930, Sidqi ’s reputation of long “Standing interest and ability was matched 
by a.n equal credibility in business c irc les. Representations reaching the Residency 
on the unsatisfactory conditions under the Wafd quoted the views of "H.E. Ismail 
Sidqi Pasha" for their authority. (95) Conversely, there were those who directly 
attributed Sidqi's r ise to power to "surreptitious" business influences and the 
polemic assumed an interesting form in the Press of the day. (96) While the 
evidence here is  inconclusive, there is  little doubt that Sidqi's record of credibility 
qualified him for the commendation of influential business elements with access to 
the Palace. More significantly, his record of achievement qualified him for the 
candidature.
$ •P T
While his early career and the War interval exerted their formative influences 
on Sidqi, the future statesman, his practical involvement in the ’twenties provided 
him with the consolidating influences in this regard. Each time his appearance in 
government had coincided with a. political upheaval and his presence was often crucial 
for implementing that government’s programme. He contributed decisively to the 
cause of Independence in its early stages and later, when it was threatened. Outside 
office he maintained an equal vitality and a marching capacity for handling power 
effectively. By 1930 he was fully alive to the implications of the gathering storm in 
the political and economic scene and he was equally prepared for what he conceived 
to be a rescue “m ission.
(95) See enc. (2) in Residency despatch of 14. 6.1930 in FO 371/14641.
(96) The authors of alHhiqilab alrDustouri (1931) and Fuad a.l“Awa.l (19ffi) for e x . , 
see bibliography -  adopted this line. For implications of Jewish community in the 
Regime, see Catta.oui (Cairo) and Alfred Tilche and Raphael Toriel (Alex), its 
official representatives, denouncing an earlier publication by a. certain Maurice 
Fargeon of a ’Union des Juifs L ibres’. See polemic in the Re veil, 28.11.1930 and 
Liberte, 29.11.1930 and 30.11.1930; For comment, denouncing any political 
affiliations, see La Bourse Egyptienne, 29.11.1930. More generally, Jewish 
business elem ents interested in the Regime, are referred to in FO 141/722 (File 352)
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CHAPTER TWO
THE RISE OF THE REGIME AND ITS CONSOLIDATION 
IN THE LIGHT OF BRITISH POLICY
"Politics requires particular qualities in the mind, spirit and 
learn ing.. .  a balanced mind, that can weigh the facts and 
calculate the consequences, without indulging in either 
optimism or pessim ism , and without relying on chance or
rumour Politics is like war, for it requires a bold and
venturesome sp ir it .. .  it differs from war in that it calls for 
temperance and moderation.. .  "
(Sidqi, 3.10.1931)
"The formula of our Egyptian policy is  a very simple o n e .. .  "
(A. Henderson, 18.9.1929)
"We remain neutral and both sides look with diverse hopes and 
apprehensions to us as the potentially deciding e lem en t.. .  M
(Loraine, 21.2.1931)
* The Rise of the Regime
The setting for the new Regime la.y in the months that shortly preceded its 
r ise . In the space of six months, between January and June 1930, Sidqi was among 
those who apprehensively followed the trend of developments under a faltering 
Wafdist statesmanship. This was the third time, in the course of six years, for 
the Wafd to resume office and this time they meant to retain it a.t all costs. Their 
determination was reflected in their priorities and dictated the course of develop- 
ments from the outset. For the first time, the conclusion of a Treaty with Great 
Britain, hitherto the raison d'etre of the Wafd, was relegated to a secondary 
position in a programme headed by the objective of "protecting the Constitution”. (1)
The new Government under Nahas took its first practical steps in the direction 
of consolidating its immediate power base on the political and executive levels. It 
ensured the coordination of the party in parliament by endorsing the statutes of the 
Parliamentary Wafdist Group in February, 1930. (2) These vested a central executive
(1) See Speech from the Throne, MMN, 11.1.1930
(2) A summary of the statute is  enc. in Residency despatch of 13. 3.1930. (Confid.)
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organ with authority such as would concentrate power in the hands of an inner 
group that would control the organs of government whenever the Wafd was in power.
At the same time it formed within the Administra.tion a cabal of party agents under 
the "Assistant*1 Director General, a newly created post. The Wa.fdisa.tion of the 
government machinery in the Capital was matched by a. decline in the authority of 
* urodas and officials in the provinces as the latest local elections in May had 
transformed the provincial councils into Wafdist strongholds. The actual power of 
the Wafd grew stronger than it had ever been before. (3) To secure it however, certain 
basic legislation was needed in order to curb opposition, procure an effective say 
for the Wafd in the Courts and deprive the King of his constitutional prerogatives.
The last objective was sought in the Bill of Ministerial responsibility. (4)
The proposed legislation was ostensibly introduced as a measure to protect 
the Constitution, qualifying a.s high treason any violation or suppression of it and 
providing for severe penalties against offending M inisters. However much the King 
disliked it, he knew that according to the provisions of the Constitution, it would 
ultimately become law .(5) All he could do meanwhile, was to use his month of 
grace to delay the event. But the Wafd was anxious to pass the bill before the 
parliamentary session ended. Upon the return of the negotiating delegation from 
London towards the end of May, Nahas forced the issue with the Monarch -significantly, 
without consulting all his colleagues. He threatened to resign unless the King gave 
his consent forthwith to the outstanding bill. A familiar pattern appeared to repeat 
itself here, as the King a.nd the Wafd quarrelled at a moment of apparent rupture 
in Anglo “Egyptian negotiations. Yet, beyond the formal sim ilarity with previous
(3) See details on the Administration under the Wafd in letter from Keown-Boyd to 
Smart on 25.5.1930 in FQ 371/14615
(4) For copy of Bill and accompanying explanatory note, see  enc. in Residency 
despatch of 25.6.1930 (Confid); for history and nature, see  letter from Judicial 
Adviser to Oriental Secretary of 24. 6.1930 and FO confidential despatch of 4. 8.1930.
Cf. Law 32/1922 (p en a l code amendment) See A llenby t o  Curzon, 1 5 .1 0 .2 2 ’^  y6V7J/776i
(5) Article 35 in 1923 Constitution stipulates that if the King fails to return the bill 
to Chamber within 1 month it would be promulgated and come into force."The
interpretation.. .  is  arbitrary it would be more correct to deduce an opposite
meaning. " RMC, p. 19
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events in 1924 and 1927, the cr isis  in 1930 had its distinctive features. The 
transformation that overtook the Wafd itself as it was at a critical phase of its 
evolution from a. nationalist movement to a ruling Party wa.s a.mong these features. 
Forced to come to terms with the Treaty eventuality, the Wafd was anxious to 
protect itself from an anticipated treacherous thrust that would exploit the 
concessions inevitable in any Trea.ty and oust it from power. It seized the 
cordiality prevailing with the British, notwithstanding the breakdown in negotiations, 
to effectively undermine the position of the King. In fact, neither the Wald nor the 
King him self would have a.cted in the present clash without probing British rea.ction.
The Socialist government which had come to power in Britain in the Spring of 
1929 was then pursuing a. line of policy which, in effect, constituted a. novel depart­
u r e  in the annals of Anglo-Egyptian relations. (6) It was genuinely anxious to 
reach a settlement on the Egyptian Question with a "freely-elected representative 
government. " (7) It wa.s explicit in its intentions and confident in its ability. To 
prove its good-will, it proclaimed its resolution to refrain from intervening in 
all affairs not related to the four Reserved Points as it was convinced that such 
interference could only hinder the desired objective. As a result of this policy the 
Wafd was restored to power and treated to a series of concessions by the British. (8) 
When negotiations broke down towards their end over the Sudan, one of the Reserved 
Points, the rupture was declared temporary; Mr. Henderson extended his good-faith 
in proclaiming an "open door policy". (9) As the constitutional cr is is  developed 
during the month of June, the Secretary of State's personal sympathies counselled 
a more flexible interpretation of British neutrality on the side of the Wafd. Indeed, 
by interjecting his opinion at a critical juncture of its development, he underlined
(6) The novelty lies more in the rapprochement with the Wafd. Theoretically, 
British policy since 1922 maintained its consistency. See FO Memorandum by 
Mr. A .F . Orchard on 24.7.1934.
(7) See statements by the Under Secretary of State, Mr. Da.lton, a.t Welwyn on 
29.8.1929; and by the Secretary of State later in the debate on the Adjournment on 
23.12.1929. H.C..(„ vol. 233). ,
F o r  A nglo-Egyptian re la tio n s  between 1929 and 1934, see  niemorandum by H.Godwin 
on 9. if. 1936 in FQ 407/219.
(8) See Loraine to Henderson, 19.1.1930. (Gonfid).
(9) Tim es, 9 .5 .1930
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his difference from earlier British Administrations.
" I have no regrets that we ca.me to grips with political reality,
the Wafd, and ceased chasing political phantoms a.nd it is
certainly right, now, to do all we can to keep the door open and 
the friendship firm ." (10)
The Foreign Office was ready to forego the implications of the controversial 
bill if this would keep the wa.y clear for the Treaty. The last thing it wished was 
to mar the political clime which seemed so "unbelievably good." (11)
Much of the credit for rehabilitating Anglo-Egyptian relations went to the 
British Representative who had arrived in Egypt in the previous Autumn to 
implement the new Labour policy. Sir Percy Loraine was a talented diplomat a.nd> 
he differed radically from his predecessor, George Lloyd, who was steeped in 
the imperial tradition. (12) Loraine him self was fundamentally a humanitarian 
who saw "no loss of prestige or dignity in treating human beings as such, ” and 
whose self-avowed purpose was "to take the sting out of Anglo “Egyptian relations. '(13) 
He had assumed office at a difficult moment and succeeded by dint of his discreet 
handling in wi nning the confidence of both the King and the Wafd. His Fabian 
principles made him a capable devotee of the policy of non-intervention, to which 
he substantially contributed. (14) This was particularly evident with the outbreak 
of the constitutional cr is is  as he faithfully reported back on the situation and sought
(10) See FO Minutes, 27. 5.1930.
(11) Loraine to Selby, 3 .2 .1930.
(12) Loraine, Rt. Hon. Sir Percy Lyham (of Kirkha.rle) -  b. November, 1880 
d. May 1961; educated at Eton and New College, Oxford; Spent 25 years in the 
Foreigh Service between Constantinople, Tehran, Rome, Peking, Madrid, Warsaw 
and Athens before coming over to Egypt from where he was promoted to Angora and 
ended his diplomatic career in Rome. UK delegate on special Commissions inc. 
Peace Conference (1918-1919) -  A character of integrity and perception with a 
passion for fairness; a conscientious idealist and perfectionist.
Lord Lloyd’s was a Colonial Office career. See biography in C .F . Adams (1948) 
in bibliography.
(13) From Gordon Waterfield, Professional Diplomat (1973) p. 166
(14) For examples see telegraphic despatches, Loraine to Henderson on *2. .6 .1930  
and 8 .7 .1930 and 12.7.1930 -  For contrast with views of Egyptian D ept., see
FO memo of 5 .7 .1930. F0 371/ 14616 _
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guidance, but, typically, anticipated his instructions. (15) Unlike his political 
m asters in Whitehall, he clearly saw the implications of the proposed b ill and 
was less  sanguine of it; his political conscience however, counselled a strict 
observance of neutrality in consistence with past Labour professions. Indeed, actuated 
by the twin desire for fairness and consistency, Loraine was to steadily imprint 
British policy with his scruples and carry it beyond the original intentions of the 
Labour Government. For the moment though, he acted with its full authority and 
the communication which he made to the King and to Nahas respectively on British 
policy had been endorsed by the Cabinet earlier. (16)
This policy communication influenced subsequent developments in a manner 
which neither the parties to the dispute in Egypt nor the Labour Government in 
London could foresee. Loraine made it clear to the former that while HMG would 
remain strictly neutral to the internal issue at stake between them, it attached the ■ 
utmost importance to the pending Treaty settlement. T o  Nahas he added his counsel, 
purely as "a private friend", urging him not to precipitate a cr is is  at this junctureC17) 
But Nahas, who was heartened by the communication and possibly, by the disarming 
friendliness of the High Commissioner, dism issed it. His immediate power 
preoccupations were more compelling. The King, on the other hand, took little 
comfort from the communication which merely added to his immediate difficulties.
During the. two weeks in which the constitutional issue was at stake there was 
acute anxiety in the Palace. The King found reprehensible the personal conduct of 
his Prime Minister upon his return from London and, soon, the tension was 
compounded by the substance of the outstanding issues between them. He had 
anticipated the breakdown in the negotiations which would embarrass! the Government 
and provide the opportunity to get rid of it. The mutual flirtations between 
Mr. Henderson and Nahas however, perplexed him and the "open-door” proclamation 
was even more annoying. But he did not spend his time in idle contemplation. Eager 
to test the British reaction at closer range, particularly to the topical b ill, he sent
(15) Cf, Loraine to Henderson, 12.6.1930 & Henderson to Loraine, 24. 6.1930.
(16) See Cabinet Conclusions on 4. 6.1930 in Cab. 23/64
Loraine to Henderson, 10.6.1930 ( Tel./Confid.)
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his em issaries to the Residency. (18) Their readingsof the barometer there were 
more confusing than helpful and, for the first time he was at a real lo ss. He was 
caught between anxiety and despair before the evasive professions of neutrality which 
were coupled with the warning against anything that might upset prevailing Anglo * 
Egyptian good-will. The prospects of the Bill of M inisterial Responsibility were 
particularly galling for it was intended to tip the balance permanently to his 
disadvantage, and before the distracting development of a Wafdist-Labour axis^ 
he realised he could only play for time. It was a grim .future he feared, for 
him self and his son. (19) But Fuad was a gambler and rather than succumb to 
apparent British indifference to his fate, he took advantage of it and met the 
challenge of his smug Prime Minister with a vengeance. "When NahasPasha throws
y
down the gauntlet, the King knows how to pick i t . . .  " was the spirit which beckoned 
in the next government. (20)
In inviting Sidqi to lead the new Government the King was knowingly adding 
fuel to smouldering a.shes3for he could not have found a more ruthless and able exponent 
for his anti-Wafdist offensive. Rumours circulating earlier of nocturnal exchanges 
between Sidqi and the Palace lent a semblance of premeditation to the Royal offensive 
and confirmed growing fears of an assault on the Constitution. Twice,in the brief 
span of parliamentary life the former had been in danger and on both occasions 
Sidqi was conspicuous. (21) The link between the new arrival and its authority -  
bound precursors was reinforced. Sidqi's appearance now jogged the memory of 
rivals and opponents alike and provoked an ominous public reaction which was 
aggra.va.ted by its timing.
The historical context confounded reactions to the cr is is  out of which the Regime 
arose as the growing telegraphic service of the national press satisfied local
(18) Loraine to Henderson, 3 .6 .1930. (Confid)
(19) See Fuad's conversation with a British resident in Egypt -  communicated in 
Hoare to Henderson, 18.10.1930 (V. Confid); cf. FO Memo, on 21.6.1930 and 
FO Minute on 3 .7 .1930 anticipating an anti-dynastic turn.
(20) The King said this in a private audience to Adly, who was then President of 
the Senate. See Loraine to Henderson 14.7.1930. (T e l.)  Cf. Note by Selby on
record of conversation with Ziwar on 22.7.1930. (FO memo) FO 371/14617
(21) For political involvement in the 'twenties see C h.l. p .  39 ff.
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curiosity on developments elsewhere. It may be suggested here tha.t when a 
deputy rose in the Chamber and threatened to bash in the biggest head in the land 
that dared to tamper with the Constitution, and sim ilarly, when the outgoing 
Wafdist assem bly vouched for the sacrosanctity of that Constitution, they were 
both over-rea.cting to events beyond Egypt, as much a.s to real home-spun fears. (22) 
The apprehensive anticipation which had filled the Wafdist press columns in the 
week preceding the resignation of the Cabinet contributed to moulding public 
attitudes in a. manner prejudicial to the new Regime, and more generally, to the 
constitutional carnse itself. In the following month, the repercussions of world 
events continued to exercise their impact on the na.tiona.list psyche and the same 
rebellious deputy, for example, did not refrain from incursions in the same veir^ 
this time in the national press. (23) The margin of liberal intellectuals, led by the 
editor of the Siyasa., was among the most vulnerable to this impact, and suggestions 
in the House of Commons that Egyptians were possibly not worthy of democratic 
institutions, provoked a belligerent defensive which partly precipitated a.n eleventh- 
k°ur vo he-face by the Constitutional Liberal Party against the Regime. (24) Nor 
did the implications of the Fascist wave on the other side of the Mediterranean 
escape the critics of parliamentary life in Egypt. The Report which provided the 
modified Constitution with its rationale contained its share of anti-liberal influences 
in the derogatory allusions to parliamentary institutions it contained. (25)
Meanwhile, the World Depression which ha.d set in with the Autumn of 1929, 
wa.s a crucial feature in the historical setting and, it too, left its political 
repercussions. Indeed, two particular questions arise in considering the implications
(22) See MMN, 17 .6 .1930 ' & 2 3 .6 .1 9 3 0
(23) The offending deputy and journalist, Abbas al-Aqqa.d, wa.s subsequently 
prosecuted on a charge of lese-m ajeste over a. ser ies of articles in al-Moa.yyed in 
September, 1930 -  An undated publication by him denouncing European autocracies 
on the rise  may be attributed to this period. See al-Hukm al-Mutlaq.
(24) See below p£. 5P-S0
See esp. Commons debates on 29. 7.1930 . H. C. (Vol 242 )
(25) See for e x . , the allusion to the "decadence of parliamentary institutions" in RMC 
p .5 -  See further ex. jpp. 12, 24, 25.
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of the economic situation in 1930 on political developments in Egypt. The first . 
is  whether the apparently impulsive conduct of the Wafd was directly related to 
its immediate economic difficulties. Here* although no direct link between the 
Wafdist resignation and the former can be conclusively ascertained* there is  
little doubt that they contributed to the sense of insecurity which overwhelmed its 
leadership. The onsetting repercussions of the Depression in Egypt* mainly 
reflected in the sharp fall in cotton prices, empha.sised the incompetence of the 
Wafdist Administration and disclosed its readiness to gamble with the economy in 
the short-run in order to maintain its popularity. (26) It realised however, that it 
could not escape the consequences of its pursuits indefinitely and, its alarm led to 
such random measures as the massive draft made on the Government account in 
the Na.tiona.l Bank, in the week before Nahas forced his hand with the Monarch. (27) 
Irresponsibility gave way to panic and the urgency of despatching the Wafd's 
political problems seem s to have dawned on the Minister of Finance, Makram Ebeid, 
who was second to none in Nahas Pasha’s counsels at the time. (28) The Wafd, too, 
was not insensitive to the uneasiness its mediocrity in administrative matters, and 
in the management of the economy; provoked among interested quarters and critics  
alike. The invective Sidqi incurred on his arrival was partly a measure of this 
a.wareness.
The second question here concerns the opportuneness of Sidqi’s arrival at 
this juncture. It coincided with a turning point in the national economy as the new 
Customs regime-which was under preparation in the relevant government 
departments during 1929, came into force in February 1930. The last of a series of
(26) It was not its intervention in the cotton market that was reprehensible, as 
this was a practice common to a ll governments -  But it was reproached for its  
indulgence in it in worsening conditions^or the absence of an alternative policy.
(27) See confidential memorandum on economic situation under the Wafd by the 
Commercial Secretary, R. Turner, 14.6.1930. For Wafdist defence see letter 
to the editor from Makram Ebeid. T im es, 14.7.1930 -  Challenged in the same 
columns on 18.7.1930 by M.A. Abboud.
(28) See Loraine to Henderson, 19.1.1930 (Confid.) -  Ebeid’s personal conduct 
in the Ministry of Finance was not inspiring. See note of Financial Adviser to 
the Residency of 11. 6.1930, and further note on 28. 7.1930. (C onfid .)
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commercial agreements concluded in the latter part of the nineteenth century, 
the Agreement with Ita.ly of 1889, had expired in 1929, and for the first time in 
fifty years, Egypt was free to regulate its tariff legislation. (29) The event was 
greeted jubilantly particularly among industrial c irc les. Egypt was seen to have 
made a "geste de principe" in favour of its local production.
"Cette annee, 1930, " the President of the Association of Industries,
M. Henri Na.us, happily observed, " a marque des son debut, une 
orientation heureuse vers un regime economique plein de p o ssi-  
bilites d 'avenir." (30)
Industrial interests which stood to benefit most from these possibilities reorganised
them selves into the Federation of Egyptian Industries to mark the development of
corporative interests within big industry and to underline its national character. >
At a moment when its prospects of regeneration were good, industry could hardly
regard with equanimity the complications attending the Depression and the aberrations
of an incompetent administration. Sidqi's protectionist creed, backed by a practical
record of achievement, made him the most eligible candidate for the ministry of
the economy a.t this turning point. (31) If his appearance at the head of the new
government provoked a stormy political reception, it wa.s welcome among business
c irc les.
The situation, however, was an integral whole and, in imposing itself on the 
statesman, it presented him with simultaneously incongruent and interlocking 
elem ents. International currents aggra.va.ted the background of distrust against 
which the constitutional cr is is  in Egypt evolved. Sidqi's own professions of a 
constitutional faith in the interlude preceding the promulgation of the new Constitution 
in October 1930, meant little against his actual record of com m issions, while the 
duplicity and formalism in wh ich Egyptian politics were cast did even le ss  to 
simplify their language and conduct. (32) The climax of the Wafdist programme
(29) This freedom was actually qualified in view of existing Capitula.tions. See 
Ch. V below. 2.2-2..
(30) General Assembly of the Egyptian Federation of Industries, 7 .4 .1930.
(31) See Ch. I. pf*
(32) For political context see Ch. I. p. '^ 6 ffk
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which had led to its debacle, vitiated the substance of the constitutional component 
that was formally contended. The more general effect of the Depression itse lf  
was to confound lucidity among the politically conscious and to encourage a sullen 
and irritable mood among the general public. The situation called for sobriety, 
as well as a. clea.r vision and a ruthless will. Sidqi realised that self-restraint 
needed to be combined with self-assertkugfor his possible command of his 
objectives was not matched by an equal control of his course. The timing of his 
arrival and the reactions he elicited left him little room for manoeuvre. But 
he wa.s not dispirited. His strongest asset lay in a robust self-confidence and in 
his innate love of a challenge. The first quality ensured him his sobriety and 
the second, his determination, while the trials of the previous decade backed 
vision with experience, so that he knew precisely wha.t he wanted.
Sidqi saw in the elimination of the excesses of the nationalist movement a. 
condition for national prosperity and progress. The Wafd had to be contained, the 
Administration entrusted to elements of ability and m erit, and power distributed 
more equitably among its legitimate contenders. The absence of a Treaty with 
Britain undermined internal stability, while the conclusion of one was complicated 
by British scruples over the representative character of its negotiating partner. 
Sidqi felt that he could reconcile effectiveness with representativeness, neutralize 
the Wafdist menace, rescue the country's administration and finances and, conclude 
an Anglo-Egyptian settlement which would crown his own earlier efforts in 1922. 
Such wa.s the na.tiona.l mission which he felt he was destined to assume and for 
which he temporarily sacrificed his private business interests. (33)
His immediate priority,however, was political survival. The primary 
elem ents of the situation were not particularly encouraging. An ambitious but 
frightened Monarch provided, for the moment, the regim e's main source of 
stability, while lukewarm and unsteady pockets of support were not entirely absent. 
Otherwise, a hostile public and an aggressive Opposition, together with a reticent 
and unpredictable British presence hovering in the wings were the only other 
certainties on the scene. The principles of statesmanship in the circumstances 
called for the containment and control of hostile forces and the cultiva.tion of 
confidences wherever possible.
(33) See Gh.I^- Sidqi saw him self then as a business man - See Ch.Ill b e lo w ^ llT
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Sidqi's first act in power was to issue a proclamation of his intentions and 
an outline of his policy, He affirmed the resolve of his government to maintain 
order and stability and to devote its efforts to the economic cr is is . Despite the 
diffuse generality a.nd apparent complacency of the manifesto, ea.ch of its carefully 
couched statements contained a vital message for the particular sector of the 
public a.t whom it was aimed. The exhortation to calm, coupled with veiled threats, 
was directed at the Wafd; the assurances about the economy at the business 
community; the affirmations of the constitutional intentions of b is  government at 
the British ; and the assertions of equity and justice to the Constitutional Liberals, 
the recent victim s of Wafdist excesses. The subtle division of the anonymous public 
he faced was typical of Sidqi's concrete approach, while the entire gesture was 
characteristic of a style he developed and refined throughout his stewardship in an 
attempt to overcome the traditional trappings of authority and to establish his 
personal credibility. (34) It did little, however, to a.llay suspicions and fears, while 
the rational gesture accompanied by the symbolic renunciation of partisan allegiances 
and the proclamation of a National Cabinet -  together with its rationale -  was greeted  
with mockery and d isb e lie f.. His firm declaration of intent to undertake his 
responsibilities undeterred provoked the challenge that set the pace for subsequent 
events.
His next task was to secure allies a.nd to ensure his flanks against an 
unexpected British thrust. A background of common experience and personal 
association, together with a community of interests and ideas, led him to expect 
from the Constitutional Liberals something more than the tame and equivocal 
support they initially gave him. The hope of forming a government from among 
them was dashed from the beginning when Mohamed Mahmud, their lea.der, categoric­
ally refused any official collaboration. (35) For an instant Sidqi was left at the 
mercy of the Palace Party. In this context, the Na.tiona.l Cabinet bid was partly a 
gimmick aimed a.t the Monarch as much as at the public whose confidence it was
(34) See the bid for Leadership in Ch. Ill below, M>7
(35) Mohamed Mahmud, betrayed by the British, snubbed by the King and never on 
the best of terms with Sidqi adopted a dog-in-the-manger attitude towards the 
Regime and his personal antagonism cost him nearly £E 20,000 in a. libel suit in 1932.
M.H. Heyka.l,Mudhak]drat (1951) Vo 1.1, pp .314ff. -  furnished the Liberal
version of accounts.
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deemed to enhance. Sidqi, however, retained their informal provisional support 
and procured the active services of one or two of their numbers whose resignation 
from the Party obvia.ted an embarrassment. (36) Meanwhile, the negotiations and 
bargaining for a. more positive stance continued feverishly during the summer until 
they broke down in an open declaration of hostilities with the promulgation of the 
new Constitution.
The handling of the British called for another kind of dexterity of which 
Sidqi demonstrated a greater command. Aware of the key role the Residency 
traditionally played in ,government"cra.ft’ and remembering,in particular, the 
personal role of the previous incumbent in sim ilar circum stances, Sidqi paid 
the customary call on the High Commissioner with more than the usual anxiety.
He had, after all, been appointed by his Sovereign without prior British approval 
and he arrived at an unpropitious moment from the point of view of Anglo~Egypti.au 
relations as Sir Percy bluntly informed him. (37) The dubious British detachment 
from internal affairs wa.s unprecedented and, in leaving a.ll the pa.rties guessing, 
it did little to alleviate the uncertainty in which Sidqi found him self. In his first 
meeting he hinted at his intention v/ith regard to constitutional changes, but firmly 
maintained his belief that parliamentary government had come to stay. He also 
reassured HMG Representative of the .prompt . resolution of the treaty problem. 
He was really anxious for an assurance against British interference with his 
programme, but ha.d to be contented with a non-committal response. In this first 
exchange, however, he laid down the foundations of the 'corridor diplomacy' of 
which clarity, candour and a mutual appreciation of respective interests provided 
the cornerstones. Sidqi realised that his Regime ultimately depended upon the 
benevolence of British neutrality and he was aware that the policy was a frail growth 
that could be imperilled if it were left to the political vicissitudes in which it
(36) These included Hafez Afifi, Abdel Fa.ttah Yahia and Mohamed Ali Alluba; the 
last declined to join the new Cabinet.
For-Liberal Party resolutions offering Sidqi limited or conditional support, see  
Siyasa, 19.7.1930 & 27.9.1930
(37) Loraine to Henderson, 19. 6.1930 (Confid)
Outlets for the Sudan impasse over which negotiations foundered were under active 
consideration in the Foreign O ffice-FO  memorandum 12.6.1930 -  while informal 
talks with Nahas were actually started in Cairo.
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originated. He assidiously strove to cultivate British good-will, and, for the moment, 
to retain British neutrality.
B. The Power Struggle
The events that followed SidqiTs assumption of power conformed to a pattern that 
was by then fam iliar. On the 21st June, parliament wa.s prorogued for one month, a 
formality observed in order to comply with the constitutional provision for the duration 
of a.n ordinary session (art. 96). Shortly after, another Royal Decree proclaimed 
the closure of the session to provide the Government with an interlude to study 
reform s. So far, the Government had acted without incurring any technical violations 
of the Constitution, for out of practical self-interest Sidqi was anxious to observe 
the bounds of legality. Theoretically, the situation in which he acted fa.cilita.ted the 
implementation of his resolution to do so. While on previous occasions the Wafd 
had been dism issed from office, this time it had resigned. Similarly, by giving 
its exclusive vote of confidence to the out-going government, Parliament provided 
the new one with the excuse to adjourn the session without presenting itself before 
it for a. vote of confidence which wa.s formally denied it. But the intentions of the 
newly formed government were so suspect and the distrust of Sidqi's person was 
deeper still, so that he wa.s^out of hand, deprived of options which had been open 
to his p red ecessors.(38) His very choice to lead the government was, in the 
circum stances, a challenge to the will of the nation. His actions were consistently 
represented in such terms in the vernacular press of the day and his efforts to 
maintain good faith were repeatedly thwarted a.s a. result.
The first phase in the politics of protest and rejection was already in full 
swing even before Sidqi had counted his third day in office. “The Day of the Breaking 
of the Chains", as the 23rd June came to be known, when Deputies and Senators forced 
their way into Parliament to contest the decision to prorogue the session, pointed in 
Opposition circles to the imminent deposition of the new government. (39) Forecasts
(38) See example in text of correspondence between him and Wissa. W assef, the 
President of the Chamber of Deputies, who refused to prom ise that session would 
be confined to reading the decree a.s the case had been in 1928.
A*R. Raf*ip Fi* Aqab al-Tha.wra . . .  (1949) vol. 2, pp. 114-5
(39) Analogies from the French revolution were frequently drawn at the time and the 
storming of the Bastille was invoked here in the triumphant challenge of MPs.
62
to that effect consumed the columns of the p ress. Three days later, a national 
congress, the forerunner of other assem blies of diminishing impact, met. It 
passed a unanimous vote of no-confidence in Sidqi and warned him of a universal 
boycott campcugft if he failed to present himself to Parliament in a. month's time 
when it was due to meet. The congregation of MPs and provincial councillors 
dispersed on a pledge to lay down their lives for the Constitution. There was little 
that wa.s manifestly novel in this procedure to alarm a. government of experience 
and good memory. It was,however, the sinister pitch beneath the formal sim ilarity  
in protest patterns which was ominous.
Confrontation was inevitable in the presence of an active will to defy 
authority. The sea.son was inaugurated on the 1st July 1930 with a. series of 
provincial visits undertaken in reponse to ostensibly innocent invitations to Nahas 
Pasha by prominent local Wafdists. The Government warily contented itself with 
security measures and mudirs made officious arrangements with local Wafdist 
committees so as to minimise the threat to public order. But the whole object of 
the v isits  wa.s to undermine such order so as to embarrass the government and 
intimidate the British through a rowdy demonstration of popularity. Disturbances 
reached their peak in the riots that broke out in Alexandria in the middle of the 
month, when a foreigner was killed, shops damaged and casu a lties among both 
civilians and police were high, (40) These had originated in a memorial for the 
"martyrs" of Mansura. incidents, five days earlier, but turned out to be a deliberate, 
well-organised affair in which the assaulted police were taken by surprise. It 
took the timely arrival of suitable reinforcements to save the situation>but this did 
not prevent the chain of repercussions that followed. Two British warships set sa il 
for Alexandria and Mr. MacDonald made a threatening policy statement in the House 
of Commons on the next day, which was officially communicated to both the Egyptian 
Government and the Wafd. In the British recognition it earned for itself and in the 
embarrassment it caused the Government the Wafd had almost secured its objective.
(40) It is interesting to note that the riot organisers^sweating effendis blowing 
their whistles and waving their handkerchiefs” ma.de a point of keeping foreigners 
unharmed. An authoritative and comprehensive account is  found in Residency 
despatch of 23.7.1930 in FO 371/ 14618
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However necessary a.nd practical the Statement was from the British point 
of view, it was symptomatic of differences in the Foreign Office over Egyptian 
policy. It denounced the intentions of the Egyptian Government to use HMG "a.s 
an instrument for an attack on the Egyptian Constitution", upheld the 1922 
Declaration, invoked HMG's international responsibilities and placed the 
responsibility for public security squarely on the shoulders of the Government 
and the Wafd alike. It infuriated the King, a basically frightened Monarch^and led 
his disheartened Prime Minister, for a moment, to consider resigning. (41) Sidqi 
was more a.rticulate than his sovereign in exposing the inconsistencies of the British 
gesture. He found it inconceivable to r  them 'to  invoke in one and the sam el b rea th  
the 1922 Declaration in principle and deny it in action. He thought it equally absurd 
for them to call the Egyptian Government to account for that which it had not 
committed, and it was difficult to reconcile the responsibility laid upon it with 
actions that undermined its authority. After all, as he pointed out to the High 
Commissioner, he had managed to control the situation with his own resources,, 
without seeking British assistance. Sidqi, the 'unflappable1, however, soon recovered  
his composure, although he remained critical of the gesture. (42) On 18th July, he 
handed Loraine a strong, but carefully worded,note, in which he communicated this 
resolve, recorded his criticism , defended his government's conduct a.nd upheld the 
precincts .of Egyptian sovereignty. (43)
One of the earliest commitments which Sidqi had undertaken,!!! return for 
continued British neutrality, concerned British international responsibilities in Egypt. 
The gentlemen's agreement he concluded in the early interviews with Loraine 
contained an assurance that his a.ctions would be steadfastly designed to provide 
against such a contingency arising whereby physical'British intervention would
(41) Such reports were broadcast on 19.7.1930; For record of audiences with King 
Fuad see telegraphic despatches from Loraine to Henderson of 17.7.1930, 21.7.1930  
and 22.7.1930 -  For Loraine's interviews with Sidqi see separate telegraphic 
despatches of 17.7.1930 a.nd 18.7.1930 .
(42) L. Grafftey-Smith conveys a vivid description of Sidqi's conduct in his Bright 
L evant(1970) p .28.
(43) He immediately released the note to the press. It was "a historic document" -  
Moqa.tta.rn, 22.7.1930; Sidqi was commended for his statesmanlike qualities by Watanist 
Ahmad Wafiq. Ahram, 20. 7.1930; while a leader in the Egyptian Gazette (23.7.1930) 
criticised the British statement. The Wafdist columns either ignored it or saw in it
an act of collusion. In fact Sidqi had sought Loraine's leave before giving him the 
note to communicate to the HMG.
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become necessary. He promised to keep the High Commissioner accurately and 
fully informed of events through the Director of the European Department, and if 
he, by any chance, miscalculated and an anti-government movement gained the 
upper hand, he would accept the consequences o f his failure, and he would give his 
warning in time. (44) Much depended upon this pledge. His ability to contain the 
active threats of his opponents in the long months before the new regime was launched 
thus constituted the acid test for retaining power. But Sidqi wanted to remain in 
office to achieve certain objectives and, in the absence of British support, he was 
anxious that they should not impede his freedom of action. So he embarked on the 
thorny course of cultivating British good-will by observing an irreproachable conduct.
-/
His hesitant debut in the power struggle was dictated by his intentions to abide
by the "fringes of legality". (45) The first setback to a policy of resoluteness
interlaced with scruples had come upon the prorogation of parliament when
conflicting instructions were issued to the police designed to preserve the dignity
of the body of MPs and at the same time to maintain his authority; they were
impracticable. More resoluteness was essential in the presence of an active will
to provoke disorders. Upon the troubles at Bilbeis and Sharqia. one week later, he
issued a communique restricting the activity of the Opposition and followed it up
with an emphatic statement. He stressad that, as Minister of Interior, his role was
preventive as well as punitive; while not wishing to resort to exceptional measures,
he promised he would not hesitate to do so if necessary. He urged the public to
attend to its business unperturbed. (46) In practice, however, he continued to
observe a considerable show of scruple as seen in his statement, upon the Mansura.
riots, shortly after.
"In order not to furnish a pretext to subversive p ro tests .. .  the 
government decided to have only recourse to such mea.sures as were 
the least likely to be considered as an attempt against individual 
liberty and which,on the other ha.nd,were such as to prevent collision. "(47)
(44) Loraine to Henderson, 8 .7 .1930. FO 571/ 14616
(45) Ibid.
(46) La. Bourse Egyptienne, 4.7 .1930
(47) Ahram, 10.7.1930
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In his anxiety to refute the Wafdist ca.mpa.ign underway in London which imputed the 
disorders to provocative government measures, Sidqi overreached him self. He had 
issued strict instructions to the police a.t Mansura. to practice moderation and restraint 
which observers subsequently confirmed they did - while the police at Alexandria had 
remained unarmed in pursuit of this policy.
"It is  this nervousness which has generally weakened the
Government in its handling of the situation which in no ea.stern
land can be controlled without administrative sternness. "(48)
One of Sidqi's fundamental sources of disappointment with the British ultima.tum 
following the disturbances at Alexandria., was the disregard with which it met his 
painstaking effort to preserve law and order without recourse, up till then, to severe  
or provocative m easures. Thenceforth, he resolved on a redoubled vigilance. Hi^ s 
opponents would be given no cause to doubt his resoluteness, nor an opportunity to 
triumph in his lapses, while his British umpires could s till be meted the necessary  
prudence. The next active round between the government and its opponents was 
expected on the 21st July, the date of the convocation of the adjourned parliament.
The riots were promptly put down a.nd the authority of the government was proportion­
ately enhanced. The principle of deterrence beca.me effective.
The combined effect of Sidqi's firmness and the British communication to Nahas 
produced equivocation in the ranks of the Wafdist leadership. While still anxious to 
embarrass the government, it was particularly loa.the to expose itself to British 
wrath and it partly wished to escape the retaliatory m easures of the government 
as well. It sought alternative channels of protest and petitioned the Monarch for 
a.n extraordinary session which was duly refused it on equally valid legal grounds. 
Meanwhile, it launched a non-cooperation campaign, Indian-style. (49) It incited 
the popula.ce against paying taxes on the revolutionary pretext that a government 
shorn of the support of the representatives of the nation wa.s not entitled to public 
money. (50) The publicised reversion to 'constitutional' tactics was an admission of 
the futility of its street offensive as much as a device to im press its British mentors.
(48) Loraine to Henderson, 17.7.1930 in FO 371/14617 -
For w itnesses referred to in Mansura riots see confidential despatch of 12.7.1930
(49) Mr. Ghandi was invited by Nahas to v isit Egypt on his way to Uganda, and Sidqi 
was disconcerted. Official arrangements were made to preclude his landing at Port 
Said. Ebeid was also active on the India Committee. See Residency despatches of
16.12.1931 and 28.12.1931 in FO 371/15412.
(50) These resolutions were passed at a meeting of Wafdist Body of MPs and provincial 
councillors on 26. 7.1930 -  The taxation boycott campaign was a disappointment.
Hoa.re to Henderson, 6 .12.1930. (jLonPrd)
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The Wafd wa.s even more anxious than Sidqi to secure British favour and their 
contest incriminated them in a manner which his did not. They attributed their fall, 
their exclusion from power and their accumulating grievances to British complicity, 
and they strenuously denounced British neutrality. Their salvation lay in British 
intervention and its delay heightened their efforts to bring it about. While Sidqi*s 
public utterances underlined the thesis of Egyptian sovereignty, the effect of his 
opponents' appeals was to denigrate it. The specta.cle of the nationalist leaders 
denying their own purpose was hardly the opportunity to be m issed, although Sidqi 
may have exploited it less  to his advantage than to their detriment. In dwelling on 
the conflicting implications,cfhizbiya (partisanship) and wataniya (patriotism) he was, 
in the same breath delivering a civic lesson to his compatriots and exposing the 
contradiction in which the. nationalist leaders were trapped. >
The internal political conflict gained its momentum from London. The Wafd, 
mindful of its recent political victory which had restored it to power, had lost no 
time in sending its leading em issaries to organise its political campaign there. (51)
Its efforts on the home "front were run on lines to support the British “aimed offensive 
conducted in London. (52) The Palace too had its em issaries there while the Liberal 
leader who initially sulked his way into indolence, soon joined the fray. (53) The 
annual leave of the High Commissioner too, in this eventful summer,coincided with
(51) MaJkram Ebeid and Ahmad Maher left for England at the beginning of July. A 
monthly publication, Egypt, was the mouthpiece of the campaign, while Ebeid gave 
lectures and interviews in British circles as in the Union of Democratic Control on 
24.10.1930 and in the Manchester Guardian, 17.10.1930. For resulting pressures on 
the Foreign Office, see FO/371/14621.
(52) For ex. in anticipation of \su ita b le  ' instructions from Ebeid in London, Nahas 
delayed his declaration to the press on Anglo "Egyptian treaty possib ilities, which 
was in reply to references to Egypt in the prorogation of Parliament debate in the 
House of Commons, for nearly 3 weeks. Ahram, 13.8 .1930.
(53) e .g . Mahmud luncheon in FO circles. FO Minute, 10.7.1931; Letter to the 
Tim es, 27.10.1930.
Abboud's efforts on behalf of the Regime ; See Chancery despatch of 29.6.1930 and 
FO Minute by Mr. Selby on 15.7.1930 -  FO 371/14616 -
Later these efforts were directed at undermining the Regime through dubious 
contacts maintained with the diplomatic correspondent of the Daily Telegraph, 
an enigmatic Prof. A.M . Gerothwohl. See Ch. IV notes
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the imminence of major constitutional developments and London became the barometer 
for tensions in Cairo and Alexandria. In those circum stances, professions of British 
neutrality rang somewhat hollow. !
In fact, doubts were initially raised in Foreign Office and Residency circles  
about the practicability of maintaining complete detachment from internal affairs.
Its wisdom in the constitutional issue particularly was questioned on more than one 
occasion. (54) But Sir Percy maintained his faith in it even at the more difficult 
moments. By a painstaking process that involved avoiding "anything calculated to 
give the impression that our weight is thrown in one scale or the other" Sir Percy 
almost succeeded in impressing its feasibility as well as its utility.
" When absolute neutrality was decided on a. year ago, " a. senior 
Residency official observed," I denounced it vehemently as outside 
the region of practical politics. Sir Percy Loraine has done more 
with it than I should ever have thought possible. " (55)
British neutrality was not originally intended to be a. disinterested stance. As 
mentioned earlier, the Labour Government had adopted it in order to remove 
obstacles from the path of negotiations and it maintained it towards the constitutional 
issue for the same purpose. Upon Sidqi's arrival, however, there was some 
confusion and a. perceptible divergence set in between the motives of the High 
Commissioner and those of the Egyptian Department. Following an initial jerk 
the latter continued to postulate the imminent^if delayed,resumption of treaty 
negotiations with the Wafd and neutra.lity was regarded a,s a chastening device 
before the Wafd could be brought back to the next conference table. To Loraine on 
the other hand, while the ultimate objective was relegated indefinitely to the near
(54) The strongest reservation from the Secretary of Sta.te came just before elections. 
” Are you satisfied that the complete absence of that Residency guidance and advice 
which has prepared the wa.y for so much political evolution and which strict adherence 
to neutrality and aloofness would preclude, w ill in time promote a 'natural coalition' 
with a definite programme for constitutional compromise and treaty settlem ent.. ."  
and goes on in stronger terms still. Henderson to Loraine, 11.5.1931 (Immediate) -  
Sir Percy replied denouncing any change of policy before elections -  cf. FO 
telegraphic despatch of 28. 6.1930.
(55) Hoare to Henderson, 20. 9.1930 in FO 371/14620.
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future too , h is  sense of honour permitted a tactical concession in priorities 
to keep the gentleman's agreement with Sidqi* He used British neutrality here to 
allow the crystallisation of a.n Egyptian answer to the Egyptian question of power-* 
sharing. To put it differently, if somewhat ungenerously, "to keep the ring clea.r 
and help both sides fight their quarrel out to the bitter end, " as an angry critic 
acidly remarked. (56) In the perplexity it produced among Egyptians though, the 
policy led to a discreet strengthening of the British position.
Historical patterns and political habits died hard. Far from diminishing 
its impact on the conduct of internal events and allowing an "Egyptian answer" to 
evolve to an "Egyptian question", the British presence was progressively dragged 
to the foreground. .Loraine could hardly grasp the impact of the Gromerian legacy 
and the decades of an ambivalent authority structure on the Egyptian mind . He was 
consequently disillusioned with the abortive results of h is conscientious pursuits.
" All that happens is an indictment of HMG, a request for 
intervention in internal affairs, a suggestion -  and rather an 
impudent suggestion -  that I should 'consult' with people who 
allowed and I believe encouraged their press openly to denounce 
British policy as a sham fraud and insidious insincerity, who do 
not shrink from personal abuse of Mr. MacDonald, Mr. Henderson 
and m yself. No, I will have no such 'consultations’. To any schemes 
which aim at union in Egypt.. .  and which are inspired by the good­
w ill towards England commensurate with the good-will towards 
Egypt as a whole which so palpably informs the policy of HMG and 
my own efforts to carry out that p o licy .. .  I w ill listen with every 
sym pathy." (57)
The manifest good-will which motivated Loraine's personal efforts was, to Egyptians, 
a.s novel a. departure as that policy itse lf. The consultations which provided the 
backbone of Opposition attempts to break out of their im passe and in which they 
desperately sought British connivance, were, however repugnant, the only means 
of political action in which Egyptians were trained.
(56) Mr. Churchill’s address to a Conservative meeting at Minster echoed his 
earlier attach on Labour "scuttle" Egyptian policy. See T im es, 20.8.1930 ~ c f - 
H.C, (Vol. 242) p. 1018.
(57) Residency Minutes, commenting on notes of an interview between the oriental 
secretary and a Wafdist moderate (F. Barakat) in April, 1931, enclosed in 18.7.1931  
despatch in FO 371/15407.
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With Sidqi and his opponents anxious to placate their unwieldy arbiter, the 
British remained throughout the pace-setters. Statements on Egypt made in London, 
debates in the House of Commons, newspaper columns were all nervously scanned 
by the Opposition in the hope that the straw in the wind that spelt their delivrance 
might be clutched, while the actions of the High Commissioner were closely followed  
and variously interpreted with the same object in view. While the bulk of Wafdist 
journalism continued its arid forecasts of the end of the Regime, Sidqi rs press  
interviews and editorials in the pro-government press on the other hand, aimed at 
combating this im pression. Meanwhile,the inter-party consultations and bargaining 
between the Wafd and the Liberals degenerated into a banal exploration of alternatives 
to entice British action before they dwindled into mutual abuse on the reef of despair.
The initial rejection of Sidqi and the stolid refusal to come to terms with the 
regime anticipated a derogatory policy that steadily outmanoeuvred its authors beyond 
the political system to which they had become wilful outcasts. Sidqi urged his 
opponents to address them selves to their Sovereign and to rehabilitate their power 
through accepting to compete within the newly established framework instead of 
seeking to overthrow it. But he could not repeat him self too frequently since that 
was interpreted as a sign of weakness. The Government was taunted for its non­
viability and attendant non-eligibility as a negotiating partner, and the taunt was 
a cruel remirder that continued to unsettle Sidqi’s peace of mind. Contented though 
he was with his initial round of successes in quelling insurrection and putting his 
reforms through, their consolidation demanded the final round.
Beyond the elections the continual flow of assertions on British neutrality 
constituted a liability and Sidqi had to adapt his tactics accordingly. Instead of 
harping on the benefits of that neutrality and on its conformity to the 1922 Declaration, 
the moment had come to channel the good-will under cultivation into practical avenues 
and to resume the Treaty negotiations. In the process, the regim e could acquire 
that element of authenticity ( i .e . stability) which, otherwise, would continue to 
elude it. Although the treaty-negotiations were invariably the Achilles heel on 
which his predecessors had stumbled, he was confident of his ability and, despite
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the absence of palpable British encouragement, he was determined to tackle them. 
He had practical incentives for their resumption. The allied Opposition that had 
emerged in April 1931, shortly before elections, from die National Pact concluded 
between the Wafd and the Liberals, had emphatically warned the British that any 
treaty concluded with Sidqi wpuld be open to repudiation. The issue thus became 
a critical test for his authority. Furthermore, with the convocation of the new 
Parliament, Sidqi had to defy the challenge that exploited procrastination as well 
as to appease growing pressures within the Regime itse lf. In this context, the 
protra.ction of the Trea.ty issue in the post-parliamentary period ensured the 
continuation of the power struggle side by side with the consolidation of the Regime.
Impelled by various reminders, Loraine too had to reconsider his priorities 
and adapt his weapon to the changing situation. By the end of 1931, British ta.ctics 
congealed round two central points, both equally inspired by his ideals and, 
together, designed to crea.te a treaty-ripe situation. One was aimed at Sidqi and 
the other at his opponents; and the purpose was to inspire>by indirect British 
influence, the crystallisation of a union of national leaders. As usual, the case was 
presented with a persuasive eloquence that stilled the more doubtful elements at 
the Foreign Office.
" . .  .we axe not without slow, tacit, methods of pressure, even 
though we eschew intervention, and those methods are far safer 
far saner, and in my view, far more honourable than those which 
the Opposition parties wish to dictate to u s. A irefusal to intervene 
is  the strongest form of pressure on those parties to think and 
act in a truer spirit of democracy and constitutionalism. An 
unwillingness to negotiate a settlement with Sidqi until his Regime 
has a broader political ba.sis than it at present p ossesses is the 
strongest lever for inducing him to seek the coopera.tion among 
other political p a r tie s ., .  " (58)
He was aware of the fears and expectations the British presence inspired in both 
parties to the dispute. Faced with the futility of a pure Egyptian solution to a 
question whose purity wa.s mistakenly assumed, Sir Percy reverted to the bridge
(58) Loraine to Henderson, 28.11.1931 (Confid.)
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tha.t linked Constitution to Treaty. Neutrality was now innoculated with a more 
positive element in the discreet contacts he resumed with members of the 
Opposition. (59) But the political education underway was not without its qualifications.
" The various steps which I have taken have not had for their object 
the detachment of prominent Egyptians from their political creeds 
or their a.ttachment to fresh allegiances. They have been designed 
to discourage extremism and to sow, so far as may be and in the 
least unsuitable soil the ideas of conciliation and cooperation, to 
point a moral but not to administer a lecture. " (60)
To honour the pledge of non-intervention and to drive home the practical moral, 
he remained emphatic on the lim its of such British political excursions.
" I have laid it down as a rule, alike for m yself and for officers of 
the Residency who see Egyptian personages, that our responsibility 3 
is on no account to be involved in relation to such future courses 
of action as these personages choose to adopt, least of a ll in the 
direction of any condition of guarantees.. ."  (61)
In following in the tracks of his predecessors Percy Loraine remained true to 
form in abiding by his earlier scruples. Despite his caution, hopes to use British 
influence a.s a lubricant were da.shed by intra.nsigea.nce.
To the Opposition,British neutrality was a.n "expensive innovation" to which 
they continued to react with mounting frustration. (62) Requests for British 
intervention which previously confined themselves to sections of the Wafdist press  
were now urgently repeated in priva.te interviews with officials of the Residency. (63)
(59) These contacts were resumed a.s early as April 1931 and understandably they 
posed difficulties. See Loraine's personal despatches to Murray of 19.3.1931 and
2.4.1931 in FO 371/,15404
(60) Loraine to.Henderson, 12.12.1931. ( Confid.)
(61) Ibid.
(62) Mohamed Mahmud to Reuter correspondent “ Mr. Delany on 3.12.1931.
(63) See Loraine to Simon, 28.11.1931 and 7.12.1931 -  Nahas had aired his 
ambivalent feelings to British neutrality from the beginning, first to Loraine 
and next to Consul-General H-Smith. See Residency despatches of 20.6.1930  
and 29.6.1930 ( Confid.)
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The restrictions on the press did not prevent abuse. (64) The belligerent tone was 
maintained and instead of a constructive trend evolving towards compromise a.nd 
cooperation as Loraine hoped, an alternative to abortive insurrection was sought 
in subversion as Sidqi had feared.
" Among the factors encouraging the opponents of the present 
regime in their rebellion to this day has been an illu sion .. .  
which has turned into a conviction among them, that the 
present government is incapable of negotiating.. .  "(65)
The delay in pronouncing upon his eligibility for negotiations obstructed the 
consolida.tion of the regime by inhibiting potential loyalties and by the opening 
it left for irrefutable attacks in a vulnerable flank. Thus, the uncertainty that 
pervaded the fate of a.n Anglo-Egyptian settlement effectively undermined authority.
7
C . Treaty Diplomacy
By the Spring of 1932 Sidqi was feeling sufficiently confident that his position 
invited the a.ctive recognition of HMG. His firm administration, his prudent handling 
of difficult economic and financial circumstances and his preservation of law and 
order had rendered a great service to Egypt as well a.s to the British. Politically, he 
possessed the full confidence of his Sovereign, he had a large majority in the new 
Parliament which was functioning normally under the modified constitution, a 
number of his former political opponents had swung to his sideband altogether, he felt 
that he had enlarged and strengthened his following in the country to a notable extent 
since the e lection s.(66) At least the forms were perfected while the substance was 
felt to be a matter of time. British fears of repudiation by a. subsequent government 
were remote and overdone. The moment for disproving the humiliating inference 
that he, Sidqi, was the only impediment to concluding an Anglo-Egyptian settlement 
had arrived.
(64) See Ch. III. pp 9&~99
On his side the High Commissioner swallowed the discomfiture of the anti-British 
campaign in order not to give Sidqi "an excuse to muzzle the p r e s s ."
Loraine to Henderson, 29.3.1931 (Confid).
(65) This was said in the course of an address to MPs on 2.11.1932 ushering in toughei 
measures against the Opposition, upon his return from Geneva. The speech was broad-1 
cast to the nation and Sidqi, thus, became the first head of government in Egypt to use 
this medium.
(66) An imposing list of the provincial fam ilies adhering to the Regime was compiled
in the Interior in the Spring of 1932 in preparation of the Treaty offensive. See copy 
in Residency despa.tch of 1 /. 6.1932.
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As the conclusion of the Treaty was a main item in Sidqi's programme from 
the outset, he had never lost sight of it. He realised however tha.t he needed the 
active cooperation of a sepa.rate and independent w ill, beyond his immediate 
influence, in order to implement that part of his programme. The difficulty was 
compounded by the plurality of interests which contributed to that other will. With 
an eye on the power constellations in the Foreign Office, he appointed the able and 
experienced Dr. Hafez Afifi to the Egyptian Legation in London. (67) In the mean­
time, in anticipation of the moment when negotiations were resumed, he. invested 
his personal efforts in power centres nearer home. He set about his task in two 
directions, one wa.s aimed at the High Commissioner's person while the other sought 
to foster the general impression that he, Sidqi, was a credible ally to legitimate 
British interests. Before long, he was able to convince Loraine of his reasonableness, 
good faith and earnestness. The transformation that overtook an initial critical 
reserve on the part of the High Commissioner was the measure of this success.
" The fact is , " Sir Percy admitted, " that I a m now able owing 
to the personal confidence I appear to have won from Sidqi 
Pasha to discuss with His Excellency, with a. frankness only 
limited by the discretion necessarily imposed by the 
imponderabilia. of the situation and not possible with other 
statesmen with whom I have had to deal, the range of Anglo- 
Egyptian relations in their broader and in their more 
detailed aspects alike. Sidqi Pasha, naturally understands 
where he him self stands as regards Egypt; what is  unusual 
is  the exactness of his appreciation of our position. " (68)
Other qualities, too, were equally conducive to Sir Percy's personal esteem .
,r Apart altogether from political considerations, " he reflected,
I cannot help admiring the man’s courage. He has as his un­
relenting adversary the most formidable political organisation 
that has been in modern Egypt. His only point of support is the
(67) Hafez Afifi, b. 1886 originally a Nationalist who joined the Wa.fd in 1919 and 
later played an a.ctive part inorga.nising the Constitutional Liberal Party and its 
mouthpiece, al-Siyasa.. Vice President of the CLP; deputy in 1926 Parliament and 
under the Mahmud Regime;(June, 1928 - October, 1929) was Minister of Foreign 
Affairs. Described a.s "tactful a.nd friendly, while sticking up for Egyptian interests" 
(FO Personalities) -  A doctor by profession who turned to diplomacy and^eventually, 
to business. He vividly recorded his impressions of political life in England and 
Egypt -  See bibliography.
(68) Loraine to Simon, 17. 6. 1932 (Confid.)
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King and His Majesty's support, though I believe it to be sincere 
in the present case, in the past has not usually been a constant 
or dependable factor; the Residency, the third force in the 
situation is abstractly friendly but distractingly aloof and enigmatic; 
it has not hea.ped curses on him but it has been even more economical 
ofits benedictions and generally its attitude must appear to him like 
that of a crouching leopard. A ma.n does not work in such circumstances 
for purely selfish  reasons. " (69)
In tribute to the undaunted resoluteness, Loraine pledged) him self, in the event 
of Sidqi succeeding in consolidating his precarious position on a constitutional 
basis, not to grudge him" one ounce of the satisfaction of having achieved that 
result by his own personal resources. " Although for long months ahead he 
overtly maintaimd an uncompromising reserve and would not recommend any 
positive departure from the proclaimed neutrality, yet when he perceived that 
the moment wa.s due his verdict was in Sidqi’s favour.
” I feel that if we were to conclude a Treaty with Sidqi, we could 
not find a.mong Egyptian statesmen a. better or more reasonable 
collaborator for the purpose of its proper implementation'.^ 70)
It was a candid confession based on the experience of two hard years on probation.
Sidqi had not attained his objective fortuitously. It was the outcome of a 
steady stewardship in which prudence supplemented courage and tact resoluteness. 
He knew he was playing a dangerous game in a vulnerable setting. The daily 
exposures of his Opponents' equivocation in invoking British intervention were 
backed by a persistent edification of Egyptian sovereignty in a. manner that was not 
beyond provoking a British offensive. (71) But his personal discretion and practical 
restraint prevented a double-edged weapon from abuse. A wedge^ moreover, was 
driven between deeds and professions as he was always anxious to record his 
practical solicitude for "reasonable" British interests. The contracts of British 
officials in the police and Interior were renewed for three years instead of one 
as previously; Egypt's commitment under the 1885 Loan Agreement involving the
(69) End.
(7°) Ibid.
(71) Campbell to Simon, 8.10.1932 (Confid).
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payment of nearly £E1,000,000 to HMG was spontaneously disposed; a British 
Trade Mission visiting Egypt in early 1931 was secured a cordial welcome and 
certain British lapses>like the failure of a British contractor working on the Aswan 
Dam, were shrewdly overlooked. (72) The general deference with which Sir Percy's 
representations usually met -  and "the occasions have not been few" it was remarked 
all indicated an active desire to reduce friction and cultivate a preliminary fund of 
good-will in anticipation of an impending alliance.
" I myself, " the scrupulous Sir Percy admitted,' agree that we 
have cause to be grateful to Sidqi in these respects and that a 
wide measure of credit is  due to him "(73)
Apart from the Treaty, Sidqi was shoring up his resources for the immediate and
}
vital expediency of safeguarding his personal position against an unexpected change 
in British neutrality. The retention of the good "Will of key British officials and 
subordinates ensured him an influence over power-centres to his benefit as well 
as the efficiency of his Administra.tion. His hopes were justified when Mr. Keown« 
Boyd, the Director of the European Department, proved one of his staunchest 
supporters in local British circles and, for all pra.ctical purposes, was his right 
hand in the Interior. The vehemence with which his particular position was attacked ^  
was a mea.sure of the fury of the Opposition at their rival's la.ck of scruple.
Indeed, Sidqi's whole position depended upon the reliability of the Egyptian 
a.rmy and the Egyptian police. The former was assured him by the British Inspector" 
General and by the presence of a British staff officer with each of the three brigades 
into which the army was divided, while the latter was under British command and 
had its share of British constables so that the Cairo City Police, the provincial 
police and officials generally felt ultimately subjected to the watchful eye of an 
Englishman. (74) In view of the impending Treaty, Sidqi felt that he could afford
(72) Another instance of handling a vital British interest is  seen with regard to the 
controversial position of the Egyptian State Railways (ESR) London office. See file 
88 m FO 141/722.
(73) See Loraine to Simon, 17,6.1932
(74) In 1931 the number of British police officers of a ll ranks employed by the Egyptian 
Government was recorded as 208. See file 199 in FO 371/15418 Part of the fem inist 
contribution of the era. was the petition against the use of British officers : Manchester 
Guardian, 4 .5 .1931. More effective pressure was brought to the Foreign Office by 
Mr. Spender. See FO Minutes on 2. 5.1931 in FO 371/15404.
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to restore momentarily to the British officers and officials in the Egyptian service 
a power which wa.s virtually eroded. The result of this subtle policy was an 
efficient organisation that proved an obedient and reliable instrument. But it was 
not without its setba.cks. Sidqi paid for his exploitation of these British elements 
when he received another untimely representation from a harassed Labour 
G overnm ent (75) He was visibly dismayed. To him those British members in the 
Egyptian service were executive officers in the fullest sense and the Egyptian 
government wa.s acting strictly within its legal rights in employings as it had 
hitherto done, the British army and police officers who were in its service. The 
Foreign office did not deny him the justice of his claim, but there, again, it was 
simply another matter where the legality of the issue did not coincide with its 
politics.
While he was disposed to listen with the most "attentive and sympathetic” 
consideration to the High Commissioner's representations there were lim its to 
Sidqi’s complacency. Several attestations confirmed him as "an ever vigorous 
defender of the Egyptian point of view. " In securing the withdrawal of the air and 
w ireless cavea.ts a.ga.inst adequate guarantees for the British, the negotiations were 
described as "long and tough".(76) He strove, by dint of ta.ct and perseverence, to 
promote an Egyptian interest particularly where an issue of sovereignty arose and 
the right of the government to control activity of foreigners in Egypt was questioned. (77 
Although he was eager to resume negotiations and was always ready for a conciliatory
a
gesture, he remained tenacious on one point. At a. moment when^British reversal was 
imminent and the Service Departments were examining new proposals in the Draft 
Treaty under consideration then, Sidqi refused to accept terms, less  generous than 
those offered to his predecessors on the ground that he wa.s no less a. nationalist
(75) See Loraine to Henderson, 8.5,1931 (T el.)
(76) See Residency secret despatches of 6.2.1932 and 21.5.1932 in file 249 in 
FO 371/ 16120/16121.
(77) A case in point was the control of m issionaries and another was the subjection 
of foreigners to press legislation. See confidential despatches of Loraine to Simon
of 2 .3.1932 and 24. 6.1932; for issu es of fisca l legislation see below. Ch. V. pp 222 -f f
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than the Wafd. (78)
The resurgence of the treaty-diploma.cy which characterised the greater 
part of 1932, coincided with onsetting rumours about the impending replacement 
of Sidqi by a National Government. The emergence of a Coalition Cabinet in Britain 
in the previous Autumn stimulated fresh hopes, particularly among the "moderate” 
elements in the Opposition and, so desperately convinced was Mahmud of the 
soundness of the British example, that he brought it to the attention of the King in 
the one solitary petition he raised in June 1932.(79) The dubious contacts in progress  
between the Residency and such elem ents, fed the speculation and raised tangible 
fears elsewhere. (80) Sidqi realised tha.t the critical test that would terminate his 
uncertainty could not be indefinitely delayed. Alrea.dy, towards the end of 1931, he 
had intimated to Loraine in two successive encounters, that he was a.t his disposal to 
resume the negotiations and that Hafez Afifi would return to England in the ea.rly 
Spring with instructions in this sense. (81) As the months dragged on and Sidqi 
received no positive response to his initiative, beyond an inconclusive meeting with 
Sir John Simon, the Coalition Cabinet Secretary of State, at Geneva in September 1932; 
his simulated patience and composure gave way. British procrastination in the 
circumstances could only confirm his apprehensions that the threats of his opponents 
outweighed all effective demonstrations of ability and good-faith on his part. The 
thesis of the Wafd's exclusive mandate to negotiate which he strove to demolish
(78) For item s in 1930 offer to the Wafd under revision see Annex n o .2 in FO 
memorandum by Mr. Mack, 25.11.1931. Another FO memorandum includes the 
points at issue with other -Service- departments as well as the draft under 
revision. See 31(33) 3 in Cab. 23/76 -  The revision already started in June 1931 
when new proposals for British forces were under examination at the Residency. 
See Loraine to Peterson, 20.6.1931 (Personal^Confid.) -  in FO 371/15407.
(79) This idea, eventually led to the split in the Wafd in November 1932 and was at 
the root of diploma.cy and scandal in Opposition circles earlier in the year. See 
disclosure in Ahram, 13.4 .1932,
(80) See note no. S'*? above. The effect on Sidqi wa.s disquieting. See Residency 
despatch of 19.12.1931 and further confidential despatches -  Loraine to Simon, 
30.1.1932 and 6 .2 .1932.
(81) See Loraine to Simon, 15.11.1931. (T e l .) & to  Oliphant, 19.12.1931 (Personal 
A further insight into Sidqi's intentions is given in private letter from Campbell to 
Peterson on 7.11.1931 . FO 371/15407.
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could only gain credence in public eyes. Towards the end of the year, he 
communicated his disillusion to the correspondent of the Da.ily Mail, in an 
implicit threat in which he hinted at the advantage of "Irish tactics". (82)
The High Commissioner was not insensitive to Sidqi's predicament. In the 
course of the year Sidqi partly reaped the rewards of his prudent handling as 
Loraine aroused him self from his aloofness and pronounced on his "negotiability". (83) 
He drafted two comprehensive reports dealing at length with the issue of negotiations, 
its opportuneness and its prospects, the one shortly before his annual summer leave 
and the other following his return towards the end of the year. The first paved the 
way for the Geneva meeting while the second ca.me to urge on the need to follow 
that meeting with some concrete action. (84) His earlier analysis of the situation* 
was interspersed with reservations that detracted from the force of his recommend- 
ation, while until December 1932, the views of his Advisers were not unanimous on 
the advisability of resuming negotiations with Sidqi. By then, however, there was 
little doubt in Lora.ine’s own mind that the Sidqi Administration was strong enough 
to conclude a Treaty and to implement it. He was, moreover, convinced that the 
prospects were propitious for a settlement and he established a plausible thesis 
for resuming the negotiations.
. " We are now in the presence of a situation which I believe is  
unique in the rather chequered career of Anglo-Egyptian treaty 
negotiations -  v iz . an Egyptian Government eager to resume 
negotiations in a friendly and unbomba.stic frame of mind, 
enthusia.stica.lly supported in this and in other respects by their 
Sovereign and possessing a stable majority in Parliament,
(82) This interview7 was given toWa.rd Price on 31.12.1932. cf. pressures following 
Geneva meeting in records of conversation with Egyptian Minister in London. FO 
Memoranda on 11.10.1932 (Secret) and of 21.12.1932 (Secret). FO 371/16110.
(83) A term coined by Sir Percy to designate the eligibility of Sidqi as a negotiating 
partner.
(84) On Geneva, meeting see memorandum by Sir J. Simon and Sidqi's Note to the 
Secretary of State enc. in despatch from UK Delegate, Geneva to the Foreign Office 
on 23.9.1932 (Confid.). The only immediate action taken in consequence was to 
refer the FO draft proposals to a special sub-committee of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence (GID) for examination. See ref. in 50(32)6 in Cabinet Conclusions. 
See Cab.23/72 & C.P. 329 - Cab. 24/233. For glimpse of Simon’s personal 
state of mind see his Note on 30.8.1932 and his personal letter to Sir J.
Maffey on 4.12.1932. FO 800/287.
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during the lifetime of which the major portions of the Treaty 
could be implemented. If we are sincerely anxious to reach 
the treaty settlement, it would seem actually imprudent to 
neglect the opportunity.. .  The implementation of the Treaty 
is  more important and will probably prove more difficult 
than its signature. The best guarantee for successful 
implementation in Egypt is harmony and coordination between 
King, Government and Parliament. That we can have now.
With a Wafdist Government, I fea.r we shall never have it. "(85)
Seeing the undermining effect of the continued absence of a.ny clear British stance 
on a.n issue tha.t had become the hotbed of public controversy, especially after 
the Geneva meeting, Loraine too became demonstrably anxious. Apart from the 
preoccupations of HMG elsewhere which delayed any action on the Egyptian Question, 
doubts at the wisdom of the Treaty policy were arising among certain interested' 
departments in London, while the effective modus vivendi under which Anglo- 
Egyptian relations were conducted in the past two yea.rs suited some tempers and 
promised an alternative to the Treaty. As long as the latter, however, remained 
the proclaimed objective of HMG, the present position could not be prolonged 
indefinitely. In warning of the consequences, Loraine echoed a familiar note,
"Egyptian good behaviour under the Sidqi regime during the last 
two years has been very largely conditioned by the expectation that 
England would shortly grant Egypt her complete independence 
through an honourable settlement. Anti-Wafd which the Sidqi 
regim e mainly represents believes that good behaviour is  the 
best road to British good-will and a. treaty; W afd.. .  believe that 
'Irish tactics' alone a.re efficient for the purpose of extorting 
Egypt's rights from British imperialism. If anti-Wafd, not­
withstanding good behaviour, reach the conclusion that a trea.ty 
is  nevertheless withheld, it may well come to share the Wafd's 
views on the subject of tactics. "(86)
Just as Lord Allenby ten years earlier had been anxious that British policy should 
not alienate the 'modera.tes' so, now, Sir Percy Loraine was keen that "good conduct" 
should not go unrewarded and that the anti-Wafd should not be driven to despair.
But British policy languished into va.ccilla.tion under the National Cabinet. The 
impending deterioration of local conditions in the resulting void impelled him to
(85) Loraine to Simon, 17.6.1932
(86) Loraine to Simon, 9 .12.1932. (Secret)
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adopt a conspicuously noyei tone away from the practice of leading opinion in 
the Egyptian Department by the masterful insinuation in which he excelled.
. It is  necessary that a decision should be taken. Some definite 
course of principle must be laid down. I have shown that there 
are risks and dangers in every course; but I dislike more than 
any of them the idea of drifting and not knowing what we are 
aiming a t ." (87)
Gravity could not endure trifling with and the moment for stern a.dvice to his 
superiors ha.d arrived,
s£ i}:
A combination of diligence and scruple under the Regime underlined the 
void and imbalance for which the inconclusive Anglo-Egyptian connection enshrined 
in the Declaration of 1922 was responsible. At the same time it accentuated the 
objective role of the Residency as the centre for effective power and prestige in 
the polity itself. Political reality was such as to defeat any policy which over­
looked or underrated its consequences. 'It must be confessed,’* the Head of the 
Egyptian Department reflected, " that the Egyptians have a good deal of excuse 
for regarding it -(neutrality)- as a disingenuous pose and for drawing the inference 
that it is  adopted to screen a policy that cannot openly be avowed. " (88) One of 
the active impediments to the constructive pursuit of such a policy even if it were 
possible, lay in the fact that the Anglo-Egyptian Question, like its contemporary 
Anglo-Indian counterpart, constituted an issue of inter-party politics in England 
itself. The regular forecasts on the impending disappearance of the Regime thrived 
on the periodic v is its  by prominent Britishers and the more frequent incursions
(87) Ibid.
(88) FO minute in Residency despatch of 6 .5 .1931. FO SVl/lSHOH.
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into Egyptian, politics by British journalists and politicians alike. (89) Sidqi had 
not only to contend with the evils of party politics in Egypt but he had before him a 
more formidable adversary in the workings of the democratic process there. It 
held him in a double-fisted anticipation of an imminent policy reversal in the 
Foreign Office to his disadvantage and of an endemic bout of local reverberations 
in the Egyptian political clim e. (90) In the immediate context British neutrality 
exerted a moderating influence on the power struggle,, restraining Sidqi and 
emasculating the anti-Regime offensive. Ultimately, inaction proved as effective as 
action. It contributed to the emergence of the Regime and was equally instrumental 
in obstructing its consolidation. It thwarted the efforts of statesmanship and under­
lined the limitations imposed on the statesman by the situation. The Anglo-Egyptian 
dimension, however, wa.s one among others in the struggle to consolidate authority, 
and its importance did not overshadow the more immediate problems which Sidqi 
took up with equal vigour and determination.
(89) Mr. J. Murray, Head of the Egyptian Department, visited Egypt in January-  
February, 1931. See his interesting memorandum on 20. 2.1931 in FO 371/15403 -  
Other visitors included Mr. J.A. Spender, member of the Milner Mission and journal­
ist whose activity annoyed Sidqi. See Sidqi's letter in News Chronicle, 29.4.1931
Sir Arthur Balfour at the head of a trade mission in March 1931 was guilty of a 
diplomatic "gaffe" in a. publicised exchange of civilities with Sidqi on 6. 6.1931. Sir 
War dr aw -Milne, MP and member of the Anglo-Egyptian Association arrived in early 
1933. For other controversial functions relating to the British business community 
see file 352 in FO 141/722. The tours of the oriental secretaries nearly collided 
with Sidqi's electoral campaign. See Residency despatch of 23rd March, 1931. In 
London, critical leaders and letters to the editor (eg. Times 21.5.1931) and 
correspondent m essages (Daily Telegraph, June and September, 1932 & July 1933 -  
See Sidqi's letter in End,22.7.1933) often inspired developments in Egypt. Statements 
in the House of Commons,despite deliberate curb, were inevitable, eg. 23.7.1930  
and 27.10.1932 - apart from untimely P.Qs in May, 1931. Far-flung and isolated 
intrusions, eg. George Lloyd on Egypt in the New York T im es, 3 .8 .1930, were 
equally provocative. Sidqi, the King,and even the High Commissioner at diverse 
times protested.
(90) The memoranda on the Egyptian press for July-August 1930, see in FO S l l / m w l / t 
and the second part of 1932 - esp. June 1932.provide representative samples of such 
local reverberations. See separate file 92 in FO 371/ 16116
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CHAPTER THREE
THE CONSOLIDATION OF AUTHORITY
"Egypt is not served by pretty words but by deeds. "
(Sidqi,. £7 J-0.1930)
,f The great reform er.. .  the lead er.. .  who went back to the 
people, journeying the length and breadth of the country.. .  
in astounding energy and boundless perseverence -  at risk  
to his very life -  rendering to the electors in their own 
villages, a. direct a.ccount of his deeds and-.. .  intentions.. .  . 
investigating their needs and desires, soliciting their ,
consent. "
(Latif Nalchla., a deputy, 7.7.1932)
“ The New Administration
A concrete notion o f e f fe c t iv e  government la y  a t the heart o f  the 
''energetic, movement o f renaissance" which Sidqi envisaged for Egypt. I t s  core  
rested  on a sound Adm inistration which was q u a lif ie d  in  the follow ing terms :
(i) It afforded people order, justice and security that enabled them to proceed 
undistra.cted with their business;
(ii) It was spurred by concrete, purposeful thought to resolve outstanding problems 
and to devise means for progress and reform;
(iii) It was marked by profuse output;
(iv) It inspired respect (ha.iba wa'ihtiram), retained its  boundaries intact and its  
authority unimpaired.
Only through the undiminished retention of its sta.tus would the Administration be in 
a position to sustain its discipline, vitality and efficiency a.t a. level which enabled it 
to discharge its responsibilities and transform itself into a.n instrument of regener­
ation^).
(1) A limited, but useful, summary of the message of Sidqi's electoral campaign is  
found in Residency despa.tch of 24.4.1931 (Confid.)
(2) Beni Suef political address, 14.4.1932.
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The Administration was thus conceived as a repository of authority and a 
custodian of order, as well as an agent of change. This dynamic conception prompted 
changes in the Constitution to enhance-the executive* and it brought the Administration 
into prominence under the Regime. But, there were practical motives, too, behind 
its consolidation. The cr isis  out of which the Regime emerged and its subsequent 
political isolation confined Sidqi's initial options to force and repression. Equally, 
the situational contingency made the agents of the new Administration exercise  
their coercive powers before they could prove them selves in an architectonic capacity 
Politics were complicated by the prevailing financial stringency which provided a 
further incentive for strengthening the executive machinery. A strong Administration 
was imperative for the retention of power and for justifying Sidqi's claim s on public 
allegiance. Both purposes ultimately depended on his ability to maintain order and 
protect the national economy.
A . The Reorganisation of the Administration.
Sidqi's first step wa.s to reorganise his forces in the Interior in order to 
overcome the disruption and shaken morale he found there.
" When Sidqi Pasha took over the government on June 20th, 
the spirit of the administrative officials wa.s broken. Except 
in the City Police Forces there was little or no attempt at 
conscientious work and the public good was entirely forgotten 
in the ra.ce for the favour of the po litic ian s.. .  "(3)
The problem he faced here was as much a Wafdist lega.cy as a result of developments 
over the past decade. In tackling it he charted a course that constituted a laudable 
departure.
" Sidqi Pasha has made some effort to break: a.way from the 
spoils system which exercised such a poisonous influence on 
the Egyptian Administra.tion and is introducing even in village  
life the savage personal feuds which is the Egyptian understanding 
of party politics. "(4)
(3) Note by Keown-Boyd -to Oriental Secretary, 15.9.1930 (Secret). FO 371/14620.
(4) Loraine to Henderson, 27.9.1930 - FO 371/14621
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The Promotions Board, up till then a neglected body, wa.s called in full session and 
worked continuously for almost a month during which period it devised a scheme to 
improve the Service. On the basis of an objective examination of their records, 
officials were classified into categories of fitness : inefficient ones were placed on 
half-pay or transferred to less responsible posts and latitude for the promotion of 
good junior men was thereby afforded. Promotions were secured in order of seniority* 
while zealous and active men were posted, after consultation with the mudirs, to the 
more important districts. Account was taken of the need to maintain a balance among 
the provincial and city forces so that transfers and promotions from the centre to 
the fringes were compensated by equivalent moves that left the middle echelons of 
the service as well equally reinforced. A notable absence of vengeance and of * 
party spirit characterised the process underway and, where political considerations 
could not be avoided, Sidqi acted with discretion. (5) Occasionally, he was prepared 
to pay the price of maintaining a. high calibre in the Administration by running the 
risk of indisposing his executive associates or alienating his potential a llies. (6) The 
fact that these moves were adversely criticised by Wafdists and Liberals alike was 
perhaps a measure of their moderation. In official British circles in Egypt, they 
were acclaimed a.s "the first genuine attempt made for several years to improve the 
S erv ice ." They were also estimated as, "the beginning of a measure of permanent 
administra.tive reform" rather than a political move calculated to meet a transient 
situation. (7)
The attempt to reconcile good administration with political congeniality was 
more evident in the move affecting senior posts, where,however, a measure of 
discretion and fairness was again the rule. (8) Capable and upright Wafdist figures
(5) Subordinates known to be under control of local Wafdists were given fresh starts 
elsewhere, eg. sub-mudir of Qena. .
(6) Note by Keown-Boyd, 15. 9.1930, op. cit.
(7) Ibid.
(8) See note of 12. 8.1930 on some of the changes in Egyptian administrative personnel 
compiled by the Oriental Secretary in collaboration with Keown-Boyd, in FO 371/14619.
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were retained in active responsible service even if they were transferred elsewhere 
to pander to some political bargaining in progress at the time with the lib era ls . 
Pa.trona.ge also played its  part, although here, too, it was comparatively minor 
and moderate, as promotions, generally, involved cases of some merit. The 
transfer of Sidqi's nephew, for example, to the Department of Public Security, 
brought with it youthful vigour and ability together with a reliable and trustworthy 
element in a top security post. (9) In the absence of party allegiance the search for 
loyalty in sensitive posts occasionally invited pa.trona.ge. Conversely, the more 
critical the political situation grew and the greater the political preoccupations, the 
more vital the issue of loyalty and trust became. Sidqi naturally preferred an 
Advocate "General who was amenable, as well as capable, in order to keep him 
informed of enquiries in progress, while the advent of "a. more energetic and 
courageous " Procureur"General, coincided with the pursuit of a firmer line of 
policy towards the Opposition. (10)
Unless, however, a means were found to instil a sense of security in the ranks 
of the Administration, its reorganisation would be undermined and senior officials 
would continue to abide by political prudence and evade administrative diligence.
On the 22nd September 1930, a. decree was passed whereby government officials 
appointed by Royal Decree would, in future, be dism issed only by the same method, 
on advice of the Council of M inisters, or the Minister concerned. The political
(9) The Wafdist London«ba.sed campaign against Sidqi's nepotism caused the Foreign 
Office to ma.ke enquiries, and the result of investigating four specific cases : Ibrahim 
Sid Ahmad, Abbas Sid Ahmad, Mansur Ismail and Ahmad Kamel are found in Cairo 
Chancery despatches to the Egyptian Department of 17.9.1930 and 30.9.1930 in FO 
371/14621, Ahmad Kamel had the necessary seniority for the appointment to the Dept, 
of Public Security and was described as "experienced and capable". He acted as Sidqi's 
personal secreta.ry in the Palace go-betweens in September 1933, became Secretary of 
the rea.ctiva.ted Sha’b Party in Ma.y 1935 and considerably revived its moribund organ; in 
37/38 when Sidqi was Minister of Finance, A.K. wa.s Minister of Trade and Industry. 
Sidqi had a. genuine interest in advancing and encouraging young men of talent and 
ability; Abdel Rahman el-Biali (See Ch. IV) was another notable object'of his active 
solicitude. This observation was confirmed to me in personal interviews, notably with 
Dr. Hana.fi Abu’l Ela. (see 1000 Great Lives). The mentor/educator trait left its mark 
upon a. circle of graduates of the Trades and Economics School. See tribute in 
Majallat e l Tijara wall mohasaba., July 1953.
(10) See memorandum prepared by Judicial Adviser on Mustafa Mohamad enclosed in 
Secret Residency despatch of 12.11.1930.
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purpose of this measure was apparently to strengthen the hand of the Grown in the 
dism issal of higher government officials. In point of fact, it secured rationality 
and stability as it introduced a uniformity of procedure where its absence was long 
felt; it was moreover, a check upon the a.rbitrary d ism issals that followed a change 
of government. While the decree wa.s one a.spect of a policy designed to introduce 
an element of security among officials, the firm restraint with which Sidqi handled 
individual situations established a. precedent of conduct for his subordinates and helped 
sow the seeds of confidence and reliability in the Service as a whole.
The combined effect of reorganisation and discretion paved the way for restoring 
a considerable measure of administrative consciousness in milieux where it had 
either been corroded or practically extinguished, as in the Ministries of Interior, 
and Justice. This duly reflected on the zea.l with which threatened rebellion was 
qua.shed and order maintained at more than one critical juncture. On the eve of the 
elections in May, 1931, administrative efficiency was at its  peak both in organisation 
and personnel. " . . .  today, I can express with assurance, " the Director General of 
the European Department remarked, " that governors and commandants of police 
are the best I have known. " (11) Following an extensive and meticulous enquiry 
into the course of what turned out to be the most controversial elections in Egypt, 
he concluded that " the usual pressure being exercised by an interested and efficient 
government had been unusually effective" and, that the results were, consequently, 
not without m erit. The testimony of a competent -  if not an altogether disinterested  
observer -  wa.s, itself, a tribute to the skill and acumen of a stales man ship which 
had succeeded in reinforcing its executive ranks as w ell a.s in propitiating its 
prospective arbiters. If British neutrality was initially instrumental in Sidqi's rise  
to power, its retention and consolidation were almost entirely shouldered by the 
Administration he reorganised. The performance of his Administration, moreover, 
strengthened a. provisional stance of British policy in his favour.
;J<
(11) See the comprehensive Report on the elections by Keown-Boyd on 22.5.1931, 
together with enclosures in Residency Confidential despatch of 29.5.1931 in FO 371/
15406
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In invoking the ideal of good Administration, Sidqi might ha.ve conceived a 
certain affinity with the British colonial tradition. As Under Secretary of the Interior 
between 1911 and 1914, he had witnessed Kitchener’s reform s and was, apparently, 
im pressed by his conduct. (12) In the post-colonial era, however, which Sidqi 
conversely saw as "the first stages of independence", objectives differed. (13) The 
model Egyptian official here was expected to be actively committed to reform and 
development. Sidqi appealed to officialdom to observe a patriotic zeal in its daily 
pursuits, particularly where these contributed to advancing Egypt’s economic 
independence.
" De meme, je souhaite de voir les efforts des administrations de 
1'eta.t en fa.veur de l ’industrie s'inspirer non seulement du devoir 
administratif mais du sentiment qu’ils  ont a s ’a.cquitter d'un ?
devoir national ayant dans leur esprit 1a. valeur d’un dogme. "(14)
But the scope for the dedicated official wa.s coextensive with his activity which wa.s 
not confined to his executive duties. (15) His conventional political impartiality, 
assumed in the model official, carried him beyond renouncing the politics of 
partisanship to denouncing it actively. This partly justified the contradictory role 
in which officials found them selves a.s they engaged first, in creating a political 
party and next, in canvassing for elections. This again seemed to be a. necessary  
concession to the requisites of a. transitional phase from subjection to sovereignty 
in the Egyptian setting. Under the Regime, the political concept itself was adapted 
to a.ccomoda.te the political role of the Administration as rea.son was seen to replace 
emotion in the later phases of political evolution. (16) This plea, for rationalism was 
as much a bid for moderation in the conflict -ridden political atmosphere of the day, 
as a. legitimisation for the political role of the Administration. The resemblance of 
good Administration under the Occupation and that under the Regime is, consequently, 
qualified.
 ^ ^
(12) SeeMudhakkirati p> n
(13) See Electoral manifesto, 6 .12.1923.
(14) Address to VUIth General Assembly of the E .F .I . on 7 .4 .1930.
(15) See Administrative tours and profiles below. }>99-.
(16) See "The Meaning of Leadership" (al-za/ama.), Sha*b, 26.5.1931. 
cf. later editorial of 25.1.1932
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While the political cr is is  led Sidqi to reorganise his forces in the Interior, 
the prevailing financial stringency gave him an additional impetus to rationalise 
elsewhere. He organised senior officials in the different dspartments into an expert 
consultative body and required them to study the economic situation and report on it 
constructively to him, as Minister of Finance. The theme of power with responsibility  
echoed in this,his first lesson> to officialdom. (17) Individually, he vested the 
members of this new Council with broad discretionary powers in their respective 
departments, subject only to guidelines on economywhich the Cabinet endorsed 
consecutively in the Summers of 1930 and 1931. He infused his subordinates with 
a sense of their importance and corporate identity as he appealed to their authority 
and competence and reminded them of their responsibility. Unlike Ministers who 
"come and go, " and whose political preoccupations prevented them from se lf-  j 
improvement in knowledge of the affairs of State, they, officials, justly constituted 
the backbone of government. (18) They were credited with both impartiality and 
respons ability.
Sidqi recognised the value of setting a practical example to his subordinates. 
Behind his desk he broached the problems he was confronted with methodically, 
diligently and energetically, maintaining throughout his cha.racteristic prudence and 
composure. Within one week of taking office in the Ministry of Finance, he had 
taken decisions on matters which had been accumulating since January 1930, and 
about which his predecessor had failed to take any action at all. (19) Individual 
accounts gave further evidence of the prudent energy he brought to the administrative 
ma.chinery. As a result of Sidqi’s efforts, the Manager of Shell Company in Egypt,
Mr. Martin, was able to settle the mraierous cases pending, some of which had been 
at issue with different government departments for many years. Sidqi’s exemplary 
conduct here could be imputed to both his political objectives and administrative idea.ls
(17) Address to meeting of Under-Secretaries of State and Directors of Services on
29.12.1930.
(18) See address on 11.9.1930 to congregation of supporters in Continental Hotel at 
a. party held in honour of his escape from the first attempt on his life.
(19) Note by Financial Adviser of 12.7.1930 - Enc . in Confidential Residency 
despatch of 2. 8.1930.
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The characteristics of the Administration in its recovered confidence and 
improving self-im age steadily evolved in the upsurge of administrative consciousness 
that followed. There emerged a vigorous and efficient organisation inspired as much 
by the personal example of its chief, as by the ethos he instilled in it and the practically 
unlimited powers it enjoyed. Officials became the leading agents of political change, 
as well as the conventional custodians of law and order. Throughout the provinces, 
the role of tax-collector and police agent was reinforced by that of reformer. The 
periodic tours which the different members of the Administration undertook in the 
provinces were instrumental in consolidating authority and constituted a striking 
feature of the Regime. They equally provide an appropriate scope for exploring some 
of the tra.its of the evolving Administration.
1. The Administrative Tours
The summer of 1931 witnessed a ser ies of provincial v isits by central 
government officials. In his address to the councillors of Sharqi,&, the Under­
secretary of State for the Interior, explained the object of his v isit as "to lay my­
self at your disposal" . He elaborated on his mission thus :
" I have begun my present tours at the instructions of the 
Prime Minister in order to communicate with you and enquire 
into your wishes and attend to your grievances because this 
prudent government (al-ra.shlda) desires to promote provincial 
councils and raise them to befitting standards, especially as it is 
they who control primary, compulsory and technical education 
and upon them ( i.e . the Councils) rests the country's w elfare. "
The speaker paid homage to the mudir, who was also the President of the local 
council, and pledged "to join hands" to secure the prosperity of the province. It 
was not enough to lend a. sympathetic ear and to acquaint the government with local 
needs and problems, but effective power called for coordination between central and 
local authorities. (20)
(20) Sha*b, 6. 8.1931. Similar v isits were made to Mansura and Benha Municipal 
Councils. This activity coincided with the convocation of a committee in the Interior 
under his colleague^to examine proposals on local government legislation which was, 
eventually, passed by the Chamber in 1933. An interesting series of editorials dealt 
with Sidqi's intentions and the proposed legislation. Ibid. 8 .9 .1931 , 30.9.1931 and
30.11.1931.
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■ The provinces them selves maintained a semblance of vivacity as their wardens 
displayed their zeal in their respective domains. Mudirs in the delta and Upper Egypt 
inspected their localities and convened the newly elected councils. (21) On 18th August, 
1931, the Councils of Behera. and Gharbia were simultaneously convoked, while the 
recently transferred mudir in Menufia, had already scheduled his tours of his province - 
two weeks earlier. On 10th August the Minia mudir announced his tours while ma'murs 
and hekemdars (district police and commandants) conducted inspections in Girga. 
Admittedly though, the activity in Upper Egypt was less  intense, or at least, less  
publicised. Some of the general activity too was the sequence of administrative moves 
which lia.d followed elections. The new incumbents were anxious to abide by their 
injunctions and to acquaint them selves at first hand with conditions in their localities.
At the same tim e, however, the resumption of pa.rlia.menta.ry life coincided with 
growing adversity and the vigilance of Authority was as much an act of political 
prudence a.s a dictate of economic needs. (22) In a despondent era, vitality became the 
hall-mark of a regenerated Administration as officials emulated the example they 
beheld in their chiefs. In Sidqi's own tours, which w ill be duly discussed, and in those 
launched by his subordinates, a model of action evolved whose political content rose  
in proportion to the grade from which it emanated.
(21) Wafdist provincial councils were dissolved following change in electoral law bj 
a Royal Decree on 29.10.19 30 -  and the new Councils were elected according to the 
modified electoral provisions.
For administrative moves following elections see MMW, 9 .8 .1931.
(22) cf. junctions to deputies to keep in close touch with their constituents and the affair* 
of their localities during the summer recess : ” Let each of us be a little Sidqi in
his constituency" (Biali), MMN, 7 .7 .1931. Sidqi addressed inter "parliamentary 
economic committee on severity of situation on 25. 8.1931, while the meeting of the 
Council of M inisters on 19. 8.1931 emphasised the urgency for economies stressing  
earlier resolutions on 7. 7.1931. The plea to landowners for frugality first echoed 
in Sidqi’s address at Mit Berra on 14. 8.1930 and again in an interview with the 
Moqattam on 30. 8.1930, frequently recurred in the columns of the Sha*b in August,
1931.
At the same time, a Ministeral Decree on 26.8.1931 launched the Credit Agricole.
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It was essential to "humanise" authority in order to reconcile it with the 
constitutional framework and aspirations of the new regim e. The party organ 
dedicated its leading columns to the "noble reformers" and the "firm administrators" 
who were seen to embody the pedagogic and ethical principles of the Regime. (23) It 
stressed  the benefits of preaching by example and saw in it a practical alternative 
for exercising power compatibly and effectively. In effect, the administrative tours 
were a bid for public confidence by demonstrating the active concern of the present 
government for the public weal; equally, they were an attempt to modify traditional 
perceptions of authority by bridging the gap between the rulers and the people. Their 
more immediate relevance, however, la.y in the implications of the unrelenting power 
struggle in progress.
Deprived of a sympathetic press and a well-disposed audience the Regime 
sought to break out of a vicious circle of allegations and overcome its political 
isolation by transposing the Administration into its mouthpiece as well as i t s  executive 
agent. The object of communicating with the public was two-fold. While administrative 
seizures and forced sales were inevitable daily occurences in the circum stances, the 
government issued measures from time to time to alleviate the situation by postponing 
the collection of its debts,or otherwise. Where ignorance prevailed such instructions 
often failed to reach the common man, or they were misinterpreted to him-by 
unscrupulous individuals who exploited the hardship to their pecuniary benefit and 
left the ddium for an unpopular government. It was necessary, therefore, for  
.administrators, apart from exercising vigilance, to explain to the people the direct 
relevance of such measures for them. It was equally vital to urge on indifferent 
audiences the importance of their active cooperation to alleviate the general plight.
This message was corroborated in Sidqi’s simultaneous practical exhortations. In 
tim e, the one available channel for combating seditious rumour became a lucrative 
means for contacting and converting - or more -often.neutralising-political opponents. 
Some of the more intimate activities of mudirs weaned a.way erstwhile political 
activists from their party allegiances in preference to an alternative creed that
(23) Accounts of provincial correspondents during 1931 especially, and generally, 
references to the Administration in the Party organ d isclose a kind of lore woven 
round it. See an ex. in Sha*b, 21. 9.1931 and 23.8 .1931. -  For pedagogic and ethical 
principles see Ch.IV. pp. 130 f f .
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upheld a single -minded devotion to business interests and an enlightened patriotism. 
The ebbing fortunes of frizbiya (’party-ism') became the practical measure of the 
accomplishments of the Administration.
2 . Administrative Profiles
In consolidating the Administration, Sidqi strove to instill in its agents an 
ethos compatible with the purpose he conceived for. it. Its absorption and manifestation 
within the different milieu# a.nd localities provided the scope for a diversity in the 
substantially uniform administrative orientation (elan) of the Regime. Admittedly, 
different patterns’ of conduct evolved in the course of the interaction between the 
personality and the situation. Where the political situation was relatively quiescent 
there was less  need for the administrator-politician and a. proportionately greater 
scope for the energetic reformer to demonstrate his zeal in more conventional fields. 
Conversely though, the political temperature of the locality depended upon its 
handling by the responsible incumbent. Generally, two distinct models may be singled 
for attention. The Mudir of Daqahlia, Harun Abu Sehli, provides the prototype of 
the administrator-politician while the Mudir of Behera, Abdel-Sa.lam el-Shazli, 
embodies the ideal administrator-reformer. The models are not mutually exclusive 
and they may best be conceived as counterpoised at different ends of a continuum 
along which a variety of intermediate types are discernible. The centre model here 
would be the efficient, 'not very scrupulous’ administrator, to which category many 
a mudir, in greater or less degree, conformed. (24)
Abu Sehli em erges as the budding autocrat. (25) A bold extrovert, with a 
characteristic lack of scruple, he set out with great determination to harness his
(24) See the secret note by Keown-Boyd on administrative moves on 15.4.1933 in 
FO 371/17008, for abstracts on mudirs involved.
(25) Harun Selim Abu Sehli : b. 1886 -  d.1937; son of a ma.'mur, hailing from a 
family of Arab stock, traditionally vested with the umdaship of Farshot/Upper Egypt; 
early education at leuttab, then went to amiri schools and graduated from Law in 1909; 
enrolled as lawyer; served in Parquet and Judiciary ; Assistant Under Sec. in Interior 
in 1926 and mudir of Assuit in 1928; politically active ; a deputy in 1924, 1926/27 and 
1936; non-partisan; victim ised by Wafd for independent stance on electoral commission  
in 1924 -  Renown for courage, said to be inherited from his maternal grandfather, a 
notable agha. in Ibrahim Pasha’s arm ies, while his piety is  attributed to his father.
93
province, the central Delta hotbed of Wafdism, which was among the last to be 
subdued. (26) Although he doubtless had a difficult task, it may be questioned 
whether his offensive may not have inflamed the popula.ce and made order more 
difficult to secure. His scheme of forcing Wafdists to change their colour by closing 
down their factories on ostensibly technical grounds, or more generally by threaten ~ 
ing their vital interests furnished the discontented and sceptical with ample cause 
for grievance and doubt. In methods and pursuits he may not have differed greatly 
from his counterpart in Sharqjjh, Niazi, another ruthless and efficient figure -  
though of a perceptibly different temperament -  but he exceeded him in his talent 
as a propagandist. During the Wafdist riots at Mansura. in July 1930, Abu Sehli 
issued his own press communiques and followed up events with an interview rationalis­
ing the ban of Wafdist meetings and disputing their legality and intentions. (27) Shortly 
before the provincial councils were dissolved in the Autumn he called a meeting 
and laid down the principles of action in the province. (28) He next threw his weight 
behind the electoral campaign and led illustrious processions which drove through 
the centre of the town amid cheers, including hails to him self, the sa/adat al-m udir. 
(29) Apart from their mildly humorous quality, the accounts of these tours convey 
a vivid impression of the pomp, ceremony and formality, the paraphernalia of 
authority, associated with the era. His political speeches lend themselves to quotation* 
in their staccato eloquence^as he faithfully reproduced the ideas of the Regime and 
invoked Sidqi’s appeals to reason and action with a fervour and communicability 
which Sidqi might have envied.
" I am a man who is not beguiled by praise, a man of a.ction, 
not profession. I represent a government pledged to your • 
good and to securing peace among you; striving to emancipate 
your minds from the vain servitude of illusion and m yth.. .
(26) The most turbulent centre outside Cairo during elections, was Dacjd-hlia (Mit 
Ghamr, Gedida. and Dilbana.) and the disturbances justified its mudirfs reservations 
that his province was not ready for elections (the only such Province so reported.)
The riot at Dilbana, near Mansura.in which villagers were armed and took possession  
of the village ended in negotiations between Government forces and villagers. See 
Residency telegraphic despatch of 18.5.1931.
(27) Ahram, 11.7.1930.
(28) Ibid, 21.9 .1930.
(29) Sha*b, 17.3.1931.
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I a.sk of you no more than that you should think with your own 
minds not with others,and that you should judge for your- 
selves not through the eyes of o th ers.. .  You, gentlemen,
are the glory of this country, its heads and umdas so,
assume its leadership and set up an exam ple.. .  follow not 
the ignorant and let not glibbers enthrall y o u .. .  I want you 
to muster the courage that would place those mites (a.ssaghir) 
in their proper pla.ce.. .  M
In an appeal for loyalty and reliability the speech rounded off on a. quotation from 
the Quran condemning hypocrites.(30)
As circum stances rendered the entire Administration an active partisan in 
the new regim e, Abu Sehli was not alone in his political excursions, nor were his 
achievements confined to his political exploits. He saved a local budget which was 
on the verge of solvency in 1930, overhauled the institutions of education in his 
province, and actively prosecuted a programme of public works which earned him 
public acknowledgement from his chief, the Minister of Interior. (31) His political 
zeal however distinguished him from other administrators whose talents and 
circumstances enabled them to present an alternative model. This latter model 
embra.ced another dimension of the executive a.cumen which the Regime took pride 
in.
While the convergence of political necessity and economic adversity contributed 
to the growth in power of the Administration, it also provided the opportunity for 
the energetic and conscientious administrator to assume greater responsibility. 
Contrary to the authoritarian emphasis in the administrator-politician the shift
(30) Ibid, speech at Mit Ghamr, 19.3.1931.
For another version of this pseudo-political campaign, see account of activity of 
mudir of Girga/Sohag on the 24th/29th March, 1931.
(31) See Ahram, 20.10.1930 ; 23.12.1932 ; also Moqattam, 5 .5 .1932
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to a.n image of paternal benevolence characterises the adm inistrator-reformer. (32)
He demonstrates a genuine concern for the welfare of the local populace, without 
discrimination, and is  solicitous of their grievances. The opportunity for relief 
abounds in the prevailing duress and he accordingly, sets his heart on giving effect to 
measures mooted in the capital, especially in regard to the campaign against the high ■ 
cost of living. (33) In some cases he takes the initiative him self in instituting such 
m easures, setting a. practical example to the capital, and heeffectively benefits his 
locality by persevering in their pursuit. (34) He is  characteristically modest in his 
public demeanour, w ill not shirk attending the sim plest function of the common folk 
and, in the same token,he renounces the pomp and ceremony of his more autocratic 
counterpart.(35) He will occasionally hint, to deflect flatterers,' that he is duty-bound
(32) cf. Abdel-Sa.lam el-Shazli. (May 1889 -  September 1957) born at Shubratana/Kafr e l -  
Zayyat, the 13th son to an old, large fam ily descended from Sidi Abu’l Hassan e l-  
Shazli. His father wa.s therein e l-a y  p leading notable) of Gharbia and sat in the 
Legislative Assembly. Educated first in the kuttab, and then a.t the School of Law and 
trained under Abdel-Ra.hman Fahmy of the Nationalist Party. He rose in the Administr­
ation starting off modestly from a mo€awen idara., in 1936 became Director of the 
School of Police and subsequently Governor of Cairo -  Became the first Minister of 
Social Affairs (1938-39) where he introduced the system  of compulsory cooperation.
In 1935 he was a.mong the high officials of the Sidqi era tried for infringing the fisca l 
laws. He was cleared and the Court verdict held him for a model official. A side­
light on the 'model adm in.' may be seen in his touring of his locality in disguise by 
night to get a first hand knowledge of its grievances in an Umar Ibn al-Khatta.b 
gesture. Following the Badari exposures he was transferred from Behera to Assuit 
as the one figure qualified to restore peace and confidence to the Province.
(33) See Ch. V. p. 199 & n otes.
(34) Another example of this type, Mohamed Sa'id Ezabi, mudir of Menufia and later 
Gharbia, initiated rival butcheries and bakeries by the local council to force merchants 
to reduce their prices, and he overcame initial fisca l difficulties which threatened
his enterprise.^ Sha’b, 16.3.1931. The precedent soon became official policy and was 
adopted in other provinces, Ib id ., 27.3.1931. In Tanta the production of ice-blocks by 
the municipality selling at 25mms. instead of 60 mm*, soon induced the Concessionary 
Company to se ll at 20 mms; ibid. 14.9.1931. It was another instance of the mudir's 
administrative acumen; In March 1933 he was promoted Under Secreta.ry of State for 
the Interior.
(35) Accounts of Shazli. Sha^b, 9.11.1932; 12.11.1932; 23.4.1931
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in whatever he undertakes. Above all, he is discreet in handling political opponents 
and, instead of seeking to embarrass them at every turn, he quietly seizes  
opportunities, when they are afflicted or in need, to condole with them in a gesture 
of sympathy, or to step forward and relieve them without much ado. The relation” 
ship that develops between Authority and the people here tends to be generally of 
a more spontaneous and reciprocal variety where active concern is  returned with 
an appreciative recognition. One of the practical s id e -e ffects  is a concrete 
improvement in public security. Political attitudes in particular, tend to be 
ambivalent and it was pei'haps indicative that Wafdist defections should maintain a 
studious non-commitment and content themselves with affirmations of patriotism  
and loyalty to the Throne. Such conduct amounted to a reluctant, but not an 
altogether grudging a.cquiescence in the status quo. In sparing the dignity of his 
subjects and in striving for their welfare, while observing an unflinching loyalty 
to his chief, the administrator-reformer, in effect, secured a political achievement 
for the Regime by living up to its professed standards. (36)
B. The Evolution of the Administration.
The Administration was consolidated against a highly charged background of 
conflict and intransigeance which affected its own evolution. The Regime provoked 
a. shrill outcry of an emotional na.tiona.lism which rallied to it elements from the 
two factions of the nationalist movement. The National Pact concluded between the 
Wafd and Liberals in the Spring of 1931 sealed the fate of a rational idealism and 
left the drop-outs to gather round another banner of rational self-interest. Na.has 
him self sounded the bugle in his invocations to the Almighty, the noble nation, the 
martyrs who fell in the clashes with Authority and, "the blood that runs in (his) 
veins", while Mahmud corroborated the chorus by condemning the rule of "iron and
(36) The note by Mr. Bennett (19. 5.1931) on tour to Behera district during the 
elections, provides a. sympathetic account of the Administration there and particularly 
of the role of the mudir.
" I am told that his Administration is both firm and paternal, that he is accessible  
to the humblest, that in regards to payment of arrears in these hard tim es, he is  
inclined to give the debtor twice the delay he asks for rather than squeeze him; that 
he makes no distinction on Party grounds, in fact, makes a point of showing impartial­
ity. " See enc. Appendix G. in "Keovm-Boyd^ electoral report cited above ( n o t e  1.
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fire "perpetuated by a "band of criminals". (37) Speeches and manifestos) were 
replete with the theme of blood, sacrifice and sacrosanctity as the caliph of Saad 
exhorted his countrymen to avenge the honour of a ravished nation and to live up 
to the memory of "the leader of the awaicening and the champion of sacrifice". When 
police cordons were drawn round the Saudist Club and the Mother of Egyptians 
became the object of sham eless warnings from- the government, Zaghlul’s tomb 
became the sanctuary for orators. (38) It provided the morbid setting for renewing 
nationalist pledges and forecasting the sinister fate that inevitably attended usurpers 
and oppressors. The message and conduct of the demagogues posed a challenge to 
Authority which perceived in them the threat of danger and anarchy.
The image of tyranny and oppression was countered by the conviction that 
without order and stability progress, the goal of civilised society, could not be 
attained. While Authority wa.s not synonymous with oppression, freedom implied 
responsibility. The absence of such responsibility invited a dissidence which could 
not be reconciled with a healthy body politic. (39) The latter, moreover, was 
particularly threatened by the perversion of parliamentary institutions into a facade 
for perpetuating an emergent tyranny. This benevolent disguise of the tyranny of 
the numerical majority rendered it more pernicious than any personal autocracy.
The only remedy lay in effectively restituting that necessary authority which spelled, 
besides knowledge and efficiency, rules and lim its, in contrast to the charlatanism
(37) See examples of revolutionary rhetoric in Na.hasfs speeches at Mansura 
10.7,1930; at Zaghlul’s tomb, 13.11.1931; 1.2.1932; 16.4.1932 and 15.1.1932.
Nahas and Mahmud in speech on Gebel Aulia on 25.5.1932 and Mahmud's speech to 
Ramadan delegations at Liberal Club on 21.1 .1932. See also m anifestos! of 16.10.1930  
and 25.5 .1932.
(38) Upon his return from Geneva (see Ch. II) Sidqi adopted a firm er line towards 
the extra-parliamentary opposition, and his advice to Mme Zaghlul to restrict the 
use of her house (the House of the Nation) to people she personally knew was a 
sequence to this policy. His interview to the Sha*bon 13.10.1932, statement in the 
Moqattam on 7  .11 .1932, along with his addresses to Sha’bists on 2.11.1932 and
24.11.1932 heralded the new line. j
(39) For a comment on the pathology of revolution, see editorial, "al-tafra marad 
ijtima*i" . Sha^b, 25.1.1932 -  This theme ran through other editorials and Sidqi 
frequently referred to the diseased society which fostered agitators and convulsive 
changes instead of orderly evolutionary development . cf. analogy below. P -H 8.
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and ignorance of the demagogues. In contrast, too, to the capricious appeals to 
the passions and emotions of the crowd, its a^tifa., authority addressed itself to 
interest and reason - al*»masla.ha and al"*aql. It was this conception that animated 
many of Sidqi's discourses and underlay some of his controversial decisions, like 
his conduct towards Zaghlul's mausoleum. (40) He believed that enlightened 
patriotism consecrated the national interest and was deferential to the collective 
efforts that served the national cause. In the absence of reason and enlightenment, 
the statesman was compelled to assume the mantle of the autocrat as a practical 
and temporary expedient to restore authority. (41)
One of the first arenas in the race to restore authority and curb demagogy was 
the press. Before the new regime was launched in June 1931, powers of suspending 
dailies were vested in the Minister of Interior, and of weeklies, in the Council of 
M inisters. With Parliament due to meet on the 21st June 1931, Sidqi realised that 
the Government would lose its powers while a delay would have to elapse before it 
could pass alternative controls through the Chambers. To overcome this predicament, 
he sped through with press and publication legislation, just before Parliament met. (42) 
Subsequent modifications defining and restricting somewhat arbitrarily, the freedom  
of journalists were later passed through Parliament in the following session in May
1932. (43) Sidqi defended the severity of the provisions on the grounds that "the
(40) Its conversion into a national pantheon was rejected by Mme Zaghlul whereupon 
a decree was issued atta.ching the monument to the Egyptian Museum as a repository 
for the mummies of 20 pharaohs. The incident had its  obvious Palace connotations, 
while its timing coincided with the ban on the commemoration of the first demand for 
independence (13.11.1918) Sidqi was thus seen to have laid the finger of ridicule on
a national shrine and provoked deeper public resentment still. See Residency despatch 
of 5.11.1931 in FO 371/15408.
(41) cf. Sidqi’s views on dictatorship below. P * 1 0 9 .
(42) Decree Laws No. 97 & 98 of 1 7 .6.1931. The accompanying explanatory note made 
an interesting emphasis on the institutionalising purpose of the legislation. -  to 
regulate the journalistic profession, (cf. with legislation on Chambers of Commerce
in June, 1933). On the other hand, some provisions undermined this objective (art.
166bis). See Note by Mr. Graves enc. in Residency desp. of 14.7.1931 in FO 371/  
15423.
(43) Amendments in the Penal Code, in June 1932, followed die Tema Bomb incident 
(see note ) and were justified by the need to protect the Regime against press 
licentiousness and irresponsibility. Contending with articles "susceptibles de depre- 
cier le regim e, le denigrer ou en diminuer le prestige" these amendments lend 
themselves to arbitrariness. See enc. in Residency despatch of 24.6.1932 in FO 371/  
16127.
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systematic misinformation of the public mind must be stopped, ,rand that some 
kind of protection was necessary in a country where the reader was credulous 
and sem i-literate, and the press absolutely unscrupulous. It was, moreover, by a 
judicial process that he sought the remedy, and not by administrative methods. (44) 
Despite this keen attention to confine the press, in practice, moderation was the 
rule, and true to the spirit in which it was conceived, under Sidqi, the law was 
applied more as a deterrent rather than a punitive instrument. (45) Notwithstanding 
the preventive m easures, the press remained a m ercurial adversary tha.t outbid 
the rigours of the Administration and constituted one of the more effective weapons 
in undermining the Regime. (46)
In contrast to its activity In the ea.rlier months which had called for an impartial 
vigilance over public security, soon the Administration wa.s involved in the dual task 
of containing insurrection and enforcing the new political order. Two related events 
occurred in the interlude that followed the promulgation of the new Constitution in 
the Autumn of tha.t yea.r, both of which left their indelible imprint on the evolving 
Administration. Recruiting members for the new political party and mobilising the 
country for elections became integral to the daily activity of officials. This 
transported the Administration to the obscure borders where the executive and the 
political ambiguously mingled. The conventional duties of surveilling, checking and 
policing were complicated where the law itself was questioned and the menace to 
order came from sources other than the common crim inal. In the capital the 
government machinery engaged to advantage in the organisational preliminaries
(44) Loraine to Simon, 24.6 .1932. (Confid.)
(45) Outside July 1930 and the elections (May 1931) the incursions against the press 
were surprisingly limited. See Annual ■ Reports for 1932, paras. 409-416 (FO 371/ 
17015), and for 1931, paras. 324^330 in (FO 371/16124) -  SidqiTs esteem  of 
constructive opposition ma.y be seen in the light of an incident related by the 
proprietor of the weekly Rose a.l-Yusuf in her m em oirs. (1952) p. 140.
(46) SeeMudliakkiratl, p .58 -But Sidqi too had unscrupulous innings with the press 
relying ©n his agile political secretary, Mahmud Rashid, for the purpose. The nightly 
ha.unt of journalists, Bar a.l-Lewa', was the setting for calculated government leaks and 
inspired rumours. The exposure which embarrassed the moderate Wafdists in April 
1932 is  one example of such leaks. See note 79 in C h.n .
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which eventually ensured an unprecedented efficiency and an unexpected alacrity in 
carrying out the elections. Beyond that, the picture differed as extensive powers were 
delegated to subordina.tes and unconventional duties became systematised. Ma’murs 
for example, upon whom much effective power devolved, were required to study the 
situation in their area.s, submit proposals for resisting the Opposition and report on 
political tendencies of prospective candida tes, while the burden of guaranteeing 
loyalties fe ll on them, in conjunction with the um das.(47) The successful conclusion 
of elections in the teeth of a desperate resolve to prevent them imposed a strenuous 
responsibility on the Administration. This officially condoned the wide powers it 
vested in its agents and, inadvertently, it sowed the seeds for future deviation.
The efficient and capable body in which Sidqi prided him self could hardly
?
escape the consequences of its political involvement. The divisive currents which 
it sought to evade infiltrated in the heat of the electoral campaign and resulted in 
resignations and dism issals which threatened the esprit de corps he strove to instil
(48) The criteria for professionalism were equally undermined a.s promotions and 
awards came to depend -at least for a moment- upon political zeal and loyalty apart 
from knowledge and ability. (49) The strains and tensions under which officials
(47) Following the first stage of the elections, Naha.s sent out to the Procureur- 
Genera.1 a long documented letter comprising a compendium of alleged irregularities 
during these elections. See Ahram, 20,5,1931, and further one on 17.6.1931. He 
cabled a sim ilar communication to the Manchester Guardian simultaneously. (20.5.193. 
A compact catalogue of charges against the Administration is found in the Report on 
the elections by Keown»Boyd. o p .c it ., Appendix B. The Wafdist Misr which continued 
to appear during elections, constituted a repertoire on coercion, summary detention, 
fraud and intimidation.
(48) The head of the syndicate of officials, Abdel Qa.der effendi Mokhtar, resigned 
just before elections and was publicly feasted by the Wafd, together with colleagues 
who followed his example. At the same time the Cabinet met in an extraordinary 
capacity on 13.5.1931 and announced the dism issal of six  officials : the above 
mentioned, Moh. e l Bakri, Saba Habashi, Hassan Ha.mdi, Musa Nasr, Moh.Fa.hmy el 
Ma.ghra.by -  (File 150 -11/137 in C.M. Archives) -  Other d ism issals followed elections
(49) A series of exceptional promotions, r ises and special salaries were provided for 
in a. memorandum by the Finance Committee requesting special powers for the 
Minister of Interior to be confined to present circum stances. This was endorsed by 
the Cabinet in its sitting of 9. 8.1931; cf. earlier decision on 15.7.1931 announcing 
general ban on increments. Isolated cases of individual exemptions, like the effective 
promotion of mudir of Girga. occurred. This was clearly a. case of nepotism, as Habib 
Hassan, the brother of a Minister, wa.s one of the le ss  able mudirs, "the blot on the 
picture". See Secret Report of 15. 4.1933 by Keown-Boyd. cited above.
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laboured demanded their recognition in their exemption from penalties and their 
enjoyment of privileges, which further enhanced their material and legal power 
base. Discrimination within officialdom was practised in favour of senior officials 
generally, and Sidqi's disposition to exercise his prerogative in delegating power 
reinforced their privileged position. (50) Conversely, in practising politics 
officials nurtured connected habits and values which adversely affected the ethos 
of discipline and order upon which the hierarchy depended. (51) The political 
contamination of the Administration was subsequently aggravated by the course of 
the power struggle as in the post "parliamentary phase public agitation and open 
insurrection were replaced by the politics of sedition and, in exposing surreptitious 
plots, the agents of authority came to connive with crim inals. The cases pending
}
before the Courts in 1932, offshoots of electoral anim osities -  tended to incriminate 
parquet officia.b as much as party politicians. (52)
(50) A comparison of figures for the first two and half years under the Regime with 
a sim ilar period preceding it, disclosed a bias in applying the la.w in favour of 
ma’murs, officers and mocawen idara. men as distinct from other minor officials, 
or those le ss  directly connected with the Administration, eg. umdas and sheikhs.
See talole of record of a.ctions and complaints against administrative officials and 
letter from Judge Booth to Smart, on 7.2 .1933 -  (enc.) in FO 371/17008 -  
Sidqi’s wide resort to delegating power seem s to have precipitated abuse in the 
senior ranks of officials. See interpellation of commutafion of pensions scheme. 
MMN, 10.4.1934.
(51) For example, the collective exemption from penalties afforded subordinates, 
following elections, clearly implicated a breach of discipline. The preliminary 
investigation into 279 complaints submitted by the parquet to the Minister of Justice 
on 10.8.1931 indicated only one side of the question, the practice of wholesale 
forgery by the Opposition. Subsequently, these complaints were filed, as the 
boycott policy deprived the Opposition from resorting to the judicial machinery.
(52) See,-for e x ., the Forged Letters Case (December, 1931 "February /
March, 1932) This case originated in a letter referred to in Nahas's communication 
to the Public Prosecutor, alleged to have been written by Allam to Sidqi, implicating 
the use of state funds for electoral bribing ; the signature proved to be a. forgery. 
For sequence and appeal judgement, see Residency despatch of 19.2.1932 in
FO 371/15423.
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The integrity of a. regenerated Administration was threatened to the detriment 
of the authority which it had successfully restored, but whose sustenance now depended 
upon the parliamentary course it launched. The reorganised political institutions had 
sprouted out of the pinnacle of administrative power and their own prospects lay 
in their ability to prove themselves,notwithstanding their decreed origin. This 
depended as much on the subsequent conduct of the Administration as on their own. (53)
The conditions for maintaining the integrity of the Administration in the 
circumstances were as essential as they were uncertain. It was essential tha.t it 
should retrench its systematic and dubious political activity, retract its extensive 
and arbitrary powers, re-a sser t and tighten its professional and institutional prem ises 
and finally, submit itse lf to some form of effective control. Whether, having savoured 
the pleasures of its growing powers, it would have been willing to relinquish them, 
is  irrelevant before the sheer weight of the objective obstacles to its doing so. The 
same force majeure which had justified the central political role of the Administration 
continued to exert itse lf in the unabated, If somewhat altered form political hostilities 
assumed, and the vigilants of authority could not afford to relax their grip or divert 
their attention from political opponents. At the same tim e, the seditious exploitation 
of the effect o f  the prevailing economic depression further complicated their task.
In the capital, the combination of the politics of the Depression and Opposition 
politics inspired a. wave of political crime as the grievances of the swelling hosts 
of unemployed were more readily fanned than remedied. Many of those were victim s 
of the electoral ba.ttlefield, collectively dism issed following strikes in the Government 
workshops, and it was not difficult to transfer their plight into a political issu e. (54)
(53) For evolution of parliamentary institutions see Ch. IV below, f- iBAIA
(54) The real figures for unemployment outstripped those officially registered -  23, 85C 
(ST§ June, 1932). The wave of political crime involved a ser ies  of demonstrational 
bombs, begun in the latter part of 1931 and aimed at politically strategic targets 
connected with the Regime. The most serious was the explosion at Tema. on 5 .5.1932  
aimed at Sidqi and company of 22 Sha^bist deputies and other figures. The Bombs 
trials opened on 19.3.1932 and the proceedings are invaluable for the light they cast
on the politicisation of grievances, the role of political agents and the self-im age of 
the culprits. See Case No. 114/1932 in the Archives of the Supreme Court (Cairo); 
the Tema bomb is  filed separately, as Case No. 157/1932 (available also on m icro­
film in records of the Superior Council for the Protection of Arts and Crafts).
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Elsewhere, In the provinces, the task of collecting tax-arrears fell on the unpopular 
officials in hard tim es, and the boundaries between judicious firm ness and tyranny 
in performing a.n onerous duty were, in practice, blurred. (55) Nor were relief 
policies without their side-effects as the new Agricultural Bank, with its network of 
shunas (stores) throughout the country, unleashed an army of officials, whose 
increased powers, equipped as they were with intimate details of their clients’ 
financial status, spelled a growing invasion of privacy. (56)
Never shorn of influence, the Administration in a.gricultural Egypt was now 
doubly reinforced with the means and the opportunity to indulge it. Precautions to 
control it remained verbal form alities. In the correspondence exchanged between 
Sidqi and Shukri, the Director of the Bank, in August 1931, it was explicitly maintained 
that the Bank was a. national institution and that its relief operations would be 
conducted on "individual merit". Sidqi him self, too, is  credibly reported to have 
intervened on behalf of political opponents to withhold sequestrations. Neither 
stipulation nor precedent, however, prevented political abuse of the relief funds and 
credit facilities. Generally, the further away from the centre of authority the greater 
the incidence of arbitrary conduct, while, the closer the personal contact between 
the exacting official and the afflicted party, the more the abuse was felt. But political 
discrimination was not the rule, for officials were often indiscriminately bent on 
extracting government dues. The politicisation of their ro le, moreover,, disposed 
the Government to maintain the defensive and to hood-wink some of the more ominous 
reports implicating their repressive conduct.
Meanwhile, discipline in officialdom sagged and, with growing Palace 
intervention, the channels of communication in the hierarchy became ambigious.
(55) So prompt were officials in carrying out their duties that in Sohag, for e x ., 
the taxes were collected before they were due I .Officially, this was explained by the 
good onion crop. -  Towards the end of 1931,' the Residency sent out a circular to 
consular agents to enquire about allegations of increased tyranny and oppression in 
the provinces. The result of investigations did not definitively incriminate
the Administration. See memorandum with summary and other enclosures in 
Residency despatch of 12.12.1931 . FO 371/15408
(56) This effect'was anticipated in the memorandum Sidqi drafted in on the Credit 
Agricole. See Documents, STS, July, 1930.
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The operation of an internal control mechanism was upset and the way for 
irresponsibility was pawed. Control grew increasingly dependent upon Sidqi’s 
effective presence and his continued exercise of statesmanship at a moment when 
both were on the wane. Sidqi’s own heavy dependence upon the Administration as his 
ultimate bulwark of support was not of a nature to facilitate his exercise of authority 
over it, while he was, moreover, handicapped by the impact of inescapable economy 
policies. Individual exemptions from the effects of the enforced ban on salary r ises  
and promotions were, by the Spring of 1933, giving way to collective exemptions in 
departments that were particularly exposed to increased pressures and responsibilities 
notably in the Interior and Finance. (57) The struggle to maintain standards and 
ensure that proven zea.l did not go unrewarded, went side by side with his multiplying 
economic preoccupations and with the switch in his priorities to the Anglo-Egyptian 
question. His deteriorating physical condition and, eventually, his protracted 
absence from office during 1933, deprived the regime of a necessary element of 
political control before a more reliable alternative had been institutionalised. The 
wide publicity given earlier to the activity of the Administration in the party organ, 
which had presented an indirect check on its actions, subsided and, even the opposition 
press, perhaps partly due to the restrictions on reporting cases before the Court 
(sub judice), was momentarily deflected from its pursuit. Lulled into a false sense  
of security, the power of the Administration continued unchecked before it could 
exa.ct its nem esis.
•J’ T
The initial rehabilitation of authority on the eve of Sidqi's assumption of power 
involved the concurrent reinforcement of the Administra.tion together with the Courts 
that would review its exercise. While effective government demanded a strong 
executive, Sidqi’s commitment to a constitutional ideal underlay the quest for a
(57) "In order not to have responsibility and competence go unacknowledged for so 
long, " a ser ies of exceptional r ises and promotions were granted mudirs (File 150 - 
29/10 in C.M. Archives) and officials in the Finance- (File 150 -  11/503); see MMW 
27,4.1933 and 1 1 .5 .1 9 3 3 .Earlier on, awards were granted to officers who had 
"proved their merit" in the Bombs cases (See memorandum by Minister of Interior 
on 28.11.1932) although their implementation was delayed until April 1933. Out of 
the 9 candidates, 5 were effectively promoted, while the rest were given exceptional 
r ise s . Sidqi had originally conceived of the distinction between effective and nominal 
promotions in the hope of retaining a. moral incentive. His view prevailed over that 
of his colleague in Education, who sa.w in the formality an administrative inconveniena 
Ibid., 19.8.1931.
working ’balance' within-the modified framework of power. Under the Regime 
the consolidation of the judiciary by creating a higher court of appeal was executed 
in a spirit that offset forebodings of the eventuality occurring under the Wafdisation 
impulse of its predecessors. (58) The Cour de Cassation that emerged was presided 
over by a distinguished authority of renown and personal integrity, whose appointment 
bade well for its prospects as an independent national institution. (59) The corrective 
to administrative abuse ultimately lay in its verdict.
In December, 1932, the Supreme Court took a decision to revoke an appeal 
judgement condemning to death the murderers of the late ma'mur of Badari /A ssu it, 
on grounds that mitigating factors condoned the behaviour of the culprits. Investigations 
had unearthed the conduct of the deceased as brutish and inhuman, and although the 
Judge of Cassation was legally unable to rem it the sentence of the lower court, he 
condemned this conduct and urged the former to review its  sentence. Further 
enquiries into other cases in the same province showed administrative abuse to lie, 
specifically, in three main areas : corporal torture to ektract confessions, im prison­
ment without trial and forgery in recording proceedings. (60) These disclosures, 
together with the Cassation verdict, inspired a heartsearching in the ranks of the 
Regime and provoked a public outrage which political opponents exploited with a. 
vengeance. On 4th January 1933, the Cabinet resigned and, on the same day, the 
reconstructed Cabinet was announced. (61)
(58) See Decree-Law No. 68/1931. For comment see letter from Judge Booth to Smart 
on 7.5.1931 (Confid.) enc. in FO 371/15426. cf. Ch. II p. 50.
(59) Abdel Aziz Fahmy was President of the Native Court of Appeal in 1929 and 
Minister of Justice in two previous governments -  ex. member of the Legislative 
Assembly, founding father of Wafd and President of CLP, but abandoned politics in 
pursuit of original career in judiciary. " . . .  a convinced and-unusually disinterested  
nationalist", sums him up. See Personality List in FO 371/.15421 . The new Court 
came to fil l  in a "lacune" in the administration of Justice. See Speech from the Throne, 
June, 1931 -  cf. another such gap was filled with the creation of the long debated 
Conseil d'Eta.t, again under Sidqi, in 1946.
(60) See statement in reply to question on administrative brutality MMN, 1.2.1933 -  
The M inister's reply constituted a. sta.tistical defence of the Regime which was shown 
to have provoked less  complaints against officials than some preceding governments.
It should be pointed out though that the change in the law of prosecutions against 
officials under Mahmud in 1928, resulted in le ss  convictions against officials.
(61) On the same evening the new government received a vote of confidence and on 
the following day, Sidqi explained the reasons for the changes and gave his account of 
the split with Maher in a lengthy reply to an inspired question. MMN, 5 .1 .1933. This 
was in retort to earlier interviews in the Balagh with the outgoing M inisters. See also 
letter from Judge Booth to Oriental Secretary on 13.1.1933 (enc) in FO 371/17007.
• The a.vld politicisation of the issue complicated Sidqi's task. While he was 
prepared to placate public opinion by giving justice its due course, he wa.s anxious 
to retain the loyalty of his subordinates who, on account of the offensive conduct of 
a. few of their number, were now subjected to a vicious campaign of undisguised 
political design - . The wisdom of combining discretion with firm ness was more 
important here tha.n at any previous juncture for he had to counteract the impending 
demoralisation of the agents of Authority without infringing the necessary discipline. 
He urged on his colleague, the Minister of Justice, the a.dvisability of postponing the 
cases pending judgement before the Courts for several weeks until the political 
conflagra.tion had subsided. Ali Maher demurred and gave way to his successor, 
Ahmad Ali, who adopted this line. At the same time, Sidqi launched a swift 
administrative movement in the provinces which involved transfers, promotions and 
new appointments, so that, by the Spring of 1933, the Administration temporarily 
recovered much of the cohesion, efficiency and morale which were at stake in the 
Winter.
Despite the political contaminations that extended the malaise of the 
Administration to the entire regime and which, consequently, undermined the 
benefit of an effective corrective, yet the consolidation of the judiciary was an a.ct 
of statesmanship. The mea.sure,which had a.ccompanied the reorganisation of the 
Administration a.moimled to a paradoxical vindication of Sidqi's constitutional 
intentions. These, however, were more fully borne out by his bid for leadership 
which sought to check the weight of the coercive dimension necessity had so 
disproportionately emphasised. While the Administration remained the indispensible 
institutional weapon in consolidating authority, its limitations were evident enough 
to inspire and sustain an alternative recourse to the only other weapon he readily 
commanded.
1C7'
II. The Bid for Leadership.
The architectonics of power lay in the sphere of politics, not in Administration, 
and Sidqi met the immense challenge to his authority with a concrete and energetic 
bid for leadership. He conceived his role in terms of consolida.ting a new way of 
government as well as in terms of the more immediate contingency of the power 
struggle. Realising that the foundations of the new regim e depended on inculcating 
new values and not simply on destroying others, he launched his constructive bid for 
public loyalties, significantly, not for his person, but for a new public outlook on 
political life in general. He believed, among other things, that the absence of a 
constitutional ethos had been one of the main obstacles to parliamentary life over, the 
past decade. On the other hand, the parliamentary ideal wa.s not his sole preoccupation 
at a time when the scope for action and reform was vast and urgent, if Egypt were 
to catch up with the march of progress and occupy its rightful place among the other 
civilised and sovereign nations of the world. Sidqi, above a ll, saw the reality that 
was Egypt in the- problems it had to contend with a.s it emerged from an era of British 
domination to one of independence and he was keenly aware of a. profounder structural 
and cultural evolution which imposed its own exigences on the situation. (62) Indeed, 
the purpose of fostering a civic ethos comprising the major virtues of moderation, 
action and reason and others, like self-discipline, frugality, self-reliance and 
cooperation, was to make it possible for the modern institutions Egypt was adopting 
to strike root and to survive the quicksands of transition. (63)
A. The Constitutional Ethos
Sidqi conceived the ethos that underlay parliamentary institutions to lie in 
a spirit of moderation. He condemned the preceding era for its disruptive excesses  
which had engendered its generic instability and led to a gulf between thought and
(62) This awareness can be traced to his formative experience, esp . on the Alex.  ^f 
Municipality, while his work on the Commission in 1916 confirmed it. See C h .I ^ f ^ ' 
In 1930, he strove to communicate it to the public in his earliest addresses, eg. on
11. 9.1930, 10.12.1930 a.nd 1.10.1931 -  "En a.vant’r, was his slogan (EFI address, 
April, 1931) - In 1946, Sidqi became the first president of the Institute of Scientific 
Research, which was launched to lead Egypt into the technological era and for which 
he had long campaigned.
(63) Cf. the requisites for institutionalisa.tion below. Ch. IV. PP* 132-134-.
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action, aspira.tion and-achievement. The result was frustration. In neglecting 
fundamental principles, it had fostered a. basic disequilibrium in which boundaries 
between institutions were infringed, rights and duties confused and responsibility 
lost. "A l-ifrat w'alt-afrTt, wTa.l qusur w'al-ta.qsir" were, consequently, its landmarks. 
(64) In contrast, a sense of temperate sobriety underlay sound Authority. He 
perceived "a basic harmony and complementarity in the various institutions in the 
new era. which ensured it profusion, variety and a steadiness in its activity at a 
moment of world adversity when such attributes were strikingly r a r e .(65) He took 
pride in the restored parliament for the strain of moderation which he found among 
its parties and members and which was partly reflected in the enlightened tolerance 
It maintained towards the Government -  (al-ta.sa.muh fi al-haqq) This attitude induced 
the latter to solicit the general interest and refrain from parochial concerns. (66)
He contrasted this with blind partisanship^on the other hand, which he deprecated 
for its attendant excesses and for the manifest passions and tyra.nny it had led to in 
the past. Nor in his view, did it accord with the constitutional spirit for private 
interests -generally -  whether of party or individuals-to override the general interest 
which he felt he had now restored as the common point of reference for a ll. Wataniya. 
constituted the antidote to hizbiya.
"In turning over a new leaf, the epoch of cults (of persons and 
parties) is gone. We have all become human beings (vabiidulfa.h) 
in a constitutional era. where the Wa.tan reigns suprem e.. .  The 
present era. is not stamped with the seal of a particular faction 
(f i Ta.) but it embodies the Nation (umma.) in its totality and 
diversity, in its struggle for reform and its  aspirations for 
Independence.. .  " (67)
(64) Beni Suef, 14.4.1932.
(65) Ibid.
(66) A hr am, 24.7.1931.
(67) Address to Sha*bist Parliamentary Body on 17.6 .1931.
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Despice the hitherto unhappy experience of parliamentary government in Egypt 
which had left authority undermined, the executive trampelled upon and an unworthy 
legisla.ture, dominated by a tyrannical faction wringing havoc with the National 
interest in the ascendant, Sidqi retained his basic conviction. " . . .  but, I still 
remain a constitutionalist. " The alternative was reprehensible.
"Dictatorship is  a dangerous weapon that should only be 
resorted to in particular cases and then only for a limited 
p eriod .. .The new Constitution (on account of its  greater 
compatibility) prevents the excesses that are likely to lead 
to dictatorship." (68)
He saw dictatorship itse lf as a form of excess which, as such, was neither conducive' 
to security and confidence nor, in the long run, was it conducive to political > 
stability. Under it the conditions for progress were uncertain, as people were subject 
to the whims of the dictator and to his arbitrary exercise of power. In contrast, 
he believed that, "in every na.tion security and order provide the basis for material 
and moral progress"; (69) the superiority of constitutional government la.y in its 
compatibility with the conditions for progress. (70) It ensured the supremacy of 
the law over the will of individuals, subdued pa ssions and secured the effective 
equilibrium that characterised a healthy polity. Moreover, by adequately safeguarding 
the principle of representation, parliamentary life promoted stability and progress.
It was political realism  and utility which may thus be seen to have conditioned 
SidqiTs option for constitutionalism,.
In public Sidqi was categorical in his assertions.
" . . .  the unquestionable intention of our Government is to 
maintain constitutional principles and to safeguard most 
carefully, the liberties gained by the people. " (71)
(68) Interview with the correspondent of the Echo de Paris, 10.5.1931. See,in the 
same vein private interview with T. P. Conwell-Evans on the 27.11.1930 in
FO 800/282
(69) Address to Guiza. delegation, 3 .5 .1931.
(70) Address to Sho?bist parliamentary body, 7 .1 .1932.
(71) Address in Continental Hotel gathering of supporters, 11. 9.1930.
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This re-a.ssura.nee was given to a heterogeneous congrega.tion in September 1930, 
at the height of the political speculation that preceded the promulgation of the new 
order. Towards the end of .1932, in an informal address to a group of deputies and 
sena.tors, Sidqi reiterated his basic conviction and reflectively pursued his option.
"Had we not been truly constitutionalists believing in the 
principle of shura (consultation) and seeking to propagate 
it and abide by its precepts, and to confine ourselves within 
its bounds, how easy it would have been to follow in the 
tracks of others who assumed power under exactly sim ilar 
circum stances.. .  We could, then, have suspended the 
Constitution for a period and suppressed the press in batches 
of tens and hundreds.. .  then, we could ha.ve governed without 
tribulation of the ignorant and we could have escaped the 
vigilance and censor of the legitimate representatives of the 
nation -  But we were loathe to deprive the nation of one of the 
dearest fruits of its struggle. "
He further a.dded,
"We could not think of following the example of others because 
we earnestly believe that the government of the country ought 
to be conducted upon the basis of consultation and along 
constitutional principles on condition that the docile, peaceable 
people are spared the cha.rlata.nism, guile and agitation.. .  It 
is  this conviction that has kept us from slipping impulsively 
in to .. .  a dictatorship.. .  whose very conditions are not present 
in our country. (When we opted for the Constitution) we did so 
without hesitation, fully content in our resolution. "(72)
Assuming a certain consistency in SidqiTs personality, projection could possibly 
provide an indirect measure for testing his professions of faith. Modesty, 
temperance, sincerity and integrity were among the forem ost traits he admired 
in the self-denying devotion to the Wa.tan and to Right (alH-[aqq) which he perceived 
in another eminent statesman.
"The highest offices in the land did not corrupt his modest and 
noble chara.cter.. .  Sarwat Pasha led his life a thinking head
(Ra.'s mufakkira.) a.s well as an a.ctive and productive figu re__
no: irresponsible tattler or agitator.. .  (but) throughout a man 




The strains singled for praise upon the commemoration of his friend included 
qualities he tried to inculcate in his country-men, while, in the model of 
character and conduct he upheld to them,, he conceived the embodiment of that 
ethos in whose absence constitutional prescriptions were subverted.
The practical cprroboration of a constitutional ethos however, was not 
confined to SidqiTs reflections nor to isolated confessions. "Egypt is not served 
by pretty words, but by deeds", was a motto that was soone-r proved than echoed 
under a leadership which sought to confirm its m essage in the course of realising  
itse lf. Part of this message aimed at emancipating Egypt from exploitation by a- 
faction of its own sons. (74) Sidqi had learnt from his experience in 1925 that his 
arch-enemy was, not the superior political organisation of the Wafd, which he 
could counter and repress by a more efficient and determined organisation, but 
the Zaghlulist myth for which the Wafd indomitably stood. Unless the latter was 
successfully challenged the authority of the Regime remained precarious, while, 
in the absence of an alternative set of norms, the parliamentary course could not 
prosper. Conversely, the search for public consent involved a radical endeavour 
to cultivate a more propitious climate of public norms in which the constitutional 
ethos would be reinforced by an ethic of action and reform.
B. The Provincial Tours.
To preach the new civic ethos, Sidqi launched a system atic campaign that 
took him at regular intervals on periodic visits from Aswan, in Upper Egypt, to 
the provinces of the Delta and to the coastal cities, and from Qantara in the East, 
to outposts in the western desert. (75) These tours (which should be seen in 
conjunction with the Administrative tours above) may be crudely classified into 
electoral and post-electoral, the latter generally falling in two phases : August- 
October, 1931 and February-July, 1932. The electoral and immediate post-electoral 
tours are more sharply delineated by the ostensible proclamation that "political"
(74) Sha,’bist delegation, 6 .1 .1931.
cf. editorial in the Sha*b, 27.1.1931.
(75) The number of such tours and v isits conducted in 1931 and 1932 amount to 
nearly 40. Sidqi stopped at Qantara on his way back from Palestine and the Levant 
in the winter of 1932 and referred to the brotherly ties that bound Egypt to its  
neighbours. Interest (maslalia), however, was the basis of their relationship. See 
Sha*b, 14.2.1932 and 11.3.1932.
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tours were over and that the moment called for a concerted and single-minded 
consecration to national economic problems; (76) Sidqi, accordingly, put him self 
at the disposal of the people, sought their opinion and demands, examined for 
him self conditions peculiar to each locality and collected the information that 
would help him devise relief policies. The parliamentary recess accentuated the 
importance of these contacts, while their field nature enhanced their utility. The 
tours in 1932 generally followed invitations by local delegations to which he readily 
responded.. .
" . . .  not to entertain myself with ceremonious receptions.. .  
but to see your problems on the spot and to inspect your 
contribution to the reforms underway in the country.. .  as 
the time is gone when Heads of State stand aloof from 
the p eop le .. "(77)
The convocation of Parliament, then, did not prevent the executive from intensifying 
its  own effort to live up to its responsibilities and meet the vital problems in a 
situation that demanded it. (78). Government was, after all, a tax exerted by the 
Watan. (79) The importance he attached to his m ission urged him, notwithstanding 
his manifold preoccupations in office, to give priority to the tours and his own 
reward eventually dawned on him one day as he observed that "a. remarkable change" 
had come over the beliefs and attitudes of the people. (80)
Sidqi retained a national character to his tours"and strove to differentiate 
between the Regime and the Political Party. This was especially obvious during the
(76) Interview with Sha^b and press statement in A hr am, 20.9 .1931. It is difficult
to make a. strict classification for hardly a month passed without a v isit to a. provincial 
locality, a public amenity, an enterprise or a government department. The crudity 
of the classification is evident eg. on 2nd July, 1931, he was in Qaliubiya. and 
between 24/26th December, 1931, he inaugurated works in Esna and Edfu; November 
1932 in Port Said recupera.ting, but still politically indefatigable (24.11.1932) For 
the rest of the year he confined his visits to industrial, commercial and cultural 
sites in the Ca.pita.l.
(77) Address to Da.qa.hlia. delegation, 22.4.1932.
(78) Shajb, 12.5.1932.
(79) To Sha^bist delegation, 6 .1 .1931.
(80) Alexandria, 1 .7 .1932. The speech on the occasion comprised a comprehensive 
political evaluation of the past two years, cf. sim ilar speech delivered earlier in 
Assuit, 22.3.1932.
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elections where the nature of the challenge to his authority transformed them into 
a plebiscite about the Regime. The simultaneous excursions by Mohamed A 11am in 
his capacity as Party Manager were undertaken separately; they followed in the 
tracks of the Prime Minister to confirm a conviction and uphold a model of determin­
ation to see elections through -  and, more significantly, to mobilise for the Party, 
recruit agents, dispense pa.tronage and, generally, supervise the organisation he 
presided over. Sidqi, on the other hand, who was usually accompanied by an 
Ittehadist colleague as well as a Sha'bist, canvassed for the principles of the Regime 
and, by preserving his image as champion of a national cause, provided a. political 
dimension of volition which the Regime badly lacked.
One of the important functions of these visits lay in their demonstrational 
value. This wa.s again particularly evident during the. elections where a ritual 
for the legitimation of authority emerged in the pattern of exchanges that occurred. 
The typical audience comprised provincial notables or tribal eminents (eg. Beni Suef/ 
Wasta.) a.long with executive representatives of authority. Posters and pla.cards with 
suggestive Quranic verses announced the gracious arrival -  eg. "And remember in 
the (holy) Book (the story of) Ismail; Aye, he was truthful of (his) pledge”. Festiv ities  
usually commenced with an announcement to the Prime Minister by the host disclosing  
an act of public munificence in honour of the occasion. Various speeches followed 
upon which Sidqi commented on the manifest devotion and asserted his determination 
to remain in power in view of such enthusiastic support, inspired " to continue to 
serve you. " (81) The procession subsequently went onto the next township where, 
amid ceremony, it was received by the mudir and a local notable, a public site 
would be inaugurated and another round of exchanges followed. In contrast to his
A
opponents -  *a theoretical lot1 -  who by their actual conduct were opting for autocracy 
Sidqi wa.s actively soliciting the consent of the public and exploring all quarters for 
allegiance. Early in April, he visited the government workshops where he was 
welcomed by a. representative of the workers who stressed  the implications of the 
Prime M inister's practical concern for labour, notwitfistanding, his numerous other 
preoccupations. Sidqi's reply, typical of its counterparts on other sim ilar occasions,
(81) Sha*b, 2.4.1931.
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dwelled on the "noble symbol of enlightened patriotism" embodied in the arsenal 
before him, explained its contribution to the national wealth, and in a pointed 
diversion, referred to the importance of industry, " the pillar of progress", and 
to the imperative duty of government to encourage it and protect its architects. On 
the present occasion, the oral exchanges culminated in a. pra.ctical demonstration 
in which the Director of the workshops introduced the heads of different sections 
to Sidqi -all graduates of technical colleges -  and he shook hands with each one.
The encounter closed on a photographic consecration of the occasion (82) The 
rituals of legitimation were thus duly carried from the green fields to the shop- 
floors.
In the course of the formalisation of public consent Sidqi was also evolving a 
counter-weight to the autocratic origin of his power. In the immediate post-electoral 
tours he remarked with satisfaction upon a growing sense of conviction in the country 
that his wa.s a. national government "deriving its strength exclusively from public 
opinion. "(83) Regardless of its veracity, such statements backed by his active 
gestures throughout the land were not of a nature to improve His Majesty's disposition, 
The tenor of subsequent statements strove to strike a balance by emphasising the 
indispen^bility of Royal support, while in later tours prudence counselled economy 
in such utterances. Other means were resorted to to convey the political principle 
he sought to im press on his public, but their implications did not escape a wary 
Monarch either. Sensitive to the growing tension in palace c irc les, Sidqi interrupted 
an audience towards the end of 1932 enjoining it to cheer, not for him self, but for  H.M 
the King. (84)
Meanwhile, the inculcation of principles and values was actively pursued less  
by preaching, more by practice.;One of the first lessons he demonstrated by his 
incessant tours was that government derived its vitality from the momentum its 
pursuits engendered. As a. national responsibility government could only be discharged 
through perseverence. The tasks confronting it could not be resolved by incipient,
(82) Ibid., 8 .4 .1931. Similar visits were undertaken to technical schools and 
industrial s ites.
(83) A hr am, 20. 9.1931 -  The emphasis here was to deny the allegation that the Regime 
derived or sought British support. Generally his tribute was divided between the King 
and the deputies. See Ch.IV. pp .179-180; 163-164.
(84) Da.qahlia. delegation, 27.12.1932.
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isolated acts -  they demanded a systematic self-application that involved continuous 
activity. Another of his lessons on the attributes of government was that, far from 
being a fortuitious activity, it called for ability, knowledge and expertise as well 
as for resolution. (85) With the object of exploring the potentials of a. neglected 
pa.rt of the country and investigating its problems, he twice journeyed to the 
western desert first to collect practical information on the basis of which he 
propounded a number of active measures, and ten months later, to inspect the 
progress underway in their execution. (86) There was more than knowledge, however, 
as government was subject to rules which enjoined spheres of competence and the 
observance of bounds. On one occasion, Sidqi" s assent to a demand wa.s granted, 
but its implementation was made subject to the decision of the local Council concerned 
before the decree could be promulgated. (87) On another occasion, he referred the 
matter to his collea.gue, the Minister of Education, on grounds of competence and 
responsibility. (88) Government was not an arbitrary exercise of power, but an 
orderly and disciplined activity whose concrete purpose, moreover, precluded it 
from being a literary contest or an end in itse lf. To im press this meaning Sidqi 
accompanied his professions of reform, action and production (al-nasha.t, wTal*amal, 
w"a.l-intag) with successive practical demonstrations that ranged from works 
benefiting a particular locality to those of a national import. Power stations, pumping
(85) In As suit, 23.3 .1932. Sidqi referred somewhat vaguely to the mores of power 
(ta.qa.lid al-hukm) as the basis for government. Earlier statements emphasised the 
role of knowledge and rationality eg. Sha*b, 22. 9.1931, and address to Fayoum and 
Qaluib delegates on 17.10.1931. He carried the point further in his speech at 
Alexandria on 1.7.1932 -  See P* 12 7 •
(86) Between 11th and 16th October Sidqi undertook a tour of the western desert and 
among its notable incidents was the. v isit to Mersa. Ma.tir.ouh, the stop at Siwa Oasis, 
the v isit to the Frontiers Administration and the address to units of the Egyptian 
army in their barracks there. (15.10.1931) He went back in June 1932 to inspect 
the works in progress on the summer resort he suggested in a campaign to develop 




installations, bridges, hospitals, schools, a new district administration (malmuriat 
Kafr el-Sheikh), a new summer resort (Mersa Matruh), a national crop exchange, 
the Gebei Aulia Dam, were all among the works that were begun in this .era. and 
whose practical significance to the populace was the object of active exposition.
The measure of a government lay in its effective contribution to the national welfare, 
and Sidqi took pride in drawing attention to the fact that his days in power were 
productive despite the prevailing economic adversity. (89) He declined any personal 
share in a perceptibly evolving sense of approbation which he attributed to a dawning 
recognition of the Idea for which he stood, namely, that of "energy, action and 
cohesion" (al-nashaf, w'al-ama.l w'al-ta.ckla.fur) (90)
The nature of the rela.tionship between the government and the people was 
equally an object of practical demonstration on these tours. Allegiance was 
essentially a bond that rested on rationality and utility, not emotion. By expounding 
at regular intervals the various policy measures in progress, Sidqi appealed to the 
public to pass judgement upon his government not on the basis of unfulfilled pledges, 
but of its actual record. The active gesture that frequently accompanied these v isits  
confirmed the lively concern of the government for the affairs of the locality. Both, 
exposition and gesture, illuminated other attributes of this relationship. In contrast 
to the foolery and deceit of its  opponents, information and candour provided the 
yardstick of its exchanges with the public which, implicitly, constituted an effective 
recognition of the principle of accountability. This yardstick, too, postulated a 
responsiveness and activism in the dynamic interaction that governed such a 
relationship.
A technique was used to diffuse a current of intera.ction between the two 
parties whereby, specific demands were articulated by representatives of interests, 
usually a local council member, and they evoked a response of like nature. In his 
reply to speakers on one occasion, for example, Sidqi, in a sequence of precision, 
clarity and pointed brevity dealt with each of the demands raised relating to aspects 
of reform in the locality and illustrated the extent to which the Government could
(89) Girga, 9 .3 .1931.
(90) Damietta, 17.9.1931.
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comply with them, (91) On other occasions the impact of the current, of demand and 
response was heightened by the spectacle of Sidqi complying * on the spot -  with 
one of the demands raised* where that was technically or legally practicable. (92)
An important message Sidqi wished to communicate to the public was that government 
was amenable to reason and that people could influence it to their benefit. In a. 
characteristically brief but pointed address at Bilbeis, Sidqi startled his audience 
by drawing their attention to a demand^ recently made to him- in Cairo by a visiting  
delega.tion of their number but which had, on the present occasion, been overlooked. 
Then, he had turned it down; but now, having witnessed for him self its  justice, he 
had changed his mind and, as Minister of Interior, he instructed the Mudir and the 
Director of Municipalities Division to lend the demand the priority it merited. (93)
Sidqi made a point in his discou^es to invoke a code of participation by 
explaining that the effectiveness of government depended upon that of local bodies 
and individuals. (94) While the potential of strong government wa.s vast, it was not 
unlimited and, without reciprocity, its capacity for effective action was undermined.
(95) The economic depression was the practical occasion for urging public 
cooperation, while the measures pursued were designed, rather than panaceas to 
national problems, as stimulii to others to undertake their share in solving their 
problems. (96) Cooperation was invoked between individuals and authority, corporate 
bodies and authority and among individuals. The positivism  and activism enjoined in 
the principles of interaction and participation precluded the objective of autocratic
(91) Sha/b, 2 .10.1931.
(92) A telephone call to the district official in Zifta settled on the spot the first 
of a. list of grievances a local delegation petitioned Sidqi with in Gharib (his local 
constituency).
Ibid., 2.4.1931
(93) This concerned the transfer of a railway line tha.t wa.s inadequately located in 
the middle of the little town, much to the inconvenience of its inhabitants. Ibid.,
1.10.1931.
(94) Girga, 9.3.1931; Benha, 13.9.1931; Menufia, 20. 9.1931; Sharqia, 1.10.1931; 
Girga, 6 .5 .1932.
(95) Address on the agricultural programme of the government given on occasion of 
the ina.ugura.tion of the Mit-Berra/Xfta railway line, 14 .8 .1930. See also address to 
visiting delegation on 7 .2 .1932.
(96) See.Ch.V. p .220.
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consolidation of authority of which his opponents accused him. In dwelling upon 
the strength and limitation of government he evolved a concept of power tha t 
allowed for plurality, as individuals and groups were invited to partake of their 
responsibility and contribute to the effectiveness of authority.
However, he maintained a firm conviction in the nature of that dynamic 
relationship. It was incumbent on the government to protect its ward and train it. 
Conversely, Sidqi often drew the analogy between rulers and doctors.
"Rulers are the doctors of society. -Prevention better than cureT 
is  their motto « They must stop poisons from entering the blood** 
stream , hence, protect their charges from going astray or 
contracting a political infection spread by agitators. " (97)
The constitutional modifications represented one aspect of an essentially elitist 
ethos, whose positive implications were now being imparted in the ongoing process 
of political education.
A practical confirmation of the essence of leadership was also underway.
Sidqi believed that responsible and responsive leadership lay at the heart of sound 
authority, and that it provided the dynamo in the political system . In its effective 
exchanges with the public, through its functional and representative bodies, it 
bridged the distance with the people and negated the role of charlatans. Through 
information, it dispelled apathy and, by elucidating government policies, it could, 
in tim e,create a stalce in them. On the other hand, he did not confine the interactive 
element between leadership /following to its  concrete demonstration in demand and 
response currents, but he strove for an additional psychological dimension to produce 
an impact of unison. He often, for example, attributed his own vitality to the support 
and encouragement he sensed in the public. Sidqi further believed in the integrative 
role of leadership and he sought to bridge the gap, not only between authority and 
the people, but also between the national and the regional. He constantly invoked 
the practical link between parochial interests and the general interest by placing 
the former in the perspective of the la tter .(98) In demonstrating its responsiveness,
(97) Address to MPs, 2 .11.1932.
(98) eg. Rosetta, on 8.8.1931, having discussed some works of interest to the 
locality, Sidqi went on to tell his listeners of the problems and projects of their 
"larger wa.ta.n" -  cf. his next address at Benha., 12.9.1931 and Siwa, 14.10.1931.
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responsible leadership which Sidqi represented, retained its creativity and forged 
a. bond with its following, 'not by bending it to its whims, but by raising it to its  
responsibilities.
Above all, the test of leadership in the course of its exercise , lay in the 
nature of the acclaim it evoked. The leader represented a way of government, but 
he did not embody it, and he strove to transmit values and ideas,, but not to assim ilate 
the people to him self. He might set up an example, but he could not incarnate the 
nation, for leadership was instrumental and it should not set itse lf as an end. 
Leadership, as Sidqi saw it, was not a process of self “aggrandisement, but in diffusing 
its ideals, it fulfilled and dissolved itself. This impersonal concept of leadership -  
and of Authority « underlay his hostility to the cult of personality -  that legacy of 
Zaghluiism -  and underlay his instinctive urge to promote institutions. In practice, 
however, these tours brought to light the tension between SidqiTs efforts to deperson­
alise power on the one hand, and a. conflicting disposition on the part of the populace 
to idolise, on the other.(99)
G. The Press Statements and Public Address.
The transition from government a.s an act of authority to government a.s a 
principled and purposeful activity, realisable in the coordination of wills not in 
their subjugation, was the object of this exercise of leadership which was not confined 
to the provincial ' tq u r s .  From the outset, Sidqi’s emergence promised to 
bring with it a distinctive style of government. The policy manifesto and appeal for 
public cooperation and tranquility set the pace. (100) His premiership struck a new 
note in Authority a.s it focussed on communication and no longer solely on imposition.
It set out to inform people of its intentions and solicit their active regard, instead of 
imposing itself mutely and compelling a passive obedience. The gesture was a 
turning point whose momentum was sustained in the course of the steady flow of 
public statements and addresses which he delivered on different occasions and at 
diverse levels.
(99) In Deirut, Ahmad effendi Kama.1 el-Far eulogised Sidqi, "the Great", the "Khal/d 
(eternal), the Beloved, Sha*b, 9 .8 .1931. ThepZa^im"(popular leader or Fuehrer) 
becomes one of his attributes. Again in Behera. the Arabs on horseba.ck fea.st him like 
a. Conqueror and ha.nd him ’the key of the fortress’, ibid. , 9 .5 .1932 . Upon a v isit to
a girls'school in Damieta. he is treated to a poetry recita l in his honour opening with 
the verses : "O Hope of the Nile -  O Felicity's countenance" (Ya Raja’ al-N il, Ya. Wajh 
al-Seoud.. . )  Ibid., 17.9.1931.
(100) See Ch..H above, p. 59.
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Sidqi could perhaps be credited with initiating the systematic exploitation of 
the press for the purposes of the government of the day. In doing so he was impelled 
as much by the absence of a respectable partisan organ that would wholeheartedly 
advocate his views, as by his desire to address the widest possible sector of the 
public to promote a national appeal -  as distinct from a partisan one. It was made 
obligatory for all newspapers to announce official communiques, while the columns 
of the major independent dailies like the A hr am and the Moqattam provided the 
forum  for expounding government policies and the medium for announcing and 
justifying its m easures. The personal imprint of senior officials was occasionally 
felt in the national press, while Sidqi himself engaged in reasoned diatribes with his 
critics. (101) It was mainly, however, in his statements and interviews that he 
conveyed his style of government.
A glance at the personal press communications shows them to have been 
deliberate and calculated excursions that tended to recur in the hea.t of a public 
controversy or at the turn of some critical political development. The message they 
contained meant to exonerate his government from hostile or unfair charges, 
to impress,on opponents and neutral observers alike^a. point scored by his Government, 
to allay fears or reassure a. particular sector of public opinion, or to  convey a 
warning where it was due. The general tone was one of optimistic self-confidence 
designed to instil in the public a like mea.sure of confidence in the government, in his 
personal authority and statesmanship. They also reflected his determination to 
overcome an imposed isolation, defuse a rumour-ridden atmosphere and generally 
ease the prevailing tension.
Their subject was as varied as the situation warranted. Anglo-Egyptian 
negotiations and anti-Wafdist mea.sures or developments were frequent topics for 
elucidation. The former increased before the mounting offensive of his opponents 
in 1932 and towards the end of thftfyear, as British vaccillation threatened to 
undermine^irrevocably^his ga.ins. His statements and interviews were deftly designed, 
by virtue of their cumulative effect, to confront the British government with a
(101) eg. Abdel Hamid Badawi, head of the Contentieux, contributed anonymous 
articles ("an eminent jurist") defending the amendments but he wa.s detected and 
criticised. Rose a.1-Yusuf, 4.11.1930 - At the beginning of September, a dialogue/ 
diatribe took place between Sidqi and Prince Omar Tossoun'. Ahra.m and Moqattam, 
2.9.1930
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de facto situation and impress upon it the opportuneness and wisdom of emharking 
on the negotiations. Nearer home, in the context of the power struggle, such 
statements were sometimes designed to provide his wavering opponents with a face-  
saving bridge for retreat. The press communiques that punctuated the course of 
elections culminated in a proclamation that the country needed the effort of all its 
sons at that moment, and he beseeched his opponents to consider carefully whether, 
in the light of actual facts, devotion to the Watan was not a worthier cause than false  
passions and a.11 obstinate hizbiya. . He made his appeal at the height of his power, 
addressing his adversaries,not a.s head of government but as the leader of a party 
pleading the cause of the Watan. (102) At the same tim e, the challenge to his power 
lay as much in the prevailing economic adversity. While rem edies were being 
devised in government departments, he realised the importance of cultivating 
confidence in the soundness of the economy, the adequacy of his policies and in his 
personal competence. One of his earliest interviews was with the correspondent of 
a leading organ of the business community, the Bourse Egyptienne, where he outlined 
the policy and priorities of his Government. While following elections, to offset the 
effect of the political indulgences they had involved, he reassured anxious local 
foreigners of the stability of his regime and of the non-discriminating nature of its 
protectionist policies. (103) The more vulnerable his position grew before the 
offensive which exploited the economic situation and politicised its issu es, the more 
pointed and specific the statements became to refute allegations, expound measures 
and, generally, to dispel the doubts and anxieties rumours fostered.
Sidqi was equally anxious to secure a representative image of his actions 
abroad, especially a.s the efforts of his detractors were not confined to the Egyptian 
setting, while among his foreign spectators were his critics and potential execution­
ers . (104) He explained that he wa.s essentially a. constitutionalist and that any
(102) Ahram, 15.5.1931; 2.6.1931 and 24.6.1931. cf. ser ies of editorials "For the 
sake of the watan, not for individuals", in the Sha*b* September,1931.
(103) 6.7.1930; Taehodromes, 5. 6.1931 » Members of local foreign communities 
occasionally took an active part in the welcome given Sidqi on his tours in Upper and 
Lower Egypt. See egs, in Sha.^ b, 9.3.1931 and 21.4.1931 -  Still, the unprocla.imed 
state of maxtia.l la.w in force during elections inconvenienced business. See counsular 
reports and letters addressed to Keown-Boyd- enc. in Report on E lections. op. cit.
(104) horaine's simile.. 1 a crouching leopard T - p. 74 above.
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practical divergence from professions was accounted for by the peculiarities of 
the Egyptian setting; that freedom was a relative concept; political development 
an evolutionary process, and that* meanwhile, the concrete gains under the Regime 
in terms of political stability and economic achievement were its practical m easures.
(105) He empha.sised his desire to leave behind him an organised and mature 
Administration and a consolidated nucleus of worthy elements who could be relied upon 
to maintain the reputation and credit of Egypt among other nations intact. (106)
In accepting office at a critical moment, he reminded his audience, he did so wary 
of his responsibilities to his country and, once his mission was completed, he would 
return to his private life as a citizen and patriot, and resume his business activities
(107).
His defensive did not exhaust itself in projecting a more congenial self-im age 
for him self. But his statesmanship ultimately aimed at promoting Egyptian sovereign­
ty. His foreign communications empha.sised the independence of Egypt and its right 
as well as its ability to run its affairs as it saw fit in the light of its national 
interests. Aware of the role of foreign investment for development, he stressed the 
soundness of the economy and underlined its prospects in order to cultivate inter­
national confidence in it. (108) This was evident in Egypt’s endeavour to join the 
League of Nations and in its invitation of foreign capital to partake of its economic 
and social revival « in a spirit of mutual collaboration and equal partnership , not
as a f i e ld  o f  co lo n ia l ex p lo ita tio n . In h is  contribution  to  the foreign  and 
national media Sidqi combined his bid for public consent to a more enduring claim
on statesmanship.
The personal and direct imprint of his style of government appeared more 
particularly in Sidqi's public addresses, where a broad anonymity was reduced to
(105) See example o f  h is  a r t ic le s  in  the Manchester Guardian , 19.3.1931  
and the Financial News, 27.1. 1932 . Sidqi a lso  sen t le t te r s  to  the ed itor  
or messages as the occasion arose. Eg. News Chronicle, 25.4.1931; the 
Daily Herald, 23.5.1931 and the Daily Telegraph, 17.12.1931.
(106) Daily Mail, 1 .1 .1933 (interview)
(107) L’Echo de Paris, 19.5.1931 (interview) »• cf. description in' his memoirs : ” I 
am but a passer-by” Mudhakkirati p039
(108) Sidqi discussed Egypt's foreign policy realistically  and intelligently in an 
article on the subject. L'Europe Moderne, 31.12.1932
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definable proportions in a group bound by some political;* social, occupational or 
regional affinity held in purposeful convocation. While these addresses were few 
and mainly limited to a sequence of provincial delegations at the outset, the creation 
of the Sha^b Party and the intensification of electoral activity afforded new opportun­
ities . With the restoration of parliamentary life they a.cquired a different and more 
varied character which reflected a greater balance and marked the progressive 
consolidation of the Regime. Audiences alternated between Sha4bist meetings, 
parliamentary receptions and business or ceremonial functions.
Sidqi sought the opportunity to communicate directly with elements of the
population hailing from different walks of life. In the provincial elem ents, he 
as
conceived the fellah^the backbone of the country-side with vital interests at stake, 
and he assured him that there was "a close identity between the interests of good 
government and that of the people at large -  as opposed to professional politicians -  
the objective of the first was tranquility and uninterrupted b u sin ess .. .  while that 
of the others lay in chaos and agitation.. .  (109) In other elements of the urban 
population, notably workers, he infused a sense of identity and relevance to the kind 
of society the Regime aspired-^ , He. took pride in being called naslr alnimmal, he told 
a visiting delega.tion of workers from Mansura on the 1st January, 1931, for he 
believed that whoever promoted the interests of labour promoted those of the country 
in their persons, as Egypt depended on their efforts in its present quest to replace 
foreign by national wealth. He hoped that they would live up to their image as “an 
instrument of reform T>, and trust in the identity of interests that bound them to a 
regime dedicated to reform, action and independence in its  action. To youth 
delegations at the Sha*bist centre he equally invoked a sense of responsibility an d 
national calling and appealed to them to exercise their independent will and judgement. 
(110) In contrast to the euphoric Wafdist vision of the undifferentiated Umma, Sidqi 
invoked the individuality and distinctiveness of its components and, in the process, he 
might have encouraged the development of an incipient social consciousness.
(109) Sha*b, 12.3.1931.
(110) Ibid., 6.1.1931 « cf. appeal to workers to avoid politics and beware of . 
impostors (politicians), issued upon the proclamation of an Egyptian Labour Party. 
Ahram, 26.7.1931
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Generally, his addresses displayed a notable poverty in the orator and 
a compa.ra.tive wealth in the educator. Taken in conjunction with the tours^they 
provided sessions of national political enlightehrrent. Those delivered to the 
parliamentary body or to more sophisticated Sha.'bist audiences provided a fair 
sample of a more balanced expose that combined the economic to the political. ( I l l )  
The characteristic brevity that marked many of the addresses wa.s justified by the 
urgency for action ra.ther than w ords.(112) Sidqi sought to introduce a sense of 
time in an easy-going environment by setting an example. Fruga.lity)too.,was another 
virtue he sought to im press on the individual conscience, seizing upon the difficult 
economic conditions of the day to stress its validity. Just as the tours became the 
occasion for inculcating political attitudes compatible with the constitutional ethos, 
Sidqi rs addresses and accompanying gestures strove to link independence and the 
political claim s of the nation to an individual ethos of toil in dally life.
A distinction could be drawn between the public addresses in general and the 
'closed* addresses. The emphasis in the latter was usually on Authority rather than 
on enlightenment. They reflected Sidqi*s immediate political preoccupations and 
were prominent at critical turns in the launching and consolidation of the Regime 
when the challenge to its  authority was heightened. Their incidence coincided with 
the intensification of the flow of organised delegations to the Ministry and they 
constituted a means of personalising the official communiques warning the Opposition 
against its seditious intentions. They were not,however9uniform in their tenor. The 
earlier addresses played on the primordial instincts of fear in his audience, while 
his later addresses became demonstrably less strained. The contrast seen in the 
following two excerpts is  perhaps typical. On one occa.sion, following a brief expose 
on the amendments to the Constitution, Sidqi sonorously reminded his audience, a.
(111) For example of such, see addresses to Continental Hotel gathering on 7.1.1933; 
in Sha.^bist Club on 16.1.1932 a.nd to Sha'bists on 11.11.1932, 1.10.1932 and 8.11.1931, 
For examples of more specialised addresses to qualified audiences, see lecture to 
foreign journalists on 1.2.1932 ; in Alex Chamber of Commerce, 11.9.1931 and esp. 
upon Crop Exchange inauguration at Rod a.l«Farag, 7 .11 .1932 . On the other hand, the 
analysis a.nd statistics a.t Fa.youm on 14.5.1932 seemed slightly out of place, as beyond 
their audience.
(112) Sidqi sometimes resorted to economy in order to avoid an a.wkward situation and 
this frustrated his supporters, cf. his address to welcome deputations upon his return 
from Europe, on 27.9.1932.
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gathering of provincial delegations, that :
" . . .  Such is  the Constitution of the Land.. .  that must be 
venerated and followed. Let him who knows not -  and he 
who caxes not to know, be inform ed.. .  for it is  futile to 
waste time on vain attem pts.. .  their result will only rebound 
on their instigators and there can be no excuse for whomever 
has been warned.. .  " (113)
With Authority established and the Constitution effective, threats were replaced by 
more bouyant assertions. Commenting to a visiting delegation from Fayoum upon 
his latest visit to their province he observed :
" It was a happy and fortunate visit^not with regard to my 
p erson .. .  for I wish to transfer onto my country and the 
R egim e.. .  all the noble meaning manifested in the welcome 
and good«will which I w itnessed .. ."  (B£)
With the diversity in channels and opportunities for communicating with the public 
’closed’ addresses to visiting delegations lost their original importance a.s occasions 
for political discourse and briefpnforma.1 injunctions> in reply to the visiting spokesman^ 
became the rule.
Generally, however, the political importance of the delegations grew in 
proportion to the need to communicate with the public at a given moment when other 
forms were not available or they were inadequate. Just as these delegations had 
first become an audience for political discourse at a time when the Opposition campaign 
gained a new momentum with the promulgation of the Constitution, so too, their 
importance grew towards the end of 1932. With the recrudescence of public agitation 
over the Badari affair, Sidqi felt the need to break the barriers of doubt and suspicion 
by reassuring professions delivered from a position of stable authority. (115) Personal 
contact remained the one effective weapon for persuasion at his command, and he 
retained a pristine faith in the power of the spoken word to influence minds. The 
delegations were ultimately meant to become unwitting mouthpieces for Authority 
in their localities.
(113) Address to Menufjh, Guiza and Beni Suef delegations, 17.10.1930.
(114) Sha*b, 17.5.1932
(115) For the Badari affair, see above. P* 105.
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While the feature of organised delega.tions found a precedent in the Mahmud 
Regime, its originality under Sidqi was in the use to which it was put, as delegations 
came to provide the prelude and, on occasion, the sequel to the tours which he, 
him self undertook. Although, too, the imprint of the Administration was felt in 
the sundry groups that flocked to the seat of Authority to pay homage and receive 
a lesson in the mores of submission, spontaneity was not absent. Provincial notables, 
out of sheer self "interest and out of conviction, went to the Capital to exchange their 
allegiance for a guarantee of their interests. In those hard tim es, however, 
journeying to the Capital was expensive and the ingenuous reversion of the current, 
as Sidqi launched his tours and v isits, was a. dictate of expediency a.s much as of 
political principle. The flow was not completely checked but regulated in a manner 
that linked it to the tours. While the energetic bid for public consent went on with its  
forma.lisa.tion on the spot at tim es, the intermittent formalisation of allegiance, 
embodied in the visiting provincial delegations, ensured that such visits retained 
their demonstrationa.l value.
•?> ■i* t
The consolidation of authority under the Regime was a. complex task, and 
the challenge confronting statesmanship in the process, lay in striking a balance 
between the coercive and voluntary elements of a situation that left little room for 
manoeuvre. Leadership provided the dynamo that inspired a sense of confidence 
and regeneration in the ranks of a reorganised Administration. In projecting his 
presence and ideas on the national and regional planes, Sidqi aspired to create, in 
due course, that mature and enlightened public opinion which could bolster the Regime 
and offset its authoritarian origins. The scope of leadership, however, was coextensive 
with the scope of its activity, and the course of the emergent political institutions 
a.lso depended upon it.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE NEW EXECUTIVE 
I. Conceptual Foundations
" Great works must pass through distinct stages: 
first, an acute awareness of an urgent need to 
act in respect to a given problem; second, a 
profound and thorough consideration of the means 
required to secure a solution-; and, third, once 
a decision has been made, a firm, courageous and 
unflinching resolve to execute it..."(l)
Paradoxically, Sidqi endeavoured to consolidate the 'foundations of 
parliamentary life in Egypt through reinforcing the executive. His gesture 
aimed at remedying the excesses of a volatile legislature by provisionally 
restricting its powers, without violating the fundamental principles of 
the Constitution. At the same time, he sought in the Cabinet an effective 
and credible nucleus within the executive which could provide the base for 
a steady evolution of parliamentary institutions. He believed that a strong 
government would, moreover, be better qualified to handle the difficulties 
inherent in 11 the first stages of independence", and that it could thus^ , 
benefit the prospects of national regeneration as well as constitutional 
development.
The presentation here will first consider the roots and principles 
of Sidqi1s quest before it deals with its substance and practice.
A, The Genesis of Executive Power
To resolve the political deadlock of the 1 twenties, Sidqi turned 
for inspiration to the past. His patriotism did not impair his judgement 
as he conceived the relevance to modern government of the techniques and 
principles introduced by the British. Although many of the pre-War instit­
utional developments were British-controlled and inspired, he believed that 
in the course of their application, they had become Egyptian practices 
and, thereby, they constituted a part of Egyptian historical reality. In his 
quest for continuity, Sidqi,saw in the earlier pattern a model for that effect­
ive and representative form of government whose foundations he was anxious to 
secure. The trouble with the 1923 Constitution was that, in idealising Egyptian 
political reality, it had overlooked earlier developments and undermined its
(1) Sidqi referred to a "theory" that inspired the constitutional modifi­
cations in a political address in the Sha^bist Club at Alexandria on 1.7.1932.
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its identity and, in its mediation between the British, the Khedive and 
the Assembly, it acquired its self-confidence. Ultimately, however, the 
British remained responsible for the smooth functioning of the government 
machinery. In 1930, when Sidqi re-established the Organic continuity 
with an incipient tradition, his action was prompted by other considera­
tions. After a decade of political instability, authority was under­
mined, the Treaty-settlement deadlocked and prosperity threatened.
Moreover, Egypt was at a critical stage in its economic evolution which 
called for effective administration.(3) ' The exaggerated suspicion of the
executive had unjustifiably curtailed its powers at a time when the country 
needed them most.(4) In the early stages of Independence, the responsibili­
ties of a national government were credibly multiplied and it assumed them 
in difficult or "delicate" circumstances.(5) It was called upon to lay 
solid foundations in the different walks of national life and it was 
entitled to the powers which enabled it to discharge its responsibilities 
in the best possible way. The new executive, consolidated on a constitu­
tional basis, provided a timely and rational response in the circumstances.
Trusteeship♦
An ethos of trusteeship inspired the exercise of authority during 
the period of transition.(6) Government could only be entrusted to those 
who were capable of bearing its responsibility. The protection of its ward 
from undermining influences was one aspect of this responsibility. Another 
was the establishment of models for emulation and the provision of standards 
of conduct. Implicit in its exercise of authority too, was the aspect of 
educating its ward and providing the necessary political training so that3 
in time^it could assume a greater share of responsibility in turn. This 
ethos permeated the provisions of the new Constitution as well as the insti­
tutions that emerged.
The provision for indirect elections in the body of the Constitution 
was the principal safeguard to ensure the elitist principle. Contrary to
(3) For new customs regime and excise laws see Ch-V. pp.i9i;222,223; & pp.56-57.
(4) Sidqi, in his inauguration address in the Sha*b Party, 10,12.1930.
(5) Sidqi referred to the difficult situation in his speeches, see for 
example, 11.9.1930 and his statements, e.g. manifesto on 6.12.1923. The 
"delicate" situation is one of the factors prompting constitutional amend­
ments (art.28), see RMC, p.19
(6) cf. Ch. III. p. 107
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own institutional basis in consequence.
Under the Occupation, the history of constitutional development 
was intimately bound up with that of self-government.(2) DemocratIsation 
and consultation devolved from the symbol of the Occupation, Lord Cromer 
and the British Advisers, to the "Egyptian people", i.e. the Council of 
Ministers andpeventually, the Legislative Assembly. A radical departure 
from the Cromerian style occurred under his successor, Eldon Gorst, when 
existing Ministers were replaced by younger, more energetic, men, all of 
whom had had considerable experience as Administrators and Judges. They 
now took on a more active part in public affairs and the Council of Mini­
sters was no longer prepared to accept draft laws and proposals for credits 
without full explanation of the object in view. Many of the proposals 
emanated from the Ministry of Finance and it became the practice in that 
Ministry to furnish full notes of the new projects to the Ministers, some 
weeks in advance, before the matter came officially before the Council. 
Subject to British control on important matters, the Council of Ministers 
developed into a fairly effective governing body. At the same time, more 
weight was given to the Legislative Council, with Ministers reluctant to 
pass legislation of which it disapproved, (e.g. the extension of the Suez 
Canal Concession - 1911). Under Kitchener, advances were made in two 
directions. First, mudirs and governors were strengthened as a step 
towards consolidating the national Administration. Second, the Organic 
Law was Introduced and the Legislative Assembly emerged. The latter 
development signified an extension in the powers of the Legislature without 
undermining the effectiveness of the Executive. ' Legislative powers were 
given to both the Council and the Assembly with the necessary approval of 
the one exercised in consultation with the other. (See articles 12-16 
in the 1913 Organic Law.)
From the above glimpse of the course of self-government, two 
significant aspects of Egyptian political reality emerge. First, that ■ 
the benefit of the overt retreat of the British accrued to the body of 
Ministers, not as acolytes to the Sultan, but as responsive agents of 
power endowed with a measure of autonomy. Second, that the concept of 
the power of'the executive in the Egyptian setting was not synonymous with 
that of the power of the Sultan or the King. As it interposed between the 
contending forces on the political stage, the Council of Ministers developed
(2) See historical review of constitutional developments under the Occupation
in Note by Sir W. Brunyate presented to the special commission or constitutional
reform in 1918, enc. in Wingate to Balfour, 18.11.1918 (Secret) in FO 407/183.
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the erroneous assumption that elections were a right, the Report on the 
modifications explained that "Authorities were agreed that elections were 
a function" for which electors should be properly qualified.(7) The 
Electoral Law spelled out the necessary qualifications for electors and 
delegates‘as well as candidates?prescribing for minimum fiscal or educa­
tional faculties.(8) The two-stage electoral system was compared to - 
and here the report quoted ’experts’ - "a filter through which water 
passes freshened and purified" and at the same time it reconciled the 
principle of representation with the need to maintain the high standards 
necessary for legislative assemblies. Politics was thereby prevented 
from being reduced to a profession followed by persons of "mediocre 
intellectual and moral capacity". Moreover, by reducing the size of 
the Chamber to proportions more compatible with the real needs of the 
country . in its present stage of evolution, a greater efficiency would 
be secured, while the deputy returned by larger constituencies, was deemed 
to be "naturally ... of a higher standard and more ... capable". Indeed, 
the whole argument for maintaining two chambers and readjusting the propor­
tion of nominations to the upper Chamber was based on the assumption that 
it would provide Egypt with the reservoir of experience, ability and mature 
judgement which it strongly needed and which parliamentary life in its 
early phases, with its novel and unfamiliar electoral practices, threatened 
to deprive it of. Ideally, a body was stipulated whose elitism was only 
confined by the need to advance another objectivepolitical training.
The pedagogic principle notably inspired the Sha*bist political 
clubs. Apart from the opportunity they provided for younger members in 
particular, to organise and to develop a cooperative spirit, their declared 
aim was to enlighten and educate youth.(9) The national perspective, in 
which their mission was conducted, shifted the focus away from their parti­
san origin as they became a forum for spreading political, social and
(7) The quotations here are taken from the Report on the modifications to 
be introduced in the Constitution (RMC) (Cairo, 1930). An English copy,
used here for pagination, is found in FQ 371/1H621.
(8) Elector-delegates were required to pay £E 1 tax p.a. or house rent
of £E 12 p.a. or have rented land for one year paying not less than £E 12 - 
or possess a primary or secondary school certificate. Voting age was 
raised to 25. Deputies had to be on the electoral list for two years and 
could only be nominated for 2 constituencies in the same mudiriya. For 
other provisions see Electoral Law - No. 38/1930.
(9) See address given by Mahmud Rashid, Sidqi's political secretary and
leader of Young Shafbists, of Cairo - Sha*b, 29.5.1931.
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economic culture.(10) But the provision of political training and culture 
was one dimension of the needs of a transitional society whose progress 
depended on a wider movement. In the field of national policies, particu­
lar attention was paid to educational programmes,with the emphasis on the 
technical aspect and on a practical, as opposed to an academic, orientation.(11) 
A special committee sat to consider an adequate educational policy on a 
comprehensive scale and began by drafting the legislation enforcing 
national elementary education.(12) The political disturbances that arose 
in early 1932 following the transfer of Dr. Taha Hussein Dean of the Faculty 
of Arts,to the Ministry, were seized as an opportunity for drafting the 
statutes of the various faculties and the organic statute of the University 
itself.(13) Subsequently, other legislation was passed in 1934 subjecting 
independent institutions to regulation and control. Education was the 
acknowledged key in any effective evolutionary thrust and the stability and 
growth of parliamentary institutions partly depended on it.
The third dimension of trusteeship lay in the ethical principle.
The provision that granted the Administration the right to appeal to the 
Courts to suspend offensive press organs for na period long enough to efface 
the memory of the offence” , was justified on the ground of danger of a grave 
subversion of public morality” among other reasons.(14) Violation of 
articles pertaining to the Press, it explained, was different from the 
violation of other laws; it had "graver results, a wider field and was more 
difficult to combat.” The guardians of society, who were ultimately respon­
sible for its standards, had temporarily to take the matter in their own hands.
(10) See address by Hanafi Mahmud Abul-Ela at Alexandria Sha^bist Club 
on 22.1.1932.
(ID See Ch.Vp$6Sidqi stressed the priority he gave to technical schools 
on his tours. See esp. incident in Damietta, on jil1 9- -A Sha^bist
deputy, Nakhla, contended with his colleague that, "In this day and age of 
materialism, the nation could not afford to pursue its sentiments", and 
that people needed the education that would qualify them to earn their 
living. MMN, 6.3.1933.
(12) The law was promulgated on 4.5.1933 to give effect to art.19 of the 
Constitution. For priorities and comment see Campbell to Simon, 23.6.1933 
in F0 371/17023.
(13) See Law No. 20/1933. For T. Hussein incident and general background
for such legislation, see Loraine to Simon, 22.3.1932 & 8.4.1932, in F0371/16124
Laws modernising education in the Azhar were also promulgated at the time.
See A.Yallouz, "Chronique legislative... in E.C.vol.25 C1934) pp.761 - 809.
(14) RMC, pp.27-28
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In practice, the mouthpiece of the Regime, the Sha^b, proclaimed a Press 
Charter in its first issues in which it pledged itself to uphold certain 
standards in the political and ethical spheres.(15) It defined the scope 
of journalistic activity, its obligations towards its readers and the 
legitimate means it was entitled to adopt in its political warfare with 
opponents. The policies of the Regime, too, were sometimes influenced 
by such considerations of morality. The lift of the ban on the lucrative 
opium culture in Upper Egypt, for example, was refused on the -grounds 
that profit was not the only motive to be taken into consideration. (16)
The Requisites for Political Institutionalisation.
Sidqi's prime concern was "to establish things on a solid and 
durable basis which would last into the future".(17) The amendments 
in the Constitution were thus undertaken with an eye on the requisites 
for institutionalisation. He believed that the viability of political 
institutions was undermined if fundamental consideration^ were overlooked.
The first such consideration was compatability. The wisdom of the unquali­
fied transplant of a regime that was the product of the 19th century 
evolution in Europe was questioned. The constant adaptation of parlia­
mentary institutions in Europe itself was invoked to dispute the existence of 
a fciodel’ system ideally suited to all situations. Historical, social, 
economic and political reality were all eloquently cited to justify the 
restrictive provisions of the new Constitution. "The prevalent unifor­
mity of conditions in the various spheres of Egyptian life", for example, 
and the "lack of differentiation and political education" reduced the 
needs of representation.(18) Elsewhere, it was pointed out that Egypt 
was "an agricultural country" where "the village is the basis of social 
life" and where, "rural standards of society" prevail.(19) This rendered 
the two-stage electoral method a more authentic system of representation, 
for, if the illiterate villager was not qualified to pass judgement on 
public issues, he was perfectly capable of choosing those among his com­
munity who possessed wider knowledge and could more adequately represent 
him. A historical affinity was, moreover, conceived between the new
(15) Sha^b, 10.12.1930 and 12.12.1930.
(16) MMN, 19.1.1932.




Chamber and earlier legislatures, while room for future amendments was 
admitted on the assumption that political education and economic develop­
ment justified a political change. A reasonable, realistic compatability 
between structures and institutions admitted of a rational and principled 
change which deferred to the laws of evolution and continuity. Compata­
bility was thus not a static, but a realistic concept.
The temporal dimension was another vital consideration in laying 
the foundation of institutions. Whatever the Government’s ideas about 
the limitations of parliamentary government, it was convinced that it was 
the most suitable in the circumstances. But it was equally convinced 
that "a long period must elapse before this life can be definitely estab­
lished in Egypt- ." (20) In private^ Sidqi contended that it was not a 
dictatorship, that he aimed at but a parliamentary regime, "gradually, 
getting more democratic". (21) In the meantime, those in authority 
bridged the span by spreading education among the public, protecting it 
from decadent influences and providing it with an opportunity to promote 
its wealth and social differentiation. In effect, Sidqi sought to create 
new values through the new Constitution and its institutions. Durability, 
however, was an essential condition for maturation. The explicit ban on 
the revision of the Constitution during its first ten years was the answer 
(art. 156). The period was not altogether arbitrary. With two parlia­
ments behind it, the third could reasonably expect an era of earned liberal­
ity. With its foundations firmly established, it was in no imminent danger 
of challenge; Wafdism would have receded further back in the national 
memory and emancipated its mental captives; a degree of politicaltraining would 
have been acquired. In the presence of a positive programme of reform^and 
with reasonable expectations of its execution in a framework of political 
stability, the volume of wealth would have grown and its distribution 
developed to the advantage of the evolving form of government. By then, 
too, the problematic Anglo-Egyptian question would have been resolved and 
in the process, political opinion (hitherto, synonymous with nationalist 
opinion) would have matured. The strategic objective of the period of 
institutional incubation would have thereby been attained.
(20) Ibid. , p.16.
(21) See interview with T.P. Conwell-Evans on 27.11.1930 in F0 800/282.
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The conditions for stability and durability were, however, under­
mined if an effective weapon of political action went unchecked. The 
exceptional provisions to control a licentious press reinsured the condi­
tions for institutionalisation.(22) The interim stipulations could be 
abrogated by law on the initiative of the executive, taking into consideration 
the wishes of the legislature. But their abrogation could not occur before 
the lapse of three years - another set limit, explicitly inserted to protect 
the Constitution "in its infancy".(23)
D. The Amendments in the Constitution.
Political power was rationalised within a framework of stability 
and continuity.(24) The supremacy of the law was upheld in every title 
of the Constitution and provided the standard for the conduct of power. 
Law-making was ultimately subordinated to the will of the people (art.23). 
While the cardinal principle remained intact, the provisions ensured the 
executive arm considerable latitude. It could, for example, exercise 
its prerogatives in the absence of the representatives of the people to 
whom it remained accountable; that it should not abuse its licence and 
culminate in absolutism was procured by the provision for the continuity 
of parliamentary life (art.38) as well as by the obligation to submit all 
legislation for sanction before parliament when it met, (arts. 25 and 41).
To secure an element of stability in public affairssthe exercise of the 
popular will was bound in its conduct by certain principles, such as the 
stipulation that no legislation could be abrogated except by law. But it 
was the quest for a compromise between effectiveness and balance that 
essentially characterised the constitutional amendments.
A fundamental balance was, in fact, maintained. "No law can be 
promulgated if it were not voted by Parliament and sanctioned by the 
Monarch" ensured that legislative power was concurrently exercised by both 
powers. "The King exercises his powers through the intermediary of his
(22) Article 15 3 stipulated an "exceptional press regime" that entitled 
the Administration to prosecute offending newspapers before the Courts.
See note 14 above. Press legislation was passed on 18.6.1931 before 
Parliament met. See Ch.III.p. gs
(23) RMC, pp.12,28.
(24) The term "rationalisation" became current then. !Le rationalisation 
du pouvoir ' was first used by Prof. Mirkine Guetzewitch. See art. by White 
Ibrahim "Systemes Parlementaires dans le Monde", MIQ, Vol. 1, 1931. A 
useful and comprehensive Note oh the amendments prepared by the Judicial 
Adviser, Judge Booth, is enc. In30.11.1930 despatch In F0 371/14621.
135
Ministers” (art.4-8) and the provision that "The acts of the King bearing 
on the affairs of State are void unless they are countersigned by the 
President of the Council of Ministers and the competent Minister,"
(art.60) defined the locug of the executive power. The appointment of 
the Sheikh of al-Azhar and the heads of religious institutions was the 
personal prerogative of the Monarch that was duly circumscribed by other 
restrictive provisions (see art. 134- in conjunction with 14-2 & 143).
At the same time, the transfer to the Courts of powers concerning the 
Press and electoral offences countered those vested in the executive.(25)
But there were also stipulations to speed up the pace of govern­
ment. The reservation for the executive of the initiative in financial 
legislation was among such measures (art.28). The management of the 
State finances was a principal function of government and efficiency 
called for the introduction of financial measures by the executive so as 
to avoid clogging up the parliamentary machinery in its infancy with 
unnecessary bills.(26) The "final decision" rested with Parliament with 
regard to the' "proposals" of the dxecutive and the latter would not neglect 
the proposal of any urgent law. Other stipulations too extended the 
general legislative powers of the executive. It was no longer necessary 
to convoke Parliament in an extraordinary session to receive decrees pro­
mulgated in cases of emergency during its recess (art.4-1). The Constitu­
tion which granted that right did not subordinate it to this restriction, 
which "annihilated that right" as the Report argued. Its extension to 
periods when Parliament was dissolved was justifiable for "so long as 
the right had been delegated to the executive to dissolve Parliament (it) 
must not be deprived of the power of promulgating urgent laws during periods 
of dissolution.".(27) The object was to secure the effective administra­
tion of the country during periods of political disarray comparable to the 
contingency in which the Regime was launched. By resolving the practical 
embarrassments that attended such occasions it deprived its adversaries of 
their legalist defences. But it also made the constitutional balance more 
precarious.
(25) See art. 90 of the Constitution for electoral offences. The Report 
explicitly refers to the balancing principle in justifying provision 154 
on press offences.
(26) RMC , pp.18-19.
(27) Ibid, pp. 19-20.
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Flexibility,however, did, not conflict with the observance of 
limits. The retention of the initiative in fiscal legislation did not 
lose the parliamentary deputies control over such fiscal measures and 
the financial policy of the government in general. Like all other 
legislation they were voted by the Chamber. Although the closure of the 
session no longer depended upon the termination of the budget review,the 
government was bound in its execution to confine itself to those sections 
voted and to observe the provisions of the preceding year on its own 
responsibility. The recourse to its prerogative of issuing supplementary 
credits in the interval was not to circumvent the control of Parliament 
as all legislation passed between sessions had to be submitted for approval 
within a month of its convocation.(28) The vote of confidence remained 
the ultimate weapon in the hands of the Chamber; but the gravity of its 
implications, which was reinforced by recent experience, led to constraints 
on its exercise.(29) The upshot was to qualify the limits on the executive’s 
initiative without destroying them. Further, by attenuating one Power 
and activating the other, the shifting balance reduced potential friction 
to the advantage of effectiveness.(30)
Effective government, however, did not depend on the efficiency 
of the executive alone and, paradoxically, some of the curtailment in the 
powers of the legislature were means to improve its standards of performance.
(28) The corresponding clause in 1923 was more strict. It provided for 
the immediate submission upon the meeting of parliament of the exceptional 
legislation for ratification.
The Egyptian Gazette, 25.10.1930 gives in parallel columns clauses changed 
in the old Constitution and the corresponding clauses in the new one, together 
with new clauses with no counterpart. An instructive summary is found in 
F0 memorandum by JB Mack on 27.10.1930.
(29) Art.65 provided for a special majority and delayed action. In the 
previous Wafdist Chamber a vote of exclusive confidence,passed on the spot,, 
in the resigning Government drowned the odd voices that counselled 
deliberation. See MMN, 17.6.1930
(30) An analogy was drawn here with the head and the heart, the limbs 
and the will, in evaluating the restitution of the. balance between
the executive and the legislature. This reinforces the recurrent theme 
that appealed to reason and interest against sentiment. See above.Ch.Ill 
note 75 & pp.116,123; also cf. p«41, Ch.I.
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Reducing its absolute numbers to proportions more compatible with the 
present needs of the country for representation^and with efficiency^ 
was one such measure.(31) Similarly, the provision for a comite legislatif 
to which every draft law X'/as submitted for examination on points of form 
and harmony with existing legislation (art.96), in turn, insured the 
parliamentary regime against another of its weaknesses.(32) A time limit 
was stipulated for the work of the committee in order not to allow it to 
hold up necessary laws and undermine the prerogative of Parliament.
Despite its offensive wording the provision for a law to determine the 
rules for the internal organisation of the Chambers was^ equally^ an effective 
gesture in rationalising what had hitherto lent itself to arbitrariness.(33) 
The law that emerged confirmed the general quest for effectivity, variously 
expressed in the terminology of the Regime.(31) By reducing potential 
friction between the legislative and the executive, and by enhancing their 
efficiency in their respective spheres, a modicum of effectiveness was 
provisionally ensured.
The meticulous attention paid to defining the relative scopes 
of competence of the two powers was sometimes abrasive. There were, for 
example, provisions introduced to protect the executive from actual or 
potential "aggressions” by the legislature (arts.67 and 69 on ministerial 
impeachment) and others to protect it from unwarranted interference. The 
only legitimate control that Parliament was entitled to was to be exercised 
through the medium of questions and interpellations. The legislators 
admitted the superfluity of the provision, but they sought their justifi­
cation in a past that rendered "some such measure imperative". On the other 
hand, intra-power relations were less assured and, even at this early stage 
of idealisation, tensions were perceptible. An example here is found in
(31) RMC, p6
(32) Ibid., pp.24-25
(33) Referring to the confusion and abuse, notably in fixing their 
emoluments, the Report suggested that "if this state of things is to 
be remedied, the Chambers must be deprived of the right to order their 
internal regulations as they wish." (p.25)
The new law (No.88/1931) disqualified a Chamber from benefiting from rises 
enacted during its tenure.
(34) Cf."All our days in power are productive..." (Sidqi at Girga,9.3.1931) 
Other recurrent terms of the era were:fAroalT (action), Intag ( production; 
utility) muntiga (fruitful, productive); Islah (reform); Bina*(construction); 
Tagdid (renovation).
They were often Interchangeable. See also Ch.HI and V.PP- 115,116; 195.
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reserving for the King the last word, "la haute main11, in the appointment 
of Senators and, accompanying the prerogative with4the insistence on the 
counter-signature of the Cabinet "as a sure guarantee of complete co-opera­
tion between the King and the Ministry in a spirit of mutual understanding."(35) 
By transferring effective authority to the executive and by defining the 
boundaries of competence of the legislature, it was clear that a potential 
source of tension lay, not in their inter-relations, as in relations within 
the executive. The extension of its prerogative, moreover, increased the 
chance of abuse without adequately safeguarding against it. It was left 
to the exercise of these powers to create, in their momentum, their own 
checks.
Perhaps the gravest weakness in the new Constitution lay in its 
decreed origins and the circumstances in which it was promulgated. Its 
provisions amounted to a consecration of government by decree while its 
formal endorsement of other decrees passed under earlier crisis regimes 
was prejudicial to the prospects of normalising the present one. Nor 
could the amendments be abstracted from their situation and they were 
thus conceived in the spirit of a defence with a vengeance. The new 
Constitution could hardly be judged on its own merits and its constructive 
aspects were lost to the public.
The amendments ultimately constituted a legal expression of con­
flicting political aspirations. On the one hand, they were the result 
of an autocratic will and were conceived as a means of promoting autocratic 
ambitions. On the other hand, they were a means of securing an elitist 
government that was both effective and representative. In the former 
instance, the retraction of parliamentary powers was a stepping-stone to 
their withdrawal, or abrogation, in favour of a personalised government 
represented by the King. In the second instance, retraction was a therapy 
designed to foster the conditions for institutionalising a way of government 
compatible with modernity. The ethos of trusteeship flowed from the latter 
aspiration. While the uniqueness of the new regime lay in its overt search 
for institutionalisation, circumstances conspired to overshadow this 
dimension and bring into prominence its autocratic aspect.
E . The Palace-Sidqi Dimension of Power.
Although Sidqi had assumed power with the object of promoting his 
conception of the national interest, the political context in which he 
acted rendered him an instrument of the Royal will. His initial success 
in imposing authority and promulgating the new order in the face of mass
(35) See RMC pp. 12, 13, 14.
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opposition, constituted a triumph for the King. In view of the letter’s 
undisguised hatred for the 1923 Constitution and his previous offensive 
against it, the anti-liberal implications of the victory were clear. The 
violations implicit in the manner of introducing the amendments were defended 
on grounds of force majeur. But this defence could not alter the Royal 
gratification entailed in the notion that what the King granted he could 
withdraw; that power consisted in a series of "actes d ’autorite".(36)
The legal quibbling on the point merely confirmed the pragmatic substance 
of a compromise imposed by necessity.(37) With elections pending, the
consolidation of the new Constitution spelled a further gain for the King 
personally. Sidqi*s determination to impose the new order stirred latent 
animosities and sharpened political alignments, so that existing cleavages 
within the Royal Family were openly politicised.(38) As princes were 
drawn into the power struggle and contested the authority of their master. 
King Fuad was increasingly isolated and his position on the Throne, which 
he had occupied at a wink of fortune and upon which he never felt quite 
secure, was further shaken.(39) In this context, the upshot of some 
private diplomacy in which Sidqi engaged at the time was politically 
significant. The ex-Khedive, Abbas Hilmi, unseated by the British sixteen 
years earlier upon the outbreak of the Great War, and always perceived as a
(36) This observation was made to Adly upon Fuad’s accession to the Throne. 
See Wingate to Balfour, 8.10.1918 (V.Confid.) in F0 4-07/183.
(37) A controversy arose over the oath of fidelity to the new Constitution 
which the King did not administer. In a riposte to critics, Sidqi maintained 
that the oath to the original instrument was ipso-facto valid for its 
successor, as replacement did not spell discontinuity. See reply to PQ in 
MMN, 26.6.1931. See also statement to press earlier. Ahram 23.6.1931.
(38) Fuad's autocratic temperament alienated his kith and kin as well as 
his subjects. See Hoare to Henderson, 11.10.1930 in F0 371/14621. While 
Abbas Halim’s manifestos were more noisy (Ahram,27.9.1930 and 8.10.1930) and 
Prince Omar Tossoun’s dissension more dignified (ibid 2.9.1930) the adhesion 
by a host of princes to the resolutions of the 8th May National Congress in 
1931 was of a greater consequence.
(39) For ex., the draft of the Sultanian Rescript drawn by H. Rushdy in 
consultation with Sultan Hussein Kamel, shortly after the declaration of 
the protectorate, provided succession on a collateral basis in which Fuad’s 
prospects were remote. See enc. in Wingate to Balfour on 19.8.1917 (Secret). 
Nor was Fuad financially secure before his accession to the Throne. See 
Secret memo by Financial Adviser in Allenby to Curzon, 16.3.1923 F0 407/196.
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keen adversary and potential threat by Fuad, was persuaded^against a 
lucrative pension during his lifetime, to abandon his claims to the Throne 
and recognise the rights of his Uncle and his line of successors according 
to the 1923 laws regulating the Monarchy.(40) The settlement also contained 
an endorsement of the new constitutional regime, and its announcement 
came at a moment when the opposition had reached its climax and King Fuad’s 
isolation had seemed complete.(41) The invitation of Sidqi to spend ten 
days in the Royal Estates at Edfina, in the summer of 1931, marked the 
peak of Royal favour displayed towards a dutiful Prime Minister.(42)
Sidqi was disposed to emphasise his loyalty in the hope of 
evolving enough trust from his Sovereign to ensure his co-operation. 
Confrontation, he thought, would merely hamper his policies or objectives 
and his past, as mediator and coordinator in the national movement, made him 
a credible champion for such cooperation.(43) Moreover, he realised that " 
his influential presence within the Regime was necessary for its consolidation 
in the early stages. The longer he retained the King’s favour and manip­
ulated the capricious Royal will, the more he could play for time to enable 
the young institutions to attain the necessary autonomy. With the mere 
duration of the regime, and with the promotion of conditions that favoured 
stability and institutionalisation, he believed that the King could be
(40) This occurred as a result of an initiative by Abbas Hilmi who was 
a personal friend of Sidqi - Correspondence started on 14,2.1931 in the 
strictest secrecy - with the ex-Khedive’s private secretary as a go-between 
Loraine, as well as the King, were informed, although communications
on the subject were made on a personal basis to restrict circulation 
in the Residency,a n d t o  respect Sidqi’s wish for strict confidentiality" 
(Loraine to Murray, 17.3.1931) Sidqi was aware that his success benefited 
Fuad as well as the- British who had a legal suit pending against them by the 
ex-Khedive. See file 76 in F0 371/15412 & 15413
(41) Although ready by April, the Agreement was released to the public on 
12th May, 1931 - The recognition of the 1930 Constitution was not originally 
included in the formal draft of the government but seems to have been 
voluntarily submitted, more as a token of his friendship for Sidqi than
his uncle.
(42) Earlier tokens of Royal favour were shown in Accession Day Honours 
when the King granted Sidqi the '(Srand Cordon"of Mohamed Ali and decorated 
the different members of the Council of Ministers to show it stood on a 
different footing from previous ones. The Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Justice, Agriculture and Waqf got 'hl-Imtiaz
The Minister of Communications (T.Doss): the Grand Cordon of the Nile.
The Ministers of Public Works and Education, Karim and Sid Ahmad, became Pashas
(43) See above Ch. l.pp. 33-34.
induced to come to terms with a situation in which his dignity remained 
intact.(4-4) Meanwhile, he was ready to compromise over points of form, 
little aware that the gesture would eventually subvert the principle. 
Further, by alternating covert pressure with persuasion and flattery he 
hoped to initiate the King into the mores of constitutional conduct. (45)
The King, however, was aware of the ambitions and peculiar 
notions of his Prime Minister and he saw in them a blemish on that loyalty. 
Sidqi had,moreover, assumed power on terms that assured him a wide measure 
of freedom in exercising it.(46) Although the King initially kept his side 
of the bargain, the strains were there. A legacy of personal and' political 
ambivalence fed these strains and conditioned the development of their 
relationship.(47) The political framework within which it developed was 
analogous to its counterpart in the past decade but the difference lay in 
the increased vulnerability of the King's personal position. This rendered 
him more amenable to the discreet handling of his.Prime Minister. Sidqi, 
in turn, relied heavily on the forces in the situation in advancing his 
objectives.
The launching of the new Constitution provided the first practical 
test of the alliance. Sidqi counted on the initial good-will of the King 
andsmore particularlyson his fears. For the moment, the King's principal 
anxiety was lest the British, "who never knew what they wanted and always 
changed their minds", should resume their intervention in internal affairs 
to his disparagement.(48) Sidqi shrewdly impressed on the King the implic­
ations of such a departure and reminded him that the continued observance
(44) i.e. in contrast to the indignity that had accompanied the promul­
gation of its predecessor in 1923 - See earlier correspondence between 
Allenby and Curzon: 8.8.1922 in FO 371/7736; 15.10.1922 and 7.11.1922 in 
F0 371/7738.
(45) As an example of flattering the Royal ego, Sidqi substituted the ritual 
dinner to 200-300 guests given on the occasion of Accession Day in 1930 by an 
entertainment with a buffet-supper for 1500 guests.
(46) See Residency despatch of 25.10.1930 in F0 371/14621 Mr Hoare's 
conjectures here seem quite plausible in view of another account of Sidqi's 
return to power in 1946 (interview, Ibrahim Rashid). While always ready to 
assume power in difficult circumstances, he made sure he had the freedom 
of manoeuvre he needed.
(47) For earlier relationship between Fuad and Sidqi see file 6148 in 
F0 141/448
(48) See audience in Loraine to Henderson, 17.7.1930 (Confid.)
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of British neutrality depended on how far the new regime satisfied British 
conditions to qualify it for resuming negotiations. Continuity of 
parliamentary life was the first such condition.(49) Part of the 
representativeness of the regime, too, was secured by the adhesion to it 
of as many elements as possible. To this end Sidqi exploited his 
negotiations with the Liberals to retain the fundamental principles of the 
Constitution against the currents that threatened them.(50) Fuad followed 
the bargaining with distaste and was only too relieved when it broke down.(51) 
However unsettling its general effects on the Regime, Sidqi profited from 
the equivocal stance of the British to advance his constitutional purposes.
At the same time the King could not altogether trust his Prime 
Minister. He wished to ascertain for himself the limits to which amendments 
could be safely passed without provoking dBritish backlash. Sir Percy Loraine, 
the only British representative the King thought well of, could, he reckoned, 
be counted on to let well enough alone.(52) So, he sent out his feelers beyond 
the Residency to test reactions in the Foreign Office - but he was duly 
rebuffed.(53) It was in this gnawing uncertainty in which the King hovered 
that Sidqi pushed on with his plans.(54) The implications of the Wafdist
(49) The inferences in Mr.MacDonald's statement disinclined the King from 
indulging his conventional reservations on the amendments. See Ch. IE ^ ‘But 
this did not prevent attempts to undermine the principle of ministerial 
responsibility.
(50) See below - Note 56
(51) Hoare to Henderson,27.9.1930
(52) King Fuad believed that Percy Loraine was "un gentleman” among his 
race. He received the news of his transfer on 12.8.1933 "rather 
tearful and subdued" and, in a later audience, Mr. Campbell recorded his 
remarks on the King's attitude to Sir Percy thus ...." of whose qualities 
and manner of conducting his mission His Majesty, on this as on all other 
occasions, he spoke in the warmest terms."
Campbell to Simon, 19.8.1933 (Confid.) in F0 371/17009
(53) Tyrrell to Henderson. 11.10.1930 (confid.)
The soundings here were conducted by the King's son-in-law, Mahmud Fakhry, 
in charge of the Egyptian Legation in Paris.
(54) In countering currents advocating postponement of elections}the 
British lever proved equally effective. See Confidential Residency despatches 
of 21.2.1931 and 17.3.1931 in F0 371/15403
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menace for the Monarchy, together with the British factor, rendered the 
balance of forces initially in his favour and he used it to advantage.
The Constitution that emerged contained the seeds of tension and 
compromise. At first glance it appeared that the Monarch had had his ■ 
way. The extension of the Royal prerogative in the appointment of 
religious heads, for example, was at the expense of the Council of Ministers 
(Law No. 15/1927), while the change in the proportion of appointed Senators 
and the undue emphasis on the King's role in the process were at his command.
In both instances, however, the qualifications were significant and the 
attempted reconciliation between the loci of power was noteworthy. But it 
is perhaps the lobby diplomacy which accompanied the promulgation of the 1923 
Constitution that casts an illuminating light upon its successor.(55) Then, 
the removal of the stipulation that sovereignty emanated from the Nation 
(art.23) was bitterly contested.,while the constraints on the executive 
(arts. 48 & 60) were no more palatable. These principles were no more agreeable 
to the King in 1930 and their retention signified a qualified success for 
Sidqi.(56) The outcome of the tacit bargaining pointed towards a mutual 
compromise and concession that might have been inequitable but was nonethe­
less important in principle. The Prime Minister had, by guil.e, taught a 
vain, headstrong monarch his first lesson in constitutional politics.
The seeds of tension in the Constitution were equally reflected 
in the institutions that emerged. The formation of the new political 
party, for instance, entailed a perceptible strain on the loyalties of 
the administrative agents who were involved in political recruitment.
Latent strains between the Palace Ittehad Party and the Sha*b Party were 
brought to the surface by the unscrupulous press organs of the Opposition *
Even before Parliament had met and the two rivals confronted each other 
in it, its posts provided the bone of contention behind the scenes.(57)
(55) See memorandum on the principal modification in draft of the con­
stitutional committee introduced under T. Nessim at the insistence of 
King Fuad, enc. in Allenby to Curzon despatch, 23.4.1923 in FQ 407/196; 
cf. Abdel-Aziz Fahmy's open letter, Ahram, 17.3.1923.
(56) The question of ministerial responsibility was bitterly contended 
by the King in 1923. See remarks by Sarwat in 15.10.1922, despatch of 
Allenby, op cit. In 1930, he tried to circumvent it by including the 
Senate in the vote of confidence. See palace-inspired leakages in the 
Ahram 13.10.1930 and the Daily Telegraph 15.10.1930.
(57) For clash between Palace candidate, Tewfiq Rifaat and the Government 
candidate, Tewfiq Doss, see Sha*'b (editorial) 17.6.1931.
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While the majority of the intermediate and lower posts eventually went to 
Sha{bists, both Chambers were headed by Ittehadists.(58) The difference 
lay in the ostensible compromise reached over the non-partisan character 
of the presidency of the lower Chamber. Tewfiq Rifaat, Minister of War, 
resigned his Cabinet post and was "elected" as an Independent. The 
solution reflected the uneasy alliance that broke down two years later, 
when the balance of forces switched to the disadvantage of the Prime 
MinisterS5^  Meanwhile, with adequate Sha4bist representation in the 
secretariat, Sidqi was content to remain in effective control of the 
Chamber and gave way to the King in matters he regarded as formal.
From the outset, the development of the new institutions under 
the Regime was conditioned by the dual conception of power. Whereas the 
one encouraged a trend towards institutionalisation discernible within 
the executive and legislature, the other ultimately defeated it. The 
shifting balance between the King and Sidqi provided the framework for the 
trends that emerged.
(58) The Vice-Presidents in the_Chamber were Allam and Menzalawi while 
the Secretaries were el Said Habib, Hassan Ismail, Mohamed Ibrahim Helali 
and M.‘Aziz Abaza and the Questeurs were M. Towayyer and Wali el Gindi (the 
only consistent Ittehadist). In the Senate, the Vice Presidents were 
Hassan Sabri (Independent) and Ahmad Talaat (Sharb) with the Secretaries 
evenly divided between the Sha*b and Ittehad.
(59) By 1933, the appointments in the Chamber were no longer a formal 
matter. See Loraine’s confidential memorandum, Paris 23.8.1933. See 
also below, p.
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11• THE-EVOLUTION OF THE EXECUTIVE 
A. Trends towards Institutionalisation
The impetus for institutionalisation lay with Sidqi. As 
President of the Council of Ministers , Minister of Interior and Finance 
as well as leader of the parliamentary majority, the burden for proving 
the new institutions fell on him. Characteristically, he began with 
an attempt to inculcate the constitutional ethic in the course of his 
practical conduct.
Sidqi posed as the model Primus inter pares. Information and 
persuasion provided his standard of conduct. Controversial policies 
concerning economies or new tariffs for example, were explained in open - 
discussion.(50) Differences were admitted and other views, when not 
conceded, were acknowledged. . When the Minister of Foreign Affairs 
disputed the restrictions in the proposed legislation for the Chambers 
of Commerce, Sidqi explained their necessity in the early stages of the 
movement as interim provisions until a more compatible cooperative ethic 
developed. If, moreover, their recent chequered course was to be over­
come, some such restrictions were needed. He did, however, promise to 
take into consideration some reservations expressed by his colleagues.(61) 
On another occasion, he deferred to the view of his colleagues on the 
method of applying the proposed stamp duty increases.(52) Policy 
decisions were usually taken by steering opinion to evolve a form of 
consensus. Having given rein to his colleagues to express their views 
on a proposal at stake, he generally rounded off with an eloquent and 
forceful presentation of the case, which took into consideration their 
views.(63) His style animated the meetings of the Council and the 
difference his presence made was felt particularly upon his return from 
an absence.(64)
(60) See for ex. Cabinet meetings on economies: 19.8.1931; on agreement 
with Land Co.: 25.11.1931; on Gebel Aulia cement: 2.11.1932 in MMW.
(61) Ibid,27.1.1932
(62) Ibid, 30.1.1932.
(63) Ibid, 21.12.19-31 and 24.1.1932
(64) cf. sessions of 6.10.1932 with earlier ones under Yahia and again 
meetings of 13.4.1933 and 27.4.1933. Ibid.
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His readiness to delegate power to colleagues and subordinates 
was another aspect of this collegial disposition. The practice was resorted 
to as a means of enhancing effectiveness and initiative in the Administration. 
When he delegated powers to senior officials to implement the newly- 
proposed scheme for the commutation of pensions, he vested them with the 
necessary discretion on grounds of their assumed competence.(65) During 
his incapacitation in 1933 Sidqi informally entrusted the Minister of 
Public Works, Mohamed Shafiq, with the conduct of the government. He kept 
in constant touch with affairs and through him he communicated his views to 
the Cabinet. At the same time he allowed him some discretion. He was, as 
Sidqi informed him in a cabled message from Montpellier in August 1933, 
the man on the spot, who, while knowing SidqiTs recommendations on the issue 
at stake, was nonetheless better informed of its practicability in the 
prevailing circumstances.(6 6) Conceivably, work pressures and practical ■ ■ 
considerations induced him to entrust others with wide responsibilities 
and discretion. But expediency here was reinforced by a stand of principle. 
Originally, he believed that "a Minister should not arrogate all authority to 
himself”.(67) In the Council and the administrative departments he'headed, 
he availed himself of the opportunity to practise his professions. This was 
equally true of his style in the other political institutions he presided 
over.
Sidqi*s Leadership in the Party
Sidqirs vital role in the Party did not dispose him to arrogate 
to himself the wide powers ear-marked for its executive.(6 8) His deputy.
(65) This led to abuses as shown in the cases brought against the heads 
State Domains Dept.,Mahmud el-Orabi, and of Direct Taxes Administration, 
Abdel Hadi Mohamed. They obtained in exchange for the capital value of 
their pensions, government lands at favourable prices only to resell them at 
a vast profit. See below. Note 203.
(6 6) Some messages and cables sent by Sidqi in 1932 and more in 1933 are 
found .in his personal file in the Archives of the Council of Ministers. The 
above formulations on Sidqi*s conduct of his office are partly based on 
their perusal.
(67) See his 1923 Electoral Manifesto referred to earlier.
(6 8) The organic law for the Party emerging in 25 articles, was drafted by 
a committee under the ex-judge Ahmad Tal*at. See text in Moqattam 3 Ahram 
19.11.1930.
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Tewkif Doss, who was also a Cabinet colleague, delivered the annual address 
to the General Assembly and assumed an influential political role in the 
Party..(69) Mohamed Allam, the somewhat cryptic Party Manager, was dele­
gated wide powers to speak and act on its behalf.(70) Sidqi encouraged 
activists to chair meetings at which he himself was present. This was 
particularly noticeable during the later period when the Party became the 
setting of the internecine conflict between him and the Palace.(71) By 
vesting his supporters with responsibility and providing them with 
opportunities to prove themselves, he encouraged ability and talent. This 
was not confined to his political supporters, but it was an attitude that 
stimulated colleagues and subordinates alike.(72) By publicly acclaiming 
their efforts moreover, he denied himself an undue credit and divested 
power of a personal connotation. This reinforced his objectives of 
institutionalising pcwer and confirmed his conception of leadership.(73)
This conduct was reflected in the Party. Resolutions were 
passed here in a manner that sharply contrasted with its counterpart in the
(69) Doss. B. about 1875, a son of a bible colporteur in Assuit. Educated 
at the American Mission; lawyer by career, left Zaghlul and joined the
C.L.P. in 1922; Minister of Agriculture in 1925 where he came under Palace
influence and left the Liberals. A Sidqi partisan in 1928; joined the 
Executive of the Sha'b upon formation of Party and became the Cabinet 
mouthpiece and the "well-informed source" of foreign telegrams. Strong 
suspicions of corruption made him an embarrassing colleague and, upon 
Palace pressure>he was dropped in January, 1933.
(70) Allam, served in parquet before becoming Mudir of Guiza and Assuit 
during the War. His appointment as Governor of Alexandria in 1921 was 
frustrated by his record during the 1919 disturbances. Later, as Judge
in Cairo Native Court of Appeal (Assuit), put on pension in 1928. An active
Party manager and provincial orator in 1931 and 1932; as Minister for Agri­
culture introduced a programme for training agricultural graduates; fervent 
and compromising partisan of Sidqi in subsequent developments.
(71) Thus, younger elements like Biali, Abaza and Nazmy came into the fore to 
chair meetings. See for activity of Party the ,Sha*b of October and November 
1933.
(72) This was confirmed to me in personal interviews with people who worked 
with Sidqi. He often praised efforts of others in public, like Gamal eddin 
for his role in Provincial Councils legislation and Abdel Wahab, for the 
Cotton Policy.
(73) See Ch.III. f. 1)9
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Wafd during the same period.(74) As a rule, Sidqi would present the 
questions that preoccupied the Government and invite their exploration in 
the free discussion that followed. The resolution subsequently adopted 
was not binding, so that differences in opinion could still be expressed 
in Parliament.(75) In the absence of an imposed uniformity tolerance 
was rife and some of.the most articulate and constructive critics of the 
Government were often Sha^bists.(76) But there were vital issues for 
the Government like the debate on the Gebel Aulia where greater discipline 
was necessary.(77) It was indicative that Sidqi sought to secure this 
discipline by a real mobilisation of opinion and not simply by coercion which 
was not unfamiliar to his Administration. At such times, Sidqi frequented 
the Sha'bist Club more regularly to discuss with its members while important 
meetings with its Executive and with the Sha*bist Parliamentary Body were 
held to coordinate party activity with the progress of the parliamentary 
session.(78) His political addresses on these occasions were substantial 
and the discussion that followed invited a sense of involvement and 
reciprocity among their audience. The relationship between him and 
Sha^bists, as one deputy remarked, was one of "understanding and consultation 
(shura)" away from dictation and domination.(79).
(74) The split than occurred in the Wafd in November 1932 resulted from 
the autocratic conduct of Nanas towards the majority of The Wafdist body, 
who broke away with the Vice-President, Hamad el-Bassel. It originated in 
a quarrel between Gharably and Makram during the prosecution in the Bombs 
trial cases and ended with his dismissal from the Wafd by Nahas, who backed 
Makram. In his speech in Port Said, Sidqi referred to the Wafd being 
"consumed with the fire of its own tyranny." Ahram, 23.11.1932. See also
Ch.II. Note 79. Geschichte der Wafd... ( 1937) outlines course of split.pp.137
ff.
(75) See editorials in Sha*b, December, 1932.
This account was corroborated to me in a personal interview with the late 
Aziz Abaza in his home at Maadi in summer 1972.
(75) For ex. Amin Amer attacked the pensions scheme in its first reading 
on grounds of principle (its restriction to govt, officials) and its timing 
(a loss to the Treasury ). MMN, 22.3.1933. Another Shafbist, Abdel Megid 
Nale*, campaigned with a radical Watanist, Abdel-AxisL, Soufani, for 
liberalising measures. Ibid. 19.3.1933
(77) The construction of the Gebel Aulia in Southern Sudan was one of the 
most divisive issues within the Regime and in the. country at large. It 
raised palpable fears, essentially political, and no previous Administration- 
could muster the courage to execute it. See Ch.V. pp. 194-195.
(78) The spirit of the times was vividly conveyed to me by Aziz Abaza, less
by what he said than by the way he reminisced over it.
(79) Hassan Hosni, Sha^bist deputy for Gammalia/Cairo in anniversary of
union of Parliament on 20.6.1932.
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Sidqi was anxious to uphold his image in the Party as a 
constitutional leader. He made a point of observing the letter as well 
as the spirit of the Party Statute. As a result of its expansion, a new 
headquarters for the Party in Alexandria was considered in 19 32. He called a 
general meeting in which he was officially delegated the necessary powers 
to proceed with the purchase.(80) The emphasis on constitutional mores 
was particularly evident with the onsetting breach with the Palace. On. 
the 27th September 1933, at the first signs of the impending storm, the 
Party was called to an extraordinary meeting in which it endorsed a 
resolution delegating to its President special powers to act on his own 
discretion in the prevailing circumstances. His conduct here was an anti­
dote to the administrative origins of the Party.
His leadership here too, was equally directed at developing the 
identity of the Party and invoking a sense of corporativeness within its 
ranks. He strove to achieve this effect by expounding its purpose and role. 
Here again, he emphasised the rational principle of political organisation. 
The object of the Party was to propagate ideas and not to congeal round 
individuals. Sha*bist political clubs got their impetus from their value 
as a means of developing the political, social, economic and cultural 
consciousness of its members. Their core la}^  in the young men in whom 
he percd-ved the promise of his Regime.(81) To them, persons meant little 
for they had adopted the principles of the Party.(82) Their allegiance to 
their leader was based on those principles which he represented.
(80) Sha*b,6.3.1932
The deal could possibly have been among the financial vagabie's as it 
involved a handsome bargain for Mahmud Towayyar (Sha’bist Deputy from Alex) - 
whose property was bought.
(81) Sidqi saw two categories in the Party: "the old and timid ones ... 
on the other hand, there was a larger part of the younger and he found
that it was all he could do to keep them in hand" Interview with Mr.Furness 
enc. in Residency Confid.despatch of 4.11.1933 F0 371/17010 
A secret report on "Sidqi Pasha’s grave statements" submitted to the King 
on 2.10.1933 maintained that S . deeply regretted his failure to introduce 
into his Cabinet "une majorite composde d’elements jeunes et constants", 
who would not have been subject to (such) influences and who would have been 
able to hold their own during his absence. (Abdin Archives).
(82) Address in Sha^bist Club on 4.11.1932.
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"Every movement for renovation or reform9as our 
present movement is,ought to be led and steered 
to safety by a strong, competent man, supported 
by faithful followers ...This is the sound prin­
ciple upon which the city of Alexandria has 
rallied to a man to Sidqi Pasha, not merely as 
head of Government, but as a political leader 
worthy of every respect and admiration."(83)
Political prudence, however, counselled Sidqi to acknowledge and underline 
the objective criteria of renovation and by-pass the personal references to 
himself.
With the new parliamentary era successfully launched, a perceptible 
transformation overtook the Party as it was reduced into a potentially 
effective quantity in the Chamber. Sidqi impressed on the Sha*bist Body 
its relevance, not only to the Regime as "a Pillar of Progress", but also 
to the governmental process. It was ultimately the guardian of the means 
of "our great renaissance" i.e. the Constitution, in whose hour of peril 
it was called to its defence.(81) His exhortations to Sha*bists on unity 
and cohesion contrasted with the comparative indifference he displayed 
towards them at the outset.(85) By pursuing a method dear to his heart 
in attributing his own strength to their support, he was at once reinforcing 
his own position and consolidating the role of the Party as well.
Inculcating a corporate ethos among Sha*"bists was not altogether in vain.
There emerged within the Party a tendency among members to contest 
decisions affecting them. The elections and appointments for the bureaux 
of the Chamber that were at the beginning left to an implicit agreement 
between the two Parties were no longer acceptable to Sha^hists. Pressure 
from within the Party rank and file became a factor to reckon with by the 
beginning of the third session (1932-1933). Sidqi acknowledged the symptoms 
of restiveness accompanying the growing body, but urged its members on the 
eve of their re-union to continue mindful of their cohesion.(85) The
(83) Dr. Hanafi Abu'l-'Ela, Secretary of Young Merfs Sha^bist- Committees 
in Alexandria - recently returned from Paris with a degree in political 
economy. He was more of an enthusiastic supporter of Sidqi at the time 
than a committed partisan, and he made the comment at a gathering in the 
Alex. Sha*bist^on 25.11.1932.
(84) Sidqi at a meeting of Shapbist Parliamentary Body on 2.10.1933.
(85) His first Party address (10.12.1930) hardly paid heed to the new 
members/partisans beyond giving them a perfunctory welcome.
(8 6) 23,12.1932.
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reconstruction of the Cabinet in the Spring was partly a response to this 
growing self-consciousness within the Party as well as a measure to streng­
then the parliamentary position of the Government. Aly Menzalawi, a key 
Sha^bist who chaired the parliamentary finance committee, was appointed to 
the Waqfs while his colleague, Mohamed Allam, the Party Manager and the 
Vice President of the Chamber, was made Minister of Agriculture. The 
restiveness was a landmark in the evolution of the Party from a creature 
of the Administration into a volitional political organism; much depended 
on the response it elicited from its leadership.
The rift with the Palace towards the end of 1933 showed up some 
of the strength of the Party as well as its endemic weaknesses.(87) Sidqi’s 
efforts to mobilise his supporters were not entirely unproductive. Between 
October and December the power conflict was reflected in an intensification 
of party activity. The Sha^bist Club in Cairo became the main setting for 
the rivalry between the two factions into - which the Party split. In a move 
to strengthen his hand, Sidqi tendered his resignation and, ostensibly, under 
pressure of his partisans withdrew it. The Government which had recommended 
Sha^bists to accept it, was squarely outwitted.(8 8) The struggle reached 
its peak shortly before Parliament was due to meet when he manoeuvred first to 
contest the palace-government candidate in the Chamber and next to resign 
from the Chamber.(89) Despite the Palace attempt to reduce them to 
impotence, his faction constituted an embarrassment to the Government who 
threatened, at one point, to dissolve the entire Chamber.(90)
(87) See below, pp. 180 ff.
(8 8) The Party met on 11.11.1933 and voted against accepting Sidqi’s 
resignation by 42 against 36 - Sidqi1s triumph came as a surprise for 
he was then a sick man with the Palace forces ranged against him. On 
the 15th December he finally resigned.
(89) See accounts in the memoranda for the press in December 1933 
(file 11) in F0 371/ 17003
(90) The Sha*b and Ittehad Parties were convened under Yahia and Xssa 
respectively on 17.12.1933 and warned of the consequences of refusing 
Sidqifs resignation. Just before Parliament met, Sidqi withdrew it "in 
order to save a fatal rupture" in the regime in view of that unconstitu­
tional conduct. Ahram 19.12.1933.
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Consultation provides a key trait in Sidqirs leadership style.
It encouraged the collegial and participative behaviour he exhibited in 
the Cabinet and in the Party and it left an Intrinsic effect on the 
actual process of government. Just as the concentration of power in the 
executive was originally conceived to enhance effectiveness;, consultation 
had the same end In view. It was intended to make the executive both more 
proficient in decision-making and more capable in implementing its decisions. 
This was all the more necessary in view of the expanding scope of government 
action, before its protectionist creed and its commitment to partnership.(91) 
Consultation afforded it more extensive and authoritative information and, 
at the same time, ensured it the implicit consent of the affected parties 
by involving them in the decisions. Under Sidqi, the performance of a 
strengthened executive confirmed the principle of government by consultation.
But consultation was not a capricious trend of personal government. 
The Injunction against arrogating power by the Minister to himself was 
corroborated by providing for "a body of experts" whose knowledgeable opinion 
he could solicit.(92) The Council of Under-Secretaries of State, which he 
introduced shortly after he came to power to coordinate the work of the 
Administration, provided the institutional nucleus for the practice he 
preached.(93) By pooling the key personnel in the different Departments 
he was in a position to confront the national economic problems on a 
comprehensive scale. Equally, he could reasonably expect a greater 
efficiency and accountability from his subordinates. This central insti­
tution gave a practical impetus to individual departments, and minor 
consultative bodies emerged.(94) In effect, it provided a model for 
regulating and systematising decision-making in an essentially consultative 
framework.
The institutionalisation of this practice within the different 
levels of government and its extension beyond (as will be shown below) 
provided decision-making with a modicum of rati.onality and constituted a 
self-generated safeguard against arbitrariness. Power, here, was not 
conceived in absolutist terms and its consolidation was compatible with 
constitutional politics.
(91) See Ch.V. £ 2-00 f£
(92) See his electoral manifesto in 1923.
(93) The Council was officially proclaimed on 9.9.1931 - some months after 
it had already been meeting informally. See Ch.III. p §8
(94) The Department of Trade and Industry was a focal partner in many of 
these Committees in view of the policies of the Regime. See Ch.V. p
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2. The Sidgi Parliament
Parliament provided the natural ground for testing the insti­
tutional prescriptions and vindicating the amendments in the Constitution. 
In composition it was as ’viable' as any previous legislature. The 
majority of deputies from rural constituencies represented wealthy pro­
vincial elements( 95), Ex-uwdas were notable, while the Shiakhat Commis­
sions provided a fertile ground of recruitment.(96) Commercial or 
mercantile interests were well represented with some old faces like Abdel 
Monem Raslan of Menufia, and new ones bearing the names of "well known 
families" like the Shiatis of Gharbia. There were others, of more obscure 
origins, like Mostafa Sidqi effendi, from Guiza, who was a contractor. It 
was not surprising that Alexandria should be well represented with promi­
nent personalities of the city like Gemeri, Heddaya and Arslan and new ones 
like the rising marathon contractor, Ali Hassan Ahmad. The ban on the 
candidature of professionals outside Cairo (partly intended to combat the 
stronghold of the Wafd in the provinces) was made up by a compatible 
representation of professionals from the Capital with three lawyers, an 
engineer, a doctor and two officials. There were, in all, twelve active 
lawyers, besides a number of ex-judges and other legal men, two doctors and 
four engineers, while some fifty or sixty of the members held diplomas 
equivalent to a university degree. The provincial deputies were, almost 
without exception, natives of their constituencies with local interests 
and ties binding them to their electors. With Senate appointments made 
on a functional basis, a more authentic form of representation was further 
assured. At the same time with a nucleus of hi ex-M.P.s sitting in it, 
the new Chamber was not without political experience. Politically too, 
it was more balanced, with roughly over double the proportion of Sha^bists 
to Ittehadists and a balancing bloc of Independents and Watanists. As will
(95) See Who's Who in the new Chamber, a compendium compiled by a one-time 
inspector in the Interior, R. Graves. Enc. in Residency despatch of 12.5.1931 - 
FO 371/15009.
(96) As the law forbade the combination of public posts with membership of 
Parliament (art.71) the first sittings witnessed a flood of letters from 
new deputies renouncing their umdaships etc. There was, too, the odd 
renunciation of the deputyship in preference of the mayorship, as with the 
Deshna/Qena deputy. See MMN, 29.6.1931.
Cf. "The Prime Minister means ... to get away from the artificial imposition 
of an elaborate Western electoral system and back ... to the election by 
groups of Egyptians of their natural leaders, (ie) ... the men who would in 
the time-honoured village Meglis naturally preside over the meeting and direct 
opinion - Sheikh in the old meaning of the word." See Keown-Boyd’s letter of
12.12.1930 in FO 371/14623.
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be shown below, this balance went beyond formal organisation to actual 
performance both within the Chamber and in the relationship between the 
Chamber and the Senate. In view of its origins, however, the prospects 
of the new parliament' depended on the conduct of the executive.
The earnestness with which Sidqi took parliamentary life provided 
a tangible measure of his desire to consolidate the new executive on con­
stitutional lines. His first concern was to instill in it a sense of identity, 
self-respect and self-confidence to combat the demoralising effects of the 
atmosphere in which it arose. Although the first session (21st June - 23rd 
July) lasted for only one month, the mere fact of its convocation following 
the elections confirmed its tactical purpose. It vindicated Sidqi1s pledges 
that there would be ho interruption in parliamentary life.(97) Equally, 
it proclaimed the end of the "regime d 1exception" and the beginning of the 
new era. Despite its brevity, it set the pace for his conduct in future 
sessions. In his triple capacity as head of government, and Minister of 
Interior and Finance, he replied to the greater proportion of parliamentary 
questions, answering alone, 26 out of the 39 questions posed. By the next 
session (1931-1932) a more even balance was secured among his colleagues.
By then too, Sidqi had soundly established the principle of government resp­
onsibility to the Chamber by the importance he gave to the three major inter­
pellations that were launched against it during the session.(98) Meanwhile, 
he secured the practical foundations for a productive and constitutional 
institution. Sidqi played a major role in developing the Chamber. The core 
of parliamentary life, he believed, lay in "public discussion" and in free 
’Exchange of opinion."(99) Its exercise in the Chamber corroborated the ethos 
of participation he preached in his tours. He acknowledged an able offensive 
against the Government for he was anxious to invite opinion, stimulate informed
(97) In an interview with Signor Luigi Morandi of Corriere della Serra on
30.9.1930 he said: " There shall be no interruption in parliamentary life'." 
cf. similar statement in Egyptian press, Moqattam, 29 .8.1930 and pledges
to High Commissioner in private. Ch. Ip,
(98) The first was prompted by missionary proselytisation, the second by 
the transfer of the Dean of the Faculty of Arts, Dr. Taha Hussein to the 
Ministry and the third by the government’s decision to undertake the Gebel 
Aulia project. See MMN 23.2.1932; 28.3.1932; 18.5.1932. Stricter, more 
precise, provisions in the new organic law led to a clearer distinction 
between questions and interpellations, absent previously this rendered 
interpellations fewer and more serious.
(99) See RMC, p.5 - The Wafd was accused of transforming government into 
a "mystic cult."
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discussion, maintain a sound precedent for relations between the Government 
and the Chamber and, above all, to uphold the example of deputies whose 
conduct promoted the image of responsible representation.(100) Unlike 
previous parliamentary deputies, members here were individually and collec­
tively respected and they were entitled to influence government decisions 
in the public interest. His mere presence often benefited the debate, 
while his discreet and timely interventions prevented the development of a 
strained situation into an offensive confrontation between the two powers. 
Throughout, he made a point of inculcating the constitutional ethos among 
deputies by his practical conduct.
There were two essential lessons he wished to demonstrate. The first 
was that no one party could always be the winner and the second, was that 
constitutional vocabulary was not confined to winners and losers. Credits 
were sometimes passed with a narrow majority and positions were reversed 
with the Opposition voting with the Government and Sha’bists voting against 
it. A credit for swamp clearance found 50 in its favour and 38 against it, 
with the entire finance committee opposing the Government.(101) But the 
Opposition was not always defeated and the Government set an example in 
graceful retreat.(102) On occasion, the Government’s position was para­
doxically made more difficult in the Upper House.(103) It was in compromise 
that conflicts between the Government and the Chamber were more often 
resolved. The controversy over stipulated tax limits in the Provincial 
Councils’ Bill, which was brought before the Chamber at the beginning of 
the third session, occupied two full sittings.(104) Sidqi defended the 
Government’s case for extending taxation powers of local bodies as a step 
towards their effective reinforcement. But the Chamber was averse to any 
extension to the existing 7 per cent limit and it maintained that the 
Government should balance the deficit in the budget of the local bodies. 
Eventually, taxation powers were raised to a margin of 12 per cent instead of 
the proposed 15 per cent. Parliament responded to the lessons it received.
(100) See debate on report of budget committee contending for amendment 
in credits for Ministry of Agriculture. Mahmud 2iaki, an ex-official 
sitting as an Independent deputy was praised for his competent offensive. 
MMN, 20.4.1932.
(101) Ibid., 25.4.1932.
(102) Ibid. , 20.4.1932, 7.7.1931.
(103) See below, p.
(104) MMN, 21.12.1932 and 3.1.1933.
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Signs of vitality were not lacking as Parliament soon became a forum 
for promoting interests and contesting government policies. Landowners, 
who were numerically the strongest lobby in the Chamber, were vocal. They 
demanded the full attention of the Government and distrusted its professions 
of balancing interests. During debates, Deputies were outspoken in their 
distress. ” Is the Government persecuting us?” they contended.(105) As 
early as the summer of 1931 they played a prominent role on a parliamentary 
economic committee which had been formed among deputies and senators to 
examine the deteriorating situation. It met Sidqi more than once and sub­
mitted its recommendations, some of which were subsequently Implemented.(106) 
The activity of afflicted landowners Intensified with the progress of the 
sessions. Disappointed with -.the Government’s apparent lack of response to 
their demands for remitting the cotton tax and reviewing land taxes, they ' 
launched their first full-scale interpellation against it in June 1933.
Its weight was an embarrassment and out of 40 signatures tailing it, 20 
were persuaded to withdraw.(107) With the growing activity of cereal 
interests (shitwi crops) and emergent rice interests, differentiation grew. 
Sometimes regional interests clashed as Sa^idis ( Upper Egypt) defended 
export bounties and Baharis (Delta) clamoured for more direct aid to 
stricken landowners.(108) The incidence of voting over policy issues 
reflected the development of alternative points ofview-as well as of 
diverging interests. An export subsidy proposed for barley in 1932, 
while naturally supported by cultivators, was opposed by a large number of 
deputies in the conviction that the crop was a staple diet and that its 
export would provoke popular hardship.(109) It was not altogether surprising 
for the controversial bill to be ultimately defeated in the Senate.
(105) Ibid, 5.6.1933 . This was uttered by Ibrahim Dessuqi Abaza, a big 
landowner from Sharqiya; an Independent and Vice-President of the Chamber 
in 1933/34, led the two interpellations on the land tax in 1933 and 1934.
(106) E.g. the agreement with the Land Bank. See Ch.V. For recommendations 
see Ahram, 7.9.1931.
(107) With the provision that an interpellation should be presented by 10 
members (Law 88/art. 107) the number here reflected on the confidence in the 
Government.
(108) MMN 2.5.1933. One of the earliest divisions along regional lines 
occurred over the cultivation of opium. Ibid 26.6.1931.
(109) The entire finance committee voted against it. Ibid.31.1.1933.
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The Senate assumed a positive role that reinforced the balance 
between the two Chambers. Despite its appointed majority, it proved a 
tough contender for the Government and refused to rubber-stamp bills 
passed by the lower Chamber. From the outset, its reply to the Speech 
from the Throne came more detailed and critical. Shortly after, it intro­
duced the major amendment in the fiscal powers granted to the Government 
in connection with the newly launched Credit Agricole, notwithstanding 
the sanctioning of the government draft by the deputies.(110) During 
1931-1932 nine bills were returned to the Chamber with amendments for 
reviewing. It was the first Senate since 192A to make its weight felt 
and its unexpected vitality was exemplified in the role of the young 
independent figure who chaired its finance committee.(Ill)
At the same time, a growing assertiveness on the part of the 
Chamber provided another aspect of its evolving identity. It was anxious 
to uphold its rights against the.executive as much as against its partner 
in the legislature. Some of the - provisions in the Organic Law which the 
Government had drafted, were regarded as an unwarranted encroachment 
on its'autonomy and a special committee sat to examine and modify them 
on lines more acceptable to the Chamber.(112) Another question of 
similar implications for its authority arose with regard to the fate of 
the Decree Laws passed during the parliamentary recess. Here it was 
the Vice-President of the Chamber who posed as the jealous defender of 
its rights to examine them and not merely to deposit them as some other 
deputies contended ( 113) and as the practice, had been in previous Chambers. 
Tension also developed as deputies experienced a sense of rebuff at the 
repeated return to them of bills amended or refused from the Senate. It 
was the discretion of Ministers, who were also M.P.s, like Doss in
(110) See Sidqi!s note to the Council of Ministers on 19.3.19 32 on difference 
with Senate and Appendix to Chamber's proceedings on 15.6.1932. For novel 
departure of Senate, see Journal du Caire, 26.7.1931.
(111) Hassan Sabri: an ex-Wafdist who stood as an Independent in the belief 
that with the new constitution enforced, it was only fair to give it a try, 
constituted an energetic opposition. As President of the Finance Committee 
in the Senate, he produced valuable reports, but noted for his legal hair­
splitting (the fastest to empty the Chamber) and a stubbornness that irritated 
his colleagues. The insistence of the Palace on his appointment to the 
Ministry of Finance was the direct cause of Sidqi's resignation in 1933.
(112) E.g. Instead of limiting the number of officials the Chamber could 
employ (art.14-5), deputies secured the same end (i.e. checking against 
previous practice of over-staffing and inflating budget) by posing a ceiling 
and leaving the Chamber itself to designate its staff. MMN, 23.6.1932.
(113) Ibid. 18.1.1932; 9.1.1933.
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particular1 in 1932 and later Menzalawi, and the role of key Sha'bists more 
generally, like Biali and Aziz Abaza, that prevented awkward situations 
from aggravating.(114) Generally, the conciliatory attitude of the 
executive was maintained to the benefit of the developing self-consciousness 
of the Chamber. Characteristically, Sidqi set the pace in the usual bridge- 
throwing propositions he advanced.
The dispute that arose in connection with the parliamentary rebate 
demonstrated the growing sense of dignity among deputies. Previous 
Chambers had raised the issue inconclusively, but the urgency of its 
resolution in the present instance grew under the effect of the prevailing 
economic stringency. The government that had reduced emoluments and 
qualified the powers of the Chamber to review its financial status, 
realised the gravity of the ongoing administrative seizures for maintaining 
the Chamber viable, at all. It took the initiative to propose, the inviola­
bility of the rebate and was opposed by deputies who sensed in the protec­
tive gesture an implicit slight.(115) In the event, 'parliamentary qualms 
were dismissed and its material basis was secured. But Sidqi showed 
himself no less concerned over that sense of honour that was the symbol 
of a developing identity. When deputies protested against the defamatory 
inference to themselves in the Wafdist columns and urged for tougher 
controls, he promptly responded. If until then he had tolerated abuse 
of the government, he could not possibly allow it for the representatives 
of the nation . (116) The Chamber was deftly mobilised behind a line of
action already determined by the government.
The performance of the new parliament was equally influenced by
the example it beheld. On the one hand, there was ^notable shift away 
from the forum of oration to the working committees. The session (1931- 
1932) saw a total of 224 such meetings, of which the Finance Committee alone




scored a record 72 meetings, averaging one a day. Each session could 
boast of its achievements, Depite its brevity, the first one had 
passed the supplementary credits for the Credit Agricole, while the 
third, was dubbed as the session of "culture and social legislation".
In it, the pioneer bills safeguarding women and children in industry 
and trade were sanctioned together with a law banning vagrancy. The 
bill organising the Chambers of Commerce was endorsed, while a series of 
laws organising education on elementary and higher levels was passed.
The quality of debate improved and, in contrast to the parochialism of 
the past, it was directed at more general issues.(117) The factors that 
contributed to developing parliament into a more productive organ varied.
They lay as much in the impetus it received from an energetic executive 
as in some of the institutional changes that were introduced. Its 
reduced numbers and re-adjusted proportions, the presence of elements 
with a real stake in promoting their social and economic interests, and 
the new organic law which enhanced its organisation were among these 
factors.
The new parliament manifested a greater constitutional con­
sciousness too, which was similarly influenced both by the impetus it 
received from its leadership and by institutional improvements. Minority 
representation which originally constituted one of Sidqi’s preoccupations(118), 
was secured in principle on the level of the daily despatch of affairs as 
well as on the plenary level. A provision in the organic law stipulated 
the parties to a debate in an interpellation to include at least five 
members, presumably to represent different views. It was the manifest 
endeavour to live up to the stipulation that was interesting. During the 
land interpellation debate in June 1933, nine members had wished to parti­
cipate but, time allowing for only five speakers, these were chosen to 
represent the different parties. On another occasion, where no particular 
provision was made concerning the parties to the debate, the Chamber 
opted for a liberal solution on grounds of "free discussion".(119)
(117) Foreign concessions and the Capitulations progressively figured 
among these issues, until they dominated the session in 1933-34. Sha^bist, 
Abdel Aziz Nazmy, doctor from Cairo, and Mohamed Fahim el Qe*i, (originally 
independent, Sidqi partisan in 1933,possessed cotton ginning factory) were 
among the most active crusaders in this offensive.
(118) See Loraine to Henderson, 21.8.1930 (V. Confid. ) Cf .Ch. I .;jp. f+5
(119) This admitted the participation of opponents of the interpellation 
together with the conventional speakers for the Government and the 
supporters of the interpellation. MMN, 1.5.1933.
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An engaging feature was the tolerance shown the opposition which, in the 
Chamber, was officially composed of Watanists. Sidqi gave the lead in 
the first session, when he took the unprecedented action of welcoming 
it and inviting its leader Hafez Ramadan to address the Chamber from the 
rostrum. On other occasions, he acknowledged their role publicly much 
to their gratification.(120) It was not surprising that, although a 
numerical minority, they were vocal and assumed a prominent role in the 
Chamber.(121) The comparative rehabilitation of the constitutional 
ethos and the more effective performance of Parliament under the new 
regime seemed to vindicate the constitutional changes.
3. The relationship between Parliament and the Executive.
A degree of rationalisation characterised the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature. Communicating requests to 
government departments and exercising parliamentary control depended 
more on committees than on individuals. Coordination was further 
secured by the regular attendance by the Minister concerned of the 
plenary session. He also appeared when necessary, to answer queries 
of working committees which were otherwise normally attended by the > 
senior official who represented the government.(122) At the same time,
greater administrative efficiency narrowed the gap between parliamentary - 
resolutions and government action so that the emphasis on effectiveness 
was generally secured.
The positive role of the executive within the Chamber raised 
the standard of debate and provided a unifying policy conception. This 
spared it the petty deviations that in the past took up much debating 
time. A case in point was the debate on the final budget for 1931-32 
where Ministers frequently intervened to clarify an ambiguity or to comment 
on a controversy. In justifying the claim for a supplementary credit
(120) Sidqi referred to the "integrity and patriotism" of the Watanists.
Ibid., 20.6.1932. See also references in 6.1.1932. The tolerance was 
recognised by the Watanists ..."a beacon to an era of respecting minority 
opinion" (Shorbagi, 1.7.1931) and Ramadan thanked Sidqi for respect shown 
following a heated debate (23.5.1932). Others were more belligerent and 
staged walk-outs. The most serious occurred over the Gebel Aulia credits(12.4.33
(121) In absolute numbers, it was the largest to sit on any legislature(8 ); 
they led the anti-missionary interpellation as we11 as those which followed 
on Taha Hussein and the Gebel Aulia, and they were central in other policy 
debates like that on elementary education (esp. Abdel Hamid Safid).
(122) See references in statement by Minister of Agriculture to work of 
Chamber's Committee in examining 1932-1933 budget. MMN, 31.5.1932.
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for swamp clearance, Sidqi underlined the principle of government 
responsibility for obligations undertaken by previous Administrations 
and showed that policy continued, notwithstanding the change of 
governments.(123) When the Minister of War faltered in extricating 
himself from a charge of irresponsibility, Sidqi came to his aid and 
plausibly refuted that charge. Unlike its predecessors, he maintained 
that the Ministry did not make propositions for creating an Aviations 
Committee, but instead, it presented the Chamber with concrete results.(124) 
When the Watanists seized the voting of credits for the Ministry of 
Finance to raise their customary reservations on the separate allo­
cations for the British Advisers, Sidqi stole their thunder and saved 
the order of the Chamber. There was nothing apologetic about his 
statement when he took up their point and turned it to the advantage 
of his government by reminding the Chamber that the irregularity of 
the provision simply strengthened the hand of the Egyptian negotiator 
in any future negotiations.(125) The national orientation which could 
be attributed to the legislature under the Regime, was partly due to 
the initiative of the executive.
Aware of the necessity of coordinating the activity of the 
Government and the Chamber to establish a healthy precedent of parli­
amentary government, Sidqi relied on the Shafbist parliamentary body 
on the one hand, and on Ministers, who were also M.P.s, on the other.
Key offices were held by Sha*bists who often played a leading role in 
debates. Although beyond major policy issues there was notably little 
attempt at regimenting them and they enjoyed considerable latitude in 
expressing their opinion, he actually depended on a handful of them 
in manipulating the Chamber. Among these parliamentary activists (who 
were not all Sha*bists) Sidqi found his core of supporters who eventually 
fought his battles against the Palace offensive and who, generally, 




(126) Among these activists were Amin Amer, who staunchly defended
deputies1 rights against the executive, 18.1.32; and argued for the 
extension of government role in industry 18.5.33,. (cf. p. 210). Others 
included Latif Nakhla, M. Fahim el-Qefi (see for examples of independent- 
minded and constructive criticism of government policy on 19.3.1933 and 
26.5.1932 on Agricultural Policy), Biali and Nazmy. See below, p. j.66
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of reconciliation and appeasement, as necessity arose.(127) In practice, 
it was not always easy to distinguish between the relevant spheres of 
competence and the resolution of an issue often depended on the tact of 
the executive itself. With the exception of a reminder to the Chamber 
to observe its boundaries, which was tactfully administered during the 
debate on the fundallocations for the new Agricultural Bank, under Sidqi 
there were no major incidents.(128) While pockets of tension existed, 
his presence and discreet intervention ensured that they did not develop.(129) 
His absence, during the greater part of the third session reflected 
adversely on relations between the Government and the Chamber, before the 
growing assertiveness of the one and the declining parliamentary aptitude 
of the other.(130) Significantly, the responsible exercise of their 
deputyship by some members during the fourth session (1933-1934), was a 
legacy Sidqi left behind him which strained the mediocrity of his 
successors.(131)
There was little doubt, throughout, where the initiative lay.
A glance at the comparative fate of proposals originating In the Chamber 
and at the Bills of the Government show the latter at a decisive advantage.
The end of the 1931-32 session, for example, saw all the Bills passed, while 
the others which were generally mediocre In substance, were more often 
suspended or shelved. The Government usually found a way of pushing 
through a credit or a bill that was vital to it or which it was not prepared 
to let languish indefinitely in the parliamentary machinery of deliberation. 
The matter was put on a guillotine motion and strong Sha*bists discreetly 
mobilised behind it. The debate over the controversial concession to the 
Delta Railway Co., for example, ended at the request of ten Sha^bists who 
presented a petition to the President of the Chamber requesting its
(127) For example of a restraining influence, see Ali Menzalawi, who 
chaired the finance committee before becoming Minister in 1933. Ibid,22.3.1933 
& 19.4.1933} he. read out Sidqi’s reply to the interpellation on 1.5.1933.
The spontaneous younger Sidqyists Inc. Abaza (Aziz) and Biali; see sessions 
on 7.6.1933 and 29.5.1933.
(128) Ibid. , 7.7.1931.
(129) Ibid., 18.1.1932.
(130) See p.171.
(131) MMN, '6. 2.1934- & 19.6.1934.
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termination.(132) When a debate threatened to get out of hand, the 
Government whip was evident in rushing the bill through.(133) Despite 
the fact that the initiative lay with the executive there was a mani­
fest attempt to subordinate power to its constitutional mores. Upon 
the initiative of the Chamber, the Government was authorised to pass 
credits for new buildings during the summer recess of 1932. Sidqi 
thanked the Chamber and expanded on the benefits of the motion.(134)
The formation of an ad hoc inter-Party commission, in February 1932, 
to examine the Gebel Aulia project, was a concession to the violent 
opposition the project aroused.(135) While the Government retained 
the substance of an issue at stake, it conceded to the Chamber on a 
point of procedure. Whenever it could do so, it sought the authori­
sation of the Chamber for its powers. In the event, Parliament 
became an effective surrogate to the executive.
It was the emphasis on demonstrations of its relevance to 
the conduct of government and of its importance to the political 
process that characterised Sidqi’s stewardship in Parliament.. Parli­
ament, he maintained, was indispensable for running the country and the 
sense of responsibility of the Government was heightened before the 
confidence it evoked. "The Government takes pride in your confidence, 
esteems your support, and sees its proper scope in working here with 
you, within the sacred precincts of these Chambers ..."(136) "Without 
you," he confessed earlier on to a congregation of members on the first 
anniversary of their convocation, " we could not progress at all".(137)
(2.32) Ibid,. 26., 5 .1932.
(133) Ibid., 29.6.1932
In rushing through the bill on the Thornycroft Bus Concession, the govt, 
contented itself with a brief statement on the constitutionality of its 
conduct. Among the most prominent opponents here were M. Fahim el-Qei . 
cf. note’126.
(134) Ibid., 9.6.1932
(135) Between the 1st March and 21st April, 1932, the committee met 17 
times and even then the bill had to be whisked through on a guillotine 
motion. Subsequently, the issue occupied four long sessions in the 
Chamber, the last continuing from 5 to 12.30 past midnight, the longest 
in any previous legislature. It wound up on a lengthy statement from 
Sidqi, appealing to deputies to rise to the historic situation and stressing 





This was a recurrent theme he resorted to for obvious political ends. Apart 
from the quest to instil the constitutional ethos in his immediate audience, 
it was equally necessary to impress upon his British umpires the reality of 
parliamentary government. The end of the session in particular provided an 
apt occasion for a tactful demonstration which combined tribute to Parliament 
with praise to the Monarch. His reference to the invaluable support his 
Government received from the Sovereign here however, was an appeasement which 
was impaled by the parliamentary focus of the occasion. Yet, his stress on 
the role of Parliament was more than lip-service to woo his partisans and 
deceive his spectators.
Parliament, in effect, developed into a positive forum for defending 
the Government. Parliamentary 'questions provided the occasion for publicly 
extricating it from a difficulty as well as for demonstrating its cohesion. 
Sidqi used it to advantage upon the first serious challenge to the established 
order. Two questions were tabled at the juncture of the crisis over the 
Badari incident and the resignation of the Cabinet in January 1933. In both 
instances he stood for the model constitutional leader as he enlightened the 
Chamber with the details of the dispute at stake between him and his dissenting 
colleagues. Both occasions led to a motion of solidarity behind the action of 
the Government. In the first, deputies tenaciously defended the Regime and 
the probity of the Administration against the insidious offensive of their 
detractors. In the second, the denunciation of the conduct of the resigning 
Minister of Justice, Ali Maher, was all the more effective as it came from 
the Chamber rather than from Sidqi. There were other means, both formal and 
Informal, to demonstrate the cohesion of Government and the strength of its 
parliamentary support. The vote of confidence which followed the Debate on the 
Address on the Speech from the Throne was one such example, while tie occasional 
friendly gatherings between the Prime Minister and M.P.s was another. 
Parliamentary questions and interpellations further provided the Government 
with an effective weapon in internal politics, whose value grew in proportion 
to the difficulties it encountered. Through information they vindicated it 
on issues that were deliberately selected to undermine it or to arouse the 
public against it.(138) Moreover, they secured the Government the necessary 
legitimacy in its offensive as the further restrictions in the penal code, 
in June 1932, were ostensibly undertaken in response to parliamentary appeals.
(139)
(138) See the questions, on administrative seizures and on National 
Government rumours, Ibid., 4.2.1932; on the Independence of the Courts, 
17.2.1932; on the Capitulations, 6.1.1932
(139) Ibid., 15.6.1932 & 9.5.1932
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On other levels too, Parliament proved its value. While official Departments 
persisted with indifferent success in an endeavour to introduce fiscal 
legislation which would increase revenue, discontent against the Capitulations 
was discreetly fanned in the Chamber. (140.) Sidqi himself used the views of 
the parliamentary majority to strengthen his hand in dealing with the High/ 
Commissioner or to advance an Egyptian interest with a foreign power.' (141) 
Already in the past he had learnt the value of parliament as a weapon for 
Egyptian sovereignty and, now, he manoeuvred to exploit it to this end when­
ever he conceived an opportunity.(142) Meanwhile, as long as discipline 
was maintained and the executive remained in control of debate, parliament 
provided a valuable make-weight on the side of the Government.
There were also other signs, however, to indicate that the Chamber 
was ppicking its own momentum and in the process developing certain initiative 
and autonomy. The inequitable relationship based on the domination of the 
executive became less one-sided as the debates in the Chamber grew tougher 
with the progress of the session in 1933. It was here that a deputy 
persisted perversely on a course much to the discomfort of his colleagues 
and the Government alike.(14-3) He opposed a supplementary credit for the 
sake of proving that "Parliament could obstruct the Government if it wished . 11 
Clashes between the Government and the Chamber became more frequent and the 
government grew more arbitrary in exercising its prerogatives. The pro­
tracted absence of Sidqi complicated the situation .as his Acting Deputy,
Shafiq lacked the subtleness, patience and the sheer personal weight to 
match the parliamentary juggling.(144-) A case in point was the debate on 
the report of the finance committee where tempers ran short between the 
committee rapporteur and deputies on one level, and between deputies and
(14-5) . !the Government on anothero At the same time the positive role of parliament j
(140) Ibid, 4.7.1932.
(141) Loraine to Simon, 22.6.1932 (Confid.)
(142) See ex. on Capitulations on 19.2.1932. See also above, p'i&1
(143) Ibid., 7.6.1933.
The long-winded oratory of Wahib Doss (Sha*bist) incurred on him the charge
of indulging in shahwat al-kalam.
(144) Mohamed Shafiq was popularly dubbed as el-doghri (’the straight­
forward’). See below, p.171
(145) MMN 18.5;i933 & 25.5.1933.
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continued to develop as it switched from a forum for the Government to 
defend its policies into an active promoter of these policies. In the 
debate on the 1933-34 budget, the defence of government policy in 
retort to Watanist charges came from a Sha^bist deputy instead of the 
official spokesman. Here, Abdel Rahman el-Biali, having ably expounded its 
economic policy, followed in the example of his absent leader, urging his 
colleagues to raise the issue of the Capitulations and back the Government 
upon it instead of disparaging it for seeking to balance the budget.(14-6) 
Indeed, as deputy, Biali could afford to be more audacious and explicit 
than Sidqi as head of Government. This development in the role of 
deputies was among the positive features that emerged^alongside the more 
numerous negative ones, during the session of Sidqi’s absences.
- The restiveness of the Chamber and its desire to free itself 
from the tutelage into which it was born, were not unhealthy signs either.(147) 
Thanks to Sidqifs handling of it, Parliament evolved an awareness of its 
role and, generally, conducted itself on lines that vindicated the changes 
in the Constitution. By proving itself more productive and by displaying 
a greater constitutional consciousness, it contributed to an incipient 
trend towards Institutionalising a compatible and effective form of 
government. The viability of the new institutions, however, depended 
less on their evolving autonomy than on their ability to withstand the 
disintegrating influences which emanated from the executive.
• The Trend away from Institutions
The prospect of the stability and growth of parliamentary 
institutions was a vexatious predicament for King Fuad. With the growing 
importance of Parliament, his Ministers, especially his Prime Minister, 
were at a decisive advantage, for he could hardly compete with them in 
its forum. He sensed an uneasiness lest the reins of power should slip
(146) He summed up the policy thus: (i) diversification of crops,
(ii) preservation of land-wealth, (iii) amelioration of the lot of the 
fellah, (iv) extensive public programme, (v) fighting unemployment, 
organising production and extending markets, (vii) protecting local 
industry, (viii) improving the balance of trade. MMN, 29.5.1933. £f.- 
Ch.V. below.
(147) I.e. as comparable with developments in the Party - see above, -p. 150
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out of his grip and he vested minor- events with a gravity that was 
heightened by his own superstitious and paranoic disposition'. Sidqi's 
public demonstrations of corporative cohesion which were exercised by 
him throughout the country on his periodic tours, in Parliament, and 
eventually at the Royal threshold itself, did not please the King at 
all.(148) To His Majesty, Sidqi was, after all, a rogue who did not 
basically differ from the detested Sarwat and, but for a sheer need, 
he would hardly have trusted him with so much power in the first place.(149) 
That need had now diminished, thanks to his own ruthless ability, and the 
time had come to curtail his powers and remind him where effective power 
lay and how it should be wielded. SidqiTs declining health left him
a popr match for the offensive that was being hatched against him.(150) In 
the event he was powerless before the reversing trend which was precipitated 
by weaknesses inherent in the institutions of the Regime.
(148) On one occasion, presumably Accession Day in 1933, Sidqi paid a 
visit to the Palace at the head of a host of MPs. Upon their departure, 
the King swore out furiously, "Ah, that he imagines he can frighten
me with his deputies - I will show him!" (interview with Abaza, confirmed 
by another source.)
(149) "Fuad considered that Sidqi had reached a position of strength ... 
which entitled him to act virtually as a dictator and to keep all matters 
exclusively in his hands ..." (4.11.1933 (Confid.) op cit.) Elsewhere 
"... the King was surprised that Sidqi should select his successor" -
Campbell to Simon, (Confid.) 16.9.1933; Sidqi met the King before his
departure in May and complained about direct interference in the Admini­
stration by Palace officials and on his return he made representations
to the King on the same lines; compliance with these was his condition for
reflecting on his resignation and the King was non-committal. (Mr. Furness's 
interview with Sidqi, enc. in Residency desp. 4.11.1933.).
(150) Palace intrigues could be traced to the late summer of 1932, during 
Sidqi1s first absence in Europe. Later, Ibrashi recalled that it was not 
possible to "entirely dislodge the idea (i.e. of Palace conspiracy) from 
his brain" (Loraine to Simon, 4.11.1933.) The King deigned to reflect
on the early days when he decided to "humour all his caprices" to give him 
a fair run. (Campbell to Peterson, 2.9.1933, Personal and Confid.) The 
lines on which the King's mind ran, by the summer of 1933, is seen from 
the various "combinaisons" of his own he had in his head in the event of 
Sidqi not being sufficiently well to resume office "...a fact (i.e. the 
combinaisons) which he repeated twice with some relish" as the Acting 
High Commissioner remarked (Campbell to Simon, 19.8.1933). For Sidqi's 
own premonitions, see below. p ! 7  3
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1 . The Cabinet
The same factors which initially contributed to the strength of 
the Council of Ministers, in time obstructed its consolidation. Sidqi 
had chosen his team with a view to forming a strong and effective body, 
capable of strengthening the institutional basis of authority and impressing 
on the public the non-partisan image of the Government. Apart from Tewfiq 
Rifaat, the eldest of the team, the others were in their fifties, generally 
possessed of personality and ability. Most of them had previous Ministerial 
experience; some were colleagues in 1925, (151) others were senior Admini­
strators at the time, (152) others still, made their political debut under 
the Regime. The attempt to secure a national facade was assured, in prin­
ciple , by constructing the Cabinet from the elements available. At the out­
set three were officially Ittehadist and three others had some affiliation, 
past or present, with the Constitutional Liberal Party while the remaining 
member was an Independent.(153) With the growing focus on non-partisanship, 
the admission of new recruits of no party affiliations was an asset.(154)
The Cabinet which consequently emerged possessed a measure of homogeneity in 
the common background of administrative experience and the absence of 
positive political affiliations. The only political commitment that 
bound some of its members was an anti-Wafdist predilection and good 
relations with the Palace. The homogeneity was enhanced among others 
by a shared interest in the evolving economic structure. The two Egyptian 
Vice-Presidents of the Federation of Industries were in the Government and 
at least four of the others were connected with commercial or Industrial
(151) Abdel Fattah Yahia, Hilmi Issa and Ali Maher.
(152) Ali Gamaleddin.
(153) Ali, Maher, H. Issa, T. Rifaat (Ittehadists). T. Doss, A.F.Yahia, 
H. Afifi (Constitutional Liberals or ex C.L.); Hafez Hassan (Independent). 
See Royal Rescript, 19.6.1930.
(154) E.g. Murad Sid Ahmad, Fahmy Karim, A. Gamaleddin, Ahmad Ali.
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enterprises.(155) Administratively and, up to a point, socially, the 
new Cabinet was qualified for the challenge It assumed.
It was not long, however, before the weaknesses began to show.
Once the primarily executive task of quashing rebellion was accomplished, 
the emergency team was transformed into a body to preside over the 
normalisation of affairs. Another form of dedication was now required.
Sidqi sought to consolidate the Cabinet on a more congenial political
basis, by recruiting elements from Parliament to the Cabinet in order to
reinforce the constitutional link between the two bodies. At the
same time, his behaviour encouraged a sense of cohesion among his colleagues.(156]
But this was not enough to remedy the basic political defect - the absence
of political dedication to the new order; while the move to reinforce the
parliamentary base of the Cabinet came rather late. The Ministerial
crisis which broke out towards the end of 1932 underlined existing
weaknesses.
Personalism was rife in the absence of a positive political outlook 
to bind loyalties and the strong personalities that had earlier lent the 
Cabinet strength and authority, eventually undermined it. While the 
clash between All Maher and Sidqi assumed the dimensions of a clash 
of opinion over the administration of justice - behind it was a conflict 
of personalities. Ali Maher, a strong and ambitious figure, originally 
nursed a resentment against Sidqi as he had secretly coveted the premierp; 
ship for himself. This resentment was behind his equivocal conduct as far 
back as the summer of 1930 when he was prepared to mediate to bring back
(155) Hafez Hassan, Public Works and Agriculture, June 1930, was the 
other Vice-President of the Egyptian Federation of Industries. Abdel- 
Fattah Yahia, Foreign Affairs, June 19 30, was brother of a leading 
Alexandria cotton merchant, with sidelines in many other companies.
Tewfiq Doss, Communications, held shares in Thornycroft Bus Co. under 
Abboud’s name. All Maher, Maaref, later Justice, was a Director of 
the Deutsche Bank. If it is difficult to establish with precision 
the financial connections of the individual Ministers at the time, a 
retrospective view of their later connections is helpful. In the later 
30*s for ex. Hafes Afifi, Foreign Affairs (transferred to London Legation 
July 1930), became Vice-President ofthe'EFI and eventually succeeded 
Sidqi to its Presidency. T, Doss and Hilmi Issa were other prominent 
figures in it.
(156) In the name of ministerial solidarity and collective responsibility, 
Sidqi took up the reply in the Chamber on behalf of his colleague, Yahia,. 
and defended him against allegations of dubious connections with the 
Thornycroft Co. MMN 23.2.1932. Cf. Conduct on provincial tours.
Ch.Ill above jp>.
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the Wafd.(157) It also fed the rumours that were circulated in the 
columns of the Opposition towards the end of the year which exploited 
latent tensions between Sidqi and the Palace. Although he actually 
cooperated with Sidqi for the length of two eventful years, the tensions 
between them persisted and were reflected in the conduct of the cases 
before the Courts in 1932.(158) The Badari case, over which he resigned 
at the beginning of 1933, was the occasion rather than the cause of the 
open split between then. Another key figure in the crisis was the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdel Fattah Yahia, who supported his dis­
senting colleague and was ostensibly reluctant to continue his associa­
tion with a Government of whose probity he was critical. But the out­
going Minister was credited with a strong sense of vanity as much as a 
keen sense of integrity. The relationship that ultimately bound him to 
the Prime Minister was a personal one and the daily exercise of authority 
generated tensions and jealousy that upset old friendships.(159) But 
the obstacles did not stem only from strong or independent figures. The 
Minister of Public Works, for example, Fahmy Karim, "a straightforward 
and capable character" who, up till his appointment to the Ministry in 
1930 "had always appeared to make a point of keeping away from politics", 
received a Pashalik in October 1930. Graced with Royal favour, he soon 
moved closer to the Palace, despite a formal Sha^bist allegiance, and he 
became Ibrashi’s ’henchman*. Whether the personality was a strong one, 
like Ali Maher and Hilmi Issa, or a weak one like Yahia and Fahmy Karim, 
personalism consistently undermined the prospects of cohesion in the 
Cabinet.
While effective government remained the ideal and inspired the 
attempt to reconcile it with parliamentary reality, it did not resolve 
the political problem. At a moment when such effectiveness was impaired, 
as at the juncture of the Ministerial crisis, the quest for ability and 
experience became urgent. With the normalisation of the situation, the 
portfolio of Interior which was up till then held by Sidqi, went to the
(157) See conversation of Ali Maher with Cecil Campbell on 30.6.1930,
F0 371/11+616.
(158) See Ch. III. note S X 4- 5 h-
f t
(159) Sidqi spoke of Yahia as "an old friend.
Yahis acted as Prime Minister during Sidqi*s leave in 1932 and the experience 
went to his head. The rumours on Palace Intrigues (see above) concerned the 
possibility of replacing Sidqi by Yahia who was a more pliable instrument 
in Palace hands.
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Under Secretary of State, Mahmud el Keissy, who had proved his executive 
ability in the previous two and a half years. He was "an able little 
man whose political bias was limited to his family feud", and who was, 
politically, a 'trimmer1. The new incumbent of the Ministry of Public 
Works, Mohamed Shafiq, deserves particular mention, as Sidqi went to 
great lengths to secure his services for his government.(160) Eventually, 
too he entrusted him with wide powers and, on the eve of his resignation, 
he chose him for his successorship. He is variously described as "honest, 
straightforward and industrious", "conscientious and over particular". 
Technically and administratively, he was particularly qualified for his 
appointment. Politically, he was a dedicated, but sensible patriot.
Shafiq was also a Sha^bist and his recruitment to the Cabinet was, 
provisionally, a political asset as well. In a sense, he was a combina­
tion of the capable official and the knowledgeable expert, the kind of 
technocratic reinforcement to a traditional administrator that Sidqi was 
anxious to promote in his Administration.(161) His patriotism over­
shadowed what partisanship he professed while politically, he was not 
strong enough to impress his weight in the parliamentary arena or against 
the Palace.(162)
Statesmanship could not, in itself, continue to guarantee the 
consolidation of the Cabinet. In the absence of a corporate sense 
of identity or a common explicit commitment to the parliamentary ideal, 
the constitutional trend was threatened from within. Palace affiliations 
that might have provided a common point of reference for Cabinet members 
proved a negative/influence which was ultimately detrimental. This was 
dramatised in the oath of allegiance that was imposed on Ministers early
(160) Although Shafiq was the most competent figure to replace the outj- 
going Director of the Egyptian State Railways in 1932 (Abdul Hamid Suleiman), 
the British feared his patriotism might obstruct British interest in this 
vital Dept. Sidqi interceded on his behalf, reassured the British, had a 
word with him and subsequently all went well. Shafiq too was Director of 
Siemens Orient and involved with Continental concerns ,£f ‘. note 155.
(161) Among the representative types Sidqi relied upon, advanced or backed 
up when necessary, were figures like Ahmad Abdel Wahab (Under Secretary of 
State for Finance) and Abdel Hamid Badawi (Head of the State Legal Dept.). 
These were figures who combined deep patriotism with outstanding ability. 
Their personal sympathies varied, with the first Wafdist in sentiment and 
the latter inclined towards the Constitutional Liberals. Neither, however, 
was a political partisan and Sidqi could draw a line between the personal 
and the public, as shown in his conduct towards another senior official of 
professional calibre and Wafdist loyalties, Mohamed Kamel Selim (interview).
(162) See below.
172
in 1934 and by virtue of which they were required to swear their fealty 
to the King's person and to the 1930 Constitution.(163) It proclaimed 
the triumph of the personal conception of power over the institutional
one which Sidqi had striven in vain to promote.
Palace Influences
Palace influences operated to the detriment of the Regime on
two main levels. First, there were the myriad of sectional and personal
interests which sought to influence government decisions from without.
This pattern was reinforced by social custom and by a political tradition
of ambivalence found in the dual structure of Authority which had long
distinguished between its formal locus and its effective one. This current
was naturally encouraged by the King whose own preconceptions had not
changed from the time parliamentary life was introduced into Egypt. The
premise of reigning without ruling was as incomprehensible to him as it
was preposterous: at best an imported piece of English hypocrisy he could
well dispense with.
"In a Bolshevik Constitution Lenin has all the powers, in 
a democratic Constitution it is the President of the 
United States who has all the powers ..." (164)
If Egypt must have your Constitution then he, King Fuad, was entitled to as
much. The King never abandoned this conviction and it was only natural
for the Palace to remain the focus for self-centred interests. While
Sidqi conceded to the Monarch his share of moral authority, he questioned
his right to rule. "The King," he admitted, in a moment when conventional
loyalties were severely strained, "should reign, but he must never rule ,."(165)
Under the Constitution any such attempt had to be made through irresponsible
Palace officials whose influence undermined the fundamental precept of
ministerial responsibility.
Conversely, the changes in the Constitution reinforced the 
executive and invited interested parties to influence it directly so that 
the way for extra-parliamentary influences was made easier. Although
(163) "Avant d'entrer en fonctions les ministres preteront, entre Nos 
mains, serments d'etre fideles et devoues au Roi et a la Patrie, d'obeir 
It la Constitution et aux bis du Pays, et de templir consciencieusement 
les fonctions de ministre qui leur sont confines," It was made incumbent 
on Ministers in power to take the oath. See J.Q. 29.1.1934. This was 
the last official act the King undertook before he took to bed on 26th Jan. 
His indisposition delayed its translation into effect until the ceremony 
of 21st March, 1934. This was his first official act upon his recovery.
(164) See Allenby to Curzon, 23.4.1923, op cit.
(165) Campbell to Peterson (Personal and Confid.) 22.9.1933.
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such interests could still promote their ends through institutional 
channels within the executive, the pressures which emanated from the 
Palace made themselves felt outside the regular machinery of deliberation.
As the scramble for public contracts increased under the impact 
of the policies of the Regime, the undermining effect of Palace influences 
protruded on the scene. The private war waged in late 1932 by an 
ambitious contractor with strong Palace connections, Ahmad Abboud, was a 
case in point.(166) The latter relied on his Palace connections and 
initially, on his camaraderie with the Prime Minister in tacitly pushing 
his business through.(167) When his vital interests were threatened 
by competitors he did not hesitate to reinforce his ties with influential 
elements in the Palace and to exploit dubious connections beyond, in 
order to fight Sidqi and undermine the stability of the Regime.(168) 
Although Abboud himself liras a key figure in the Chamber of Contractors, 
an affiliate of the Federation of Egyptian Industries, he generally 
acted outside this body. Where the issue at stake was personalised, 
intrigue was rampant and the disintegrating influences grew. Such 
influences, moreover, that stemmed from the Palace or hovered around it 
were generally diffuse and it was difficult to combat them without the 
confrontation degenerating into a banal personal affair.
In contrast, the wishes and influences that came from the King • 
himself operated on another level. For all their force and potential 
threat, they were localised and this made them - other obstacles
(166) Ahmad Abboud, Engineer and Contractor, about 50, of lower middle- 
class origin. Studied at Glasgow University on a Turkish Government grant 
and served as army contractor in Iraq, Syria and Palestine during the Great 
War. In 1925 was Wafdist MP, broke away in 19 28 and as a result of propa­
ganda activities for Mohamed Mahmud in London then was formally expelled. 
Engaged in similar activities on behalf of the Regime in 1930 and by the 
summer of 1933 was the Palace emissary whose diplomatic activity in London 
annoyed Dr. Afifi. He was made Pasha in 1931, ostensibly for his work on 
the Fuadia Canal.
(167) For relations with Sidqi, see file 512 in FO 141/769.
Abboud represented 27 important British firms, was equal partner with Topham, 
Jones & Railton in the Aswan Dam contract and the largest shareholder in 
the Omnibus Co. Is said to have influenced British contracts for over 
£4,000,000 under the Regime.
(168) Abboud maintained secret contacts with a dubious figure in London, 
a Professor Maurice Gerothwohl, the diplomatic correspondent of the 'Daily 
Telegraph. (D.T.) Most of the police reports about him listed in the Green 
Paper Index (PRO) have been destroyed. But some copies and relevant refer­
ences remain. See Scotland Yard Report ,10.9.1931(Secret) in F0 371/14620 
also F0 letter and Minutes of 17.1.1933 and 7.2.1933 (Priv. & Most Secret) - 
F0 371/17109. The upshot of these contacts appeared in the controversial 
articles in D.T. in summer 1932 and. 1933 which upset Sidqi and put him on
the defensive. See ex. letter to editor, DT 22.7.1933, statement in Bourse 
Egyptienne in August 1932, cf. Abboud's leTTers. Abram 8 .5 .1933 & 1 1 .5 .1 3 3 3 V
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notwithstanding - more amenable to control. While Sidqi was admittedly 
powerless to resist an express wish of the King, his genius in handling 
him was exercised in two directions. On the one hand, he successfully 
avoided open confrontation; on the other, he effectively established 
himself as the medium for conveying Royal bids to the relevant Government 
department. Until 1933, Sidqi could maintain that, on the whole, King 
Fuad behaved on constitutional lines, closely supporting his Prime Minister 
who still retained a share in the initiative.(169) Throughout, however,
the King displayed an avid interest in the details of his realm. Instead 
of incessantly reminding him of the distinction between reigning and ruling, 
Sidqi compromised to avert confrontation. With calculated discretion, he 
kept him informed of government activity but, indiscreetly, he bowed to 
expediency and interposed an intermediary between himself and the Monarch.(170) 
Knowing that the King discussed all affairs with the Director of his 
Royal Khassa and his private confidante, Zaki el Ibrashi, "anyway”, Sidqi 
conceded to a practice which eventually proved costly. For the moment, 
as long as Sidqi enjoyed the King’s confidence and the King refrained from 
directly intervening in the Administration, the constitutional facade 
continued to be maintained.
This arrangement between the King and his Prime Minister was 
fragile and arbitrary. Sidqi imposed nothing on Fuad which the latter 
did not voluntarily concede.(171) Yet the flexibility of the King’s will 
was partly conditioned by Sidqi's tact and resourcefulness, his apparent
(169) See Sidqi’s interview with Consul-General Heathcote-Smith on 20.4.1934, 
FO 371/17977. The Cabinet reconstruction in January 1933 went far to show 
that Sidqi still retained Fuad’s confidence despite the summer clouds of
1932.
(170) Zaki el Ibrashi emerged under the Regime as a less ’flashy’Hassan 
Kash’at (1925). Hardworking and intelligent, his humble origins did not 
prevent him rising from the parquet to the Under-Secretaryship of State 
(Finance) in 1925. Became Director-General of the Royal Khassa in 1927
where he managed the King’s private estates only too loyally. With the
resignation of Tewfiq Nessim in 1930, the post of Chef du Cabinet of the 
King remained vacant and for all practical purposes, Ibrashi filled the 
role. He steadily became the King's reporter and agent in Cabinet circles.
(171) There were the grudging concessions too. King Fuad, for ex., had 
never wished to appoint Afifi to the Legation in London, but he did so to
humour Sidqi (See above). no‘ 150 •
In fact, "Sidqi was able to impose his views on King Fuad to the extent 
of His Majesty's fears.” Loraine to Simon, 2.12.1933 (Confid.) in 
FO 371/17010.
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submissiveness and ready self-effacement and the ability to play up to 
the Royal ego whenever that was necessary.(172) His personal presence 
in power, his vigilance in attending the conduct of government and, above 
all, the retention of mutual accessibility with the King were all neces­
sary "'.conditions for the continuation of their implicit accord intact. 
Events in the course of 1933 consistently undermined these conditions so 
that, by the end of the year, the constitutional facade (which in the 
last resort depended on Sidqi) crumbled.
The immediate effect of his protracted absence from govern­
ment hastened the confrontation. While he convalesced Sidqi remained 
intent on his exercise of power.(173) He kept in active touch with the 
conduct of affairs, with the result that where business was not delayed 
it was transferred outside the formal seats of Authority. It was more 
difficult to persuade the King of the wisdom of Sidqi conducting business 
from Mena House rather than the King from Abdin. Until then too, his 
tact as well as his promise as a likely and able negotiator in any impen­
ding British settlement enhanced his favour as well as his authority in 
the King’s eyes.(174) The conditions in which he now strove to retain 
that authority undermined the basis of his relationship with the King. 
Communication was impeded at a moment when Palace involvement in public 
affairs increased and the scope for mutual misunderstanding grew. Old 
suspicions revived and the rumours which circulated during Sidqifs pro­
longed summer convalescence in Europe made matters worse.(175) His 
illness, too, took its toll of his temperance and deprived him of his 
greatest asset in handling the King. Gone was the image of the humble
(172) Cf. note- 45 above. The public demonstrations of allegiance to the 
King increased in late 1932. See Ch.Ill.p.ij/^ .The Sha*b Party gave an 
uncustomary grand reception to celebrate Accession Day in 1932. Before 
he left for Europe in May 1933, Sidqi visited the King to renew his 
pledges of loyalty.
(173) At the beginning the King commented on SidqiTs fervour in an essen­
tially exasperated good humour. He was satisfied, however, that despite 
his physical handicap, his s t r o k e  did not affect his lucidity and mental 
agility. See audience with Fuad: Loraine to Simon, teleg. 1.2.1933 (Confid.).
(174) The chances of Sidqi concluding a Treaty with the British .provided 
one of his most attractive qualifications for the King. See audience 
with Lord Hutchinson of Montrose on 25.2.1933 and further despatch,
Campbell to Simon, 4.3.1933 (Confid.) in FO 371/17008.
(175) Although the ex-Khedive’s position was settled by the 1931 Procla­
mation King Buad did not completely abandon his old sensitivity. Among 
the rumours that disturbed him were Sidqi*s contacts with Abbas H£lmi in 
Paris. (Ibrahim Rashid interview). The distinctive coldness of the
King toward Sidqi grew during the Summer. See Campbell to Simon, 19.8.1933.
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obedient Minister, as strains mounted and Sidqi could no longer disguise 
bis disapproval of the conduct of Royalty.(176) Meanwhile, the casual 
exasperation of King Fuad at Sidqi's persistence in managing affairs gave 
way to growing irritation. By the end of the summer, it was spent in 
an outspoken fury at the insolence of his Prime Minister telling him what 
to do. Sidqi steadily witnessed the mounting strain and his declining 
authority, and realistically, but belatedly, he recognised that "a tradi­
tion once established was difficult to dislodge."(177) By the end of 
the year, Ibrashi’s interference, in the Administration had become the 
rule. His contacts took him beyond individual Ministers to senior and 
junior officials. Notwithstanding its origin and the different form it 
assumed, the disruption in Administrative discipline recalled its counter­
part under the Wafd.(178) There were elements in the situation that 
encouraged this trend towards Palace dominance.
The Cabinet in 1933 worked under a particular disadvantage. Its 
formation at the beginning of the year had lost it some of its more 
prominent political elements while its reconstruction in the Spring 
indicated that it was essentially in a state of flux. But the new Cabinet 
hardly met before it was deprived of Its directing head. Out of its sub­
sequent nine months in power Sidqi barely presided over it for four weeks 
altogether at intermittent intervals.(179) Out of deference to Sidqi, 
a deference that was still retained towards him in the early months, the 
King appointed neither an acting Minister in the portfolio of Finance, nor 
upon Sidqi1s travel did he appoint an acting Prime Minister. The burden fell, 
in effect, on Sidqi's reliable colleague, Shafiq Pasha, whose competence, 
however, did not make up for the political weakness of the new Cabinet. Sidqi1s
(176) Later, in a meeting with the Financial Adviser, Sidqi spoke bitterly 
of King Fuad whom he described as "a 20th century Louis XIV incapable of 
understanding the meaning of constitutional government and ready to sacrifice 
the interests of Egypt to his own glorification and to his own pocket." See 
interview with F. P. Watson on 29.9.1933 enc. in Residency Confidential 
despatch of 3.10.1933. FQ. 371/17010. Cf. conversation with the Consul-
General at Alex., (note 169) where he speaks of an atavism in the present
dynasty that unfits it for constitutional government.
(177) Residency despatch of 3.10.1933, op cit.
(178) See Ch.II. note 3 ^
(179) Since his stroke on the 23rd January, 1933, Sidqi ceased to attend
his office at the Ministry. Cerebral congestion induced a temporary para­
lysis in his left arm. Feeling the impact of his absence, however, he resumed 
his attendance in the second week of April, although he retricted it to two 
hours in the afternoon in the Ministry of Finance.
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handling of important issues from his bedside ensured that public affairs 
were conducted efficiently enough, although some delay was inevitable 
where a decision of the Council of Ministers was required.(180) His 
constant contact with his colleagues, principally through Shafiq, might 
have kept him informed of the trend of events , but it was not enough to 
imbue the Council with the necessary spirit of cohesion. Council 
meetings decreased. In his absence the Cabinet disintegrated into a 
collection of individuals with neither the authority nor the moral 
courage to resist Palace encroachments. Party labels were meaningless 
as Ministers gravitated towards the Palace and turned to it for instruc­
tion. Even Shafiq, it was claimed, could hardly handle an issue without 
referring it to the Palace.(181) The King naturally cultivated this 
attention . In the late Summer, shortly before SidqiTs hustled return, 
he took an unprecedented step and hosted his Ministers to a banquet in 
the Royal grounds in Montazah Palace. His nonchalance towards Sidqi 
contrasted sharply with his earlier solicitude. By that time, however, 
the Palace had stepped in effectively to fill the political vacuum he had 
left behind.
With the political viability of the Cabinet in doubt and his own 
resources failing him, Sidqi reverted to the British. The erstwhile 
pride he had taken in his Government’s unimpeachable national conduct 
was now subdued. It was not the moment to boast in public that his 
authority rested solely on the confidence of the King and the people 
represented in Parliament, as there was less reason and opportunity now 
for such proud and confident claims. Observing the steady shift in the 
balance of power towards the Palace, Sidqi abandoned his earlier discretion 
for open intimations to the Residency. He privately confessed his mis­
givings and shortly before his departure for Europe, he asked the acting 
High Commissioner to "keep an eye" on the Palace and "to drop a hint" in 
case of an aggravation of the situation in his absence.(182) Immediately
(180) This is seen in the length of the agendas of 13th April and 27th 
April Cabinet meetings. Here resolutions taken in January only came into 
effect then as with the promotions and rises due to police officers in the 
Bombs Case. See Ch.III. Note 57.
(181) Shafiq, Ibrashi maintained, was constantly begging him to come to 
the Ministry and on each occasion produced long lists of questions which 
he desired to submit to the King. Loraine to Simon M-. 11.1933 op cit- 
On the other hand, Sidqi returned to find Shafiq in bad odour with the 
Palace for obstructing Abboud's bid for the Gobel Aulia contract.
(182) Campbell to Peterson 23.9.1933 (Personal & Confid.)
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before he left Egypt he sent for Keown-Boyd and disclosed to him his sense 
of uneasiness, a sense of "une trahison quelconque ..." in the air; the 
same sort of feeling he said, as he had in 1925.(183) It was another 
anxious message to the Egyptian Minister in London and its sequel, in a 
meeting between himself and Percy Loraine in Paris, that increased the 
tensions with the Palace.X.184)
The ideal of the King and his Prime Minister working hand in hand 
crumbled. Each was turned against the other irrevocably to the detriment 
of the ideals he professed. Failing to generate its own momentum, the 
Cabinet was powerless to stay its own eclipse and to sustain the consti­
tutional precepts on which it was originally conceived. It did not take
Sidqi long to realise, upon his return to Egypt, that his options were 
severely narrowed and by 21st September he finally resigned.(185) Sidqi's 
resignation from the government was the climax to one phase and a prelude . 
to another. It signalled the resumption of the conflict between him and
the King in another arena of political action.
It was unlike him to succumb to defeat. If the executive could not 
be checked from within, given the altered circumstances, then he could 
strive to control it from without. In the next stage of the struggle, 
he mobilised the Party and made a bid for the presidency of the Chamber.
He aimed at substituting the tacit personal control he previously wielded 
over the King from a position of relative strength within the executive, 
to a more objective form of control from institutions only recently brought 
into a sheltered existence.(186) The attempt constituted the test of 
their viability.
(183) Ibid.
(184) See FO Minute by Mr. Ronald on 11.8.1933. Sidqi phoned from France 
and asked for urgent meeting with Sir Percy. He wanted a "full exchange
of views" with him about certain matters connected with the present politi­
cal position in Egypt. For sequel, see memorandum by Loraine (Paris) 23.8.193c 
in FO 371/17009.
(185) Sidqi felt it was impossible to re-establish his former position on 
his return and intended to resign from the beginning. Loraine memo, ibid.
The pressure and enthusiasm he perceived in his supporters dissuaded him;
a meeting followed with the King on 5th September whereupon he deliberated 
on his resignation and accepted to continue. But when he realised that the 
King was determined to have his way with ministerial appointments he finally 
resigned. The resignation was accepted the same day while he was in a 
Cabinet meeting informing his colleagues of his decision.
(186) Sidqi was prepared to support the new Government on condition the 
Sha*'b Party remained in the same proportionate numerical, m a j o r i t y H i s  
manoeuvres in the Party embarrassed the Government (See p.151 ) and the *
King saw Sidqi's Intention to devote himself to leading the Party as "pulling 
strings and doing as he liked." Campbell to Peterson, 2.9.1933. op cit. I
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Deflecting influences, however, were found at all levels 
within the Regime including the executive nucleus and the party base 
on which parliamentary organisation rested. From the beginning, the 
initiative for integrating Government and parliament lay with the 
executive and its use depended on Sidqi's personal leadership. Simi­
larly, the degeneration of the constitutional amendments into an outright 
arbitrariness which made for a potentially inequitable dominance of the 
executive was prevented by his statesmanship. It was questionable 
whether away from the reins of power he would still be able to wield 
enough authority to exert the same moderating influence upon the Regime 
he had installed. He was alive to the opportunities in both Parliament 
and Party, confident that he could use to advantage the institutional 
trends within them and resist the autocratic turn that threatened to 
sway them. He under-estimated, however, the basic weaknesses that 
deprived these institutions of their autonomy and obstructed their 
consolidation.
The extent to which Parliament was a barometer for develop­
ments within the executive can be seen from a glimpse of its closing 
session (1932-1933), Growing Palace influence within its ranks over­
shadowed the general deterioration in discipline which had followed upon 
Sidqi' s ■. absence. Adulation of the Monarch was a notable feature and 
the only reference made to Sidqi was by an Independent who proposed 
cabling a message of good-health to the Prime Minister.(187) Immediately 
after, the President of the Chamber moved to terminate the session and 
the remaining Speakers who were Sha*bists agreed to give up their 
speaking time. The session closed on a burst of "long applause" for 
the Monarch. On similar occasions in the past, the latent tension 
between the conflicting conceptions of power within the ranks of the 
Regime had surfaced in the exchanges between the Government and the 
Chamber that occurred during the adjournment debate. The President of 
the Chamber who had formally assumed his post as an Independent, brought 
to bear the personal conception, attributing the achievements of the 
session to His Majesty's gracious will. This contrasted with Sidqi's 
customary procedure in dividing tribute between the deputies and the King 
while emphasising the role of the former for the achievements of the current
(187) Ibrahim Dessuqi Abaza. MMN, 22.6.1933. On his departure for 
Europe, Sidqi sent to MPs and Shafbists a message of appreciation for the 
goodwill shown him at the farewell they had given him. Sha^b, 25.5.1933.
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year. la June 1933 Sidqi was not present to shore up the frail autonomy 
of the Chamber and to defend the precarious- balance. The acclaim of 
the Royal prerogative was the consequence.
It was evident that Parliament was powerless in the circumstances 
as it echoed the forces that wielded power over it. Its effectiveness
depended on how it was manipulated. While Sidqi as Prime Minister and 
leader of its majority had commanded it to effect, the outcome of his 
present venture depended on the cohesion and loyalty of the Sha'bist 
majority. One of ■ his first actions here was to convene the Party 
Executive and request it to delegate him the special powers he needed to 
act as circumstances demanded in the interval before Parliament met.(188) 
The step was significant in view of the dimensions the struggle assumed 
as Sidqi now openly championed the constitutional cause against the King. 
The result ultimately depended on the viability of the Party.
3. The Sha*b Party.
The Party originated as an artifice of the Administration and it 
was created in the throes of an electoral campaign. Its initial growth 
was considerable so that within less than six months of its creation it 
had put up candidates for 150 electoral constituencies and emerged in 
Parliament with a credible majority. By its first anniversary it boasted 
of the existence of 18 Central Committees In the mudiriyas and governorates 
and 1938 branches in the districts and villages.(189) In fact, little 
was heard of the countless committees following elections. Party acti­
vity was generally confined to the Capital and to Alexandria with only 
minor developments elsewhere. In Alexandria, its fortunes were on the 
rise and its discernible strength and growth there were matched by the 
general consolidation of the Party organ and the flourish of political 
clubs that contrasted with the more static conditions of the regional 
committees. In time too, the new recruits to the Party reflected more 
authentically the social strata to which it appealed.
(188) See above, p. 1^9*
(189) Allam addressing a Bairam audience, Sha*b 1.3.1932
By the end of 1933 the balance shifted from the more tradi­
tional social elements to mercantile elements.(190) This partly pointed 
to the direction of policies under the Regime as those who benefited most 
found in the Party organisation an adequate vehicle for their political 
ambitions. The Party also appealed to a vague patriotism which afforded 
the opportunity for traditional and apolitical elements to join it.
Such elements as the powerful Abul Azayems m  Mima, for example, recovered 
an authority which the influence of the spreading -Wafdlst caucus had undermined 
But they were no more devoted partisans than those who benefited under the 
Regime. The latter were hardly in a position to risk their unconsolidated 
gains in defending the political order.
The Party organisation could possibly be conceived in two con­
centric circles. The outer one bore the imprint of the Administration 
and comprised, mostly, traditional elements. ■ The inner circle contained ' 
more notables with a stake in the developing economy along with a 
margin of professional and ex-officials similarly oriented. In between 
there was a floating quantity of "effendis" from the Capital and from 
urban centres comprising emergent contractors, merchants, bosses, (mo callem) 
and employees in commercial establishments. It was these elements that 
provided the voluntary substitute for the original rank and file comprised 
in the outer group, as they crystallised round the core. When the 
Ministerial crisis broke out in 1933, the Party organisation was in a 
state of flux, moving away from a "mass" organisation, administratively 
controlled and orientated towards a more restricted political association 
of elements with a real stake in the Regime.
The Party organisation thus contained elements of imposition 
and volition. While the former were more conspicuous at the outset, there 
were signs that the latter could, in due course, prevail. With parlia­
mentary life resumed, the Shafbist Parliamentary body acquired an importance 
which overshadowed that of the remoter committees in the Provinces, This 
growing importance was at the behest of the Party leadership and a shift 
of focus occurred from the mudirtam(or Administrator General) to Its
(190) The Sha’b columns in Summer 1933 (July-September) are especially 
Instructive here. Upon Sidqi's return, delegates turned up to meet him 
and names and occupations of members are often cited at length. Earlier, 
upon its formation, mercantile elements were only occasionally prepon­
derant. E.g. Aswan Central Committee consisted of three merchants, the 
remainder of the General Committee was composed of Sheikhs. Traditional 
elements included shari*~‘a lawyers and liulamas in the towns (e.g. Bulaq 
Central Committee was headed by a shari1a lawyer in contrast to Shubra 
Committee under a Contractor). In the provinces umdas and sheikhs 
presented the equivalent traditional elements.
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President (or Za*im). Sha*bist clubs developed a special vitality.(191)
The swing from the administrative to the political was equally reflected 
in the disappearance of the ambiguous nomenclature. The Presidents of
(i.
the General Committees and their Secretaries freplaced the Manager of the 
Administration of Committees", the "administrative executive committees!1 
and the "general controllers". The more prominent role assumed by Sidqi 
In the Party attracted elements, Ideally and materially more akin in 
spirit. While the direction of the policies of the Regime confirmed 
the developing homogeneity.
The core of the "inner group" was not consolidated in any single 
formation within the Party. A representative cross-section could be 
found among its Executive Committee, the Shafbist Parliamentary Body 
and the political clubs. In some ways it constituted a promising base 
for an emergent "bourgeois" party In the Egyptian setting. The composi­
tion of the Parliamentary Economic Committee formed in October 19 33 under 
Sidqi, provides some guide to this group.(192) Socially, it was hetero­
geneous with provincial elements as well as urban elements, an older 
generation (represented by the octogenerian Gallini Fahmy) and a younger 
age-group. Intellectually, a greater measure of homogeneity Is discernible 
in the common outlook on the advantages of a modern national economy. The 
degree of commitment to the ideal differed and the conception of economic 
modernisation itself was not uniform. The older generation of notables 
was more conservative, less Imaginative, and less committed than the 
younger elements who<.were more radical, dedicated and enthusiastic.
The different elements generally possessed a material stake In the emer­
gent economic order.(193) Conversely, however, no explicit commitment to 
the parliamentary form of government among Sha^bists was particularly
(191) The Sha*b Party Clubs reflected a diversity that contrasted with the 
earlier regimentation In the Committees. The Guiza Club for example bore 
little affinity with the spirit of its Alex, counterpart. It had a stronger 
conservative, pro-administrative bias.- See account of Guiza inauguration
in Sha*b, 1M-.8.1932.
(192) This Economic Committee Included Elias Awad, Gallini Fahmy, Mahfouz 
el Far, Serageddin Shahin, Abdel Rahman el Biali, Abdel Aziz Nazmy and 
Latif Nakhla.
(193) The bank account of Biali, for ex., rose by £E 112.00 between 
1931 & 1933 as a Palace report notes.(Abdin).
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■noticeable. 0940 The conspicuous failure to preach the parliamentary ethic
on the part of Sha*bist members was occasionally underlined by a theme
that stressed the importance of a strong man for a movement of regeneration*(195)
Generally, the Party was not without vitality* Ideas were not 
wanting and the coalition of material and moral interests, given time to 
crystallise into a self-conscious corporate entity, provided an adequate 
institutional foundation,, The original six principles which centred on 
independence, sovereignty and overall reform were not peculiar to it, but ' 
their interaction with developing social interests rendered them more 
relevant and, politically, more meaningful to the Party* Leadership, 
however, was a crucial factor in linking ideas to interests and giving 
cogency to the Party organisation* By temperament,Sidqi was non-partisan 
and he could hardly expect to inspire a sense of partisanship among his 
followers* (196) As a statesman and a reformer, his fundamental approach 
to institution-building in the political arena was concrete and evolutionary* 
Parliamentary government, he believed, would strike root with the development 
of the necessary and congenial social and economic structure which would 
support it* Meanwhile, although he could inspire ideas and ideals in his 
’’pupils", and infuse .subordinates and colleagues with something of his 
zeal at work, this was quite different to leading a new-born political 
Party*
The forces that for all practical purposes destroyed the Party 
came from outside it* Under direct Palace instructions the Administration 
carried out an intensive campaign to detach Shafbists away from Sidqi.
While three years earlier it had been similarly employed to suppress the 
Wafdist organisation, this time it lacked the plausible pretext* In 
persecuting Shafbists it was not out to maintain order against Insurrection(197)
(194) In March-April, 1931, some lectures were given in Cairo and
Alexandria by prominent Shafbists. The former lot was delivered by Mark 
Habashi (to be elected Senator in June) - a self-styled disciple of Sidqi - 
in which he dwelled on the dangers of a mono-cultural economy and preached 
diversification and modernisation* The political lectures were given by
the Party Secretary, Ahmad Rushdy, in Alexandria and were a negative reversion 
to the evils of Wafdism and its abuse of the nationalist movement to the 
detriment of the political development of Egypt. Neither actively preached 
the virtue of parliamentary government.
(195) See above p.150.
(196) See Ch. I*
(197) Sidqi addressed an official complaint to Mahmud el Keissy, Minister
of Interior, in this sense * See ;Ahram 2.12.1933.
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But the .'moment the pseudo-political organisation was on the point of 
asserting itself under a political leadership within the constitutional 
framework, its danger was realised. The manner in which orders were issued, 
without the knowledge of the responsible Minister, confirmed the consolidation 
of the reverse trend. Power had effectively passed into the hands of 
irresponsible Palace officials.
The task of the Administration was easier this time. Not only 
was its machinery of repression perfected, thanks, ironically, to Sidqi!s 
efforts, but there was hardly an organisation in existence to contend with.
Out of the committees that mushroomed during elections, there remained only 
a handful of general committees which were easy targets for suppression.
The sheikhs and umdas who constituted the organisational backbone in Upper 
Egypt were easily persuaded to abandon their political excursion. The odd 
pockets of resistance, observable notably in Alexandria, took some muscle- 
flexing but were eventually subdued. Conversely, the quality of the early 
recruits who sat on the Party Executive showed up to its disadvantage.
Some were time-servers, initially welcomed for the prestige element they 
rather dubiously lent. (198) Many were ex-Liberals who were anxious to secure 
their vital interests. (199) It was not difficult for the palace to cajole 
and to threaten. At the same time an untimely shift of emphasis occurred 
from the political and organisational to the pedagogic and cultural. Beyond 
its formation and the electoral flurry there was little compulsion or active 
canvassing for its membership. The Sha'bist clubs that came into prominence 
were themselves a vehicle for dissolving partisan differences in the cause of
(198) Among these, for example, were Senators Ahmad Talgat and Mahmud el- 
Towayyer, both ex-judges with notorious records.. The first had been President 
of the Native Court of Appeal in Cairo for 10 years (1919-1928) during which 
term his corruption was proverbial - was only removed by manipulating ’pensions 
scheme under Mahmud Pasha. Towayyer was a judge in the Mixed Courts in 
Alexandria, whose unprofessional conduct resulted in his transfer.
(199) The Lamloums, for example, were a powerful tribe of Arab stock in Upper 
Egypt (Minia) who were also Constitutional Liberals. A Lamloum brother 
reportedly commented in exasperation (in the pungent dialect typical of 
Sa*idis) at the indecision of the Party Executive under Mohamed Mahmud and the 
consequent threat to prestige and interests it entailed. "Sit we thus as 
lightweights in society... neither with the Government nor with the Wafd.. and 
what about our interests, where do these go?" Rose al-Yusuf, November, 1930.
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an impartial course of national "enlightenment". (2 0 0). While they might 
have constituted an antidote to the administrative origins of the Party, 
they were not sufficiently developed to be a source of strength in its 
organisation.
The Party, still in its "infancy", had not reached the point 
where it could balance the discipline and formal structure necessary for 
its organisation with the principles and allegiances necessary for its 
vitality. The search for an equilibrium left it unconsolidated, fluid and 
vulnerable before the concerted Palace offensive to which it was now 
exposed.
The parliamentary session for 1933-34 opened with a new and 
interesting balance of forces. Following his final resignation from the 
Party and his abandonment of a controversial candidature for the presidency 
of the Chamber, Sidqi retained his deputyship. (201) He used his influence 
discreetly to mobilise forces in the Chamber not restricted to his partisans, 
and there briefly emerged, under his impetus, a United Bloc comprising 
Independents, Watanists and ex-ShaTbists. Power was divided among three 
almost equal groups with the comparative numerical disadvantage of the Bloc 
offset by its superior organisation and vitality. As a result, the elections 
of the bureaux of the Chamber did not go smoothly for the Government, its 
awkward handling of its difference with the Native Bar Syndicate was exposed; 
Prime Minister YahiaTs indiscretion that reflected on Egyptian sovereignty 
was questioned; while the Government was interpellated before it had recovered 
its composure. (202)
However, the semblance of Parliament and Party working in close 
harmony to bolster and check the executive was invalidated as the latter was 
drained of its institutional substance. The interest of the Palace in both 
institutions was restricted to their use to disparage their founder. As soon 
as Sidqi resigned from the Party this interest in it subsided, while the 
manipulation of the Chamber was mainly limited to meetings devoted to exposing
(200) See above, p.130 .
(201) See above, p.151.
(202) See MMN, 22.12.1933 & 26.12.1933; 3.2.1934; 8.1.1934.
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the misdeeds of the Sidqi Administration.(203) By implication, such 
exposures emphasised the integrity of its successor and vindicated the 
Royal will In making and unmaking governments. All the scruples of co­
ordinating between Parliament and the Government were obviated by the 
simple formula of the oath of allegiance which transferred ministerial 
responsibility from the Chamber to the King.(204) It struck a new balance 
between political reality and political prescriptions. Both Parliament 
and Party became marginal to the governmental process as the notion of 
a parliamentary executive disintegrated before the autocratic reality.
The 1930 Regime owed its distinctive traits to Sidqi*s role in it 
and its duration depended on his continued presence in office. His depar­
ture, however, marked the end of an era that was long enough to leave an 
imprint on political developments. The palace rule which asserted itself 
during 1934 was distinguished from its invertebrate versions in the past 
hy a self-conscious Administration and a bold and unruly parliament which 
eventually proved to be an embarrassment to both the British and the 
Government; it was subsequently dissolved with the advent of Tewfiq 
Nessim in November 1934. All that remained under the new Administration 
was an emasculation of the Regime in a coterie of bureaucratic and techno­
cratic. elements manning a neutral government. During 1935, a brief lease 
of life was given to the decimated party organisation when Sidqi came back 
to it suddenly In the Spring. With both Independence and the Constitution 
in imminent danger of erosion under Nessim's vaccillating Administration, 
he resumed its leadership and, in May 1935, he launched his appeal for a 
United Front among all the parties and political forces in the country. 
This appeal was eventually adopted by other parties too, and it led to 
the restoration of the 192 3 Constitution towards the end of the year 
and to the resumption of the Treaty negotiations shortly after.
(203) For .such examples see sittings on 10.4.1934 and 11.4.1934; 30.4.1934;
2.5.1934 and 21.5.1934. Ibid.
(204) See note 163 above.
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The essentially personalised and centralised power of the Regime, 
which was represented in the extraordinary powers exercised by Sidqi, was 
originally the function of a crisis situation„ He had embarked on his 
enterprise from precarious premises aspiring not only to impose an element 
of stability in a state of flux, but also to consolidate institutions in 
volatile circumstances which reduced the likelihood of such an eventuality,, 
The concentration of power accentuated its strength as well as its vulner­
ability, as the fate of the Regime depended on that of its founder„ By the 
same token, it orientated the power conflict to its detriment„ The presence 
of a keen and ambitious Monarch, inimical to institutionalising power, 
precipitated deviations„ Effective resistance called for a devoted cadre 
that did not exist - or, at best, was only inchoateQ As a result, the 
consolidated executive, originally conceived as the bulwark of a compatible 
parliamentary regime, degenerated into an appendage of Palace officialdom0
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ECONOMIC POLICY UNDER THE REGIME
" Economic Policy is the heart of Politics."
(Sidqi, 24-.8.1931.)
"Today, Egypt has an industrial policy," Sidqi reminded his 
colleagues in a Council meeting that sat to consider the question of 
cement supplies for the reconstruction of the Gebel Aulia Dam towards 
the end of 1932. "One of the preoccupations of this government," he 
continued, "is to ensure that the Balance of Trade retains every piastre 
within the country." (1) At its next meeting, the Cabinet met to consider 
"one of the worthwhile projects the government was anxious to promote".
The electrification of the Aswan Dam and the establishment of a nitrate 
factory would enhance Egypt's self-sufficiency, in a vital quarter, benefit 
the Balance of Trade, reduce the cost of production and, above all, 
"provide the nucleus for great industrial projects in the future". The 
Ministry of Public Works had completed its adjudications for the project 
and Sidqi promised to present his colleagues with a comprehensive tech­
nical memorandum on the subject, which, once sanctioned, could be followed 
out by "the necessary steps for its execution". (2 )
Both instances illustrate the trend of policy under the new 
executive. Although the prevailing Depression confronted the government 
with a host of problems and difficulties that frustrated the realisation 
of its ambitions, it in no way dampened its resolve to pursue them. In 







"The present crisis should stimulate us to an energetic effort 
to increase our capacity to confront difficulties. This is the 
spirit which underlies the thought and action of the present 
government and which should equally inspire the public." (3)
In this spirit, too, Sidqi strove to promote the concepts he had always 
held. Economic independence was the cornerstone of political independence.(4) 
The prospects of political development and the consolidation of parliamentary 
Institutions, equally depended on expanding and diversifying the basis of 
national wealth in order to secure a basic equilibrium in the economy which " 
would, in time, reflect on a more balanced polity. (5) At the same time, 
he believed, government had an active responsibility for securing the 
favourable conditions required for such a development. (6 ) Industrialisation 
was a key aspect in this transformation, although Sidqi notably conceived it 
with the undertones of the reformist.
"Je suis d'avis que le mouvement industriel doit se developper 
normalement et petit a petit. Une industrialisation en masse 
sera une oeuvre sociale nefaste, tandis qu’en procedant avec 
methode, on assure a 1 ’Industrie ^gyptienne une stabilite dont 
elle a grand besoin."
When Sidqi came to power in 1930 he brought with him this develop­
mental perspective that pushed fiscal policy into other quests beyond 
balancing the budget. Indeed, in striving to reconcile a balanced budget 
to a balanced economy, Sidqi went beyond current orthodoxy at a moment when 
the ability to grapple with the immediate problems of the national economy 
posed a grave new challenge to statesmanship. (8 ) The conception of a 
national policy was itself an act of statesmanship.
(3) Political address at Benha, Shatb , 12.9.1931
(4) See Ch -1 . <p,32
(5) See Chapter IV. Sidqi maintained his views on the connection
between the social economic structure and the political and administrative 
structures - or, generally, culture - until the end of his life. See his 
opinion in review of Subhi WahidaTs book (bibliography) - in Ahram,16..3.1950; 
cf. summing of his views In article in al-Siyasa al~Isboutiya, 31.3.1929.
(6 ) See TLTS, pp. 11 - 12; 91 - 92.
(7) Address in annual General Assembly of the Federation of Industries,
11.3.1932; cf. views in previous address on 30.3.1931 in similar vein.
(8) An editorial "The Meaning of Leadership" (Ma*na az-zaMma) proposes 
new criteria. See Sha^b, 26.5.1931; cf. Sidqi’s address to Sha'bist Parliamen­
tary Body on 21.8.1931.
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This policy conception under the Regime was- a new point of 
departure, while its coincidence with the onsetting Depression made it 
particularly timely. The new customs regime which came into force in 
February, 1930, meant that Egypt had recovered a measure of its fiscal 
autonomy, and this provided the Regime with an effective weapon to promote 
its policy objectives. Protectionism, which Sidqi had advocated in 1917 
and championed in the ’twenties, now became practicable politics. But his 
original conceptions were now tempered or reinforced, by improvisation 
to meet an unforeseen contingency in the repercussions of the World 
Depression. This was signalled by the pursuit of policies to preserve 
existing wealth and safeguard ^ .threatened social structure, side by side 
with others, to promote local production and equilibrate the economy. 
Generally, the presence of a national policy influenced the issues raised 
under the Regime as well as the approach to them.
The Rational Approach.
Sidqi adopted a characteristically methodical and probing approach
to the wide range of problems with which he was confronted. His search for
means to alleviate his immediate difficulties led him to a more radical 
quest to "establish things on a solid and durable basis which would last 
into the future". (9)
The Cotton Policy that was brought before the Council of Ministers
in October, 1930, was the first indication of this new approach. It was
inconceivable to Sidqi that cotton, the staple crop of the economy and the 
major source of national wealth, should continue without any form of 
rational husbanding. (10) The present situation in which the government 
found itself, with the major portion of its liquid reserves tied up in 
cotton purchases on the one hand, and with little capacity for either storing 
them or disposing of them, was simultaneously the result and the demonstration 
of this absence of husbanding. While immediate steps were taken to reduce 
storage risks and costs by steam-pressing cotton stocks, and additional
(9) cf. Ch. IV. p. 132.
'(10) See Sidqi's Memorandum to the Council of Ministers on 18.10.1930- 
Henceforth, A.Abdel-Wahab could confidently(and competently) expound on 
the Government’s policy towards cotton. See eg. International Cotton 
Bulletin, Vol. X (No.40) July 1932, p. 524 ff.; S Vol.XI (No.44) July- 
August 1933, p.459.
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storage facilities were briskly undertaken, the search for new outlets was 
launched as part of a more general export policy. (11) This policy was 
among the proposals of a comprehensive report on the cotton question \
which was the outcome of a mission Sidqi had assigned to his diligent 
Under-Secretary of State, Ahmad Abdel Wahab, in August 1930. In this 
Report, the different aspects of the cotton situation were examined in 
depth, including its production, financing, marketing and processing, while 
the possibility of alternative crops was also explored. The recommendations 
constituted the foundations of a cotton policy that continued to influence 
subsequent Administrations and provided a safeguard against the presence in 
office of Ministers for whom "Parliament was more important than cotton". (12)
Another Report on measures to reduce the cost of living came in 
the train of the Cotton Report, just over three months later, to confirm 
the same approach. Towards the end of the ’twenties, a widening gap developed 
between wholesale and retail prices under the impact of falling commodity 
prices. (13) The protectionist pursuits under the Regime only reinforced 
the rift and aggravated the problem of the rising cost of living, (14)
While palliatives were sought with varying degrees of effectiveness, the 
situation, here too, was examined objectively and the results were put to 
the Council of Ministers in early February 1931. The Report disclosed that 
the control of retail prices was one dimension of a complex solution that 
called for reducing the cost of production, organising markets and credit 
structures, controlling rates, salaries and concessionaries, and generally
(11) A deal, for example, was concluded with Hungarian firms towards the 
end of 19 31, involving the sale of 60,000 to 100,000 bales of cotton on 
special terms. In July 1932, Sidqi was invited by the Hungarian Government 
to visit the textile site using Egyptian cotton.
(12) Makram Ebeid is reported to have made this remark to Mr. F. Watson. 
See Minute by Financial Adviser of 14.6.1930 in F0371/14641.
(13) For tables, see Memorandum of 31.1.1931 found in documents in STS, 
February 1931. Periodic tables, quoted from the Bulletin of the Statistics 
Department, comparing the trend of basic items in the different months 
between 1931 and 1934 point to a general decline in both sets, with the drop 
in wholesale greater than those in retail prices.
(14) A more incriminating appraisal is found in the reports from inform­
ants contained in the memorandum on the financial situation on the provinces
of 28.11.1933. See F0 371/18001 - Conversely, it was easy to use such 
pursuits as a scapegoat for abuse - e.g. kerosene prices. See paras. 331-389
in Annual Report for 1932. F0 371/17015.
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raising overall productivity. Some of the measures which will be referred 
to below, in discussing the rationalising impact of the pursuits of the 
Regime, were a result of these recommendations.
At the same time, one of the foremost preoccupations of Sidqi 
when he came to office in June 1930, was one of public finances. He arrived 
to find the 1930-1931 budget estimated at a deficit of £E 8 ,000,000, and to 
find nearly £E14,000,000 out of a liquid Reserve Fund of about £E18,000,000 
frozen in cotton commitments. A solution was sought to the estimated 
deficit in drastic economies, largely in the estimates for new public works, 
and in manipulating the new tariff to increase revenue. (15) Eventually, 
the budget was balanced and maintained at an increasingly favourable range 
over the next few years, despite the unabated general fiscal stringency. (16) 
On the other hand, the partial solution that was sought in economies, shed 
a light on some of the inherent features of the budgetary situation that 
called for remedy. Sidqi distinguished between two types of expenditure, 
"productive" and "unproductive", and saw how the inflatory trend in the 
latter threatened to undermine the former. He designed a policy which 
aimed at reducing this inflatory trend on the one hand, and ensuring that 
productive expenditure was systematised and stabilised in the budget struct­
ure, on the other, to protect it from an unforeseen contingency, like the 
present one.
To deal with unproductive expenditure, a new grading of officials 
was introduced in February 1931. (17) In principle, it narrowed the differ­
ential between the highest and lowest grades and fixed the ceiling (marbut) 
in a grade at an average within it. The annual and bi-annual periodic 
rises and promotions ceased to come into effect automatically as this now 
depended on the presence of a surplus in the budget of each year. New
(*i,5)See NCMPB (1931) pp. 27-30. A relevant analysis of the 1931-1932 Budget 
by Acting Financial Adviser on 3.8.1931 is found in F0 371/15409.
(16) In the first exercise for 1930-31, the deficit was reduced to 
£E2,648,174 and the balance drawn from the Reserves. In the following year, 
a surplus of £E778,758 was effected. To remove a source of disequilibrium 
and enhance rationalisation, the 19 33-34 Budget was cast in a new form 
separating the ESR Budget (Railways etc.). See instructive review and 
analysis in Note on Financial Position enc. in Residency despatch of 23.3.1933 
F0 371/17011.
(17) The new cadre, originally drafted by Sidqi, was endorsed by the 
Council of Ministers on 25.2.1931 and came Into force on 1.5.1931. For 
provisions, see Ministry of Finance Circular No. 10/1931 (25.4.1931).
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appointments equally depended' on the budgetary situation, while the various 
government departments were regarded as a single unit so that individual 
departments could no longer fill vacancies and issue promotions irrespective 
of the overall situation. The effect of these controls was cumulative, 
rather than immediate, while they directly saved the budget an annual 
increase of £E25Q,000, i.e. the cost of these periodic increments. In deal­
ing with inflation in officialdom, Sidqi took up a perennial problem which 
previous Administrations had only tentatively broached. (18) Its immediate 
yield to his own Administration was an increase of £E500,000, which included 
the sum of £E250,000, the issue of postponing effective promotions and pay 
rises due in May 1931 for the following year, and a further £E250,000, the 
result of an increase in the stamp duty on officials' salaries. (19) The 
introduction of this cadre in the depressed conditions of the era, was not 
of a nature to endear Sidqi to the afflicted majority of junior officials 
who were hit most by the new measures. (20) The slogan of interest above 
sentiment, here, echoed only too sombrely.
The positive side of the budgetary question called for instituting 
the principle of planning. While Sidqi's measures of economy did not affect 
those public works already in progress, the new works which were postponed, 
together with other projects' pending in the different Government departments, 
became the object of serious study in the Ministry of Finance. (21) Their 
execution was relegated to a five-year programme which came into force in 
1935.
Meanwhile, SidqI’s determination to advance the controversial 
Gebel Aulia project under the Regime was a typical Illustration of his
(18) E.g. as a result of proposals of the parliamentary finance committee 
in 1926/27, a special commission was formed to study Inflation In officialdom 
but until 1930, when Sidqi dissolved it, it had achieved nothing concrete.
(19) The stamp duty was collected on a differential basis of 7% for
incomes of £E20 and over and 5% for less. See memorandum from the Ministry 
of Finance of 7.9.1931 In STS, November, 1931. Follow up in Economic News, 
ibid., June 1932.
(20) To this day, Sidqi is acrimoniously remembered by the average
Egyptian in his late'60's for this cadre. Senior officials, by contrast, were 
not adversely affected. See below. No. 40.
(21) See Circular No. 20/1931 In J.0. of July, 1931.
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approach, as well as of his .priorities. The Gebel Aulia was a dam to be 
constructed in the southern Sudan, as part of the irrigation network to 
harness the Nile; its effect was to bring 250,000 feddans in upper Egypt 
under perennial irrigation and to reclaim another 300,000 feddans in the 
densely populated Delta. Sidqi, deeply convinced of the social and 
economic advantages of this project, as well as of its political implic­
ations for reinforcing Egyptian claims in the Sudan, strove to convince 
his compatriots that the Depression, for all its severity, was a temporary 
event that ought not to be used as a reason for delaying vital works. (2 2). 
With the completion of the second stage of heightening the Aswan Dam at 
the end of 1932, no major projects were underway and the budget which ought 
not to relax on development schemes, could well afford to provide for the 
new project from its ordinary resources. In fact, he launched this project 
with his eyes not only on the budget of the next three years, but with the 
ten years1 duration of the scheme in view. (23) While Sidqi!s rational 
approach to the budgetary question should be seen in perspective of his 
earlier efforts in 1922, his emphasis on developmental projects should be 
equally appraised against his earlier public pronouncements. (24)
The same methodical quest was extended to social problems, like 
unemployment, that were brought to the fore by the Incidence of the Depress­
ion, or precipitated by certain policies under the Regime. (25) Significant­
ly, unemployment was originally conceived as a social menace that was more 
deeply rooted than in an ephemeral depression and the solution sought went 
beyond the search for expedients. (26) A strong inter-departmental committee
(22) See MM, 23.5.1932 for one of his most forceful statements. Earlier,
equally persuasive and lengthy addresses were delivered in the Shaqb Club on 
16.1.19 32 and on his tours in Girga, 7.5,1932.
(2 3) See his letter to the Financial Adviser on 7.8.19 32 in F0 371/16115.
See also statement ■ in Chamber. MMN,23.5.1932. *
(24) See Ahram, 7.12.1923 (Election Manifesto) - See Ch.l. p p . i^S
(25) See Ch. Ill notes. Although no reliable figures are available, -unem­
ployment first appeared as a major problem then. An inspection by the Labour
Office conducted in 1931 in small spinning and weaving establishments found
an average reduction of over 40% - unemployed drivers in Cairo alone were 
estimated at 8,000 - 10,000. See also RECE (July 1931) p.97.
(26) Sidqi was aware that Industrialisation was the only effective solution
to a social problem whose implications were spelled out in the 1917 Report.
TLTS, pp. 63 - 64 - See also article in al-Siyasa al-IsbouHya referred to 
above.
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sat under the Under Secretary for the Interior, Mahmud el-Keissy, to deal 
with the question. (27) Its immediate recommendations included the stim­
ulation of a public works programme and of subventions by the government to 
local authorities to enable them to carry out their programmes so as to 
alleviate unemployment, take advantage of the prevailing low costs and keep 
entrepreneurial interests content. (28) One of the results was that this 
period, 1929-1933, the height of the Depression, witnessed the highest 
urban electrification in the inter-war years. (29) Meanwhile, significantly, 
the promotion of an outlook compatible with the new technical orientation 
went side by side with the promotion of local industry.
A committee met in the Ministry of Mafaref (Education) on 5th March 
1931, to lay down a general policy of education that stressed the technical 
aspect. (30) Shortly after, a Consultative Council emerged under the 
Director of the Department of Trade and Industry, with two representatives 
from the Maaref sitting on it, to consider credit facilities for small 
industry and employment opportunities for technical graduates in public 
enterprise. (31) In Impeding the prospects of employment in the civil
(27) The committee was composed of delegates from all chief labour employ­
ing departments in the government as well as the two representatives from the 
EFI. This is not to be confused with a separate committee that sat under 
A.F. Yahia to investigate a problem of labour dwellings. Typically, Sidqi 
seized the opportunity of a stop in Egypt at the time by Sir Felix-Poole of 
the Association of Electrical Industries in Britain, who was on his way to 
Ceylon, and sought expert advice on the problem. For Report see enc. In Res­
idency desp. of 5.3.19 31 in FO 371/15426. The Abu Za*bal labour complex was 
launched a year later, in 1932.
(28) Thence, the Government was authorised to raise supplementary credits
for the purpose during the summer recess of 19 32. See MMN, 9.6.1932,
(29) See table given in article by Albert Dorra, "IdElectrification urb-
aine en Egypte" in EI_ (No.2), 1939. This was due to uninterruption in 
extensive pumping works in the Delta, at the time, which Sidqi refused to axe 
for economies.
(30) See interview with Minister of Education, H.Issa, Sha*b, 9.3.1931
and leading articles on 11.3.19 31.
(31) See Ministerial Decree of 25.11.1931. Growing'pressure on technical
schools and increase in graduate force Is recorded in the period. See Ahram,
27.10.1933 and 2.10.1933. The Sha^b also studies figures and comments on 
30.8.1932. See also Chamber Debates on Budget of Ministry of Education.
MMN, -t$-V33,The search for outlets in public enterprise was criticised
by affected interests. See editorial in EI_, (No. 15} December, 1933, and 
Ahram, 24.9.19 33. The threat of government enterprise is a recurrent theme 
in the organ of the Federation during 1932.
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service, the government was anxious to encourage new outlets in free 
enterprise, in principle, (al-^amal al-hurr) and in public enterprise, 
where necessary. The control of a deteriorating employment situation 
among white-collar workers, or effendi circles, eventually depended on 
this quest for practical alternatives.
In dealing with the outstanding issues of social legislation, 
the approach was again consistent with the executive spirit. A central 
organ, the Labour Bureau, was founded in December, 1930, and, tempor­
arily, attached to the Department of Public Security, as much for reasons 
of economy and expediency as for reasons of security. (32) Leading members 
of the international labour movement were invited by the Government to 
study the labour situation in Egypt on the spot. The gesture was equally 
aimed at cutting the ground from under the feet of its opponents who 
sought to politicise labour and campaign against the Regime abroad. (33)
The Butler Report was the result of a visiting mission from the Internation­
al Labour Organisation in the Spring of 1932, and its recommendations were 
adopted by the Labour Office. (34) By the end of that year, the Superior 
Council on Labour Affairs had emerged as a result of these recommend­
ations. (35) The following summer, the first legislation on Women and 
Child labour was promulgated, having been examined by Parliament during
(32) See Sidqirs memorandum to the Council of Ministers on 25.11.1930.
See polemic in Ahram and opposition press, notably, Misr and sivasa at the 
end of November and early December, 1930. S's approach of preceding legis­
lation by an executive machinery equally satisfied the demands of the EFI 
(see edit, in EI_, November, 1930) in contrast to the approach of the Rida 
Commission, whose Report, published in March 1929, was criticised on grounds 
of unpracticability and 'idealism’.
(33) The visit by M.W. Schewenels of the IFTU to Egypt in October 1931
was a result of this campaign. See Campbell to Reading, 23.10.1931 (Confid.) 
For other activity abroad and formation of Egyptian Labour Party under 
Abbas Halim see file 49 in F0 371/15411.
(34) An Arabic copy of the report was recently reproduced in the
documents series in al-Tali*a, July, 1955. The pragmatic, gradualist and 
piece-meal approach recommended in the Butler Report made it welcome to
industry. See E_I (No. 14), November, 1932.
(35) For composition, see Decree-Law of 21.12.19 32.
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the previous session and passed on a guillotine motion. (36) Meanwhile, 
the hill on indemnities, the third item on the legislative programme, was 
before the advisory body for its consideration. For the first time Egypt 
saw effective action taken in the social field. (37) The efforts to lay 
the institutional foundations here, coincided with the measures taken 
elsewhere to consolidate the basic structure of the national economy.
Other aspects of the rational approach are seen in the spirit of 
follow-up (esprit de suite) and co-ordination that attended the implement­
ation of policy. One of the earliest decrees passed in July 1930 to promote 
local production, had given priority in government adjudications to local 
products within the margin of 10 per cent above rival tenders. Subsequent 
circulars were issued instructing government departments to modify their 
specifications to accommodate local tenders wherever possible, and extending 
the order to municipalities. Early in 1932 a further circular came to 
assess concrete results as the different departments reported on the meas­
ures taken by each to enforce the original decree. (38) At the same time, 
an earnest effort to co-ordinate activity was discernible in the quest to 
resolve the problems of one department without incurring others elsewhere.
This occured in organising efforts on a limited scale to deal with a spec­
ific issue, as with the instituting of a wool factory by the Prisons Dep­
artment in October, 1932, as well as in mobilising resources for a wider 
issue. The study of problems related to local production, in general, for. 
example, was the object of an inter-departmental committee founded in the 
Autumn of 1931 and chaired by the Under-Secretary of State for Agriculture.(39)
(36) See MMN, 16.5.1933. The laws. Nos. 58 and 65 were promulgated on
26.6.1933 and 17.7.1933 respectively. For instructive repertoire^n social 
legislation and measures under the Regime, see Zaki Badaoui, La Legislation 
du Travail en Egypte (1942).
(37) For a negative appraisal of the effort, see Amin Ezzeddin, Tarikh al 
Tabaka •al-Amila (1971), pp. 179-180, where he condemns the whole rubric of
social legislation under Sidqi as "a mean sop" to absorb and deflect labour 
opinion.
(38) See memorandum on the pace of substitution of local industry in STS,
October, 1932.
(39) For examples of other such committees see the inter-departmental
committee between the Ministries of Agriculture and Departments of Trade and 
Industry to deal with dairy products in September, 1931, or with setting up a 
tomato-sauce factory in July 1933. But there were obvious loop-holes in co­
ordination which the El pointed out (see Nos 3 & 9 in 1932 and No . 8 in 19339 
for examples.).
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In confronting his immediate difficulties, however, Sidqi resorted 
to expedients that were not always rational. Some were popular, like the 
institution of poor canteens in urban centres - an activity which was 
heightened to coincide with his electoral campaign in the Spring of 1931. 
Others were not, like the temporary ban on all new appointments and effect­
ive promotions and increments which he instituted in 1931 for one year, to 
be . successively renewed in the following two years. Nor again, was his 
refusal to cut down salaries among senior officials a decision void of 
political considerations, despite his plausible rationalising of it. (40) 
Some of these expedients too, like those taken to check prices and control 
merchants, were not very effective either. (41) The decision to abolish 
the short-lived section instituted in the Ministry of Finance in Spring,
19 31, to preside over the campaign to control the cost of living, might 
have been a rational one In the circumstances. (42) But it pointed in the 
direction of the priorities of the Regime which ,eventually3 proved socially 
expensive. In the present context, however, it is the rational approach 
to outstanding issues, and its consequences, that provide the point of 
emphasis in examining Sidqi's statesmanship.. The readiness to take account 
of the views and opinion of affected interests constituted another inter­
esting dimension of this approach.
(40) Estimating the economy resulting from such cuts at IE 170,000 he 
contended that it was not worth the shake in confidence In the country’s 
solvency such a measure would incur. MMN, 19.8.1931. He communicated his 
contention to the Moqattam on the same day.
(41) See, for example, order from the Ministry of Interior providing
for the obligatory declaration of prices on 17.3.1931. Later the Cabinet 
announced a series of measures to combat the rising cost of living on 
28.4.1931; but effective sanctions to control merchants remained unavailing. 
See econ. bulletin in STS, October, 19 32.
(42) The section was established in the Ministry of Finance under Amin 
Youssef, with a team of 15 officials and 14 members delegated from the 
Interior to supervise markets. Some of its activity is chronicled in the 
monthly bulletins in STS; one of its principle obstacles was public 
inertia. See Interview in Shafb , 9.4.1931. For reasons of abolition and 
transfer of competence, see Ministry of Interior Order of 12 .8.1931.
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Consultation and the Doctrine of Partnership.
While the concentration of power in the executive was accomp­
anied by the creation of consultative machinery to rationalise the process 
of decision making.* consultation assumed an interesting form in the 
relation between the government and interest groups. As Minister of 
Finance and head of a government professing certain policy objectives, 
Sidqi was subject to pressure from organised, as well as from isolated, 
interests. (43) Although the Federation of Industries was only one 
among these groups, Sidqi’s connections with it and the particular . 
pursuits of protectionism brought it conspicuously to the fore under the 
Regime.
To Sidqi, the Federation stood for national regeneration. It 
was the noble bearer of a mission, ”... une mission elevee, qui est celle 
de servrr la nation et de promouvoir le progres economique et social de 
notre cher patrie." It was the arche-type of the institutional setting 
for reconciling private interests to the public interest. Its primary 
task was not the defence of the individual, but, ". . la coordination et 
l’ajustement de son action avec celle de la collec.tivite, la conjugaison 
de ses efforts avec ceux de ses confreres en vue de progres du pays.” (4 4) 
The relationship between the Federation and public authorities was soon 
stabilised and regulated through the permanent representation of the 
Director of the Department of Trade and Industry on the Board of the Fed­
eration. (45) ”11 est certain que cette nouvelle forme de collaboration
(43) For organised agricultural interests see Yusuf Nahas, Juhud al-
Niqaba al Zira*iya (1952) pp. 228-229, 235-246, 292.
Proposals for a wheat policy from the Agricultural Syndicate are found In 
Sidqi’s correspondence for April, 1932, in his private files in the Archives 
of the Council of Ministers. For foreign concessionaries see ex. of a 
businessman, M. Ismalun, on behalf of Sinai Mining Co. referred to in R. 
Turner’s despatch of 18.6.1931 - FO 371/15400.
(44) Address in XVII General Assembly of the Federation, 14.4.1938.
(^5) STS, February, 1932.
201
directe et suivie," the letter from Sidqi to the Federation read, "rendra 
plus productive et efficace 1 ’oeuvre convergente des deux institutions”. (46)
A new feature appearing at the beginning of 1932 in the now fort­
nightly publication of the Federation, chronicled, among other events, the 
course of the reinforced relations between Industry and the Government*
Its confident tone reflected the legitimacy and the ascendancy which industry 
was hitherto denied. Under the Regime, an element of dialogue springs to 
the fore as praise alternates with criticism and concrete proposals are 
put to specific departments, while the head of government is made directly 
responsible for certain policies. (47) Sidqi met what he conceived to be 
its legitimate appeals, whenever that was possible. (48) The legislation 
protecting the growing food industry was a prompt response to such 
appeals. (49) In another instance the Federation adopted the grievance 
of the Association of Contractors who protested against the tendency of 
the government to favour iron and steel, at the expense of concrete, in 
its buildings. The representation which was made to Sidqi directly, 
resulted in the establishment of the desired link between the industry 
and the authorities and a compromise solution was reached. (50)
(46) This, too, was one of the demands of the Federation stated in its 
annual report (Compte Rendu) for 1930. See also, annual meeting and resol­
utions in April 1932 and welcome editorial in EI^  (No. 2), January, 1932.
As Minister of Finance in 1938, Sidqi further consolidated these links. See 
notice in L1El (No.6 ), March, 1938.
(47) See "Chronique” in L!El, January and May, 1932.
(48) The "Compte Rendue" for 1931 speaks of "la cordialite parfaite" that
characterised this relationship. For examples of the positive exchanges
see editorials in E2t (No. 8), 1930, (No. 1), 1932, (No. 4), 1932 and (No. 1),
1933. The search for a rational solution to the rivalry between the diff­
erent means of transport was a topical issue, see ibid., 7.12.1932. Sidqi’s 
letter to the General Assembly meeting in 1933 discloses the strains in that 
perfect cordiality.
(49) It was at the same time part of the legislative drive underway to
safeguard commercial morality. See Speech from the Throne in December, 1932.
(50) See editorial in El (No.10) May, 1933.
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The problems of the Federation and its constituents were only 
a part of other national problems that sometimes imposed conflicting, 
but equally legitimate, claims on the attention of the government. The 
promotion of local production was, itself, beset with mutually conflicting 
commitments between the different sections of production and within the 
single branch. The demands of balancing the budget in hard times occasion­
ally brought these conflicts to a head. The reduction of the freight rates 
by the Egyptian State Railways and of import duties on certain primary 
and intermediary products were, for example, objects of consistent repres­
entations to the government. (51) But revenue in the railways was severely 
hit by the crisis, while the relatively handsome customs yields were the 
effective support to the Treasury. It was not surprising, in the circum­
stances, that Sidqi’s responsibilities as Minster of Finance attenuated his 
protectionist xeal so that the tariff policies retained a strong fiscal 
character. It was his official responsibility, too, that dictated a wider 
recourse to public enterprise than he supported in principle, as a measure 
of economy and social expediency. The abolition of the octroi (a municipal 
duty imposed on the movement of goods) in April 1931 was accompanied by a 
decree raising the duties on tobacco from PT 20 to PT 100 and part of the 
proceeds went to local councils to compensate them for a loss of an import­
ant source of revenue. Business voiced its protests in vain, for Sidqi was, 
in fact, involved in an intricate process of balancing interests as much 
as one of balancing economies.
In the meantime, Sidqi set up the "general interest" (al-salih al- 
*'am) as the standard by which interests could be reconciled. This standard 
at times inclined more towards one group than the other, and at other times, 
it condoned hard values. (52) For the first time, however, the interests 
of business, merchants, landowners and tenants tended to be considered on an
(51) By January 1932, 30 reports had been submitted by the Federation 
to different departments. See also appeals in editorials of January 1931 
and February 19 32. During 1932 pressure for reducing ESR freight rates was 
echoed in Parliament by interested deputies like Mahmud el-Alfi, Mohamed 
Amin Mashali and Abdel-Meguid Mashwadi.
(52) gee beiow p 2.IS-Sometimes the budget stood for the "general interest" 
and the grievances of the landowners were dismissed for sentimentalism.
See, for example, Sidqi on retention of cotton tax in Chamber in MMN,5.7.19 32.
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equal footing. Its measure was the criticism, or the diminished enthus­
iasm, the Sidqi Administration eventually elicited from all quarters. To 
Sidqi plurality and diversity in the economy, as in the polity, were ad­
missible and even desirable, while compromise constituted a fundamental 
principle of social association. It inspired that co-operative ethic 
which he deemed to be essential for promoting Industry and commerce in 
Egypt. As far back as 1917, Sidqi had distinguished between two key con­
cepts, al-infirad (individualism) and al-ishtirak (cooperation/participation), 
and he attributed Egypt's problems to the prevalence of the former trait.
He also believed that Egypt's belated arrival on the industrial scene trans­
formed the task of modernising the economy into a joint responsibility - 
ib1musht&rak. In developing national resources generally, and In laying 
the foundations of industry and commerce, in particular, there was ample 
scope for Egyptians, foreigners and government alike to join hands in a 
common effort. (53) He had further conceived in organisation and management 
(al-tartib w'al-tadbir) basic skills requisite for industry. Without them, 
the physical and natural elements meant little. (54) The general interest, 
Itself, acquired its substance and relevance in the course of partnership 
and organisation. This ethos was embodied in the emerging pattern of 
contractual relationships between the government and private enterprise 
and it inspired the regulation of certain sectors of the economy.
The formalisation of the Cotton Exchange (1930-31), the Agreement 
with the Sucreries (February 19 31) and the formation of the Credit Agricole 
(June 1930/August 19 31) were all aspects of institutionalising the res­
ponsibility of government towards the national economy. Other arrangements 
that followed confirmed the general pattern. (55) The Minet el-Bassal 
Bourse Statute provided the standard model for regulating mutual rights 
and obligations. Cotton dealings were placed under government control.
The Government was represented on the Board of Exchange by one member,
(53) TLTS, pp. 120-121; 94, 26.
Ibid. , pp. 72, 73.
(55) Among the earliest such Agreements was that with the Alex. Nav­
igation Co. See note presented to Council of Ministers on 8.1.1931- found 
in Bourse Egyptienne 24.1.19 31. Another subvention and contract followed 
with Misrair which began its operations in June, 1932.
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a Commissaire, who was entitled to attend all meetings and to be present 
on the sub-committees. Although he could not take an active part in the 
deliberations, he possessed a veto right. At the same time, an arbitration 
clause was included for settling differences between the Government and 
the merchants.
A somewhat different situation is provided in the case of the 
Credit Agricole. Here the Government contributed 50 per cent of the 
capital, with the remainder largely subscribed by private banks. (56) The 
new Bank was set up in order to principally advance short term loans for 
financing crop cultivation and harvest and supply select seeds and fertil­
isers on behalf of the Government. It was provided with certain admin­
istrative facilities and privileges, like the priority of lien in respect 
to advances, and guaranteed a minimum profit of 5 per cent in its operations. 
In return, the Government became an effective partner entitled to represent­
ation and control. The Director of the Bank, styled the "Administrateur
' t  *
Delegue”, was appointed by the Council of Ministers, while two represent­
atives sat on its four-member strong board (proportionate to its contribution
. * /in capital).. The Bank was run as a Societe Anonyme whose autonomy was 
circumscribed only by its commitments to the Government,
The terms of the Sugar regie provides yet another illustration.
If, In the previous instance, the claims of a partnership were based on 
the founding initiative of the government, action here was taken in 
response to an urgent appeal from the largest industry in the country for 
protection against foreign dumping. An agreement was concluded that secured 
the industry a practical monopoly of the local market and regulated its 
terms. (57) In return for its privileged position, the Company undertook 
to be bound by certain obligations. Fixing the price of the sugar at both
(56) See Royal Decree No. 50/1930. The Bank was launched with an initial 
capital of £E 1,000,000 with a limit of £E 2,000,000 set for Government 
contribution. This was partly to ensure that its dealings were restricted 
to its original purpose and that It did not compete with existing institu­
tions. See terms and objectives, NCMPB (19 31-1932) Copy In F0 371/15409 .
(57) See memorandum by Minister of Finance of 15.12.1930. For study
of the new regime for sugar see Dr. Abdel Hakim el Rifai in MIQ, Vol. 1 (No.4), 
June, 1931.
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ends of production was left to the government, who was also given an 
auditing right and a voice in the allocation of profits. A Sugar Con­
sultative Council was stipulated for, with representatives of the cane 
cultivators, the industry and the government, in order to determine 
prices and discuss all questions related to the production and market­
ing of sugar. (58)
In all three instances the Government proved an active agent 
in promoting the national economy. The proclamation of the principle 
of joint responsibility formalised and systematised intervention, 
expanded the scope of government action and consolidated its authority 
over the economy. The Agreements also recognised the plurality of 
interests and legitimised their conflict, but, at the same time, they 
provided the channels for compromise to the benefit of the national 
economy (or, the "general interest"). By institutionalising a form of 
equilibrium among the different interests, the source of potential conflict 
was reduced and an optimal allocation of resources was made possible. 
Furthermore, in these instances of government intervention, and in its 
assumption of a limited form of responsibility, traces of a mixed economy 
can be detected. The relationship between public authority and private 
enterprise was institutionalised so as to give a positive role to govern­
ment in the administration and control of the economy, while the legiti­
macy acknowledged to private enterprise made it eligible for consultation 
and active consideration in the formulation of policies. Public money, 
too, was invested in economic enterprise in varying forms, such as subsi­
dies and capital. The terms of the partnership here, hoimever, clearly 
favoured private enterprise.
. Rationalisation .*53 ^
The immediate impact of the organisational impulse was seen in the 
general trend to rationalise the social and economic structure. The
(58) See Decree Law of 11.2.1931 instituting Sugar Consultative 
Council.
(59) On the trend to rationalise see article by Prof. Dubois Richard, 
"LTOrganisation technique de l’Etat" in MIQ Vol. 1 (No. 1) 1931. This 
review, which appeared in 1930, provided a timely forum for some intell­
ectual echoes of the period. See above, ChD IV, note 240
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commercial infra-structure was the first to benefit. Studies had.estab­
lished a direct relationship between the prevailing disorganisation and 
poor commercial practice in certain sectors and low exports. (60) Export 
control bureaux were set up at Alexandria and Port Said and control was 
first introduced in 19 31 on an optional and restricted basis for one year. 
Having proved effective and practicable, it was generalised and rendered 
obligatory. (61) Priority was given to rationalising commercial trans­
actions in the staple crop, cotton and cotton seed. Minet el Bassal ..
was duly transformed into an official exchange and government control was 
established to put an end to the chaos that had previously prevailed. (62) 
Similar action was soon taken against the Stock Exchange, although the 
general statute was only finally promulgated at the end of 1933, after the 
Mixed Courts had endorsed it. (63)
With the emphasis on diversification, the official boon given 
such cultures as fruits, vegetables and cereals was accompanied by an 
earnest attempt to organise their markets and to enhance efficiency as well 
as to improve the standards of commercial practice. The wholesale markets 
in Cairo, despite the quantity and value of the produce they handled, 
entirely lacked any public control, apart from some elementary form of 
sanitary supervision. (64-) By centralising and unifying the exchange
(60) Egyptian eggs, for example, declined sharply on the British market 
between 1925 and 1931, falling from 86.2% of British total egg imports to a 
mere 10%. Following the experimental application of control they registered 
a record rise from 98.266 in 1930 to 125,256.000 in the next year. See 
explanatory memorandum on control of exports in STS September 1931. The law 
itself was based on a compromise between free trade and public interest.
(61) The decrees instituting compulsory control on eggs and onions were 
passed on 15th December 19 32 and 8th March 19 33. The extension of super­
vision and control was not always welcome. See Bourse Egyptienne, 28.2.1933
(62) The Alexandria General Produce Association, a private body of 
individuals come together by mutual consent, without legal status, used to 
administer all cotton business before then. It disappeared in November 1931, 
as the Bourse was legalised and a Government Commissaire presided over a 
Commission of exporters, bankers, producers and merchants. Relevant 
Ministerial Decrees were issued successively on 13.11.1930, 27.1.1931, 25.8.1931 
and 1.11,1932.
(6-3) By Royal Decree of 31.12.1933.
(64-) See memorandum on Wholesale Fruit and Vegetable Markets accompany­
ing Law No. 115/19 31 and Ministerial Decrees No. 96 and 97/19 31.
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process and subjecting it to a uniform statute, the control of supply and 
demand was effected, and a fairer price ascertained, ensuring thereby the 
interests of producers and consumers alike. (65) The inauguration of the 
crop exchange at Rod el-Farag a year later, on the 7th November, 1932, was 
a celebrated occasion in the business world. (6 6) Sidqi aptly marked it 
by delivering a "discours-programme" in which he outlined the achievements 
and ambitions of his government in the light of a detailed framework of 
its general policy. (67) Protectionism and rationalisation were vividly 
shown to be complementary aspects of the same policy.
The financial base of the economy was equally consolidated and 
expanded. The nucleus for a much needed agricultural credit system was 
laid on a regular and stable basis and assured of government backing. (6 8) 
Meanwhile, the efforts to stimulate local industry stumbled across the 
difficulty of industrial credit. New legislation providing for the mort­
gage of machinery for credit, extended the security base for industry and 
rendered it more flexible. (69) A further decree passed on 4th November, 
1931, authorised the Minister.of Finance to guarantee credits by Bank Misr 
up to £E 15,000 (raising the recently instituted £E 10,000 ceiling). Sums 
in excess of that amount were left for a decision of the Council of 
Ministers. This amendment was particularly introduced to encourage joint- 
stock companies and large scale enterprise. (70) But these were only 
interim measures pending the study of a scheme for an industrial bank 
modelled on the new agricultural bank. At the same time, active measures 
were taken to promote small industry, which was acknowledged as the corner-
(65) See article by Dr. Hussein Aly Rifai, "Internal Egyptian Markets"
in STS, November , 1932.
(6 6) See Ministerial Decree No. 70/1932.
(67) See text in Economic Documents section in STS, November, 1932,
For commentary see editorial in LrEl No. 15, December 1932 and Sha*b,
8.11.1932.
(6 8) See above, p 204 and note (96) below.
(69) See Decree promulgated on 20.3.1931 governing pledges on commercial
funds, plants, etc., which was inspired by Greek sources.
(70) See article by Mahmud Saleh el-Falaki "Industrial Credit in Egypt"
in STS February, 1932 and by Dr. Hussein Rifai on "Industrial Credit" Ibid., 
May 1932.
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stone for large industry and was, moreover, seen to represent "worthy 
social theories and values" the Regime was anxious to promote. (71)
Technical guidance and c r e d i t were organised for craftsmen and technical 
graduates as an initial amount of £E 30,000 was set aside for the pur­
pose. (72) Trade, too, received its share of attention as the government 
made subventions depend on their activity in establishing permanent 
exhibitions.
An effort to stimulate professionalism went together with the 
consolidation of credit structures. Up till then, Egyptian Chambers 
of Commerce were voluntary associations that tended to wither away through 
lack of control, poor finances and the absence of the necessary corporate 
spirit among its members. This inclined Sidqi to reverse his earlier 
tentative attitude towards the role of government on that score and opt 
for action. (73) Accordingly, a new law organising the Chambers appeared 
in 1933. (74) Its aims were to•achieve "cooperation and cohesion among 
those employed in the trades and industry... to stimulate the growth of 
a strong and coherent commercial opinion" and to provide for reliable 
intermediary institutions that could supply government with "the knowledge 
and counsel it needs to draw up its policies in economic, commercial, 
financial and industrial questions." (75) The stipulation for professional 
representation on the consultative, executive and arbitration committees 
in the reorganised markets could also be seen in this perspective.
The mainspring of the rationalising impulse stemmed from the 
vitality of the central executive machinery responsible for promoting 
the business sectors of the economy. The Department of Trade and Industry,
(71) STS (editorial) November, 1934.
(72) See Memorandum by Ministry of Mcfaref of 25.11.1931 and Decree Law
of 2.3.1932. Cf. Six-point programme for coordinating a practical system 
of education suggested in TLTS pp. 111-112.
(73) Ibid. p. 26.
(74) The decree was promulgated on 3rd August 1933. Successive decrees
founding Chambers in Cairo, Port Said and Fayoum followed towards the end 
of the year. See Decree Laws Nos. 81, 82 and 97 for 1933.
(75) For Memorandum accompanying Bill of Chamber of Commerce submitted
by Sidqi to .the Council of Ministers on 21.1.1932. See STS February, 1933.
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founded in early 1920 as a direct result of the recommendations of the 
1916 Commission5 was now further consolidated. Already by early 1930, 
it had undergone a wide measure of reorganisation, which led to the intro­
duction of new sections, more than doubled its credits and increased its 
staff. (76) In February, 1931, a Director General was appointed to 
preside over it. Its growing stature was reflected in its mouthpiece, 
which changed from a quarterly to a monthly issue, marking the "inaugur­
ation of a new era in the economic revival of the country’1. (77) Despite 
the general drive for economy throughout the government departments, a 
supplementary credit in the 19 32-1933 budget for a model tannery was 
justified by the eventually remunerative nature of the nascent projects 
which could hardly be counted as liabilities on the budget. (78) The 
section of agricultural industries was effectively developed to the 
advantage of the Balance of Trade while the system of model industries 
was activated. Apart from the tannery, a dyeing factory, a carpet factory, 
and an experimental mechanised textile station, created during 1931 and 
1932, set the pace in this direction. Sidqi explained its purpose:-
"The aim of the Ministry of Finance is to erect model factories 
for instruction and guidance because it is up to individuals and 
(private) companies to found the original industries. By setting 
up its teinturerie... and glass factory... the Government wishes 
to encourage capitalists to establish Industries of this nature.
It is not for the Government to take risks and subscribe in spheres 
not properly its own... Yet, it does not hesitate to extend a hand 
wherever new Industries it conceives to be viable and beneficial 
need it... it can extend direct support to industry without 
actually supplanting it." (79)
(76) An attempt was undertaken in 1929 to revive the Department on the 
lines of the 1917 recommendations. New sections launched included agricult­
ural industries, industrial research, labour affairs, and chambers of 
commerce. Credits rose fromj^35,000 to^90,000. Ahram (supplement) 28.2.1931.
(77) STS May 1930. An improvement in quality of research and a growth in 
scope of readership is noted between 1930-1934. The organ, originally 
appearing in 249 pages, rose from 1761 pages in 1931 to 1950 pages and 2167 
pages in 1932 and 1933 respectively. Italy and Japan provided the main models 
for study in its leaders during the period and to a lesser extent Russia, 
Turkey and Iran.
(78) See NCMPB (1933-34) p. 8 . Copy encl.in F0 371/17012. Cf. Report of 
Finance Committee on the supplementary credit. MMN 2.1.1933. The drop In 
leather imports suggests more than^the obvious decline in the volume of 
trade. See study on "Commerce Exterieure et Production Locale" in EI_ (no.14) 
November, 1933. Similar studies follow for 1934 & 1935.
(79) MMN 2.1.1933.
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With the growing activity and importance of the Department under the Regime , 
interest in its organisation and role grew and the restrictions of its pur-' 
pose to guidance, instruction and encouragement tended to be questioned.(8 0)
Its transformation into a Ministry in 1934- was inevitable; it did not occur 
earlier only on account of the budgetary situation.
The rationalising trend seemed imminent in view of the methodical 
and systemic orientation under the Regime to current problems, the intensity 
of these problems and, above all, the policy objectives of the Regime. 
Statesmanship committed the government to provide the legislative, admin­
istrative, fiscal and general economic framework that ensured the pace and 
direction of economic activity. It was no more tolerant of anarchy in the 
national economy than it was towards political anarchy. The reinstatement" 
of its authority in the field of production and exchange secured for the 
economic environment those elements of stability and continuity that were 
as essential for institutionalisation in the economy as they were in the 
polity.
Protectionism
The provisional measures taken towards the sugar and textile industries 
were integral to a strategy of stimulating local production, in the same way 
as the wheat policy was more than an expensive innovation or improvisation.
In April, 1930, the ’Filature National’ launched an appeal to impress upon the 
authorities the urgency of its plight. (81) The Misr textiles complex at 
Mehalla el Kobra was only just being born in the same unpromising circumstances 
that threatened its older rival. (82) Yet here was an industry which early
(80) Ibid. 18.5.1933. The dissenting view here was led by two Sha^bists, 
Amin ^ Amer and Abdel Aziz Nazmy.
(81) See h’El, (No. 5) 1930. Compare Annual Report for 1930 with counter­
part in 1935 where net profit for company was over 58,000 and modernisation 
of plant is recorded. By the end of 1934- an agreement with Misr Spinning Co. 
saw emerge a joint bureau for marketing textiles. SeeMGTQ (No.1) January 1936 
for 1934- Annual Report. For a concise history of textile industry in Egypt 
see article in L’El (No.2) February, 1930.
(82) The Misr Textile Company was officially inaugurated at Mehalla on
21st April, 19 31. One week later reports were leaked of the government examining 
a project to encourage and protect textile industry. Sha^b 29.4-.1931. See 
also Ch. 1 for Sidqi!s connections with the Filature Nationals, p. 47
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investigation had established as one in which Egypt enjoyed a relative 
advantage and which was, accordingly, singled out for encouraging as 
potentially viable. (83) In May 1931, negotiations with the two Companies 
terminated in a contract by which the Government promised to sell them a 
total of 350,000 kentars of raw cotton, over a period of three years, on 
favourable terms, on condition they continued to purchase the usual quota 
off the market. A subsidy of 200 mms. per kentar cotton used in their 
factories was also promised them, until their net profit attained the margin 
of 5 per cent of paid capital (the subvention was later reduced to 150 mms.). 
Expansion was the objective of the agreement and, apart from providing for 
favourable conditions, such growth was explicitly ensured by obliging the 
Companies to utilise the quantities made available to them to the full, and. 
to modernise their equipment within a prescribed period. (84)
The Agreement provided the Government with a productive means of 
disposing of its heavy stocks, secured an embarrassed market a convenient 
outlet, partly relieved a stricken class of agriculturalists and, above all, 
ensured a threatened nascent industry a steady supply of its raw material 
on terms it would not have normally obtained.
That the purpose of the Agreement was not simply to give a boost to 
the textile industry but to benefit the national economy by ensuring its 
expansion, is perhaps more readily appreciated by a look at another aspect 
of the controversial agreement with the Sucreries. (85) The area under cane 
cultivation in Upper Egypt was 50,000 feddans and, by virtue of the Agreement 
and the subsequent ban on sugar imports, it was expected to rise eventually ^ 
by a further 15,000 feddans. (86) One of the first undertakings of the Sugar 
Company was to provide for the total supply of the local market and to 
modernise its equipment, so as to allow for the proportionate expansion of
(83) TLTS, pp. 90 ff.
(84) Decree Law of 27.5.1931. See accompanying memorandum presented to the 
Council of Ministers on 5.5.1931.
(85) See above, p. *2-0^
(86) See Memorandum presented to the Council of Ministers on 7.2.1931. 
Despite fall in local consumption during 1932-33, exports kept the area 
under cultivation undimLrished. Revue dTEgypte Economique et Financier,
29.10.1933.
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of sugar cane cultivation. (87) The general emphasis on growth was common to 
the Agreement with both industries 3 but the terms of securing the common 
objective varied. First9 the sugar industry was an old, established one and 
could reasonably be expected to, at least, satisfy local demand in a manner 
neither expected nor demanded of a new-born one. In further promoting it, 
the Government had at stake the interests of sugar cane cultivation, as well 
as the principle of diversification. Moreover, the crop was an Important 
source of revenue that benefited the Treasury as well as manufacturers and 
cultivators. These considerations were reflected in the prohibitive tariff 
on sugar imports which contrasted with its moderate counterpart imposed on 
textiles. (88)
Despite its marked moderation, the tariff policy under the Regime . 
was sufficiently effective due to its flexibility. Duties on imports ranged 
between 12 per cent and 25 per cent and they were constantly subject to revision 
to cope with the fluctuations in world prices.(89) An example of this flex­
ibility is provided in each of wheat and fruit tariff policies. The first was 
eventually put on a sliding-scale by which it automatically changed, in 
inverse proportion, to prevailing world prices, while the tariff on imported 
fruit was put on a seasonal basis to reconcile the Interests of local citrus 
production with Levantine imports. (90) The promotion of the cultivation of 
both was part of the drive to diversify, but the relative position of each In
(87) For rise in production and modernised installations effected In 
1931 and 1932, see account in the "Compte Rendu" of the Socifete General des 
Sucreries presented to its General Assembly on 27.2.1933, extract in L 1 El 
(No. 8) 1933.
(88) Sugar was the first to benefit from the tariff modifications in July, 
1930 (Decree Law 24.7.1930). It was put on a specific basis instead of ad 
valorem. In May, 1932, a sharper rise from £E 9 to £E 12 was introduced to 
render the regie effective.
(89) A series of important Acts modifying the tariffs since the revised 
customs regime came into force in February 1930 (Law No. 2), included those 
issued on 24.7.1930, 20.12.1930, 16.2.1931, 31.2.1932, 13.9.1932 and 29.4.1933. 
A concise study of the significant changes introduced to the tariff policy 
under the Regime is found in STS October, 1933.
(90) Representations from Levantine interests hit by the fruit tariff were 
made repeatedly, especially during Sidqi's winter visit to the Levant. His 
reaction was typical of the motto, 'interest above sentiment’, as he reminded 
Egypt's brotherly neighbours.that interest was the basis of their relationship. 
Sha*'b, 14.2.1932 and 11. 3.1932.
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the economy, here again, conditioned the difference in the tariff policy 
maintained towards it. Although the duties on fruits were decisive in 
promoting the emergent fruit cultivation, they were not intended to bar the 
local fruit market to imports. (91) In contrast, as a result of the. tariff, 
on wheat and floury imports in both items witnessed a spectacular decline 
between.1930- and 1933, falling from 30,021 tons to 185 tons in the one and 
from 80,855 tons to 2,993 tons in the other. (92) Like sugar, wheat was an 
established winter crop, and its promotion effectively benefited agriculture, 
relieved a portion of afflicted landowners by securing them a reasonably 
remunerative crop and improved the Balance of Trade.
The tariff barrier was part of a general policy which included extending 
credit facilities, providing export incentives and rationalising the crop 
exchange. The consolidation of the milling industry and the formation of the 
Chamber of Millers in 1935 was among the direct results of the current wheat 
policy. (93) At the same time, the integrated effort in stimulating the 
cultivation of fruit was seen in the distribution of select breeds in the 
Delta and Western Desert, the engagement of a Spanish packaging expert in 
the Department of Trade to train Egyptians in the skills for export, the 
regulation of the fruit and vegetable market and the formation of a Fruit 
and Vegetable Company in which the Government was a founding partner. (94)
The protective measures were happily more than isolated Incursions or 
palliatives to relieve the immediate distress. They were integral to the 
strategic offensive under the Regime to institute the principle of diversif­
ication and to promote local production.
(91) The area under fruit cultivation rose from 11,286 feddans in 1929-1930 
to 33,000 feddans In 1932-1933. Govt, measures stimulated trend for divers­
ification among landowners. See article by Dr. Hussein Rifai, "Egyptian Dried 
and Preserved Vegetables", in STS, October, 1933 pp. 1589-1608. Compare with 
another article by Jan Schatz, "Most important Agricultural Crops..." where 
different figures are given. Ibid., p. 211. Government assumed greater 
share in marketing production. See STS November 1932, pp. 1729-1732. For rise 
In fruit exports between 1930-1935 see MGTQ (No. 6 ), 1936.
(92) See tables in "Commerce Exterieur et Production Locale, 1933-1934" -
El (No.14) Nov. . 1934.
(93) An account of the milling industry In Egypt Is given in EI_ (No. 10)
May, 19 36.
(94) The Company was formed on 25th August 1932 with a capital of IE 10,000 - 
£E 15,000 effectively aided by the government. First news of project appeared
in STS (Econ. bulletin) June, 1931. The Department of Trade undertook to study 
external markets and propaganda and set up the first fruit and vegetable 
marketing station at Benha. See Econ. Bulletin, Ibid. , October, 1932.
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Relief Policies.
The summer’ of 1931 witnessed in Egypt the worsening conditions 
resulting from the Depression as cotton prices dropped by over 43 per cent 
since 1929 compared to the average fall of 26.9 per cent in other primary 
products. It was at about this time, too, that the new Constitution came 
into effect.as Parliament convoked. With insurrection contained, and the 
disruption of elections over, an era of comparative stability was begun 
and statesmanship could be devoted to handling the deteriorating economy.
Sidqi summed up the situation firmly to his advantage
"The Government considers that enough time has been spent in 
partisan wrangling (al-tattahun al-hizbi) and It is now determined 
to consecrate its efforts to the affairs of the nation which has 
given it Its confidence."(95)
A series of relief measures was inaugurated with the promulgation of a decree
on 12th August, 1931, by which payment of Government agricultural loans and
advances on seeds and fertilisers amounting to £E 2,000,000 due that year
were postponed. The debt was divided in installments payable over a five
year period, interest free. This was followed by the expeditious launching
of operations of the new Credit Agricole in time for the October 1931 cotton
harvest. Supplemented by Government funds, it intervened on behalf of debtors
to stay the course of foreclosures.(96) By the end of 1931 it had intervened
in 874 cases pending before the Courts and spared 34,426 feddans the fate that
attended them. Before the year was out, the Government concluded another
Agreement with the Land Company (al-sharika al~^iqariya) in November, to take
on from where the Credit Agricole’s role proscribed it to act.(97) It stepped
(95) Ahram, 20.9.1931.
(96) This was an additional role the Bank undertook, on top of its original 
functions, and a further credit of £E 1,000,000 was advanced to it for the 
purpose. See correspondence between Sidqi and M. Shukri of 13,8.1931 and
16.8.1931 in STS, August 1931 (Documents). For objectives and terms see MMN
7.7.1931 (Annex).. For critical assessment, see debate on supplementary credit 
in February, 1933. MMN, 21.2.1933 (S Annex.) Cf. note 56 above.
(97) By the end of 1932, the Land Company (presided over by Taleat Harb) 
had bought 8,320 feddans for £E 551,580 and by the end of the following, exercise 
it bought a further 17,780 feddans for £E 1,228,000. See Minister of Finance 
statement on the operations of the Company. MMN, 26.6.1934. The debate on 
the supplementary credit of £E 1,000,000 provisionally given to the Company at 
the beginning of its operations was the occasion for vehement criticism of 
the terms of the Agreement. See MMN, 19.4.1933 and references in interpellation 
debate of 5.6.1933.
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in to buy land upon which foreclosure could not be halted and to temporarily 
administer it on behalf of the Government in anticipation of its eventual 
recovery by its original owners (see below). Another gap in the credit 
structure was filled by instituting a land mortgage bank to provide long 
term credit for the same class of small and medium holders (essentially 
10-150 feddans) for whom the Credit AgricoleTs short-term credit services 
were originally intended. A gesture of solidarity with the stricken 
class of large landowners remained to be taken. Although relatively few, 
the severity of their plight and the fact that a majority of Deputies were 
among them and that, generally, they possessed some education, made them 
vocal. They were also the clients of established mortgage and credit 
foreign institutions whose own base was now equally threatened by the 
crisis. .
During 1932, statesmanship was devoted to exploring avenues for 
balancing conflicting menaced interests, and the preliminary result appeared 
in the package deal concluded with the three major mortgage and credit
y . t ^institutions, The Credit Foncier Egyptien, the Credit Hypothecaire and the 
Land Bank. (98) Its substance was to consolidate the outstanding debts into 
a new loan and to extend payment over a period of 30-35 years (instead of the 
average 16 years), while a limited amortisation was made of the interests 
due from 8 per cent and 9 per cent to 7 and 6.5 per cent. The Banks abandoned 
their claims for 1932 and, in return, the Government Issued Treasury Bonds 
to the value of 3.5 million pounds to pay out 2/3 of outstanding debts to 
the Banks.(99) It substituted itself, thereby, as creditor in place of the 
foreign institutions.
Emphasis on the economic aspect, generally, characterised the measures 
taken to relieve landowners. The stimulation of alternative crops to cotton 
supplemented private revenue, enabled landowners to meet their pending 
obligations and helped to restore a modicum of vitality to the slump-ridden
(98) For terms and history see NCMPB (1933-1934) pp. 16-19.
(99) The issue , of ten-year M-5% interest Treasury bonds to the value of
£E million, closed in February, 1933 - thrice over-subscribed. The 
Government favoured small investors (£E 100 - £E 500) among individual 
applicants, the majority of whom were Egyptians. Campbell to Simon, 
7.3.1933 in F0 371/17012.
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economy.(100) Export bounties, drawbacks on imports, subsidies to local 
produce, the extension of the service of the new Agricultural Bank to 
different crops and sectors of the agricultural population, were all among 
the measures taken to counter-check the deflatory trend, prop up prices 
and above all to maintain threatened land values.(1 0 1)
Land was the basis of national wealth and about 10 per cent of it 
was mortgaged to foreign lending institutions.(102) In the face of default­
ing debtors, seizures advanced progressively and, however reluctant creditors 
were in effecting foreclosures, they would not forego their rights. Credit 
operations had almost come to a standstill owing to their equal unwillingness 
to commit funds in uncertain circumstances. Meanwhile, the ability of land­
owners to meet their obligations was rendered physically impossible as in many 
cases they were reported to be living off their capital.(103) With the 
meagre liquid reserves, there was little room for. effective government 
manoeuvre on the wide scale needed. The purpose of the initial sum of one 
million pounds, put at the disposal of the Credit Agricole in its supplementary 
relief role, was mainly to enable intervention on behalf of landowners so as 
to effect a compromise solution with creditors, or to pay a portion of the
(100) For bird’s eye view of deflatory cycle see Annual Reports for 1931 and 
1932 in F0 371/16124/17015, also NCMPB (1931-1932) p .7.
F o r  limited but instructive survey, see Introduction in RECE (July, 1931).
The Financial Adviser, who held different views, qualified Sidqi*s approach 
as-more that of a psychologist. See Note by H,Jones on 7.8.1932. F0 371/1611M-
(101) A surplus of the bean crop, for example, exported at a cost of
£E 14-,000 brought in £E 250,000 in return and was quoted to typify the idea 
of economic expenditure under the Regime. See explanatory note accompanying 
1932-1933 budget.
Upper Egyptian interests warmly supported the supplementary credit. See MMN
2.5.1933.
(102) See Abdel Wahab’s lecture in Victoria College on "The Economic Situation 
in Egypt" on 10th June, 1931 - i.e. out of an estimated total value of
£E 500/600,000,000 about £E 35,000,000 was mortgaged.
(103) E.g. the Abu Husseins of Menufia, whose land, in one of the most fertile 
provinces, barely gave a crop yield of £E 9,000 while their amiri (government) 
commitments alone stood at £E 12,000. See interpellation debate, MMN, 
5.6.1922. See also RECE (July 1933), p.9.
217
interest due. The key to relief Hay in providing debtors with the means 
by which they could help themselves. Where, however, no payment was 
possible and foreclosures were inevitable, the land was sold at ludicrous 
prices., It was here that the Agreement with the Land Company was instrumental 
in upholding the value of distrained land. (104-) Its intervention in the 
market raised the value of land on forced sale even where it did not purchase 
it directly.
There were other dimensions to the economic perspective in the relief 
measures. The Agreements with the Credit institutions were less notable for 
their immediate effect on the debtors than for the endeavour they embodied 
to narrow the margin between the value at which the land was bought in the 
years of boom and their real values. At the same time, the payment of 2/3 
of the outstanding arrears to the Banks, which came in fact as a generous boon 
to the embarrassed institutions, was regarded by its critics as an exorbitant 
price paid by the Government. Although the charge was not unjustified, the 
gesture could have been calculated. The injection of the unexpected sum into a 
strategic institution in the economy and its availability for circulation 
was part of Sidqi's strategy to bolster value. While the three interested 
institutions were foreign, their location and the scope of their operations 
rendered them a part of the fiscal structure of the national economy and 
their collapse could only further undermine the latter. Similarly, their 
foreclosure on land which they were not equipped to administer and whose 
disposal they were ready to effect, regardless of the price paid, was no more 
likely to benefit the economy. Furthermore, the Depression had hit morale 
together with material stability, and the Banks abstained from their operations 
to the detriment of their clients. The Agreements were a means of rehabili­
tating lost confidence in the financial establishments, inspiring hope in 
destitute landowners and restoring an element of vitality to a deflated economy. 
The psycho-economist went hand in hand with the nationalist as the implications 
of replacing foreign creditors in a national debt can hardly be overlooked.
The economic axis of the relief measures was a source of public 
grievance in another respect. The mortgage institutions which the government 
launched with public money and provided with administrative facilities to
(1Q4-) According to official statistics provided by the finance committee, 
9,387 feddans on sale for £E 44-5,4-50 (average £E 4-7.4-4-9 per feddan) landed 
on the Company for £E 679,330 (i.e. £E 72,362 per feddan). See MMN, 19.4-. 1933.
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meet the long-term needs of small and medium owners was bitterly criticised 
in the Chamber for its interest rates. In view of its purpose, its clientele, 
and its origins, the 7~8 per .cent rate it charged seemed exorbitant. Yet 
Sidqi defended his point, maintaining that foundations had to be solid and 
flexible in order to enable the emergent institutions to withstand competi­
tion in a commercial setting. The Government was unwilling to expose a 
pioneer experiment in national banking to set-backs; in time, when the bank 
had established itself, high rates could be reduced.(105) Characteristically, 
he had his eyes on the future. This detachment and apparent indifference to 
the social plight simply confirmed the frequent theme of ’interest above 
sentiment’ which was not a popular expedient in the circumstances.
There were other considerations which prompted the relief measures 
and conditioned the form they assumed. The preservation of landownership' 
was among the fundamental objectives of statesmanship. Sidqi saw the back­
bone of Egyptian society in that strata of middle-landowners who were badly .
hit by the c r i s i s . O w n e r s  of less than 30 feddans amounted to 99 per cent
107and they owned about 5k per cent of the total land. Never quite secure
in the absence of adequate institutions in the country-side to meet their
108needs, they often became the victims of moneylenders. It was this.. .
class which the Credit Agricole came to support. The record of its actual 
dealings tended to favour smallholders of 10 feddans or less.^^ The Credit
(105) See the debate on the Credit Hypothecaire in.the Chamber, Ibid, 22.5.1933
(106) The Consular Reports enclosed in 2nd June, 1932 despatch FQ 371/16114 
refer to the stringency among ’’middle and small landowners” ; ’’middle class 
farmers (50-150 feddans)", "proprietors of middle and large estates". Else­
where it is the large landowners who are reportedly the worst afflicted,
(see Annual Report for 1932 Fp 371/17015) and the least able to meet their 
commitments. See Report in assessing ’the worst hit elements' probably 
underlines the central assumption, namely, that it was a general affliction 
which hit the rural social classes on the whole.
(107) See Sidqi’s memoranda on the Credit Hypothecaire on 15.11.1931 and
16.3.1932. Again in Parliament, he defended the retention of the IE 50 tax 
ceiling to limit the scope of the bank's operations to smallholdings. MMN
22.6.1932.
(108) See Vivian Cornelius's Report on "Usury and Moneylending" of 22nd July 
1931 (file 2414) in FQ 371/15429. The Credit Agricole and the Credit Hypo­
thecaire were explicitly launched to combat the practice as the explanatory 
memos in both point out.
(109) See Report on Bank activity in STS, May 1932. This comes out more 
clearly in later reports. The -first address of the Director to the General 
Assembly on 30.4.1934 stressed this point.
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Agricole was also originally conceived as a nucleus for a Bank of Coopera­
tives , (see art. 5 of its Statute). The development of the cooperative 
movement, which was necessary for strengthening die middle classes in the 
rural areas, had already set in with the 1927 legislation on cooperatives 
and now it was further promoted.(1 1 0) But large landowners equally had 
their claims on the attention of the Government. A margin of one fifth of 
the resources of the Agricultural Bank was duly retained for them. More­
over, the instructions in the correspondence exchanged in August 1931, 
between Sidqi and its Director, Mahmud Shukri, stipulated the need to stay 
the course of forced sales on their individual merit, while Sidqi inter­
vened personally on behalf of non-partisans and even opponents. The ges­
ture was not entirely disinterested.. .He realised that responsiveness on 
the part of the Government was necessary to secure the social fabric in 
the provinces and to maintain political stability.
The Agreement with the Land Company aptly illustrates the desire 
to reconcile social and political stability with nationalist objectives.(Ill) 
The menace to the social structure was confounded by a threat of political
dimensions as the issue of forced sales was reportedly being bought by a
company of foreigners who had specifically organised for the purpose.(1 1 2) an(
The sum advanced by the Government to the Land Company to buy up mortgaged land
(110) Between 1929-1930 the number of cooperatives more than doubled. Members 
increased from 22,336 to 48,317 and the number of societies rose from 217 to 
514. See study by Jan Schatz on the development of the cooperative movement 
in Egypt between 1925 and 1931 in STS January, 1933. The encouragement of the 
trend was a primary objective of government agricultural policy,
MMN 7.7.1931 and Menzalawi on government measures, ibid. , 16.5.1934.
(111) These terms are explicitly laid out in the memorandum prepared by Sidqi 
on 25.11.1931. The nationalist purpose was spelled out in the Chamber by 
Menzalawi- speaking for the government. MMN, 5.6.1933. The Agreement was 
inspired by the Turkish law prohibiting foreign land ownership, with the 
difference emphasised as in Egypt, the purpose was to fight speculators and 
induce banks to hold their hands. Sha*b 19.11.1931 - Turkish law was a source 
of active inspiration for other nationalist propositions. See, e.g. Abdel Aziz 
Nazmy's references to Company Law, MMN 12,3.1934.
(112) This seems to have been first authoritatively reported in the report 
presented by the economic parliamentary committee to Sidqi on 7.9.1931. See 
also references in the Chamber, MMN 19.4.1933
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administer it temporarily was the solution. The terms on which the land 
was to be resold throw light on the political criteria of the Regime. The 
immediate concern was to retain property in the hands of its original owners. 
Where this was impossible in the course of the five year period set for 
recovery, priority was given to his relatives, to members of his locality 
and, ultimately, to his compatriots. The consolidation of the sovereign 
base of the economy was thus as important, under the Regime, as the preser­
vation of the social structure and of political stability.
The conception of the nature and the limits of government responsibi­
lity equally influenced the form and extent of relief policies. While the 
principle of moratorium on government loans and an interest free repayment 
in installments was stipulated in 1931, the Government further accepted the- 
installments due, in kind, (barley) in the following year. In doing so, 
it resorted to a practice not seen for the previous fifty years. Beyond 
that, however, it possessed neither the means nor, more significantly, the 
will to relieve debtors of their responsibility. Effective relief, it 
emphasised, was being extended to those who showed an active disposition to 
meet a part of their commitments. Meanwhile, it preached the work ethic, 
the virtues of frugality and a return to the land, and it provided landowners 
with the means to rehabilitate their situation. At the same time, the 
limitation of the capital of the Credit Agricole and the restriction of its 
scope and clientele were as much the result of the prevailing stringency 
and the desire to serve those sectors deprived of credit facilities, as 
that of an anxiety not to compete with (or offend) existing Banks. Theirs 
was a legitimate scope of activity and, here as in industry, public inter­
vention was only an ultimate resort to supplement, and not to supplant, 
private resources.(113) The principle of limited responsibility was con­
sistent with the doctrine of partnership, and together they paved the way 
for political institutions and values statesmanship wished to promote.
Protectionism provided a fresh momentum which transformed a period 
of stagnation and despondency into an era where new structures were consolidated 
and nascent trends developed. Industries on the verge of collapse were given
(113) Cf. above p. 209.
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a new lease of life while others were consolidated or begun.(114) The 
improving balance of trade under the Regime reflected more than a gross 
depreciation in the volume of trade as it registered an active substitution
of imports by local production and a rise in certain exports. In 1931-32
the excise duty almost doubled its counterpart in the previous year and by
the end of 1934 it amounted to £E 1,500,000 with the sum collected on local
produce equalling twice that collected on imports.(115) An incipient change 
in the structure of imports similarly pointed in the direction of development, 
with a relative shift occurring to primary material and to intermediate pro­
ducts. This trend persisted beyond the immediate years of crisis as cotton 
revived and the volume of trade grew. Another area, the Bank Misr complex, 
conveys a confident picture of consolidation and augmentation which contrasted 
with the previous decade of faltering moves and uncertainty. A steady rise 
in industrial loans and net profits is registered, while the annual reports 
of its textile companies record an "undreamed of success", with revenue 
unexpectedly exceeding expenditure in the first year of the new cotton 
industry in Mehalla and with the budget of the Flax Company, which benefited 
from drawbacks under the Regime, achieving a surplus, for the first time 
since its formation. At the same time, the Misr Airworks, launched in 19 32 
with a government subvention, set the pace for a pattern of enterprise, 
later confirmed by the Misr Assurance Company in 1934. The pattern was 
one where Egyptian capital and administration participated in a majority 
with foreign capital and expertise, in contrast to the generally 'pure’ 
Egyptian initiatives of the past. It presented a variation on the theme 
of partnership.
The relative success of Bank Misr was only a measure of the dawning 
prosperity of business and industry, of which the greater proportion was
(114) See above p. 210 ff.
The local press teemed with isolated accounts of successful national 
enterprises launched, eg. Ahram, 14.2.1932 & Balagh, 8.11.1932. For 
progress of Bank Misr and its companies see Times (Supplement) 26.1.1937.
(115) STS, October 1932 (p.1568) and July, 1934 respectively. The trend 
continues in 1935. See MGTQ ..,(No.2) 1936. See also Abdel Wahab’s talk on 
"Egypt's Balance of Trade""on 26th May, 1932 in STS. For comment on figures 
for 1932 quoted from the Report of Customs Dept, on Foreign Trade, see STS, 
July, 1933.
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foreign. (116) The Depression brought into sharp contrast the hardship 
of the afflicted majority with the comparative well-being, of the predomin­
antly foreign minority, and the situation was compounded by the active 
policies of the Regime 0 The inequity of the prevailing system of taxation 
heightened as the immediate benefits of these policies accrued to the 
wealthy minority while the burden of direct taxation continued to fall 
on the classes least able to meet it. Conversely, Sidqi was committed 
to rectifying the lopsidedness in the economy at large, and the imbalance 
in its fiscal base commanded priority. It provided the occasion to advance 
another political objective. Even though the burden of these efforts often 
remained behind closed doors, between government departments and the lobbies 
of diplomacy, the persistent encroachment upon existing Capitulatory 
privileges was another landmark of the Sidqi Regime.
Fiscal Legislation
The recovery by Egypt of her sovereignty in matters of tariff 
legislation potentially undermined the existing Capitulations. To counter 
this effect, the new Tariff was introduced as a provisional measure enjoying 
formal British consent and subject to denunciation at any time by a year's 
notice. "If at any time the Egyptians were to introduce objectionable 
modifications in their tariff, HMG could denounce the Convention. By 
agreeing to the new regime provisionally for one year, HMG would be gaining 
time without in any way weakening their capitulatory position". (117)
With its coming into effect, the likelihood of such objectionable proposals 
materialising increased. Sidqi did not disappoint them. For all his tact,
(116) Out of the 21 companies that emerged between January and April 1930, 
only one was Egyptian in capital, formation and administration. The new 
tariff rendered Egypt a fertile ground for investment and increased the need 
for a national industrial bank. This was the theme of a series of lectures 
given by Abdel Halim Nosseir in early 1931. See Ahram, 11.5.1,931. The census 
of the Statistics Depts. on Joint Stock Cos. for 1931 underlines local foreign 
preponderance and comparitive solidarity.of their enterprise. A summary is 
given in Ahram, 27.10.1933. Alternatively, a trend of growing enterprise 
among nationals is seen from the demands of the Department for industrial 
loans. In January-February 1932 out of seven such requests only one was a 
foreigner. STS, March, 1932.
(117) The Minute by the Judicial Adviser on 29.12.1929 dwells on the 
Capitulatory breaches involved. The conditions on which HMG accepted the 
application of the customs tariff are found in F0 despatches of 30.5.1929, 
31.12.1929 & 16.2.1930. See File 13 in FQ 371/1^62R and FQ M-07/210.
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the practical conduct of the Egyptian Government soon gave grounds for 
apprehension, (118) In 19325 the excise laws were passed in Parliament 
authorising the Government to raise duties and modify tariffs at will 
without consulting the Chambers. The Government was vested with these 
exceptional fiscal powers for a period of one year (instead of the three 
it had originally requested) subject to renewal. (119) The nature of the 
excise laws and the manner in which they were promulgated, without consult­
ing the Mixed Courts, aroused British anxiety. (120) While the British played 
for time, Sidqi astutely seized opportunities to raise the issue of the 
fiscal Capitulations.
A preliminary characterisation of his fiscal offensive may be 
summed up in the following points
(1) It was essentially subtle and pervasive..
(2) It was recurrent as it was intimately bound to the
annual preparation of the budget.
(3) It was integrally bound to the policy direction under
the Regime, The expansion and diversification of the 
base of fiscal resources was part of a comprehensive 
drive to consolidate and rationalise the fiscal structure 
of the economyo
(h) It was heightened to coincide with peripheral developments 
which provided the occasion for pressing forth with an 
intrinsic policy objective.
(5) It was conducted with a deceptive complacency and a
deliberate tactfulness wHch blunted its public effect.
The rational approach to fiscal policy and the institutionalisation 
of the distinction between the types of expenditure resulted in an incipient 
tradition of planning. A policy of retrenchment was the negative dimension 
to balancing the budget, but with the execution of a programme of public
(118) Cf.note 130-. By the end of 1932, the Commercial Secretary was drafting 
a statement on the cumulative effect of various changes in the tariff, at the 
request of the Board of Trade. See Residency despatch of 17.12,1932 in
FQ 371/1612M- and Memo enc, in BT despatch to F0 on 25.4.1934.
(119) See MMN, 17.2.1932.
(120) Campbell to Simon, 20,7.1933 and 8.6.1933 in FQ 371/17109.
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works relegated to coming years, growth was intrinsic to the budgetary 
policy and the search for new sources of revenue was inevitable* (1 2 1) 
Contrary to current assumptions, this quest was more bound up to future 
anticipation than to immediate needs. While the pecuniary factor had a 
significant bearing in the circumstances, and while Sidqi himself implied 
it in his conduct progressively, it was not insurmountable, (122) He was 
able, with considerable dexterity, to balance the budget from available 
sources by manipulating the tariff (notably the match and tobacco duties) 
to the extent that, in a difficult year (1932-1933), he effected a surplus 
of over £E 2,000,000, much to his financial credit, but to his more immediate 
social censure, (123) The far-sighted perspective in which the quest for 
new resources was donducted can be more adequately appreciated by a look 
at his priorities in pressing with fiscal legislation,
patente tax provides an apt example of a strategic tax which had 
more in view than its immediate anticipated pecuniary benefit» (124) This 
was a tax of Continental inspiration imposed on the trades, industry and the
(1 2 1) "... it is difficult, even impossible, to reverse our steps ... as this 
will imply a loss of a considerable number of advantages which have become 
indispensable for the progressive onward march of the country ..." Note from 
Sidqi to the Financial Adviser on 7.8.1932 in FQ 371/16115. For Van Zeeland's 
findings, see below.
(122) See adjournment debate in MMN, 11.-7.1932.
See also statements to Reuter (Bourse Egyptienne, 24-.5.1932) and, following the 
Mixed Courts verdict^on 21,1.1933 in the Ahram and the Times. For resurgence 
of tax diplomacy in Residency circles see despatch of 12.1.1933 and enclosures 
in FQ 371/17011.
(123) Revenue was at £E 37,139,881 and expenditure at £E 35,946,856 apart from 
an unused balance of credits for £E 875,307 credited for the following year.
See note on Final Budget for 1932-1933 in FQ 371/17014. "The- result as far as 
the stability of the budget is concerned is satisfactory, but it is hard to • 
justify the extraction from the people in so difficult a year of £E 2,000,000 
more than the government needed to pay its way." The surplus was eventually 
equally split between reinforcing the Reserve and relief measures.
(124) This was a tax inspired by Continental sources and has nothing to do 
with a patent duty.
A copy of the draft law of 22 articles together with the explanatory note 
is enclosed in the 12.1.1933 despatch. It proposes a sliding’ scale tax of 
10% to 25% of the value of the premises and doubles the rates for the companies, 
etc. The professions are taxed on a proportionate base and those for commerce 
and industry are estimated on a progressive scale. A critical, review is found 
in Treasury Note (T.2044/5B/1932) and in F0 despatch of 22.4.1933. See also 
critical note by Financial Adviser of 25.5.1932, furnished on Sidqi's request.
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professions and assessed on the basis of the rental value of the premises.
It was the nearest approach to an income tax practicable in the circumstances 
and Sidqi pressed forth.with it to the exclusion of the other imminent taxes 
projected like the entertainment tax and the stamp duty which stood a greater 
chance of being accepted by the Powers on account of their "minor" scale.(125) 
He persistently solicited British approval and discreetly sounded foreign 
powers for their reaction, basing his argument on equity and reinforcing it 
by the incidence of the Depression. (126) French commercial interests 
outwardly maintained an attitude of demonstrable reasonableness on the 
grounds that, "if the Capitulations are to be maintained they must be elastic 
and that industry and commerce must be willing to pay a fair share of 
taxation". . But when faced with the prospect of its realisation, the draft 
was typically found "inopportune" and "excessive". (127) In contrast, the 
British reaction was ambivalent as It did not wish to stand in the face of 
a reasonable fiscal reform and, at the same.time, It wished to keep the Cap- 
itulatory regme. unimpaired in order to enhance its bargaining power in 
negotiations. Eventually, however, the initial conciliatory disposition and 
the hesitation gave way to a determination to resist the proposals before 
the unfavourable response they evoked from interested British quarters the 
Foreign Office consulted.
Sidqi, however, did not despair. If the rental base was an unfair 
premise for taxing wealth, he readily consented to any alternative the 
British could suggest, provided that "the alternative would achieve a fairer 
distribution of the incidence of taxation aimed at by effecting an adjustment 
of the proportionate burden borne respectively by the owners of real property
(125) The British distinguished between "minor" and "major" taxation on the
basis of the scale and nature of a tax. See FO despatch of 16.12.1931 in
FQ 371/15417. The patente tax was considered to be the "thin end of the 
wedge" that could not be permitted. (FO Minutes in 12.1.1933 op cit.) Cf. 
with FO Minutes 2.1.1932 despatch In FO 371/16113.
(126) See exchanges between Sidqi and F. Watson on 2M-.11.1932 and with 
Loraine on 12.1.1933 (cf .notel22 Jiis conversation of 10th March5ii 1932 with
Loraine should be viewed in context of his later approaches. At the same
time, Abdel Fattah Yahia was authorised to approach foreign powers, (especially 
the American and the French). See also Hafez Afifi in London, FO Minute on
16.6.1932 in FQ 371/16109.
(127) French attitudes/interests in the Caisse de la Dette were also
embarrassingly rigid. See J.A. Gallop to M. Peterson, 19.11.1931 in
FO 371/15411. For views of French Minister see enc. in Residency despatch
of 27.2.1933. FO 371 /17012.
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and the non-landowning classes.” (128) With the principle maintained, the 
revised draft resorted to graduation in taxing the trades by subjecting 
business to a sliding scale of taxation on the basis of their "benefices 
realisables"(art.3). This was met acidly by the British Chamber of Commerce 
who saw in it a discriminatory wedge aimed at European businesses. On 
another stipulation it protested:-
”We consider that it is entirely unjust that Companies should be 
subjected to a higher rate than individuals and we can only
surmise that the object of the provision is to make foreign
capital pay a specially enhanced rate seeing that the majority 
of incorporated societies consist mainly of such capital.” (129)
The urgency of the patente tax derived from its political appeal. Its 
manifest purpose of spreading the fiscal burden to classes hitherto exempt 
from direct taxa'tion rendered it a radical innovation. In the same gesture
it extended the sovereign power of legislation to a sector of the
population claiming, in principle, the privilege of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction. By 1933, the growing tendency of the Egyptian Government 
to override the Capitulatory privilege called for seperate representat­
ions. (130) While the proposed patente continued during 1932 to be the 
subject of Sidqi's private parleys, the impending confrontation was localised 
over another fiscal issue.
The subjection of the growing motor traffic to State regulation and 
control was dictated by the depreciating revenues of its ^conventional rival 
the Egyptian State Railways, and by the new responsibilities which the motor cai 
entailed for the Government. Sidqi presided over a Motor Commission formed
(128) Loraine to Simon, 12.1.1933, FQ 371/17011
(129) See enc. in Residency despatch of 17.3.1933. „ FQ 371/17012. ' .
(130) F0 Minutes on 11,4.1933, ibidi.
"Sidqi is inclined to override the assent of the Powers in an un­
precedented manner". Minutes in 23.1.1932 despatch (file 132)F0 371/16113. 
This was particularly the case In the new tariff where representations 
against modifications were unsuccessful. See file 13 in FQ 371/14626/14627. 
See also Minutes in Residency Archives, "Sidqi and the Capitulations", 
(12.11.1931) and"The Fiscal aspect of the Capitulatory Regime "(3.12.1931)
FQ 1*41/769 (file 443) cf ‘ "The agitation regarding the existing fiscal 
regime is... largely the result of an assidious campaign initiated by Ismail 
Pasha Sidqi", (Sir Bertram Hornsby, 16.5.1929). See above Ch.I- note 80.
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in December 1931 to lay down a fiscal and administrative regime for motor 
vehicles, but its application to foreign subjects involved Capitulatory 
breaches. In the face of repeated representations, the Government agreed 
to suspend the restrictions without, however, abolishing the machinery under 
which they were practised.(131) Convinced of the legality of its case, it 
continued to elaborate Its motor tax legislation.(132) Although Sidqi was 
personally anxious to speed up this legislation, he strove to avoid a head­
long clash with the Residency. The institution of a special commission to 
enquire into the question of motor transport, upon his return from Europe 
in 1932, was an active gesture to placate the tensions which were aggravated 
by the tactlessness of his colleagues during his absence.(133)
The crisis which arose over the payment of the Public Debt coupons 
provided an opportunity to press forth with the tax legislation pending.
With the defection of sterling from the gold standard in September 1931, 
bondholders expected the Egyptian Government to make payments at gold parity 
and, thereby, aroused the deepest instincts of injustice among public and 
official opinion throughout the country.(134) The Government challenged 
an adverse decision by the Mixed Courts and carried the Issue over to the 
diplomatic field in a two-pronged offensive. At one point it sought to 
manoeuvre the Powers into a situation where a unilateral renunciation of 
the Court’s decision appeared justified. Public opinion unanimously backed
(131) Notice on 9.2.1933 suspending application of provisions of Council 
of Ministers’ Decision of 29.2.1932. See protest note to Egyptian Government 
of December, 1932 and reply enc„ in FQ 371/170Q3o (3j
(132) See Residency-despatches of 9.6.1933 and 3.8.1933 and earlier FO
Minute in 4.1.1933, ibid. On Sidqi*s personal concern in getting the
legislation through, see Residency Archives. FO 141/769.
(133) See Campbell to Simon, 8.10,1932 (Confid.)
(134) See correspondence between Sir Edward Cook and Sir F.WC Leith Ross
of 24.2.1933 enc. in FO 371/17011. See also Council of Ministers’ Note 
(prepared by Sidqi in convalescence) setting forth view of government on
13.3.1933. At the same time resolutions were passed by the political parties 
at the beginning of February and by syndical bodies (doctors, officials,) 
refusing payment in gold. See denunciation in Chamber of Deputies, 23.1.1933. 
Bill denouncing Mixed Courts was presented during the session In both Chambers 
(see Annex, in MMN, 6.6.1933) and in MMS, 4.1.1934. "For once in the recent 
history of this country, all Egyptian parties are united on a point of
vital interest to every Egyptian," Loraine to Simon, 18.2.1933 - FQ 371/17012.
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this course. The less popular expedient at which Sidqi hedged was to use 
the issue as a bargaining counter to secure the Government a free hand in 
its fiscal legislations He led the diplomatic initiative himself and sent 
Badawi Pasha, the chief Legal Adviser, to Paris and Rome to follow up the 
case from the "judicial aspect". ‘His statements in public invoked the two 
issues simultaneously, while his private exchanges in Residency circles saw 
this synchronisation increase pressure for passing the patente tax. In 
practice, the budget for 1932-3.933 was drawn up without making provisions 
for the gold payment. (135) The British feared that as a result of the 
procrastination and time-gaining tactics of the Egyptian Government a practical 
infringement would occur. But Sidqi was resolved to. uphold national rights 
without clashing with the Powers. In a Cabinet meeting he reminded his 
colleagues of the priority Egypt placed on its financial reputation and ex­
pressed the substance ;of his preoccupations.
"Egypt will take into due consideration every legitimate contention 
of its creditors, but it asks for no more than that it should not 
be thwarted in its ambition to keep abreast with progress and 
development." (136)
Meanwhile, the provisional Anglo-Egyptian Agreement regulating 
Egyptian currency was due for revision at the end of December 1932. Sidqi 
perceived in it another opportunity to advance his policy objectives. A 
neutral foreign expert, M. van Zeeland (to whom the British somewhat grudgingly 
consented) was invited to advise the Egyptian Government on the most efficient 
method to re-organise its monetary structure. (137) The mission entailed 
comprehensive investigation into the financial situation and its findings 
reinforced the objectives of the Regime. For Egypt to weather through the 
international financial stringency, budgetary equilibrium was maintained to 
be imperative. While economy and a reduction of taxation in real values were 
both recommended to secure the necessary equilibrium, fresh taxation more
(135) This was an instance of the de-facto approach conceived under the 
Regime to by-pass the restrictions of the Capitulations.
(136) MMN, 23.5.1932.
(137) Originally the mission was invited to advise the Government on the 
liability to pay the public debt coupon in gold. Egypt’s charges were 
estimated to increase by 4-0% as a result of the gold payment3 i.e. at least 
£E 2,000,000 was required to pay the debt. See MMS, 24.1.1933.
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evenly distributed was found to be essential.(138) As a sequence to the 
mission, Sidqi headed a committee which Included the Under-Secretary of 
State, Abdel Wahab Pasha, the Governor of the National Bank and the Governor 
of the Bank of England, to study its recommendations. Foremost among these 
was the establishment of a Central Bank of Issue. In the meantime, in June 
1932, the Government Intervened in the gold market and by the end of the year 
it had effected purchases for the value of £E 7,000,000.(139) One of the 
results of this action was to render the Government in a position to sell the 
equivalent value of British Treasury Bonds used as cover for £E banknotes.
In reinforcing the Reserve Fund, the Government had, in the same gesture, 
put the Egyptian pound on a tfiore solid and independent base. Thus the 
foundations of an autonomous ^ monetary base substantiated the efforts under­
way to protect and strengthen a threatened monetary structure.
The balancing principle to which statesmanship adheredin Its economic 
policies was a double-edged weapon which alienated landowners without 
securing an alternative reliable support from others. Sidqir s appeal to 
the business community to be more realistic towards their outdated privileges 
was met with ambivalence. "If the Government secured aid and protection for 
the Industrialists," his argument ran, "it expected from them In return a 
precise understanding of the new necessities of the country". (14-0) In
(138) See Loraine to Oliphant, 13.1.1932 (Private and V. Confid.) in
F0 371/16113. See also despatch of 11.12.1931. in F0 371A54-11 » M. Paul van 
Zeeland, however, was optimistic for "L’Egypte est entre des mains surs et 
energiques," and it was under a statesmanship of prudence and foresight as well 
See interview in La Bourse Egyptienne, 13.2.1932.
(139) See Ministry of Finance, Note on Proposed Budget, 1933-1934-,p.23. The
intervention on the gold market was a measure both to consolidate banknote 
cover and to.control smuggling. See Sidqi1sannouncement of 18.2.1932. This 
followed rumours of vast gold exports at end of 1931,(which particularly 
worried Sidqi at the time as his son, Dr0 Amin, recalls) and the decision 
followed investigations the government launched. See R D Turner’s despatch of
5.2.1932 (enc.) in F0 371/16113. For purchase of French and Belgian securities 
see despatch of 3.2.1933 in FQ 371/17Q110
(14-0) See his address In the annual meeting of the EFI in April, 1938. By
then the Treaty of Montreux had been signed and Egypt could launch Its income 
tax, which Sidqi elaborated in his next term as Minister of Finance, although 
it came into effect under his successor, Ahmad Maher. For ambivalent reactions 
see exo of I. Meyer, Temps corresporrLent protesting at the "grignotement" of 
the Capitulations<, Minute by Oriental Sec. of 10.1.1933 in F0 14-1/769.
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rectifying and reinforcing the national economy, everyone would benefit, 
bondholders included. (14-1) ' To the British, while Sidqi’s budgetary 
husbanding was handsomely acknowledged, his protectionist policies were 
pronounced to be "regrettable". (14-2) Sometimes, as in the case of the 
shipping subsidy, they were viewed with positive alarm. (14-3) Their more 
general effect, however, was to launch the country into an era with a 
distinctly utilitarian fervour.
A shift of diplomacy to the economic plane occured, as the quest for 
economic independence inspired the drive to diversify economic relations 
and, at the same time, encouraged rival European Powers to develop their 
commercial relations with Egypt. The development of Anglo-Egyptian relations, 
themselves, on a more commercial footing, set the pace. (14-4-) The visit of 
the Balfour Trade Mission, in February/March 1931, was followed by the 
formation of an Anglo-Egyptian Finance Corporation* (14-5) Egypt’s relative 
standing in the eyes of the Board of Trade grew, while an interesting pattern 
can be detected as new British interests connected with emerging Egyptian 
enterprises, clashed with vested British interests opposed to developments In 
progress. (146) This trend was precipitated by the growing responsibility which
(141) La Bourse Egyptienne, 24.5.1932.
(142) FO Minutes in Residency despatch of 15.1.1931 - file 162 in FO 371/15417
(143) In reply to Mr, Hoare’s representations, Sidqi told him that "the moral 
advantages" of the Egyptian flag hoisted on the High Seas was worth some
"pecuniary loss". See despatch of 29.1.1931 - ibid. The spectacle of Egypt, a 
maritime state, without a fleet evoked special bitterness. See TLTS, p. 22.
(144) See Lampson to Simon, 7.1.1935 (Confid.) and 17.5.1934 (Confid.); see 
also FO communication to Board of Trade on 28.9.1934 and Cabinet meeting of
25.9.1934, considering inter alia, priority to be given to economic relations
in Anglo-Egyptian diplomacy. By the end of 1934, a Treaty settlement had, for
all practical purposes, "receded Into an indefinite future", (Peterson to 
Simon, 27.10.1934/Secret); while Lampson advanced his theory of" promoting a 
’practical and direct’ community of interests".
(145) For Confidential Report of UK Trade Mission see DOT enc. in 17.4.1931 
despatch in FO 371/15398 and Crowe to Oliphant, 15.8.1931 in FO 371/15399.
The British Financial Consortium was one of these recommendations. See DOT
files 27260 and 25740/1931 in FO 371/15426.
(146) See statement of policy in DOT communication to Commercial Secretary 
on 24.2.1933 (enc.) in FO 371/17020. For conflicting British interests, see 
DOT despatch of 17.1.1931( fil^ ' 162 above)•'17.2.1931 & 14.3.1931 (file 357)- 
See also memorandum by DOT on.31.12.19 32 In F0 371/17003.
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the Government assumed for promoting the economy, and by its active negoti- : ■ 
ations of partnerships and transactions with foreign institutions, as well 
as by the extension of its authority over the economy in general. The govern­
ment was transformed into an interested agent with a vital stake in the evol­
ving economic structure and, in this capacity, it commanded the attention of 
organised and official concerns abroad.(147)
In the more immediate context of the enquiry, the economic policies 
of the Regime, that originally aimed at promoting stability and political 
institutionalisation, produced the reverse effect. Rival business factions 
backed rival political factions and undermined the cohesion of the executive. 
(14-8) On another level of>the political battlefield, business politics pro­
vided. ammunition with which to 'slander opponents and impugn the integrity 
of the Administration.(149) Sidqi!s defence of local production was often 
attributed to meaner motives and turned against him and the Regime together.(150
(147) e.g. the rivalry between Imperial Chemical Industries and a German
firm over the hydro-electric dam at Aswan. See e n c .in 27 0901933 in FO 371/17003 
and Minutes of 27die 1933. In his memo, on the formation of an Anglo-Egyptian 
Finance Corporation, the Commercial Secretary maintains its necessity to offset 
waning British influence in the face of successful Continental efforts.
29.5.1931 (V. Confid.) op cit. ( FO 371/15426)
(148) See Ch. IV. pp. 172,173.
(149) Among the first such Tscandals' was the award of the Aswan Dam contract 
to Topham, Jones and Railton against its rival Ms. Lindsay. See letter^of 
Minister of Public Works in Egyptian Gazette, 2.12.19 30. The cause celebre 
pending before the Courts at the end of 1933 had originated in charges brought 
against the Ministers of Public Works and Agriculture, Fahmy Karim and Menzalawi 
by the Siyasa editors. The latter won the day and the Ministers resigned,,
Apart from the controversy over the Cairo Bus Concession (see file 429 in
FO 371A5123 ) another prominent issue involved the Alex Ramleh Concession (see 
file 546 in FO 371/15423). For business politics see file 254 in FO 141/759.
For Press polemics over scandals and Government contracts, see representative 
samples in press memoranda of November, 1933 and March 1934 in files 11 & 13 
respectively. FO 371/17003 /I7982.
(150) His previous connections with the Komombo Sugar Complex and with 
Egyptian cement concerns, drew the attention of his critics to his personal 
stake in their advance, e.g. he was rumoured to have lined his pocket with
£E 100,000 from the deal with the Sucreries. See Grafftey-Smith's diary on a 
tour to Upper Egypt, 2.4.1931., in F0 371/15404. The classic example is 
perhaps the Alex. Corniche Scandal, which was the subject of vicious political 
warfare in the Press and in Parliament in 1934, (esp. April and May),, See MMN
26.4.1934, 1.5.1934 and 21.5.1934. Sidqi took al-Jihad to court for libel in 
early April. Also see Abram, 25.5.1934. See conversation with Heathcote- 
Smith, enc. in Residency despatch of 28.4.1934 in F0 371/17977.
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One of the foremost obstacles to institutionalising emergent interests 
within existing political structures lay in the intrinsic weaknesses of 
these interests. Local business circles exploited nationalist and personal 
themes as they vied with each other to advance their private concerns.
An impaired corporative ethic impeded their social cohesion and reflected 
adversely on the course of political institutionalisation. Above all, 
the predominance of the foreign element introduced'.an external factor 
to the situation which undermined both the national economy and the 
parliamentary regime. The autonomous social and economic base which 
parliamentary institutions assume was absent in the Egyptian setting.
Local business interests could hardly emerge as a solid bloc to promote 
their cause through Parliament. The Capitulations, complicated the issue 
as they emphasised the nationalist question and weakened the case for 
any partnership between Egyptians and foreigners. (151) Moreover, 
compelled through necessity and a combination of realism and self-interest 
to associate with their foreign counterparts, Egyptians developed ambi­
guous attitudes to their own position which left them politically weak 
and on the defensive. Conversely, in seeking to promote the national 
economy, statesmanship was incriminated in dubious pursuits and received 
for its endeavours censure instead of commendation. To the extent that 
protectionism profited local industry , it incurred Sidqi the wrath of 
the nationalist movement and of the afflicted landowners whose social 
grievances were duly translated Into political issues.
The connection between the economic policies of the Regime and its 
political objectives was, ultimately, confirmed. National sovereignty 
on one plane, was inextricably bound up with Egyptian claims in the:‘.Sudan 
and the political aspect of certain policy pursuits, like the Gebel Aulia
(151) See above, p.203.
The eventual resolution of the Capitulations strengthened the case for the 
doctrine of partnership. See SidqiTs speech on "La politique industrielle 
d'apres guerre de L'Egypte" at the Royal Club of Commerce on 12.4.1945.
The imperative of collaboration which he spelled out on this occasion, was 
summed up in another talk given a few days later at the Rotary Club, in 
Alexandria, thus:- .1 Tintensification de cette collaboration
harmonieuse, appuyee sur la science et la technique qui sont le bien commun 
de l'humanite..
project, can hardly be overlooked. On another plane, the consolidation 
of the national economy was generally devised to promote political 
independence. The particular steps taken to enhance the national infra­
structure and to advance social and fiscal legislation constituted the 
brickwork in the edifice of Independence.
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CONCLUSION
Sidqi*s foremost concern was to lay foundations for compatible 
political, economic and social institutions in order to strengthen the 
basis of a sovereign and independent Egypt. His awareness that such a 
task was complex and indivisible conditioned his approach and endowed it 
with an element of realism. Thus, while he saw how closely related the 
internal and external aspects of Egyptian sovereignty were, he realised 
that the consolidation of this sovereignty was essentially an internal 
question. To him independence was only the beginning of a long hard road; 
its measure lay in Egypt’s ability to live up to its aspirations. The 
consolidation of the national economy, finances and administration, and 
the creation of effective representative institutions which could plan, 
direct and protect national interests constituted the substance of this 
measure. This institutional urge on Sidqi*s part reflected his quest for 
a symmetrical type of growth and reinforced his basic conviction that 
progress implied a steady and orderly process of evolution.
There was more to Sidqi*s statesmanship however, than a mature sense
of awareness of political realities. He was, above all, a man of action
as well as of practical common sense. He realised that a problem was not
resolved by suppressing it and that its solution lay in the search for
alternatives. The choice between alternatives in itself was governed by
other considerations. In his words,
’* The difficulty does- not lie in the choice of remedies, 
but in reconciling the various means with their side-effects.
In treating one problem we do not wish to land ourselves in 
another. '*
The abrogation of one constitution was thus accompanied by the promulgation 
of another, the suppression of the Wafd was attended by the creation of 
the Sha*b and the encouragement of other associations; the denigration of 
one system of values and beliefs was parralleled by the propagation of an 
alternative system. He had no illusions about the nature of the task!‘he 
assumed. In order1 to build he had to destroy, to ensure healthy growth he 
had to rectify and, to cure the disease, he had to go to its roots. His real 
challenge did not lie in his ability to suppress existing structures and 
impose, new one, but, rather, ;in the init-iative he took
* Address to an audience of Deputies and Senators on 2nd November,1932.
i
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to consolidate the alternatives he had to offer. One aspect of this 
initiative was his bid for public consent and his attempt to cultivate a 
reinforcing ethos of reform and action, reason and moderation. Another 
aspect lay in the economic policies he launched and In the measures he took 
with a view to developing and strengthening the middle classes in Egyptian 
society. Throughout, Sidqi realised that institutions were more than formal 
structures and that their growth demanded both a suitable climate of opinion 
and a conducive social and economic base. It was this dual thrust which 
underlay and Influenced his architectonic statesmanship.
In his search for a solution to the political impasse of the ’twenties 
Sidqi turned towards the economy. Perceiving the connection between the 
economic, social and political structures in society, he sought a remedy 
to the excesses which constrained parliamentary life In rectifying the 
economy and stimulating a measure of social differentiation. In his view, 
the predominantly monolithic social structure of agricultural Egypt encour­
aged the perpetuation of an autocratic form of government, whereas plural­
ism seemed more conducive to a parliamentary system. The practical route 
to a steady pace of political development ultimately lay in promoting the 
economy. Sidqi’s conception of the value of the economic weapon for 
promoting political ends was not new. Originally he had conceived of it-.as 
a means for reinforcing Egypt’s independence; now he resorted to it as 
a device to promote parliamentary institutions as well.
Sidqi's conception of the relationship between political and economic 
problems conditioned his outlook to their solution in other ways. He 
realised that social change required time and that Institutions needed an 
’incubation’ period in which to take root and grow. So he resorted to a 
tutelary device. The formula he adopted here took into consideration this 
need for a transitional period in which parliamentary Institutions could be 
fostered, economic diversification instituted and a measure of industriali­
sation launched. Trusteeship and protectionism each ensured that their 
respective wards were protected from undermining influences in their ’infancy’ 
and were safely nurtured into maturity. To this extent they constituted 
two facets of the same interim policy. In view of his awareness of the 
realities independence entailed, It was perhaps no surprise for Sidqi 
both to have perceived the dynamic inter-relationship between the various 
problems Egypt faced and, to have assumed that a practical affinity 
characterised any approach to their resolution.
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In practice however, Sidqi’s achievements did not measure up to the 
level of his endeavour. In the short term he was able to contain insurrec­
tion, provide a measure of political stability at a critical moment and 
neutralise an immediate threat to the national economy. Altogether, he 
outlived any of his predecessors as Prime Minister and gave Egypt the longest 
period of stable government in the inter-War years and the longest parlia­
ment it had known. Under his government, Egypt enjoyed a relatively wider 
autonomy and saw its economic infra-structure consolidated. His states­
manship was instrumental in both, as in the one it confirmed and strengthen­
ed a provisional stance of British policy and, in the other, it actively 
benefited from the economic depression. Likewise, he demonstrated consider­
able acumen in steering the political institutions which he had launched.
In the long run however, his political regime did not take root and his 
desire to lay those foundations which would continue into the future did ; 
not materialise.
This failure to institutionalise may be attributed to a number of 
factors, some of which lay in the situation itself at that moment, while 
others were of a more general character. Sidqi sought to lay the bases of 
parliamentary government in the middle of a general crisis which militated 
against such an attempt. The growing power of the'Administration under the 
Regime was a corollary both of the repercussions of the- Depression and of 
the conduct of the power struggle. More generally, the concentration of 
power at the time was a function of the political and economic crisis.
Egypt was not alone in this trend- In the international setting, the 
critical situation on the eve of the ’thirties fostered a counter-parlia­
mentary tendency which entailed ’’unparalleled departures” even in England, 
the home of parliamentary government. In Egypt the historical situation 
was complicated by the country’s status as a polity in transition where 
the effectiveness of the executive was necessary in order to cope with the 
immediate difficulties at hand as well as with those inherent in a 
developmental situation. Such conditions rendered it difficult for the 
bid for stability implied in Sidqi’s institutional quest to succeed.
Sidqi’s attempt to adapt the parliamentary form of government to the 
Egyptian setting was ill-timed and clashed with the uncongenial circums­
tances of the day in other ways. Here indeed, Hamlet’s lamentation about 
the time being "out of joint" might echoe Sidqi’s misfortune. He came to
* See for example the debate on the emergency powers granted to the 




institute a middle ground variety of politics the watchwords of which were 
moderation and rationalisms at a time when the ground for it was practically 
eroded. Towards the end of the twenties, Egypt was at the juncture of a 
series of social, economic, cultural and political crises which, together, 
encouraged a drift towards radicalism. By the ’thirties it was question­
able whether an attempt to create institutions could succeed given the weakness 
of its social backbone. The middle classes, never very strong were now 
further demoralised by the Depression. Nor was the cultural climate pro­
pitious, as an incipient crisis in national identity seems to have provoked 
a reversion away from liberal ideals. Among politicians and statesmen, 
the advocates of moderation and rationalism hitherto a supine force, were 
on the wane. The death,, in. 1933, of the leading representative of the 
moderate faction in its quarrel with the Zaghlulists, Adly Pasha,( himself 
an image of that supinity) was symbolic of the end of a generation and of>
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an era. Ironically, the Sidqi Regime precipitated instead the polarisation 
of issues and stances which was already in progress during that period.
The manner of the inception of the political institutions under the 
Regime was possibly a more cogent factor which impeded their consolidation.
The new institutions were born out of the pinnacle of administrative power
and the circumstances in which the Constitution itself was launched consti­
tuted its weakest point. Once again the critical situation seems to have 
brought the coercive dimension to the fore and, in retrospect, it would
seem to have been the height of folly for Sidqi to have attempted to impose
an order which postulated consent. Nor was he blind to such folly. His 
bid for leadership was launched to counteract such an effect and to switch 
the emphasis in his regime from coercion to volition and from imposition 
to consensus. Here, however, he laboured at a disadvantage.
If Sidqi steered the fortunes of the State at a critical moment with 
demonstrable competence, it was indicative of his qualities as a states­
man but not as a leader. Sidqi was a frustrated leader having made a bid 
for public consent and failed. In this bid he had striven to depersonalise 
power and to modify popular conceptions of it in a manner which collided 
with the Egyptian national temperament.. The latter, essentially emotive, 
personal and individualist, rejected an alien quest and Sidqi found himself 
engaged in an uncongenial exercise which further alienated the public from 
him. Where creativity, rationality and temperance had enhanced his




statesmanship, these very qualities undermined his prospects of being 
proclaimed'leader in the'Egyptian setting. At the same time he had neither 
of the virtues of representativeness which would bind people to him in a 
gesture of recognition, nor of that charisma which could command popular 
affections. The result was that the leadership vacuum persisted.
This gulf between Sidqi as a statesman and as a leader undermined his 
architectonic endeavour and defeated his effort to lay foundations for 
durable political institutions. Its origins lay in his formative years; 
the sequel to the non-communicability syndrome was found in its consequences 
for his regime. The 1930 Regime showed how the skills required for state­
craft needed to be complemented by a willing and committed following, 
sufficiently influential and competent to ensure continuity and make 
institution-building possible. Unless statesmanship and leadership are 7 
integrated political engineering falters.
The Sidqi Regime itself epitomises the predicament of the attempt to 
found institutions in the first decades of this century. It came as a 
reaction to the falterings of the preceding decade and, rather than blaming 
it for the failure of the parliamentary experiment in Egypt, it would be 
more apt to view it merely as another episode in this failure. This episode 
however, possessed a particular significance as it isolated more sharply 
some o’f the inherent difficulties for success. The negative implications 
of the protrusion of the Palace, In particular King Fuad, and the rampant 
individualism of Egyptian politicians were both emphasised In discussing 
the trend away from institutions. Other obstacles which emerged from the 
study suggest wider applications, which could be relevant to a colonial 
or a. pseudo-colonial situation.
The Regime demonstrated how the absence of a basic political autonomy 
created a ’leak1 in the political system and deprived It of the necessary 
initiative to maintain Its own momentum. The interchangeability of the 
two principal issues in the ’twenties, the Treaty and the Constitution, 
had given a formalistic turn to Egyptian politics which was aggravated 
under the Sidqi Regime. .Instead of the sovereign and the people consti­
tuting the principal contestants for power in a self-contained setting, 
an alien element with an ambiguous but integral role was introduced into 
it. This destroyed the fundamental premise for the operation of parlia­
mentary politics. To confirm the point still further, no positive action
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was possible nor was any change conceivable to the political players who 
had outmanoeuvred themselves from the legal system, without the effective 
intervention of the Residency to bring it about. Here British neutrality 
merely accentuated objective realities and pointed to the extraneous 
obstacles to founding viable political institutions.
Another such impediment which undermined the parliamentary experiment 
was suggested towards the end of the study. If it is accepted that 
historically the growth of parliamentary government in Europe was partly 
a function of the developing commercial and industrial middle classes 
there, then it would be reasonable to assume, as Sidqi did, that the social 
and .economic structures were equally important considerations in laying 
the foundations of parliamentary government In Egypt. However, here again, 
the presence of a strong foreign enclave which comprised the backbone of 
the business and manufacturing community and was vested with extra-terri­
torial privileges merely complicated the situation. It obstructed the 
development of a cohesive and coherent Egyptian bourgeoisie and fed 
nationalist strains to the disadvantage both of parliamentary politics 
and of the kind of social and economic setting which would support it.
From the outset, these factors converged with the absence of political 
autonomy to undermine the conditions for parliamentary government in Egypt. 
Under Sidqi, the policies and priorities of the Regime brought these 
external obstacles to the fore.
The radicalisation of Egyptian politics to the right was one of the 
characteristic developments of the inter-War years. It would be interest­
ing to assess the Regime In the light of this development and to consider 
In retrospect, its possible implications for It. First, however, a sequel 
to the preliminary classification of regimes suggested in the Introduction 
seems in order. As the enquiry itself has shown, the Sidqi Regime emerged 
as a reaction to its Wafdist predecessor and, to all intents and purposes, 
it constituted its 'antithesis*. If the two currents of the nationalist 
movement in the 'twenties are juxtaposed, the Wafd could be seen to have 
represented the romantics' who were traditionally rooted, and to a certain 
extent, they constituted a variant of the Nationalists ( the Watanist Party) 
The Liberals, on the other hand, represented the rationalists and they
(
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were an extension of the pre-War Umma Party. Seen in this context, the 
Wafdist regime which emerged in January 1930 was the culmination of the 
secular romantics whereas the Sidqi regime which restricted the form of 
liberal institutions in an effort to protect them, was the culmination of 
the rationalist tradition. In this sense both regimes failed.
Meanwhile, at the turn of the 'thirties, there was a resurgence of 
Watanist trends, in which process the Sidqi regime seems to have been 
instrumental. A Shafbist deputy once contended that if Sidqi Pasha's 
sole merit lay in destroying the Wafdist claim to an exclusive monopoly of 
nationalism and in restoring a legitimacy and an equality to other political 
groups and views, then that in itself was a historical mission. In effect, 
the political levelling afforded the Watanists an opportunity to revive ■* 
after the post-War lapse when they had fallen into the background and 
left the field for their counterparts who were more attuned to a secular 
decade. The trend they represented however, remained dormant, not dead, 
and it was easy for them to reassert it in the more confused era that 
followed. They did so, not through their party organisation, which was 
morbid, but, essentially through raising their voice loud and clear.
In his wish to establish his claims to;;the constitutionalist spirit,
Sidqi went to lengths to extend his tolerance to the Watanist Party which 
officially constituted the Opposition in his Chamber. Hafez Ramadan, 
their leader, was invited by Sidqi to address Deputies from its rostrum 
in its earliest sessions. Abdul Hamid Sa*id, who was a leading spirit 
in the YMMA, was an active parliamentarian who notably contributed in 
debating political and cultural issues. For the first time since the 
inception of parliamentary life, the ' Opposition 1 was formally sanctioned 
and its views, though still contested, became legitimate. After the 
Watanists had been the object of persistent scorn and denigration under 
the Wafd, they were now meted respect and opportunity. In addition, 
they provided the Regime with the populist dimension it lacked and, at 
the same time, they became the recruits and mainsprings for political 
movements which were gathering momentum under the Regime.
Hassan Hosni is reported to have said this in an anniversary gathering 





Politically;, the Regime provided a model of government characterised 
by firmness, intolerant towards the excesses of extreme partisanship, 
upholding an example in national unity and emphatic on the relevance of 
economic priorities for national independence. In exposing the hypocrisy 
of politicians and the futility and meaninglessness of political parties in 
Egypt in its day, it contributed to the development of a national conscious­
ness hostile and distrustful of both. By implication, too, it impressed on 
the public the value of a leader, who was strong, wise and able, preaching 
morality reform, instead of politics, and exhorting all men of reason 
and integrity to judge modern institutions in terms of their own traditions 
and their historical contingency. From here it was only a short step to 
applauding the virtues of tradition and condemning the travesties of moderjiity. 
At the same time, a call for action, utility and thrift under the Regime 
combined with an appeal to landlords to return to the land, not simply as a 
means of economy.' but as an act of social virtue. From here too, it was but 
another short step to invoking the virtues of the country-side( al-'asala) 
and condemning the evils and immorality of the city. Indeed, one of the 
regular columnists in the Shafb Party organ, al-Faruqi, contributed, in 
1931 and 1932, front-page articles in this sense with a growing frequency.
In the more immediate context of the power struggle, it is possible 
to consider the situation under the Regime in.terms of a psychology of mass 
rejection and imposition. Rejection and protest however, were not confined 
to political issues, but, through the progressive politicisation of every aspect 
of national life, the political rejection of the Regime became symbolic of 
a deeper convulsion. As the Sidqi Regime eventually passed away, the political 
manifestations might have waned, but they left behind an ambivalent mood - 
partly articulate, partly critical^ but grossly-emotional - which constituted 
the substance of an irrational rejection. Similarly, if the politics of 
imposition eventually expired, they also left in their trail a conviction 
in their superiority to the politics of persuasion and compromise. They 
seemed more effective and more impressive.
While it lasted, the Regime fostered a deep mood of frustration 
through its policies and the themes it propounded as well as through its more 
general conduct. Dismissals and transfers from official posts, particularly 
in educational establishments throughout the country, accompanied the ‘modifi­
cation in the staffing cadre which was then in progress, and it was difficult
/
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in those times to isolate measures of economy and efficiency from political 
motives associated with such moves. Although in another category, the 
wholesale dismissal of workers from the government workshops during the 
electoral agitation in 1931 provided one of the more obvious examples of 
such ambiguity; its sequel lay in the series of political crimes that ensued. 
Elsewhere, the closing off of the civil service to new recruits in principle 
was among the surest inducements to mounting frustration. Nor should the 
effect of invoking the virtues of individual initiative and free enterprise 
in a field objectively closed to the purpose, be underestimated. Of a 
similar effect, was the exaltation of an ethos of interest and reason and 
its juxtaposition with a defamatory emotionalism which in practice, bred 
keen tensions and provoked an emotive challenge. The latter was aggravated 
by the exactions of the Administration which was, in its pursuits , among 
the effective catalysts to evolving trends.
The anti-foreign sentiment and opinion which was crystallising 
in the latter phases of the Regime were possibly among these prominent trends 
which the Regime unwittingly fostered. Here, the pursuit of certain policies 
seems to have been instrumental. The exemption from the general ban on rises 
and promotions granted foreigners in the Egyptian service, or those on 
government contracts, exacerbated the effect of denying the privilege to 
their Egyptian counterparts. Similarly, the settlement with the foreign 
credit and mortgage institutions which might ultimately have benefited the 
landowners and preserved intact the principle of national ownership, aroused 
much bitterness in the financially-stricken milieu in which it was concluded. 
The protectionist policies which were calculated to benefit the national 
economy and the producing sectors in general, had their negative effects in­
sofar as they actually benefited a particular sector, local industry, which
was dominated by foreigners ( many of whom were local jews) Concessionary
Companies embodied most visibly the notion of profiteering foreigners 
thriving on the misfortunes of the nation, so that by 1934, they constituted
the butt for the anti-foreign offensive in the press and in Parliament .
Nor can the effect of the administration of fiscal policies be left 
out of account in considering the catalystic implications of the Regime.
The promptitude and ruthlessness with which taxes were exacted might have 
preserved Egypt's financial reputation, but it exacerbated social tensions 
which were ultimately echoed in a nationalist strain. Constrained by the
i
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Capitulations and pressed for revenue, the Government could not afford 
to spare whatever opportunity it could seize. -IJhe effect of moratoriums 
and temporary expedients of relief did not prevent the hard-pressed pop­
ulation, which was generally compelled to meet its standing obligations,
.from being embittered at the spectacle of its local foreign counterpart, 
apparently, escaping scot-free from its share of contributions. Here, the 
agitation against the Mixed Courts in 1933-1934, which was another mani­
festation of the gathering anti-foreign movement, was directly sparked off 
by this notion when foreign judges claimed their right to receive their 
salaries at gold parity and a Mixed Court verdict justified their claims on 
legal grounds.
At this point, It might appear that the situation In which the 
Regime found itself, namely the Depression, was the overpowering factor 
which was In Itself, sui generis, producing Its radicalising impact. While 
the Depression in Egypt as elsewhere was certainly a powerful agent in the 
political setting, the effect of the administrative Tdiligence’ which the 
Regime maintained was Instrumental in crystallising frustrations. To 
illustrate the point, it was doubtful whether people went hungry at the 
time considering the abundance of basic food-stuffs and the amount of meat 
reported in butchers’ stocks. Admittedly, some account should be taken of 
discrepancies between the country and urban centres and of reported 
shortages and abuse of retail merchants. It was, however, precisely the 
scale of slaughters which was indicative of the measure of humiliation 
to which the hard-pressed fellah was driven as he was compelled to part 
with his cherished gamoussa to stave off his honour. More often than not, 
he was deprived of it against his will by the seizures and exactions of 
the Administration.
Indeed, the immediate effect of the Depression may have induced 
a state of wretphed resignation among the people. But it was possibly the 
measures taken to counter it which provoked a profound sense of grievance 
and resentment. The belief that God's will be done might be accepted , but 
the deliberate commissions of man against man can hardly be regarded with the 
same forebearance. It was here that the impact of the hostile politicisa­
tion under an unpopular government contributed to the whipping up of a 
consciousness of injustice which inspired the trend towards radicalism.
f
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The Regime contributed to the radicalisation of Egyptian politics 
In other ways. It harboured two conflicting currents which were simultan­
eously contending for supremacy: the one was a country-wide campaign towards 
political demobilisation, the other was an equally extensive, although, 
possibly, a more intense campaign to politicise. The first was conducted by 
the Administration and it coincided with a political code which preached 
pragmatism, while the other was a desperate reaction which emanated from the 
opponents of the Regime and it paved the ground for an ideological variant 
of politics. Here the tensions between the themes of interest and reason 
advocated by the Regime and the emotive strain which characterised the 
campaign of the Opposition converged in practice to produce an irrational 
cult. Both conflicting processes: political demobilisation and political 
mobilisation were leading away from secular politics, as the one was giving 
way to a pre-eminence of morality while the other was politicising the 
moral issues and , in the course of Its exercise, It was abandoning the 
political Idiom. The drift from politics to religion was underway.
Meanwhile, the prevailing state of political frustration was 
intensified by the breakdown in the political process as It had developed 
in the ’twenties. As the happy circulation of governments came to an abrupt 
and baffling end, before the unprecedented departure in British policy 
and the dispiriting prolongation of theSidqi Regime, a breach occurred 
in the 'rules ' of the political game. In considering the Anglo-Egyptian 
relationship it is possible to conceive its ’rules’ or principles both in 
an implicit convention drawing on historical precedent and political 
experience , and in a formal ’constitution', comprised in the 1922 uni­
lateral declaration of Independence. The one set conflicted with the other 
and, in practice, the Declaration had been vitiated from the outset. The 
belated act of its assertion under the policy of the second Labour Govern­
ment, and the pursuits of Sir Percy Loraine in particular, perplexed, 
confused and frustrated the political actors. It led them to overplay 
their parts in a pathetic attempt to invoke the political reality which 
they had once known. Sidqi’s own obdurate persistence in power defied 
the norms of political conduct and equally provoked the unparalleled scale 
of opposition which was embodied in the proclamation drawn up in May 1931 
by the abortive National Congress. The national press of the day aptly 
reflected the measure of this despair as, time and again, the political 
barometer was misread: signs, auguries, omens were all feverishly ferretted 
in a vain attempt to bring back familiar political patterns.
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This political frustration occurred at a moment of an acute and 
complex crisis which threatened the nation. People sensed a real threat 
to their livelihood in the face of the falling value of their crops and 
assets, and in the scale of administrative seizures, while the campaign 
against the missionaries, the concessionary companies and the gold payment 
of the public debt coupons, all reflected a dee]}, awareness of a threat to 
their identity and security. Moreover, with the emphasis under the Regime 
on such values as interest and reason, together with the progressive ration­
alisation of public life, and more generally,with the onslaught of a 
utilitarian era, a compulsive search for a sense of community became 
imminent.
In the absence of regular outlets in the political process at a 
moment of heightened crisis, an alternative structure and idiom had to be ? 
sought outside the realm of politics. As indigenous forms and patterns 
surfaced and a more familiar social and historical pattern came to assert 
itself, an element of continuity was maintained. The dominum politicum 
came to signify the religious reality, not as a theological or spiritual 
concern, but as a social and political and a culturally familiar locus, or 
point of reference. This provided the ’Egyptian dimension’ of the solution 
to a crisis situation. Here, it may be relevant to sound a more general 
note and question the compensatory function of politics within the 
social system. It would appear that when the struggles and tensions within 
society cannot be resolved at the political level, they transpire beyond it 
and at this point, inter-human relations come to assume an intra-human 
dimension. The Sidqi Regime in Egypt in 1930 unwittingly underlined the 
centrality of politics to the social system and brought to bear the 
importance of a modicum of political integration and consensus to a 
balanced society. Insofar as it presided over a critical era of transition,
it promoted certain trends and obstructed the development of others.
On balance, it sharpened political frustrations and, despite its rationally 
orientated statesmanship, it contributed to an evolving irrational cult.
As both the Sidqi Regime and the economic depression were 
challenging factors in the situation in Egypt on the eve of the thirties, 
it would be legitimate to assume that both were catalysts ,in their own way,
to evolving trends. Some of the possible implications of the Regime for
the course of Egyptian political evolution could thus perhaps be considered
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to advantage against some of those of the Depression. This exercise 
provides the sequel to the postulate on the creativity of politics which 
was posed at the outset of the enquiry.
The Depression itself adversely affected all the sectors of 
production. While agricultural interests were the immediate victims of the 
slump in world demand for agricultural products, other interests gravitated 
in the orbit of the cotton economy and the deflation of business was a 
natural reflex. Within the producing sectors, local industry stood to 
suffer equally, if not irrevocably, from the dumping policies of other 
countries at the time. Alternatively, the service classes, or the stable 
income groups, were likely to have maintained a comparative ascendancy.
This suggests that while the Depression may have generally led .> 
to a state of insecurity among major sectors of society, it left others 
relatively intact. The tendency to fall, back on traditional culture and 
values, which was one. aspect of a radicalism to the right, seems to have 
developed as a reaction to the stagnating influence among the conventional 
sectors of production. It was in the nature of a survival mechanism which 
was partly a counter to mass deflation and demoralisation and partly a device 
of protest. In substance, it constituted a revulsion against material 
values and a bid for a communal solidarity: a call for 'Gemeinschaft1 
rather than TGesellschaft1, which was duly expressed in a resurgence of 
religion. The leaders came from the comparatively secure sectors of the 
middle classes, particularly from the more articulate exponents of tradi­
tional values. The vitality of such organisations as the YMMA in the capital 
and similar cultural offshoots in the provinces, like the schools for 
learning the Qur’an, were cases in point. This tendency was more than a 
negative response to hold together a tottering society; its exponents 
saw in it a means of regeneration - and in this respect. It represented 
the contribution of an ascending leadership.
The role of the Sidqi Regime may be seen against this background. 
Generally, it provoked a challenge of a peculiar order which intensified 
the prevailing sense of insecurity. While it may have been instrumental 
in bringing about certain developments, its influence does not appear to 
have been uniform .or in total congruence with that of the Depression. In 
some cases it qoincided with it and reinforced emerging trends- In others 
it conflicted with it and deflected from such trends; while in a third set 
of cases it stimulated developments that were not necessarily a function of
S
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the Depression itself. Through some of its policies and its orientation, 
it enhanced the role of the administrators who were engaged in combating 
political adversaries and in communicating to the public the values of the 
Regime. Religion was encouraged as a corrective to the ’immorality’ of the 
politicians, and it is perhaps worth noting here, in this context, how the 
Administration lent a special prominence to religious festivals throughout 
the provinces and authorised lengthy moulids (anniversaries of holy men and
local saints). At critical moments, too, the Government resorted to the 
ulama■ of the Azhar in order to invoke a legitimacy which it never completely 
secured and to invite public cooperation when it needed it most. The first 
such appeal was made in July 19 30 to secure political tranquillity during 
the summer agitation which followed the advent of Sidqi,while another 
similar appeal was made in June 1932 in an effort to reinforce a rather ■'>
ineffective campaign to curb the cost of living.
Insofar as the Regime might have averted the total demoralisation 
of the agricultural classes, it attenuated some of the attendant effects of 
the Depression. Politically, it reinforced a traditional pattern of 
authority. While Parliament and the provincial councils admitted emergent 
mercantile interests, representation on them basically favoured the 
traditional structure of the country-side. The new credit and mortgage 
institutions were equally means for reinforcing a threatened social and 
economic structure in the country and they paved the way for the diminution 
of the role of the usurer and middle-man at a time when they might have 
reasonably been expected to thrive. Conversely, the consolidation of an 
emergent urban middle-class or bourgeoisie, among the trading and manu­
facturing sectors was, conceivably, the result of the deliberate protec­
tionist pursuits of the Regime. At a moment of general slump, prosperity 
was constructively channelled and not left solely to profiteers.
The effect of the Regime on politicians was ambigious. It 
detracted from their worth and strove to decimate their influence, yet, 
indirectly, It enhanced their opportunity for action. At the same time, 
in view of the abstention of the Wafdists, who constituted the nationalist 
secular politicians, fresh recruits were sought in the fringes of society. 
These were given the opportunity to assume a political role through the 
formationsof the Sha*b Party, while the crackdown on the influence of the 
professional politicians, left the field open for more traditional elements
f
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"to emerge in the country-side. Moreover, in the circumstances of the day-, 
the same policies which fed the anti-foreign current paved the way for 
the rising strata of neo-traditional leaders to take the place of the 
discredited politicians. On a slightly different, though complementary, 
note the Regime stimulated the growing youth cult observable in the early 
thirties, through the ideals and example of its leadership.
Apart from the trend towards a radical variant of politics, the 
’thirties were also notable in Egypt for an evolving economic nationalism. 
Here it may be questioned whether the Depression in itself did anything 
to reveal the deformities of the Egyptian economy.and to infuse a corres­
ponding zeal to rectify it. Rather, it was the interpretation given the 
event and the imputation of its consequences to an ’unbalanced’ economy 
which drove home to the public its implications. By expounding its ideals 
and taking an active initiative to realise them, the Regime provided the 
tangible consciousness of the Depression. On the other hand, the Regime 
challenged its opponents to adopt new ways which were eventually reflected 
in their conduct of the power struggle and which added an emotive dimension 
to that developing economic consciousness. The theme of economic 
nationalism could be regarded as the direct product of the Sidqi Regime: 
the joint offspring of the ’idea’ (and practice) of its leadership and the 
reaction it evoked among the opposition to the Regime.
The Sidqi Regime constituted a radical attempt to resolve the 
Egyptian national question by seeking to lay foundations for viable 
national institutions. Significantly, this attempt was conducted within 
the framework of a conventional western liberalism. So, the Regime was 
neither a protest against that philosophy nor a revulsion from its ways.
On the contrary, it presented an authentic endeavour to accomodate the 
fundamental tenets of this philosophy to the exigencies of the Egyptian 
situation.
” Liberalism ... cannot afford to be conservative in its 
methods and instruments. It has to move with the times and 
alter its strategy and tactics to meet the demands of changed 
conditions. The sentimental casualness of 19th century 
liberalism is no good in this harder and more exacting age.”*
It was this ” sentimental casualness ” which the Sidqi Regime denounced.
* H.G.Wells, After Democracy( 1932) p.24; Sidqi generally believed that 
sentimentalism, ”une tendresse irreflechie" Would not serve the interests of 
Egypt. Cf. opening of his address to an audience of lawyers ‘pn 26.3.1926.
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Its ideal was a strong government which could reconcile the requirements 
of representation and deliberation with those of action and effectiveness.
It sought it in consolidating the powers of the executive at the nucleus of 
a parliamentary form of government which it set out to preserve. Likewise, 
in asserting the principle of government intervention in the economy while, 
at the same time acknowledging the legitimacy of the private sector and 
upholding its primacy, it sought the means by which it could coordinate 
the interests of the State and those of the individual. The institutions 
which emerged at the time consecrated the fragile boundaries between the 
two kinds of interests to the advantage of the latter.
This stress on the liberal frame of reference of the Regime is 
significant in view of the tendency to generalise on the reaction against 
liberalism in the ’thirties. Viewed in the perspective of later develop-  ^
ments, this stress acquires a further relevance.
Here, a somewhat 'crude analogy between the Sidqi Regime in 1930 
and the Egyptian Officer junta in 1952 may be interesting. Both had strong 
administrative priorities and an executive penchant, both reacted to party 
politics and deprecated the spirit of partisanship; on a more positive 
scale, their common ethos included the slogans of action, order and unity. 
Under both regimes, the nationalist question assumed a more concrete form, 
as the economic aspect was emphasised in the one and the social in the other. 
Alternatively, both orders were variants of a reaction to liberal democracy 
and parliamentary institutions as they had been practised in Egypt in 
preceding years. While Sidqi however, was at pains to assert his funda­
mental constitutionalism and while his retractions from the 1923 Constit­
ution were designed to give a new lease of life to parliamentary govern­
ment in Egypt, the idiom in 1952 differed. The key concept shifted away 
from ’constitutionalism’ and ’parliamentary government’ to that of 
’democracy’ which acquired social connotations. This social dimension 
which was only at its inception in 1930, when the Sidqi Regime itself 
effectively contributed to its growth, had by 1952 crystallised. The 
immediate implication of shifting paradigms lay in the solutions sought 
for questions of internal development. Where Sidqi advocated economic 
liberalism, the army junta opted for an alternative route. The social 
background of the leadership concerned and the respective historical 
experience behind each governed these options.
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Viewed in the spectrum of the contemporary nationalist movement s 
it may be tentatively suggested that the Sidqi Regime provides the missing 
link between 1919 and 1952. If a historical continuity is sought in the 
nationalist movement, the domination of the political dimension may be found 
in the 1919 uprising and its immediate sequel; that of the economic dimen­
sion may be found in the Sidqi Regime and its aftermath; while, in 1952, 
it was the social dimension which came to the fore. It took a span of over 
three decades for the different aspects of the Egyptian Question to mature 
and crystallise. Conversely, the generation which presided over the 
fortunes of the country on the eve of 1919 was a generation of ’elders’ 
which belonged to a different era - it was rooted In the 'nine'teenth century.
The paternalistic, charismatic leadership of Zaghlul had its enigmatic
protrusions which combined elements of both worlds: that of a society of -j 
tradition and elders and that of the rising society of the masses. The 
generation which came to lead the nationalist movement in 1952 was an 
offspring of the youth cult which had been nurtured in the 'thirties.
Between 1919 and 1952 there was a generation gap which was reflected in 
the crisis of leadership and in the dearth of political figures of high 
calibre.
Sidqi protruded on the political setting without belonging to 
either world. Ostensibly, he grew up with the generation of elders and 
patricians, but at some early stage, he by-passed, or outgrew them, and 
became something of an anachronism in a dragging age. Out of tune with 
the times, he was rejected by one set and suspected by the other. These 
tensions were reflected In his predicament as a frustrated leader.
If the Sidqi Regime presided over an era of transition, it is 
perhaps Ironic that it should have been presided over by a statesman who 
was himself an embodiment of ■ transition. This attribute was consecrated 
in his solitary stance on the Egyptian political stage - not merely in






- Verbal proceedings of the sittings of the Commission(1901~1909)
- Verbal proceedings of the sittings of the Delegation (1903 - 1909)
Department of Overseas Trade ( England)
- Reports on Economic and Commercial Conditions in Egypt for 
1929, 19311933 and 1935
Egyptian Government
Report on the modifications to be introduced in the 1923 Constit­
ution and the Electoral Law. Cairo, 1930
Speeches from the Throne (French) 1930, 1931 (June & December), 
1932 and 1933.
- Taqrir Lajnat al-Tijara w fal-Sinaca - Cairo, 1925
( 2nd impression of the Report of the Commission for Trade and 
Industry, first submitted in 1917)
Department of Trade and Industry (Cairo)
- Sahifat al-Tijara w tal-Sinaca ( 1922- 1940)
monthly bulletin of economic and commercial events (esp. between 
1930 and 1935); statistics - economic legislation: memoranda 
and other documents - Studies by members of the Department.
Federation of Egyptian Industries
- L'Egypte Industrielle (1924 - 1940)
Annual Reports of the Federation esp. between 1929 & 1935; 
Chronicle of activity of the Federation and affiliates from 1932. 
Editorials ; Studies and articles.
Parliamentary Debates (Cairo)
- Madabit Majlis al-Nuwwab ( esp. 1926-1928; 1930; 1931-1934 )
- Madabit Majlis al-Shuyukh ( 1931 - 1933 )
Parliamentary Debates (London)
Official Report, Fifth Series, Parliamentary Debates, Commons.
( for years 1929/30 - 1931/32)
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IsmaCil Sidqi Pasha
-  Mudhakkirati. Cairo 1950 -.
- Elections Manifesto published in the Ahram on 7th December,1923
- Political and Public addresses between 1930 and 1935
Addresses in the annual General Assembly of the Federation of 
Egyptian Industries for 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933(letter) and 1938
- Miscellaneous contributions outside the period 1930-35, notably:
"Le Regime fiscal egyptien et les Capitulations" - ( talk) rep. in 
L TEgypte Contemporaine, Feb -March, 1926 pp. 81-92
" Mustaqbal Misr. al-Sinaciya" (article) - in al-Siyasa al-TIsbou°iya, 
29.3. 1929
" La Question Industrielle dans ses Rapports avec le Standard de 
Vie des Classes Pauvres." Talk given at the Rotary Club,
Alexandria in April, 194-5
"L’Essor de L'Industrie Egyptienne" Talk given at the Royal 
Geographical Society on 4-th January 194-0
" La Politique Industrie^lle d'apres Guerre" Talk given at the 




Foreign Office archives and Cabinet Papers with emphasis on the 
former, which comprise a range of sources, the following of which 
were the most important for the study:
a. The general correspondence between the Residency and the 
the Foreign Office between 1920 & 1938 generally with stress on
certain periods like 1922/1923 (exchanges between Lord Allenby and 
and Lord Curzon); 1925; 1930 -1936 - Some of the correspondence
consulted outside this period has been relevant eg. 1917/18/19 & 
1942)
b. Foreign Office Memoranda on the Egyptian Situation or on 
Anglo-Egyptian relations between 1930 & 1936
c. The Annual Reports of the High Commissioner ( 1930-1935; 1925 ^ 
1922 &. 1921) and Personality Lists .
d. Reports by Alexander Keown-Boyd, Director of the European 
Department, Ministry of Interior (Cairo) on the Administration 
and the 1931' Elections -
e. Reports by the Judicial Adviser, Judge G.A. W. Booth on 
the Constitution and legislation under the Regime generally.; 
Equivalent reports by the Financial Adviser, FP Watson ( or 
Hugh Jones) on the Budget -on fiscal legislation & 'conversations 
with Sidqi.
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f. Correspondence from the Commercial Secretary R.M. Turner 
( & ,h.B. Larkins) to the Department of Overseas Trade.
g. Memoranda on the Egyptian Press (weekly) and Reports on 
the situation in the Provinces - prepared in the Chancery, 
esp. contributions from the Oriental Secretaries, W. Smart 
and L. Grafftey-Smith-
h. Consular Reports on the economic and political situation 
in the Provinces for 1931, 1932 and 1933 ( This practice of 
consuls reporting on the situation in their localities was only 
revived in late 1931 on the recommendation of the Egyptian Dept.
The reports are summarised and integrated in memoranda form; 
some of the original reports survive in the Residency Archives.)
i. The Residency Archives (FO 141) were consulted for odd years 
between 1919 and 1934. Their relevance in the later period
lie in the /’Minutes they contain and the exchanges between the 
High Commissioner, Sir Percy Loraine and his staff.
j. The Cabinet Minutes and Conclusions as well as Cabinet 
memoranda for the period under review ( 1930 - 1935 ) were of 
restricted value in this study/
2. Egyptian Archives.
a. Abdin Palace Archives.
i. A miscellaneous collection of intelligence reports on the 
political activities of local politicians, among other topics of 
interest to the King between 1925 and 1935 - (odd and discontinued)
ii. Collections of press cuttings, both arabic and foreign.
(Invaluable guide due to balance, comprehensiveness and accessibility)
b. Dar al-Mahfuzat, the Citadel.
Sidqi’s personal files and those belonging to other senior officials 
and Ministers. These are officially preserved records with details 
of qualifications, promotions, transfers, awards, etc...
c. Dar ul-Qada1 al-°ali. (Muse^ e Juridique)
Political crime cases: notably, the Bombs Case 1931/32 and the 
abortive assassination attempt against IsmaCil Sidqi Pasha, 1932.
( A well conpiled synopsis of these cases is found in the Centre of 
Contemporary Egyptian History and Documentation, while the original 
files have recently been reproduced on micro-film by the Council 





d. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers
i. Mahadir Majlis al-Wuzara' (1930 - 1933 & 1946)
( Minutes and Resolutions inc. some memoranda)
ii. Official files containing background and details on subjects 
• brought before the Council of Ministers.
c . »iii. The Private Papers of Isma ii Sidqi during both periods of 
his premiership (esp. for 1932 &1933) (2 files),
iv. A miscellaneous collection of suspended newspapers and 
periodicals. ( mostly in decrepitude)
3. Private Papers and Memoirs.
a. The Private Papers of Mr. Arthur Henderson.(PRO)
b. The Private Papers of Sir John Simon. (PRO)
c. The Malta Memoirs. (March - April,1919) *•
Reflections and observations recorded by Sidqi during internment.
d. The Waterfield Papers.
Notes made by Gordon Waterfield on the Loraine Papers when 
preparing his biography of Sir Percy Loraine. St. Antony’s, 
Oxford.
Newspapers and Periodicals.
al-Ahram ( 1919; 1921/22; 1930-1935) 
al-Balagh ( 1931, 1932, 1934)
L’Egypte Contemporaine :'1920 - .
Le Journal Officiel du Gouvernement Egyptien (1930 - 1934)
Majallat Ghurfat Tijarat al-Qahira (1936)
Majallat al-Iqtisad w ’al-Qanun (1930 - 1935 )
Majallat al-Iqtisad w Tal-mohasaba ( 1951 - 1954) (biographies)
Misr (1931 esp )
al-Muq attain ( 1930, 1931)
al- Mussawar (1948)
Oriente Moderno( Rome, 1930 - 1938 generally) invaluable for checking and 
perspectives)
,Rose al Yusuf ( weekly: 19 30 -1933) ( odd issues appearing under different
names during the period)
Rose al-Yusuf ( daily : 1935)
al-Sarih ( weekly, 1932, 1933)
al- ShaCb ( December 1930 - 1935)
Survey of International Affairs. ( kllA) ( 1929 - 1933) 
al-TaliCa ( 1965- )
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